EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From its earliest moments the operation went awry. The soldiers, with
some notable exceptions, did their best. But ill-prepared and
rudderless, they fell inevitably into the mire that became the Somalia
debacle. As a result, a proud legacy was dishonoured.

Systems broke down and organizational discipline crumbled. Such
systemic or institutional faults cannot be divorced from leadership
responsibility, and the leadership errors in the Somalia mission were
manifold and fundamental: the systems in place were inadequate and
deeply flawed; practices that fuelled rampant careerism and placed
individual ambition ahead of the needs of the mission had become
entrenched; the oversight and supervision of crucial areas of
responsibility were deeply flawed and characterized by the most
superficial of assessments; even when troubling events and disturbing
accounts of indiscipline and thuggery were known, there was disturbing
inaction or the actions that were taken exacerbated and deepened the
problems; planning, training and overall preparations fell far short
of what was required; subordinates were held to standards of
accountability by which many of those above were not prepared to
abide. Our soldiers searched, often in vain, for leadership and
inspiration.

Many of the leaders called before us to discuss their roles in the
various phases of the deployment refused to acknowledge error. When
pressed, they blamed their subordinates who, in turn, cast
responsibility upon those below them. They assumed this posture
reluctantly - but there is no honour to be found here - only after
their initial claims, that the root of many of the most serious
problems resided with "a few bad apples", proved hollow.

We can only hope that Somalia represents the nadir of the fortunes of
the Canadian Forces. There seems to be little room to slide lower. One
thing is certain, however: left uncorrected, the problems that
surfaced in the desert in Somalia and in the boardrooms at National
Defence Headquarters will continue to spawn military ignominy. The
victim will be Canada and its international reputation.

The following is a summary of the final report of the Commission of
Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. To the best
of our ability, the report fulfils our obligation under various orders
in council to investigate the chain of command system, the leadership,
discipline, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces, as well as
the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence, in
respect of the Canadian Forces' participation in the United Nations
peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1992-93.

During the deployment of Canadian troops, events transpired in Somalia
that impugned the reputations of individuals, Canada's military and,
indeed, the nation itself. Those events, some of them by now well
known to most Canadians, included the shooting of Somali intruders at
the Canadian compound in Belet Huen, the beating death of a teenager
in the custody of soldiers from 2 Commando of the Canadian Airborne
Regiment (CAR), an apparent suicide attempt by one of these Canadian
soldiers, and, after the mission, alleged episodes of withholding or
altering key information. Videotapes of repugnant hazing activities
involving members of the CAR also came to light. Some of these events,
with the protestations of a concerned military surgeon acting as a
catalyst, led the Government to call for this Inquiry. It is
significant that a military board of inquiry investigating the same
events was considered insufficient by the Government to meet Canadian
standards of public accountability, in part because the board of
inquiry was held in camera and with restricted terms of reference. A
full and open public inquiry was consequently established.

The principal conclusion of this Inquiry is that the mission went
badly wrong: systems broke down and organizational failure ensued. Our
Inquiry canvassed a broad array of issues and events and a massive
body of documentation and testimony to reach this unhappy
conclusion. Even then, in two major respects, we encountered
considerable difficulty in fulfilling our obligations.

First, the Inquiries Act provides the authority to subpoena witnesses,
hear testimony, hire expert counsel and advisers, and assess
evidence. Under normal circumstances, such powers should have given us
the confidence to present our findings without qualification. However,
on January 10,1997, while Parliament was adjourned, the Minister of
National Defence announced that Cabinet had decided that this Inquiry
had gone on long enough, that all hearings must be cut off on or about
March 31,1997, and that a report with recommendations was required by
June 30, 1997.

This was the response of the Government to our letter setting out
reporting date options and requesting an extension until at least
December 31, 1997, a period of time that would have allowed us to
conclude our search for the truth. That search had already involved,
among other things, thousands of hours of preparation and
cross-examination of the individuals who played various roles in the
Somalia deployment - and as time progressed, the superior officers to
whom they reported. As our investigation progressed, we were able to
move closer to the key centres of responsibility as we moved up the
chain of command. Unfortunately, the Minister's decision of January
10, 1997, eliminated any possibility of taking this course to its
logical conclusion and prevented us from fully expanding the focus to
senior officers throughout the chain of command who were responsible
before, during and after the Somalia mission.

The unexpected decision to impose a sudden time constraint on an
inquiry of this magnitude is without precedent in Canada. There is no
question that it has compromised and limited our search for the
truth. It will also inhibit and delay corrective action to the very
system that allowed the events to occur in the first place.

Second, the careful search for truth can be a painstaking and, at
times, frustrating experience. Public inquiries are equipped with the
best tools that our legal system can provide for pursuing the truth,
but even with access to significant procedural powers, answers may
prove elusive.

Even in those areas where we were able to conduct hearings - on the
pre-deployment phase of the mission and part of the in-theatre phase -
we were too often frustrated by the performance of witnesses whose
credibility must be questioned. The power to compel testimony was our
principal mechanism for determining what transpired in Somalia and at
National Defence Headquarters. Some 116 witnesses offered their
evidence to the Inquiry in open sessions broadcast on television
across Canada.

Giving testimony before a public inquiry is no trivial matter. It is a
test of personal and moral integrity that demands the courage to face
the facts and tell the truth. It also involves a readiness to be held
to account and a willingness to accept blame for one's own
wrongdoings. Many soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers
showed this kind of integrity. They demonstrated courage and fidelity
to duty, even when doing so meant acknowledging personal shortcoming
or voicing unwelcome criticism of their institution. We are cognizant
of institutional as well as peer pressure facing the witnesses who
appeared before us. These soldier-witnesses deserve society's respect
and gratitude for contributing in this way to the improvement of an
institution they obviously cherish.

However, we must also record with regret that on many occasions the
testimony of witnesses was characterized by inconsistency,
improbability, implausibility, evasiveness, selective recollection,
half- truths, and plain lies. Indeed, on some issues we encountered
what can only be described as a wall of silence. When several
witnesses behave in this manner, the wall of silence is evidently a
strategy of calculated deception.

Perhaps more troubling is the fact that many of the witnesses who
displayed these shortcomings were officers, non-commissioned officers,
and senior civil servants - individuals sworn to respect and promote
the values of leadership, courage, integrity, and accountability. For
these individuals, undue loyalty to a regiment or to the institution
of the military - or, even worse, naked self-interest - took
precedence over honesty and integrity. By conducting themselves in
this manner, these witnesses reneged on their duty to assist this
Inquiry in its endeavours. In the case of officers, this conduct
represents a breach of the undertakings set out in their commissioning
scroll.

