The shooting that occurred on the night of March 4, 1993, was a major turning point in the deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. It resulted in the death of one Somali national and the wounding of another and may possibly have prepared the way for the tragedies of March 16th. These events, in turn, could not be contained and resulted in public ignominy for the Canadian Forces, leading eventually to this Inquiry.

The shooting on March 4th was in itself the culmination of a dubious interpretation of the Rules of Engagement to the effect that Canadian soldiers could shoot at fleeing thieves or infiltrators under certain circumstances.

The planning and execution of the mission by the CARBG's Reconnaissance Platoon that night caused serious concern among some other members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group. Immediately after the shooting, Major Armstrong, the medical officer who examined the body of Mr. Aruush, the Somali who died in the incident, concluded that he had been "dispatched" and alerted the Commanding Officer. In the days following, Major Jewer, the chief medical officer, and Captain Potvin, the Padre, met with the Commanding Officer to express similar concerns. Many suspected that the two Somalis had been deceived, trapped, and shot, in violation of the ROE. The authorities at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa immediately expressed concern that the two men had been shot in the back while running away from the Canadian compounds and that excessive force might have been used.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the entire incident was the subject of a cursory Summary Investigation agreed to by the Commanding Officer, who designated a captain in his chain of command to report on the incident. In other words, the Commanding Officer investigated his own operational actions and decisions.

The Summary Investigation report concluded that the shooting was within the ROE, absolved the Reconnaissance Platoon of any criminal responsibility, and praised its work. This may have led other troops to believe that all such incidents would be investigated in the same spirit. In fact, in January and February there had been a number of similar shootings at fleeing Somalis. There had also been known instances of improper handling of prisoners, including the taking of trophy-style photographs. All of these incidents had gone unpunished, as did alleged beatings on the nights of March 14th and 15th, thus possibly laying the groundwork for the brutal torture and killing of a Somali teenager while in detention in the Canadian compound on March 16th.

Chapter 38 provides an exhaustive examination of the events of March 4th, the allegations subsequently made, the deficiencies of the summary investigation, and the cover-up that ensued.

While this section makes specific findings, we reached one general conclusion: the response of the chain of command to the administrative, operational, and disciplinary problems manifested in the March 4th operation was weak, untimely, inadequate, self-serving, unjustifiable, and unbecoming the military leadership that our soldiers deserve and the Canadian public expects. Integrity and courage were subordinated to personal and institutional self-interest. It is our belief, based on the evidence adduced before us, that the failure of leadership immediately to address and remedy the problems revealed by the March 4th incident may have made possible the torture death of a Somali youth 12 days later.