The phrase 'Rules of Engagement' (ROE) refers to the directions guiding the application of armed force by soldiers within a theatre of operations. The ROE perform two fundamentally important tasks for Canadian Forces members undertaking international miss ions. First, they define the degree and manner of the force to which soldiers may resort. Second, they delineate the circumstances and limitations surrounding the application of that force. They are tantamount to orders.

The record shows that CF members serving in Somalia fired weapons and caused the loss of Somali lives in several incidents. Individually and collectively, these incidents raise critical questions surrounding the ROE governing CF members in Somalia. Did the ROE anticipate fully the range of situations where the application of force would be possible? Were the ROE clearly drafted? Was information about the ROE passed adequately along the chain of command? Were CF members properly trained in the ROE?

In answering these questions, we come back again to failures noted elsewhere in our report: lack of clarity surrounding the mission in Somalia; inadequate time to prepare, giving rise to hasty, ill-conceived measures; a chain of command that did not com municate the ROE clearly to its soldiers; deficient training in the ROE generally; lack of training in the mission-specific ROE before deployment and in theatre; and indiscipline by CF members in observing the ROE.

More specifically, we find that the ROE reached Canadian soldiers in a piecemeal, slow, and haphazard manner. Multiple, inconsistent versions of the soldier's card explaining the ROE coexisted in theatre. Moreover, the inter-pretation of the ROE was chang ed substantially during operations. The ROE themselves were substantively weak and incomplete. They failed, among other things, to address the crucial distinction between a "hostile act" and "hostile intent."

The interpretation and application of the ROE created considerable confusion among the troops. The highly questionable interpretations offered by commanders added to the confusion, as did the failure to consider adequately the issue of the possible non- application of the ROE to simple thievery and to advise the soldiers accordingly.

The training conducted in the ROE in the pre-deployment and the in-theatre phases alike was inadequate and substandard. Indeed, our soldiers were poorly trained in the ROE, having been confused, misled, and largely abandoned on this crucial issue by their senior leaders. These realities contributed directly to serious practical difficulties in applying the ROE while Canadian operations in Somalia were continuing, notably with regard to the March 4th incident.

Our recommendations are intended to clarify the development of training for, and application of, rules of engagement and to lend greater certainty to them.