Evasion and deception, which in our view were apparent with many of
the senior officers who testified before us, reveal much about the
poor state of leadership in our armed forces and the careerist
mentality that prevails at the Department of National Defence. These
senior people come from an elite group in which our soldiers and
Canadians generally are asked to place their trust and confidence.

We are well aware of recent reports submitted to the Minister of
National Defence addressing issues of leadership and management in the
Canadian Forces. Certainly, such studies and reports by informed
specialists are valuable. But only a full and rigorous public
examination of these issues, with the opportunity given to members of
the military to provide information and respond to criticism, can lead
to a thorough assessment of the scope and magnitude of these
problems. Only an extensive and probing analysis of the people,
events, and documentation involved can lead to focused and meaningful
change.

This Commission of Inquiry was established for that very purpose. Its
truncation leaves the Canadian public and the Canadian military with
many questions still unanswered. In fact, the decision to end the
Inquiry prematurely in itself raises new questions concerning
responsibility and accountability.

Although we have raised concerns about the credibility of witnesses
and leadership in the armed forces, it would be unfair to leave an
impression that the mission to Somalia was a total failure. While we
point out flaws in the system and shortfalls in leadership, we must
and wish to acknowledge that many soldiers and commanders performed
their duty with honour and integrity. Accordingly, we strongly support
the issuance of appropriate medals to those who served so well during
this troubled mission.

Moreover, we feel it is important in a report of this nature to
acknowledge the invaluable contribution that the Canadian Forces have
made, and continue to make, on Canada's behalf. Thousands of soldiers
have performed difficult and often dangerous tasks on our behalf in
pursuit of the nation's goals. Most often their dedication,
selflessness and professionalism have been taken for granted, because
these qualities have been assumed to be the norm. That is what made
the events involving Canadian Forces personnel in Somalia so
unpalatable. It is the sharp contrast between those events and the
accustomed performance of our military that elicited reactions of
alarm, outrage, and sadness among Canadians. In the end, we are
hopeful that our Inquiry will yield corrective measures to help
restore the Canadian Forces to the position of honour they have held
for so long.

INTRODUCTION

For a thorough discussion of the overall approach taken by the
Inquiry, its terms of reference, proceedings, methodology, rules of
procedure, rulings, and formal statements, we direct the reader to the
Introduction to this report (Volume 1, Chapter 1).

Terms of Reference

The scope of any public inquiry is determined by its terms of
reference. Ours were detailed and complex and were divided into two
parts. The first contained a broad opening paragraph charging us to
inquire into and report generally on the chain of command system,
leadership, discipline, operations, actions, and decisions of the
Canadian Forces, and on the actions and decisions of the Department of
National Defence in respect of the Somalia operation. The terms of
reference stated clearly that our investigation was not limited in
scope to the details and issues set forth in paragraphs that followed.

The second part of the terms of reference required us to look at
specific matters relating to the pre-deployment, in-theatre, and
post-theatre phases of the Somalia operation. Specific pre-deployment
issues (before January 10, 1993) included the suitability of, and
state of discipline within, the Canadian Airborne Regiment; and the
operational readiness of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group
prior to deployment for its missions and tasks. In-theatre issues
(January 10, 1993 to June 10, 1993) included the suitability and
composition of Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS) for its mission and
tasks; the extent, if any, to which cultural differences affected the
conduct of operations; the attitude of rank levels toward the lawful
conduct of operations; and the manner in which the CJFS conducted its
mission and tasks and responded to the operational, disciplinary, and
administrative problems encountered in-theatre, including allegations
of cover-up and destruction of evidence. Post-deployment issues (June
11, 1993 to November 28, 1994) were to address the manner in which the
chain of command of the Canadian Forces responded to the operational,
disciplinary, and administrative problems arising from the deployment.

These Terms of Reference obliged us to determine whether structural
and organizational deficiencies lay behind the controversial incidents
involving Canadian soldiers in Somalia. The Inquiry was not intended
to be a trial, although our hearings did include an examination of the
institutional causes of, and responses to, incidents that had
previously resulted in the charge and trial of individuals. The
Inquiry's primary focus was on institutional and systemic issues
relating to the organization and management of the Canadian Forces and
the Department of National Defence, rather than on the individuals
employed by these institutions. However; this focus inevitably
required us to examine the actions of individuals in the chain of
command and the manner in which they exercised leadership.

Our mandate, so described, required us to consider several fundamental
institutional issues. How is accountability defined, determined, and
exercised within the chain of command of the Canadian Forces? Were the
reporting procedures adequate and properly followed to enable both an
effective flow of information within the chain of command and the
taking of appropriate corrective measures whenever required? Did
actions taken and decisions made in relation to the Somalia operation
reflect effective leadership or failures in leadership? To determine
this, we intended to examine the decisions and conduct not only of
officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces, but also
of top civilian staff within National Defence Headquarters (for
example, the Deputy Minister of National Defence). In fact, we were
able to cover the vast majority of issues assigned to us under the
terms of reference. However, due to the Government's decision to
terminate the Inquiry, we were unable to reach the upper echelons with
respect to the alleged issue of cover-up and the extent of their
involvement in the post-deployment phase.

We were obliged to consider whether the correct criteria were applied
to determine whether Canada should have committed troops to Somalia in
the first place, and whether the mission and tasks of the Canadian
Forces and the rules of engagement governing their conduct in theatre
were adequately defined, communicated, and understood. It was also
necessary, given the disciplinary and organizational problems that
became apparent within the Canadian Airborne Regiment at relevant
times, to assess the extent to which senior military leaders advised
or should have advised the Minister of National Defence, through the
chain of command, as to the true state of readiness of the CAR to
participate in the mission.

We had also intended to address the scope of the responsibility and
duty of the Deputy Minister of National Defence to keep the Minister
of Defence informed of significant events or incidents occurring in
theatre, and the extent to which these responsibilities and duties
were carried out. Further, we had intended to examine in detail the
duties and responsibilities of the political and civilian leadership
at the ministerial level, including the scope of the duties and
responsibilities of the Minister of National Defence at the time of
the in-theatre activities, the Hon. Kim Campbell, and whether the
Minister was kept accurately informed of problems occurring during the
Somalia operation. In examining this broad issue, we had determined
the importance of considering the nature and scope of the duties and
responsibilities of ministerial staff to keep the Minister
appropriately informed, as well as the duty and responsibility of the
Deputy Minister to organize the department to ensure that information
appropriate and necessary to its proper functioning was conveyed and
received.

