For a thorough discussion of the overall approach taken by the Inquiry, its terms of reference, proceedings, methodology, rules of procedure, rulings, and formal statements, we direct the reader to the Introduction to this report (Volume 1, Chapter 1).

The scope of any public inquiry is determined by its terms of reference. Ours were detailed and complex and were divided into two parts. The first contained a broad opening paragraph charging us to inquire into and report generally on the chain of command system, leadership, discipline, operations, actions, and decisions of the Canadian Forces, and on the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence in respect of the Somalia operation. The terms of reference stated clearly that our investigation was not limited in scope to the details and issues set forth in paragraphs that followed.

The second part of the terms of reference required us to look at specific matters relating to the pre-deployment, in-theatre, and post-theatre phases of the Somalia operation. Specific pre-deployment issues (before January 10, 1993) included the suitability of, and state of discipline within, the Canadian Airborne Regiment; and the operational readiness of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group prior to deployment for its missions and tasks. In-theatre issues (January 10, 1993 to June 10, 1993) included the suitability and composition of Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS) for its mission and tasks; the extent, if any, to which cultural differences affected the conduct of operations; the attitude of rank levels toward the lawful conduct of operations; and the manner in which the CJFS conducted its mission and tasks and responded to the operational, disciplinary, and administrative problems encountered in-theatre, including allegations of cover-up and destruction of evidence. Post-deployment issues (June 11, 1993 to November 28, 1994) were to address the manner in which the chain of command of the Canadian Forces responded to the operational, disciplinary, and administrative problems arising from the deployment.

These Terms of Reference obliged us to determine whether structural and organizational deficiencies lay behind the controversial incidents involving Canadian soldiers in Somalia. The Inquiry was not intended to be a trial, although our hearings did include an examination of the institutional causes of, and responses to, incidents that had previously resulted in the charge and trial of individuals. The Inquiry's primary focus was on institutional and systemic issues relating to the organization and management of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence, rather than on the individuals employed by these institutions. However; this focus inevitably required us to examine the actions of individuals in the chain of command and the manner in which they exercised leadership.

Our mandate, so described, required us to consider several fundamental institutional issues. How is accountability defined, determined, and exercised within the chain of command of the Canadian Forces? Were the reporting procedures adequate and properly followed to enable both an effective flow of information within the chain of command and the taking of appropriate corrective measures whenever required? Did actions taken and decisions made in relation to the Somalia operation reflect effective leadership or failures in leadership? To determine this, we intended to examine the decisions and conduct not only of officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces, but also of top civilian staff within National Defence Headquarters (for example, the Deputy Minister of National Defence). In fact, we were able to cover the vast majority of issues assigned to us under the terms of reference. However, due to the Government's decision to terminate the Inquiry, we were unable to reach the upper echelons with respect to the alleged issue of cover-up and the extent of their involvement in the post-deployment phase.

We were obliged to consider whether the correct criteria were applied to determine whether Canada should have committed troops to Somalia in the first place, and whether the mission and tasks of the Canadian Forces and the rules of engagement governing their conduct in theatre were adequately defined, communicated, and understood. It was also necessary, given the disciplinary and organizational problems that became apparent within the Canadian Airborne Regiment at relevant times, to assess the extent to which senior military leaders advised or should have advised the Minister of National Defence, through the chain of command, as to the true state of readiness of the CAR to participate in the mission.

We had also intended to address the scope of the responsibility and duty of the Deputy Minister of National Defence to keep the Minister of Defence informed of significant events or incidents occurring in theatre, and the extent to which these responsibilities and duties were carried out. Further, we had intended to examine in detail the duties and responsibilities of the political and civilian leadership at the ministerial level, including the scope of the duties and responsibilities of the Minister of National Defence at the time of the in-theatre activities, the Hon. Kim Campbell, and whether the Minister was kept accurately informed of problems occurring during the Somalia operation. In examining this broad issue, we had determined the importance of considering the nature and scope of the duties and responsibilities of ministerial staff to keep the Minister appropriately informed, as well as the duty and responsibility of the Deputy Minister to organize the department to ensure that information appropriate and necessary to its proper functioning was conveyed and received.

In short, we interpreted our mandate broadly, yet reasonably, given the nature of our task, and limited our Inquiry to those issues set forth in the terms of reference, which in themselves were broadly defined. We would not examine issues that appeared to us to fall outside the scope of our mandate.