Our terms of reference required us to examine the suitability of the Canadian Airborne Regiment for the Somalia mission. Was it adequately manned, organized, equipped, and trained for that particular mission?

In this regard, the inherent suitability of the CAR is an issue for consideration. But to suggest that a unit possesses inherent suitability does not necessarily mean that a unit is in all respects suitable for every mission. It is at this point that considerations of mission-specific suitability come into play.

Putting aside these theoretical considerations, we found that even before a restructuring of the CAR in 1991-92, there were recognized deficiencies in the organization and leadership of the Regiment. These differences were exacerbated by the reorganization, which failed to eliminate the independence of the Regiment's three commandos. Francophones and Anglophones generally manned seperate commandos and did not work together; the relationship between 1 Commando and 2 Commando in particular went beyond mere rivalry, spilling over at times into hostility. Cumulatively, the result was a lack of regimental cohesion at the most basic level.

Furthermore, the downsizing that took place during the 1992 restructuring of the CAR occurred without first determining the appropriate 'concept of employment' for the Regiment. What emerged was poorly conceived. As with the move of the CAR to CFB Petawawa in 1977, the Regiment's downsizing in 1992 occurred without sufficient consideration being given to the appropriate mission, roles, and tasks of the CAR.

In addition, there was a deterioration in the quality of personnel assigned to the CAR. This was exacerbated when the Regiment was downsized to a battalion-size formation. There were personnel shortages in several critical areas, to the point that the CAR was not properly manned at the time of the Somalia mission.

There were also significant problems at leadership levels that undermined the cohesion of the CAR, to the point where the Regiment ceased to operate effectively. Lack of discipline was one of the reasons the CAR failed to reach a workable level of cohesion. There was also a lack of cohesion among the officers and non-commissioned members of the CAR. The failure to separate master corporals from the rest of the troops in barracks weakened the authority of non-commissioned officers. Furthermore, officer-NCO cohesion within the CAR was weak. Conflict and mistrust existed among several key officers and NCOs, and this affected the proper functioning of the chain of command.

There was a substantial turnover of personnel within the Canadian Airborne Regiment during the active posting season in the summer of 1992. This rate of changeover was not unique to the Regiment but was nonetheless excessive and contributed further to lowering the cohesion of the unit during the period of preparation for Operation Deliverance.

In short, although the CAR was inherently suitable in theory for the mission to Somalia, in fact its actual state of leadership, discipline, and unit cohesion rendered it unfit for any operation in the fall of 1992. From a mission-specific perspective, the CAR was improperly prepared and inadequately trained for its mission, and by any reasonable standard, was not operationally ready for deployment to Somalia.