Volume 3 analyzes how planning for the Somalia mission generally was conducted by officers and DND officials during 1991-93. It provides a thoroughly documented case study of how Canada planned and committed Canadian Forces to an international operation. Our recommendations suggest how Canada might plan better for peace support operations in the future.

On the whole, regarding the Somalia mission, we found that reckless haste and enthusiasm for high-risk, high-profile action undermined due process and rational decision making at the most senior levels. Doctrine, proven military processes, guidelines, and formal policy were systematically disregarded. What guidelines and checklists that did exist were treated with little respect. The deployment therefore began with an uncertain mission, unknown tasks, ad hoc command arrangements, an unconsolidated relationship to U.S. command, and unclear rules of engagement. An international commitment initially conceived in the Canadian tradition of peacekeeping was hastily reshaped into an ill-considered military operation for which the CF and the troops it sent had little preparation.