Accountability is a principal mechanism for ensuring conformity to standards of action. In a free and democratic society, those exercising substantial power and discretionary authority must be answerable for all activities assigned or entrusted to them - in essence, for all activities for which they are responsible.

In a properly functioning system or organization, there should be accountability for one's actions, regardless of whether those actions are properly executed and lead to a successful result, or are improperly carried out and produce injurious consequences. An accountable official cannot shelter behind the actions of a subordinate, and an accountable official is always answerable to superiors.

No matter how an organization is structured, those at the apex of the organization are accountable for the actions and decisions of those within the chain of authority subordinate to them. Within a properly linked chain of authority, accountability does not become attenuated the further one is removed from the source of activity. When a subordinate fails, that failure is shouldered by all who are responsible and exercise requisite authority -subordinate, superior, and superior to the superior. Accountability in its most pervasive and all-encompassing sense inevitably resides with the chief executive officer of the organization or institution.

The term 'responsibility' is not synonymous with accountability. One who is authorized to act or who exercises authority is 'responsible'. However, responsible officials are also held to account. An individual who exercises power while acting in the discharge of official functions is responsible for the proper exercise of the power or duties assigned. A person exercising supervisory authority is responsible, and hence accountable, for the manner in which that authority has been exercised.

A person who delegates authority is also responsible, and hence accountable, not for the form of direct supervision that a supervisor is expected to exercise but, rather, for control over the delegate and, ultimately, for the actual acts performed by the delegate. The act of delegation to another does not relieve the responsible official of the duty to account. While one can delegate the authority to act, one cannot thereby delegate one's assigned responsibility in relation to the proper performance of such acts.

Where a superior delegates the authority to act to a subordinate, the superior remains responsible: first, for the acts performed by the delegate; second, for the appropriateness of the choice of delegate; third, with regard to the propriety of the delegation; and, finally, for the control of the acts of the subordinate.

Even if the superior official is successful in demonstrating appropriate, prudent, diligent personal behaviour, the superior remains responsible for the errors and misdeeds of the subordinate. However, in such circumstances, when assessing the appropriate response to the actions of the superior whose subordinate or delegate has erred or has been guilty of misconduct, the authorities may be justified in selecting a penaltv or sanction of lower order or no penalty or sanction whatsoever.

It is the responsibility of those who exercise supervisory authority, or who have delegated the authority to act to others, to know what is transpiring within the area of their assigned authority. Even if subordinates whose duty it is to inform their superior of all relevant facts, circumstances, and developments fail to fulfil their obligations, this cannot absolve their superior of responsibility for what has transpired.

Where a superior contends that he or she was never informed, or lacked requisite knowledge with regard to facts or circumstances affecting the proper discharge of organizational responsibilities, it will be relevant to understand what processes and methods were in place to ensure the adequate provision of information. Also, it will be of interest to assess to what extent the information in question was notorious or commonly held and whether the result that occurred could reasonably have been expected or foreseen. Moreover, how the managerial official responded on first discovering the shortfall in information will often be of import.

To this point we have concentrated on defining terms and establishing guiding principles. We now move to a consideration and analysis of the more practical issues at hand that raise accountability concerns.

The Inquiry found, first of all, that the standards discussed above have not been well guarded recently in the Canadian military. The hierarchy of authority in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), and especially among the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Deputy Minister (DM), and the Judge Advocate General, has become blurred and distorted. Authority in the Canadian Forces is not well defined by leaders, nor is it clearly obvious in organization or in the actions and decisions of military leaders in the chain of command. Moreover, we found that governments have not carefully exercised their duty to oversee the armed forces and the Department of National Defence in such a way as to ensure that both function under the strict control of Parliament.

The most significant of the deficiencies we noted that bear on accountability are as follows:

1. Official reporting and record-keeping requirements, policies, and practices throughout DND and the Canadian Forces are inconsistent, sometimes ineffective, and open to abuse. We have seen that, in some cases (for example, Daily Executive Meetings records and minutes), as publicity regarding Somalia matters increased, records were deliberately obscured or not kept at all, in order to avoid later examination of views expressed and decisions made.
2. In Chapter 39, describing the document disclosure phase of our hearings, we demonstrate the existence of an unacceptable hostility toward the goals and requirements of access to information legislation, an integral aspect of public accountability. There appears to be more concern at higher levels to manage the agenda and control the flow of information than to confront and deal forthrightly with problems and issues.
3. The specific duties and responsibilities inherent in many ranks, positions, and functions within NDHQ are poorly defined and understood. Further, the relationship between officers and officials in NDHQ and commanders of commands as well as officers commanding operational formations in Canada and overseas is, at best, ambiguous and uncertain.
4. The nature and extent of the duties and responsibilities of superiors to monitor and supervise are unclear, poorly understood, or subject to unacceptable personal discretion. Justification for failure to monitor and supervise seems to be limited to the assertion that the superior trusted the person assigned the task to carry it out properly.
5. The current mechanisms of internal audit and program review, which are the responsibilities of the Chief of Review Services (CRS), are shrouded in secrecy. Reports issued need not be publicized, and their fate can be determined at the discretion of the Chief of the Defence Staff or the Deputy Minister to whom the CRS reports. The CDS or the DM, as the case may be, retains unfettered discretion as to follow-up and as to whether there is to be outside scrutiny of a report. The CRS has no authority to initiate investigations. No mechanism exists for follow-up or independent assessment of CRS reports or suggestions for change.
6. A disturbing situation seems to exist with respect to after-action reports and internally commissioned studies. These reports and studies can serve an accountability purpose once produced, provided they are considered seriously and their recommendations are properly monitored and followed up. While requirements to produce evaluations and after-action reports are clear in most cases, no rigorous and routine mechanism exists for effective consideration and follow-up. We have numerous examples of the same problems being identified repeatedly and nothing being done about them and of recommendations addressing and suggesting remedies for problems being ignored. Their fate seems to be determined by the absolute discretion of officials in the upper echelons, who can, and often do, reject suggestions for change without discussion, explanation, or the possibility of review or outside assessment.
7. Mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of the Department of National Defence and military activities are ineffective. A 1994 examination by a joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons was unanimous in support of the view that there is a need to strengthen the role of Parliament in defence matters. We do not envision Parliament playing an extraordinary supervisory role with regard to military conduct, but clearly, it can and should do more. Parliament is particularly effective in promoting accountability when it receives, examines and publicizes reports from bodies with a responsibility to report to Parliament (as would be the case, for example, with the responsibilities that we propose entrusting to an inspector general).
8. We identify numerous deficiencies in the operation of more indirect accountability mechanisms, such as courts martial and summary trials, Military Police investigations and reports and the charging process, personnel evaluations, mechanisms for instilling and enforcing discipline and investigating and remedying disciplinary problems and lapses, training evaluations, declarations of operational readiness, and so on. These are the subject of close examination in several chapters of this report.
9. Leadership in matters of accountability and an accountability ethic or ethos have been found seriously wanting in the upper military, bureaucratic, and political echelons. Aside from the platitudes that have now found their way into codes of ethics and the cursory treatment in some of the material tabled by the Minister of National Defence on March 25,1997, the impulse to promote accountability as a desirable value or to examine seriously or improve existing accountability mechanisms in all three areas has been meagre.
10. There also appears to be little or no interest in creating or developing mechanisms to promote and encourage accurate and timely reporting to specified authorities, by all ranks and those in the defence bureaucracy, of deficiencies and problems, and then to establish or follow clear processes and procedures to investigate and follow up on those reports.