In short, we interpreted our mandate broadly, yet reasonably, given
the nature of our task, and limited our Inquiry to those issues set
forth in the terms of reference, which in themselves were broadly
defined. We would not examine issues that appeared to us to fall
outside the scope of our mandate.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information relied upon for this report came to us from a variety
of sources. Of major importance was the production of relevant
documents by the Department of National Defence (DND), the Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (formerly the Department of
External Affairs) and the Privy Council Office. At the Department of
National Defence, a Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team (SILT) was created to
collect and convey documentation and other forms of information
ordered by the Inquiry. As it turned out, we eventually received over
150,000 documents from various government departments, all of which
were painstakingly categorized by the Inquiry's staff according to
relevance and issue.

Recognizing that the reconstruction of what happened in Somalia would
require full disclosure by DND and other government departments of all
relevant material, we issued an order on April 21,1995, for the
production of all such documents. Initial estimates from SILT were
that some 7,000 documents were likely involved and subject to
disclosure. SILT representatives made a convincing case that great
efficiencies could be achieved by computerscanning all such material
and making it available in electronic form. What happened after we
agreed to this procedure was unexpected and was merely the first
chapter in a saga of failure discussed more fully in Chapter 39 of
this report.

Document disclosure remained incomplete throughout the life of the
Inquiry. It took the form of a slow trickle of information rather than
an efficient handing over of material. Key documents were missing,
altered, and even destroyed. Some came to our attention only by
happenstance, such as when they were uncovered by a third-party access
to information request. Some key documents were disclosed officially
only after their existence was confirmed before the Inquiry by
others. Representatives from SILT were reminded continuously of the
slow pace and incomplete nature of disclosure. Following numerous
meetings on the document transmittal process and private meetings with
SILT officials at which we expressed frustration with the process,
there were still few results. Finally, faced with altered
Somalia-related documents, missing and destroyed field logs, and a
missing National Defence Operations Centre computer hard drive, we
were compelled to embark on a series of hearings devoted entirely to
the issue of disclosure of documents by DND and the Canadian Forces
through DND's Directorate General of Public Affairs, as well as to the
issue of compliance with our orders for the production of documents.

A considerable number of the many documents made available to the
Inquiry, and other supplementary documentation, were filed as
exhibits. These included, among many others, the report of the
internal military board of inquiry, comprising 11 volumes of
documentation, and the response of the Chief of the Defence Staff to
the board's recommendations; the transcripts of the courts martial of
those prosecuted as a result of alleged misconduct in Somalia;
Canadian and other military manuals and policy documents; and
literature on the Canadian military and United Nations peacekeeping
and peacemaking missions.

The analysis in this report is based essentially on the extensive
testimony and submissions made by all parties at the Inquiry's
hearings, the documents and other material entered as exhibits at the
hearings, authoritative articles and books, material collected from
symposia and from specialists on relevant topics, papers written and
other information provided by consultants to the Inquiry, and original
research and analysis conducted by our own research staff.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

In addition to this executive summary, there are five volumes to this
report.

Volume 1 introduces the general approach taken by the Inquiry,
followed by discussion of the major themes and principles stemming
from our terms of reference that guided our approach. These major
themes appear throughout the report and form an integral part of our
analysis and recommendations. This volume also contains a number of
background chapters describing things as they were at the time of the
Somalia mission. Their purpose is to give the reader a basic
familiarity with the nature and organization of the military in
Canada, as well as with the military, legal, and cultural factors that
shaped Canada's participation in the Somalia mission during
1992-93. The volume concludes with a narrative account of what
actually happened before, during, and after Canada's involvement in
Somalia. As well as describing events and actions, it points to where
we suspect systemic problems exist.

Volumes 2, 3, 4, and 5 contain the essential distillation of the
Inquiry's labours. There, we analyze the events described in the
preceding narrative to reach our conclusions and recommendations. For
each of the main themes identified earlier, we describe the standards
and norms (what should have been expected) to identify the variances
detected (the concerns flagged in Chapters 12, 13 and 14 in Volume 1)
in order to draw findings from our analysis. Recommendations follow
the findings. (They also appear collectively at the end of the report
as well as in this executive summary.)

Volume 2 addresses the major themes of leadership, accountability, and
the chain of command and examines the critical issues of discipline,
the suitability of the unit selected for the deployment, selection and
screening of personnel, training, the rules of engagement for the
mission and overall operational readiness.

Volume 3 is devoted to a case study of the mission planning process
for the Somalia deployment. Volume 4 contains our findings concerning
individual misconduct on the part of officers of the Canadian Forces
who received section 13 notices for the pre-deployment period of the
mission and the failure to comply with our orders for disclosure of
Somalia-related documents. Volume 5 contains additional findings on
several important topics, including a thorough analysis of the
incident of March 4, 1993 and its aftermath, the disclosure of
documents, and a detailed assessment of the military justice system,
with recommendations for extensive change. In the same volume, we
discuss the implications of the government decision to truncate the
Inquiry and what could have been accomplished with sufficient time to
complete the assigned mandate. Volume 5 also contains a concluding
section, a summary of our recommendations and the appendices to the
report.

The remainder of this executive summary presents the highlights of
each section of the report, followed by our recommendations.

MAJOR THEMES

Chapter 2 introduces the major themes that are central to our terms of
reference. They establish a benchmark from which to judge the
deviation apparent in the subsequent narrative account of what
actually transpired in the desert of Somalia and across the boardroom
tables of National Defence Headquarters. These themes are as follows:


	- leadership

	- accountability

	- chain of command

	- discipline

	- mission planning

	- suitability

	- training

	- rules of engagement

	- operational readiness

	- cover-up

	- disclosure of information

	- military justice

A thorough reading of this chapter permits a deeper grasp of the
themes that flow from our terms of reference. Each theme is then
treated separately and extensively in our report. Primary among these
themes are leadership and accountability, because they have a direct
bearing on all the other themes, and because they are fundamental to
the proper functioning of the military in a free and democratic
society.

THE SOMALIA MISSION IN CONTEXT

In order to appreciate what occurred before, during and after the
deployment, an understanding of several contextual matters pertaining
to Canada's military is necessary.

Accordingly, Chapter 3 examines the structure and organization of the
Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence at the time of
the Somalia mission; Chapter 4 describes the importance of the chain
of command in the Canadian military; Chapter 5 presents a discussion
on military culture and ethics; Chapter 6 explores civil-military
relations in Canada; Chapter 7 introduces the military justice system
at the time of the Somalia deployment; Chapter 8 describes the
personnel system within the CF; Chapter 9 presents a history of the
Canadian Airborne Regiment; Chapter 10 outlines the evolution of
international peacekeeping and Canada's role in it; and Chapter 11
describes the historical development of Somalia and the situation that
gave rise to Canada's involvement there.

