To our surprise, we found that in 1992 there was no formalized or standardized training system for peace operations, despite almost 40 years of intensive Canadian participation in international peace operations. No comprehensive training policy, based on changing requirements, had been developed, and there was an absence of doctrine, standards, and performance evaluation mechanisms respecting the training of units deploying on peace operations. This situation existed even though deficiencies in training policy, direction, and management had been clearly identified in internal CF reviews and staff papers well before 1992.

In preparing its forces for peace support missions, the CF relied almost exclusively on general purpose combat training, supplemented by mission-specific training during the pre-deployment phase. This traditional approach to training was not adequate to provide military personnel with either a full range of skills or the appropriate orientation necessary to meet the diverse and complex challenges presented in post-Cold War peace support missions. There was a failure to incorporate the required generic peacekeeping training, both in the individual training system and in the regular operational training schedule.

To fulfil its tasking as the UN standby unit, the CAR should have at all times maintained a proficiency in both general purpose combat skills and generic peacekeeping skills (involving, for example, the nature of UN operations and the role of the peacekeeper, conflict resolution and negotiation, cross-cultural relations, restraint in application of force, and standard UN operations). However, the CAR received little or no ongoing generic peacekeeping training to prepare it for UN operations, despite having been designated for many years as the UN standby unit. This typified the traditional DND/CF dictum that general purpose combat training provides not only the best, but also a sufficient basis for preparing for peacekeeping missions.

The absence of CF peacekeeping training doctrine, together with a lack of guidelines for the development of training plans for UN deployments or a standard package of precedents and lessons learned from previous missions, placed an undue burden on the CAR's junior staff in the initial stages of designing a training plan for Operation Cordon. Such an absence represents a clear and inexcusable failure by the military leadership, particularly at the senior levels, given Canada's decades of involvement in peacekeeping missions. The CAR staff went to great lengths to attempt to compensate for this lack of doctrine, guidelines, and materials.

The training plan for Operation Cordon did not adequately provide for sufficient and appropriate training in relation to several non-combat skills that are essential for peacekeeping, including the nature of UN peacekeeping and the role of the peacekeeper; the Law of Armed Conflict, including arrest and detention procedures; training in use of force policies, including mission-specific rules of engagement; conflict resolution and negotiation skills development; inter-cultural relations and the culture, history and politics of the environment; and psychological preparation and stress management. The failure of the training plan to provide adequately for these non-combat skills arose primarily from the lack of any doctrine recognizing the need for such training, and the lack of supporting training materials and standards.

Most of the CAR's training for Operation Cordon was conducted prior to October 18, 1992. Although most categories of training outlined in the training plans for September and October were covered, the lack of training objectives, standards, and evaluation criteria made it difficult for anyone involved to assess the level to which training had been conducted or the proficiency levels achieved. In addition, there were significant shortcomings due to lack of equipment and other training resources.

Leaders at all levels of the chain of command, with the notable exception of the Brigade Commander during the initial stages, failed to provide adequate supervision of the training preparations undertaken by the CAR for Operation Cordon.

Despite an apparent sensitivity to the need to establish an appropriate tone and attitude for training preparations and the mission, the CAR did not succeed in ensuring that these were in fact conveyed to, and adopted by, personnel at all levels within the unit. At least some components within the CAR remained overly aggressive in their conduct and bearing during training exercises. Eleventh-hour attempts to instil an orientation appropriate for peace support missions cannot counterbalance years of combat-oriented socialization.

There was confusion between the brigade and regimental levels as to the purpose of Exercise Stalwart Providence, the CAR training exercise conducted in the fall of 1992. Various perceptions of its purpose existed during the planning stages: some saw it as simply a training exercise, others believed it was an exercise to test the cohesiveness of the subunits, and still others saw it as an exercise to confirm the operational readiness of the CAR as a whole. It is our view that, given the compressed time frame, the CO should have been left to run a regimental exercise, rather than having been rushed into a brigade-level test of operational readiness.

With such a short period between warning and deployment, there was virtually no time to conduct preparatory training for Operation Deliverance. There is no evidence to suggest that any consideration was given to training requirements for the new mission by the officials responsible for the decision to commit Canadian troops for the new mission, nor is there any evidence of training guidance or direction being provided to the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group by higher levels of command. This represents a significant failure.

No significant training was conducted by the CARBG after the mission changed from Operation Cordon (a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter) to Operation Deliverance (a peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII). Various prerequisites for the proper planning and conduct of training - such as a clear mission, theatre-specific intelligence, mission-specific rules of engagement, training equipment and vehicles, and sufficient time to train - were not available. There was no opportunity for the newly constituted battle group to train together. The CARBG deployed to Somalia, on a potentially dangerous mission, without adequate training and without the battle group functioning as a cohesive whole. It was a matter of good fortune that they were not challenged by a serious show of force on their arrival in theatre: the results could have been tragic.

Our overall conclusion is that professional soldiers wearing the flag of Canada on their uniforms were sent to Somalia not properly prepared for their mission. They were unprepared, in good part, because of key deficiencies in their training. The mission called for troops who were well led, highly disciplined, and able to respond flexibly to a range of tasks that demanded patience, understanding, and sensitivity to the plight of the Somali people. Instead they arrived in the desert trained and mentally conditioned to fight.

In seeking remedies for the future, we urge the Canadian Forces to acknowledge the central role that generic peacekeeping and mission-specific training must play in mounting peace operations. Our recommendations in this regard are summarized at the conclusion of this summary.