THE STORY: WHAT HAPPENED BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER SOMALIA

Chapters 12 to 14 provide a narrative account of the Somalia mission -
it begins with the deteriorating situation in Somalia in 1992 and ends
with the Government's decision to curtail the proceedings of the
Inquiry in January 1997. Based on the testimony and documentation
available to us, it provides as complete and balanced an account as
possible of what actually happened as the basis for a full analysis of
the issues we were charged specifically to investigate.

The narrative is divided into the three phases specified in our terms
of reference, encompassing pre-deployment, in-theatre and
post-deployment events. Accordingly, Chapter 12 (Pre-Deployment)
recounts the initial decision to become involved in the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), the preparations and mission planning
that took place, and the factors involved in the declaration of the
CAR's operational readiness. Chapter 13 (In-Theatre) provides an
account of the events in Somalia from the first arrival of Canadian
troops, the early stages of their operations, the incidents of March
4th and 16th, their alleged cover-up, and the return of the Canadian
Airborne Regiment Battle Group to Canada. Chapter 14 (Post-Deployment)
summarizes the subsequent courts martial, the de Faye board of
inquiry, the creation of the Somalia Working Group within DND, and the
events that occurred during the Inquiry, culminating in the decision
by the Minister of National Defence to curtail the proceedings of the
Inquiry.

INTRODUCTION TO FINDINGS

Volumes 2, 3, 4, and 5 contain the essential distillation of the
Inquiry's efforts and form the largest portion of this summary as a
result. In them we analyze deviations from the benchmark principles
and themes established in Chapter 2. Our themes are interwoven in
terms of both their theoretical treatment and the on-the-ground
realities to which they refer. Foremost among them are leadership and
accountability, which to a great extent underlie all the others. We
have gone to great lengths to research, study, and set forth our
understanding of how these twin pillars uphold the functioning of the
military in a free and democratic society.

LEADERSHIP

The purpose of our discussion of leadership is to establish a standard
for assessing the performance of Canadian Forces leaders in the
Somalia mission.

Effective leadership is unquestionably essential in a military
context. According to one Canadian Forces manual, "Leadership is the
primary reason for the existence of all officers of the Canadian
Forces." Without strong leadership, the concerted effort that
characterizes a properly functioning armed force is unlikely to take
shape, and the force's individual members are unlikely to achieve the
unity of purpose that is essential to success in military
operations. Strong leadership is associated with high levels of
cohesion and the development of unity of purpose. Leadership is
important at all levels of the Canadian Forces, applying equally to
commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

However, leadership is also a complex and value-laden concept, and its
definition is somewhat dependent on context. It includes not merely
the authority, but also the ability to lead others. Commanders will
not be leaders if they do little to influence and inspire their
subordinates. The commander, in effect, becomes a leader only when the
leader is accepted as such by subordinates. Leadership requires much
more than management skills or legal authority. The leader is the
individual who motivates others. As one American commentator on
military leadership has stated:

Mere occupancy of an office or position from which leadership behavior
is expected does not automatically make the occupant a true
leader. Such appointments can result in headship but not necessarily
in leadership. While appointive positions of high status and authority
are related to leadership they are not the same thing.

A 1995 DND survey of attitudes of military and civilian employees
revealed dissatisfaction with the state of leadership within
DND. Survey respondents believed that leaders in the Department were
too concerned about building their empires and "following their
personal agenda", and that DND was too bureaucratic. The survey noted
that "[e]mployees, both military and civilian, are losing or have lost
confidence in the Department's leadership and management." The former
Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen Jean Boyle, stated publicly in 1996
that the rank and file had justifiable concerns about the quality of
high command. More recently, LGen Baril, Commander Land Force Command,
declared:

The Army has a significant leadership deficiency.... Unfashionable as
some of these old basic values may seem to some, it is the kind of
leadership that produced the mutual trust that bonded our Army in
combat. That trust between the leader and the soldier is what
distinguishes outstanding units from ineffective ones. Since there is
a range of opinion on the precise nature of military leadership, we
decided to identify the core qualities that are essential. We also
sought to identify other necessary attributes of leadership as well as
factors that would indicate successful leadership performance. In
doing so we examined Canadian military documents and testimony before
the Inquiry, and consulted the relevant literature for the views of
senior military leaders as well as other experts in the field. In
reviewing these sources, we were struck by their concordance in
establishing the central qualities necessary to good leadership in the
military:

Leadership Qualities, Attributes, and Performance Factors The Core
Qualities of Military Other Necessary Indicative Performance
     Leadership            Attributes                 Factors

Integrity                Dedication            Sets the example
Courage                  Knowledge             Disciplines
subordinates Loyalty                  Intellect             Accepts
responsibility Selflessness             Perseverance          Stands
by own convictions Self-discipline          Devisiveness
Analyzes problems and situations
                         Judgement             Makes decisions
                         Physical Robustness   Delegates and directs
                                               Supervises (checks and
rechecks)
                                               Accounts for actions
                                               Performs under stress
                                               Ensures the well-being
of
                                                  subordinates
	


These are the qualities we considered important in assessing
leadership related to the Somalia mission.

ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is a principal mechanism for ensuring conformity to
standards of action. In a free and democratic society, those
exercising substantial power and discretionary authority must be
answerable for all activities assigned or entrusted to them - in
essence, for all activities for which they are responsible.

In a properly functioning system or organization, there should be
accountability for one's actions, regardless of whether those actions
are properly executed and lead to a successful result, or are
improperly carried out and produce injurious consequences. An
accountable official cannot shelter behind the actions of a
subordinate, and an accountable official is always answerable to
superiors.

No matter how an organization is structured, those at the apex of the
organization are accountable for the actions and decisions of those
within the chain of authority subordinate to them. Within a properly
linked chain of authority, accountability does not become attenuated
the further one is removed from the source of activity. When a
subordinate fails, that failure is shouldered by all who are
responsible and exercise requisite authority -subordinate, superior,
and superior to the superior. Accountability in its most pervasive and
all-encompassing sense inevitably resides with the chief executive
officer of the organization or institution.

The term 'responsibility' is not synonymous with accountability. One
who is authorized to act or who exercises authority is
'responsible'. However, responsible officials are also held to
account. An individual who exercises power while acting in the
discharge of official functions is responsible for the proper exercise
of the power or duties assigned. A person exercising supervisory
authority is responsible, and hence accountable, for the manner in
which that authority has been exercised.

A person who delegates authority is also responsible, and hence
accountable, not for the form of direct supervision that a supervisor
is expected to exercise but, rather, for control over the delegate
and, ultimately, for the actual acts performed by the delegate. The
act of delegation to another does not relieve the responsible official
of the duty to account. While one can delegate the authority to act,
one cannot thereby delegate one's assigned responsibility in relation
to the proper performance of such acts.

Where a superior delegates the authority to act to a subordinate, the
superior remains responsible: first, for the acts performed by the
delegate; second, for the appropriateness of the choice of delegate;
third, with regard to the propriety of the delegation; and, finally,
for the control of the acts of the subordinate.

Even if the superior official is successful in demonstrating
appropriate, prudent, diligent personal behaviour, the superior
remains responsible for the errors and misdeeds of the
subordinate. However, in such circumstances, when assessing the
appropriate response to the actions of the superior whose subordinate
or delegate has erred or has been guilty of misconduct, the
authorities may be justified in selecting a penaltv or sanction of
lower order or no penalty or sanction whatsoever.

It is the responsibility of those who exercise supervisory authority,
or who have delegated the authority to act to others, to know what is
transpiring within the area of their assigned authority. Even if
subordinates whose duty it is to inform their superior of all relevant
facts, circumstances, and developments fail to fulfil their
obligations, this cannot absolve their superior of responsibility for
what has transpired.

Where a superior contends that he or she was never informed, or lacked
requisite knowledge with regard to facts or circumstances affecting
the proper discharge of organizational responsibilities, it will be
relevant to understand what processes and methods were in place to
ensure the adequate provision of information. Also, it will be of
interest to assess to what extent the information in question was
notorious or commonly held and whether the result that occurred could
reasonably have been expected or foreseen. Moreover, how the
managerial official responded on first discovering the shortfall in
information will often be of import.

To this point we have concentrated on defining terms and establishing
guiding principles. We now move to a consideration and analysis of the
more practical issues at hand that raise accountability concerns.

The Inquiry found, first of all, that the standards discussed above
have not been well guarded recently in the Canadian military. The
hierarchy of authority in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), and
especially among the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Deputy
Minister (DM), and the Judge Advocate General, has become blurred and
distorted. Authority in the Canadian Forces is not well defined by
leaders, nor is it clearly obvious in organization or in the actions
and decisions of military leaders in the chain of command. Moreover,
we found that governments have not carefully exercised their duty to
oversee the armed forces and the Department of National Defence in
such a way as to ensure that both function under the strict control of
Parliament.

The most significant of the deficiencies we noted that bear on
accountability are as follows:


	1. Official reporting and record-keeping requirements,
policies, and practices throughout DND and the Canadian Forces are
inconsistent, sometimes ineffective, and open to abuse. We have seen
that, in some cases (for example, Daily Executive Meetings records and
minutes), as publicity regarding Somalia matters increased, records
were deliberately obscured or not kept at all, in order to avoid later
examination of views expressed and decisions made.

	2. In Chapter 39, describing the document disclosure phase of
our hearings, we demonstrate the existence of an unacceptable
hostility toward the goals and requirements of access to information
legislation, an integral aspect of public accountability. There
appears to be more concern at higher levels to manage the agenda and
control the flow of information than to confront and deal forthrightly
with problems and issues.

	3. The specific duties and responsibilities inherent in many
ranks, positions, and functions within NDHQ are poorly defined and
understood. Further, the relationship between officers and officials
in NDHQ and commanders of commands as well as officers commanding
operational formations in Canada and overseas is, at best, ambiguous
and uncertain.

	4. The nature and extent of the duties and responsibilities of
superiors to monitor and supervise are unclear, poorly understood, or
subject to unacceptable personal discretion. Justification for failure
to monitor and supervise seems to be limited to the assertion that the
superior trusted the person assigned the task to carry it out properly.

	5. The current mechanisms of internal audit and program
review, which are the responsibilities of the Chief of Review Services
(CRS), are shrouded in secrecy. Reports issued need not be publicized,
and their fate can be determined at the discretion of the Chief of the
Defence Staff or the Deputy Minister to whom the CRS reports. The CDS
or the DM, as the case may be, retains unfettered discretion as to
follow-up and as to whether there is to be outside scrutiny of a
report. The CRS has no authority to initiate investigations. No
mechanism exists for follow-up or independent assessment of CRS
reports or suggestions for change.

	6. A disturbing situation seems to exist with respect to
after-action reports and internally commissioned studies. These
reports and studies can serve an accountability purpose once produced,
provided they are considered seriously and their recommendations are
properly monitored and followed up. While requirements to produce
evaluations and after-action reports are clear in most cases, no
rigorous and routine mechanism exists for effective consideration and
follow-up. We have numerous examples of the same problems being
identified repeatedly and nothing being done about them and of
recommendations addressing and suggesting remedies for problems being
ignored. Their fate seems to be determined by the absolute discretion
of officials in the upper echelons, who can, and often do, reject
suggestions for change without discussion, explanation, or the
possibility of review or outside assessment.

	7. Mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of the Department of
National Defence and military activities are ineffective. A 1994
examination by a joint committee of the Senate and the House of
Commons was unanimous in support of the view that there is a need to
strengthen the role of Parliament in defence matters. We do not
envision Parliament playing an extraordinary supervisory role with
regard to military conduct, but clearly, it can and should do
more. Parliament is particularly effective in promoting accountability
when it receives, examines and publicizes reports from bodies with a
responsibility to report to Parliament (as would be the case, for
example, with the responsibilities that we propose entrusting to an
inspector general).

	8. We identify numerous deficiencies in the operation of more
indirect accountability mechanisms, such as courts martial and summary
trials, Military Police investigations and reports and the charging
process, personnel evaluations, mechanisms for instilling and
enforcing discipline and investigating and remedying disciplinary
problems and lapses, training evaluations, declarations of operational
readiness, and so on. These are the subject of close examination in
several chapters of this report.

	9. Leadership in matters of accountability and an
accountability ethic or ethos have been found seriously wanting in the
upper military, bureaucratic, and political echelons. Aside from the
platitudes that have now found their way into codes of ethics and the
cursory treatment in some of the material tabled by the Minister of
National Defence on March 25,1997, the impulse to promote
accountability as a desirable value or to examine seriously or improve
existing accountability mechanisms in all three areas has been meagre.

	10. There also appears to be little or no interest in creating
or developing mechanisms to promote and encourage accurate and timely
reporting to specified authorities, by all ranks and those in the
defence bureaucracy, of deficiencies and problems, and then to
establish or follow clear processes and procedures to investigate and
follow up on those reports.  The foregoing description of notable
deficiencies in accountability as revealed by experience with the
Somalia deployment suggests a range of possible solutions. A number of
these suggestions are proposed and discussed in greater detail in this
chapter and elsewhere in this report. One suggestion involves the
creation of an Office of Inspector General, the purpose of which would
be the promotion of greater accountability throughout the Canadian
Forces and the Department of National Defence. This and other related
recommendations are discussed at length in Chapter 16.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

The chain of command is an authority and accountability system linking
the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff to the lowest level of
the Canadian Forces and back again to the office of the CDS. It is
also a hierarchy of individual commanders who make decisions within
their connected functional formations and units. The chain of command
is intended to be a pre-emptive instrument of command - allowing
commanders actively to seek information, give direction, and oversee
operations. It is a fundamental aspect of the structure and operation
of the Canadian military, and ensuring its soundness is therefore a
paramount responsibility of command.

Before and during the deployment of Canadian Joint Force Somalia, the
Canadian Forces chain of command was, in our view, severely
wanting. The Inquiry was faced again and again with blatant evidence
of a seriously malfunctioning chain of command within the Canadian
military. It failed as a communications system and broke down under
minimal stress. Commanders testified before us on several occasions
that they did not know about important matters because they had not
been advised. They also testified that important matters and policy
did not reach subordinate commanders and the troops or, when they did,
the information was often distorted. Multiple illustrations of these
problems are provided in Chapter 17.

As one example, the failure of the chain of command at senior levels
was striking with regard to how commanders came to understand the
state of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1992. Many senior officers
in the chain of command, from MGen MacKenzie to Gen de Chastelain,
testified that they were ignorant of the state of fitness and
discipline of the CAR.

Yet they maintained even during the Inquiry that they had faith in the
appropriateness of the CAR to undertake a mission because they assumed
that it was at a high state of discipline and unit cohesion.

Throughout the period from early 1992 until the deployment of the CAR
to Somalia in December 1992, several serious disciplinary problems -
one, at least, of a criminal nature - had occurred in the CAR. These
incidents, among other matters, were so significant that they led to
the dismissal of the Commanding Officer of the CAR, itself a unique
and remarkable event in a peacetime army. Yet we were told that few
officers in the chain of command were even aware of these problems.

We were asked to believe that the scores of staff officers responsible
for managing information from units for senior officers and commanders
in Special Service Force headquarters, Land Force Central Area
headquarters, Land Force Command headquarters, and NDHQ never informed
them of these serious incidents. Indeed, we must assume that the
specialized and dedicated Military Police reporting system, composed
of qualified non-commissioned members and officers who routinely file
police reports and investigations specifically for the use of
commanders, failed to penetrate the chain of command. In other words,
we must believe that the commanders did not know what was happening in
their commands and therefore that the chain of command failed. But the
matter is worse, for the evidence is that the chain of command
provided enough information that commanders ought to have been
prompted to inquire into the situation and to act.

We were told without further explanation and supporting evidence that
"the Forces had an administrative concept of organization and command
control.. and still do." However, in our view, the confusion of
responsibilities in NDHQ and the lack of precise definitions of
command authority in the CF and in NDHQ are such that they raise
worrisome questions about the reliability, or even the existence, of a
sound concept of command in the Canadian Forces generally.

It is not as though problems in the structure for the command and
control of the CF on operations in Canada and overseas was a new issue
for CF leaders. Studies ordered by the Chief of the Defence Staff as
early as 1985, to inquire into the continuing confusion in NDHQ
concerning operational planning, confirmed this issue. One of these
warned the CDS and the Deputy Minister that NDHQ could not be relied
upon to produce effective operational plans or to be an effective base
for the command and control of the Canadian Forces in operations. In
1988 the weaknesses in plans for CF operations in Haiti prompted yet
another study into authority and planning responsibilities in
NDHQ. This report found no agreed concept for the operation of the CF
in wartime; that NDHQ was inappropriately organized for command
functions; that the responsibilities of the CDS and DM were blurred;
and that "the most complex issue dealt with" was the relationship
between the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) and the
commanders outside Ottawa. None of these problems was resolved
satisfactorily.

A report prepared for the CDS and the DM in September 1992 confirmed
that these problems had not been properly addressed. Among other
things, the evaluators found "undue complexity in the command
structure. . .and too much room for misinterpretation." Further, "the
evaluation showed that there is a critical need for a simplified
command and control structure, one which will bring to an end the
current ad hoc approach." Thus, from their own studies and
experiences, senior CF officers should have been well aware that the
existing structure for the command of the CF was, at least, suspect
and required their careful attention.

In short, there is compelling evidence that the chain of command,
during both the pre-deployment and the in-theatre period, failed as a
device for passing and seeking information and as a command
structure. There is also considerable evidence that the actions and
skills of junior leaders and soldiers overcame many of the defects in
the chain of command, allowing the operation to proceed. This was
especially true during the period when Operation Cordon (Canada's
contribution to the original United Nations peacekeeping mission) was
cancelled and Operation Deliverance (Canada's contribution to the
U.S.-led peace enforcement mission) was authorized and soldiers
deployed.

DISCIPLINE

Among the many issues facing us, discipline proved critical in
understanding what went wrong in Somalia. Much of the problem of the
CAR as a unit, most of the incidents that occurred during the
preparation stage in Canada, and the many troubling incidents
involving Canadian soldiers in Somalia all have a common origin - a
lack of discipline. For the ordinary citizen who has little exposure
to the military, discipline is understood to be the cornerstone of
armies, the characteristic that one would have expected to be much in
evidence in an armed force as renowned for its professionalism as the
Canadian Forces. It was the difference between this public expectation
and the actual events of the Somalia mission that captured the
attention of Canadians and contributed to the call for this
Inquiry. For example, there were 20 incidents of accidental or
negligent discharge of a personal weapon and two incidents of
accidental or negligent discharge of crew-served weapons in
theatre. One caused an injury and another killed a Canadian Forces
soldier. The Board of Inquiry into the leadership, discipline,
operations, actions, and procedures of the Canadian Airborne Regiment
Battle Group remarked that these accidental discharges occurred "to an
unacceptable degree". These incidents call into question the standard
of self-discipline in the Canadian contingent.

Few professions are as dependent on discipline as the military. An
army is best seen as a collection of individuals who must set aside
their personal interests, concerns, and fears to pursue the purpose of
the group collectively. The marshalling of individual wills and
talents into a single entity enables an army to face daunting
challenges and great adversity and therefore to achieve objectives
unattainable except through concerted effort. The instrument by which
this is accomplished is discipline.

The chief purpose of military discipline is the harnessing of the
capacity of the individual to the needs of the group. The sense of
cohesion that comes from combining the individual wills of group
members provides unity of purpose. The group that achieves such
cohesiveness is truly a unit. Effective discipline is a critical
factor at all levels of the military, and nowhere more so than at the
unit level. Much of Chapter 18 is concerned with the CAR as a unit, or
with its various parts, the sub-units of the battalion.

However, discipline plays a vital role at all levels within the
military. Too frequently armies treat discipline as a concern
regarding the lower levels: a matter to be attended to primarily by
non-commissioned officers at the unit level and below. But discipline
is important for the proper functioning of the chain of command
throughout the military. Undisciplined staff officers or commanders
who hold themselves above the rigours of discipline can do far more
harm to the collective effort of the military than any soldier in the
ranks.

We have determined that the CAR displayed definite signs of poor
discipline in the early 1990s, in spite of the remedies recommended in
the 1985 Hewson report examining disciplinary infractions and
anti-social behaviour. These are discussed in detail in Chapter 18.

A number of factors contributed to the disciplinary problems in the
CAR, specifically in 2 Commando, prior to deployment, including
periodic lack of commitment on the part of the CAR's parent regiments
to ensure that their best members were sent to the CAR; the inferior
quality of some junior officers and NCOs; doubtful practices in 2
Commando in the recruitment of NCOs; the ambiguous relationship
between master corporals and soldiers; the high turnover rate within
the CAR and the sub-units; mutual distrust and dislike among a
significant number of the CAR's officers and NCOs; questionable
suitability of individual officers for the CAR and the ranks they
occupied; a tendency to downplay the significance of disciplinary
infractions or to cover them up entirely; and the continuing ability
of CAR members to evade responsibility for disciplinary infractions.

As we explore in greater detail in Chapter 19, the CAR was simply
unfit to undertake a mission in the autumn of 1992, let alone a
deployment to Somalia. The three incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992,
indicated a significant breakdown of discipline in 2 Commando during
the critical period of training and preparation for operations in
Somalia. Military pyrotechnics were discharged illegally at a party in
the junior ranks' mess; a car belonging to the duty NCO was set on
fire; and various 2 Commando members expended illegally held
pyrotechnics and ammunition during a party in Algonquin Park. The
illegal possession of these pyrotechnics was the result of theft from
DND and the making of false statements. A search conducted on the
soldiers' premises uncovered ammunition stolen from DND, as well as 34
Confederate flags.

These incidents were so serious that LCol Morneault proposed to leave
2 Commando in Canada unless the perpetrators came forward. BGen Beno,
after consulting MGen MacKenzie, opposed this plan. Almost everyone
suspected of participating in the October incidents was permitted to
deploy. Several of these individuals created difficulties in Somalia.

In spite of established doctrine, practice, and procedures, there were
problems at the senior levels of the chain of command in providing
adequate supervision, resulting in poor discipline, faulty passage of
information, untimely reaction through advice or intervention, and
ineffective remedial action. Such problems appear to have been so
frequent as to indicate a significant systemic failure in the exercise
of command.

In short, the attitude of all ranks toward the importance of good
discipline, from junior soldiers to the most senior commanders in the
Canadian Forces, was decidedly weak. When there is insufficient
respect for and attention to the need for discipline as a first
principle, military operations can be expected to fail. And in respect
of discipline, the mission to Somalia was undoubtedly a failure.

The fact is that, at the time of the Somalia mission, discipline was
simply taken for granted. It seems to have been assumed that trained
soldiers in a professional military would naturally be well
disciplined. The matter was tracked and reported on indifferently and
inconsistently, with no central co-ordination or sharp focus at the
highest levels. Above all, discipline was the subject of inadequate
attention, supervision, guidance, enforcement, or remedy by the senior
levels of the chain of command; it was, shockingly, simply ignored or
downplayed.

In facing the future, the first requirement is to take steps to
recognize the importance of discipline and the role it must play as a
matter of fundamental policy. Discipline requires not only policy
definition and emphasis in doctrine, training and education, but also
a prominent and visible focus in the interests and concerns of the
most senior leadership. The recommendations in this report are
intended to facilitate these changes.

SUITABILITY AND COHESION

Our terms of reference required us to examine the suitability of the
Canadian Airborne Regiment for the Somalia mission. Was it adequately
manned, organized, equipped, and trained for that particular mission?

In this regard, the inherent suitability of the CAR is an issue for
consideration. But to suggest that a unit possesses inherent
suitability does not necessarily mean that a unit is in all respects
suitable for every mission. It is at this point that considerations of
mission-specific suitability come into play.

Putting aside these theoretical considerations, we found that even
before a restructuring of the CAR in 1991-92, there were recognized
deficiencies in the organization and leadership of the Regiment. These
differences were exacerbated by the reorganization, which failed to
eliminate the independence of the Regiment's three
commandos. Francophones and Anglophones generally manned seperate
commandos and did not work together; the relationship between 1
Commando and 2 Commando in particular went beyond mere rivalry,
spilling over at times into hostility. Cumulatively, the result was a
lack of regimental cohesion at the most basic level.

Furthermore, the downsizing that took place during the 1992
restructuring of the CAR occurred without first determining the
appropriate 'concept of employment' for the Regiment. What emerged was
poorly conceived. As with the move of the CAR to CFB Petawawa in 1977,
the Regiment's downsizing in 1992 occurred without sufficient
consideration being given to the appropriate mission, roles, and tasks
of the CAR.

In addition, there was a deterioration in the quality of personnel
assigned to the CAR. This was exacerbated when the Regiment was
downsized to a battalion-size formation. There were personnel
shortages in several critical areas, to the point that the CAR was not
properly manned at the time of the Somalia mission.

There were also significant problems at leadership levels that
undermined the cohesion of the CAR, to the point where the Regiment
ceased to operate effectively. Lack of discipline was one of the
reasons the CAR failed to reach a workable level of cohesion. There
was also a lack of cohesion among the officers and non-commissioned
members of the CAR. The failure to separate master corporals from the
rest of the troops in barracks weakened the authority of
non-commissioned officers. Furthermore, officer-NCO cohesion within
the CAR was weak. Conflict and mistrust existed among several key
officers and NCOs, and this affected the proper functioning of the
chain of command.

There was a substantial turnover of personnel within the Canadian
Airborne Regiment during the active posting season in the summer of
1992. This rate of changeover was not unique to the Regiment but was
nonetheless excessive and contributed further to lowering the cohesion
of the unit during the period of preparation for Operation
Deliverance.

In short, although the CAR was inherently suitable in theory for the
mission to Somalia, in fact its actual state of leadership,
discipline, and unit cohesion rendered it unfit for any operation in
the fall of 1992. From a mission-specific perspective, the CAR was
improperly prepared and inadequately trained for its mission, and by
any reasonable standard, was not operationally ready for deployment to
Somalia.

PERSONNEL SELECTION AND SCREENING

The key question in assessing the adequacy of the selection and
screening of personnel for the Somalia deployment is whether the
system, and those who operated it, took unacceptable risks - either
knowingly or negligently - in the manning of the CAR (which made up
over 70 per cent of the CF personnel who served in Somalia) and in
deciding which members of that unit were suitable to participate in
the mission. We have found considerable evidence that unacceptable
risks were, in fact, taken.

At the time of the Somalia deployment, the CAR had not been well
served by the personnel system. Inadequacies in processes and
deficiencies in the actions and decisions of those responsible for its
operation contributed significantly to the problems experienced by the
CAR in 1992 and 1993.

Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs), which form the basis of key
decisions concerning a member's career development (appointment,
selection for courses, and promotion), were known to downplay a
candidate's weaknesses; yet they were relied on heavily, even blindly,
in appointment and promotion decisions.

The chain of command repeatedly ignored warnings that candidates being
chosen for important jobs were inappropriate selections. As a matter
of common practice, career managers refrained from passing on comments
about candidates when they were made by peers or subordinates. They
also did not accept advice from officers about replacements. Except
for formal disciplinary or administrative action, information about
questionable conduct by CF members was not normally noted in files or
passed on to subsequent superiors. Furthermore, there was an absence
of formal criteria for key positions such as the regimental commanding
officer and the officers commanding units of the Regiment.

Land Force Command waived its own informal criteria in order to
accommodate the nominees of parent regiments to the CAR, while
candidates who better suited requirements were available or could have
been made available. Representatives of the regimental councils of the
parent regiments, or regimental 'Godfathers', who are outside the
chain of command and therefore unaccountable, had too much influence
in the process. This was particularly problematic for the CAR, since
these officers had a virtual monopoly in putting forward nominees from
their own regiments for postings in the CAR, and since any
repercussions of a poor choice would be felt by the CAR and
significantly less by their own regiments.

Individual career management goals were too often allowed to take
precedence over operational needs in the appointments
process. Bureaucratic and administrative imperatives were allowed to
dilute the merit principle and override operational needs. In some
cases, the chain of command allowed completely irrelevant factors,
such as inter-regimental and national politics, to influence key
appointment decisions. In spite of the fact that the CAR was known to
require more experienced leaders than other units, the chain of
command knowingly selected less qualified candidates for key positions
in the CAR when better candidates were available or could and should
have been made available.

The Delegated Authority Promotion System (DAPS) promoted less
experienced soldiers to master corporal - an important position,
representing the first level of leadership in the Canadian Forces. The
CAR abused the DAPS by using it to avoid posting in master corporals
from parent regiments, in order to promote internally. Due to the lack
of mobility of personnel among the CAR's three commandos, this
practice meant that DAPS appointments in the CAR were much less
competitive than those in parent regiments. Cpl Matchee, for example,
was appointed to master corporal through the DAPS, even though he had
not been successful in competition with his peers; he had recently
participated in the Algonquin Park incident of October 3rd; and his
platoon second in command and his platoon commander had raised
concerns about the appointment and actually questioned his suitability
for deployment to Somalia.

It was generally recognized by Land Force Command - well before the
Somalia deployment - that the CAR was a special unit in that it had a
requirement for mature and experienced leaders at all levels: senior
NCOs, as well as platoon, company, and unit command positions. Yet, by
the time of the Somalia deployment, there was an apparent trend toward
younger and less experienced soldiers and junior leaders. Promotion
practices such as the so-called 'airborne offers', which used
promotions to fill vacancies in the CAR, and the Delegated Authority
Promotion System - particularly as it was used in relation to the
Airborne Regiment - contributed to this trend.

There were no strict standards for selection of soldiers for the
CAR. While the CAR could veto selections and post soldiers back to
source units, initial selection of soldiers for the Regiment was
entirely in the hands of these units. The informal selection process -
operated, as it was, by the source units and regiments - left the CAR
vulnerable to being used as a 'dumping ground' for overly aggressive
or otherwise problematic personnel. Despite the recognized need of the
CAR for more mature soldiers, some soldiers sent to the Regiment had
been involved in recent misconduct.

Poor judgement was shown in the screening of CAR personnel for the
mission, especially in relation to 2 Commando. Short-term morale
appears to have taken precedence over discipline. The unit leadership
rejected significant warnings about the suitability of
personnel. Appointments to key positions in the CAR were allowed to
stand in spite of serious misgivings on the part of senior officers
and members of the chain of command, and in spite of the fact that the
unit was on its first overseas deployment in several years.

Our suggestions concerning Canadian Forces promotion and appointment
policies, as well as further action to deal with racism in the
military, are provided in the recommendations at the end of this
summary.

TRAINING

Fundamental to a unit's operational readiness are troops well trained
to perform all aspects of the mission to which the unit is being
committed. Accordingly, our report touches on a broad spectrum of
issues related to training, and includes, but is not limited to, a
review of the training objectives and standards used for Operation
Cordon and Operation Deliverance.

To our surprise, we found that in 1992 there was no formalized or
standardized training system for peace operations, despite almost 40
years of intensive Canadian participation in international peace
operations. No comprehensive training policy, based on changing
requirements, had been developed, and there was an absence of
doctrine, standards, and performance evaluation mechanisms respecting
the training of units deploying on peace operations. This situation
existed even though deficiencies in training policy, direction, and
management had been clearly identified in internal CF reviews and
staff papers well before 1992.

In preparing its forces for peace support missions, the CF relied
almost exclusively on general purpose combat training, supplemented by
mission-specific training during the pre-deployment phase. This
traditional approach to training was not adequate to provide military
personnel with either a full range of skills or the appropriate
orientation necessary to meet the diverse and complex challenges
presented in post-Cold War peace support missions. There was a failure
to incorporate the required generic peacekeeping training, both in the
individual training system and in the regular operational training
schedule.

To fulfil its tasking as the UN standby unit, the CAR should have at
all times maintained a proficiency in both general purpose combat
skills and generic peacekeeping skills (involving, for example, the
nature of UN operations and the role of the peacekeeper, conflict
resolution and negotiation, cross-cultural relations, restraint in
application of force, and standard UN operations). However, the CAR
received little or no ongoing generic peacekeeping training to prepare
it for UN operations, despite having been designated for many years as
the UN standby unit. This typified the traditional DND/CF dictum that
general purpose combat training provides not only the best, but also a
sufficient basis for preparing for peacekeeping missions.

The absence of CF peacekeeping training doctrine, together with a lack
of guidelines for the development of training plans for UN deployments
or a standard package of precedents and lessons learned from previous
missions, placed an undue burden on the CAR's junior staff in the
initial stages of designing a training plan for Operation Cordon. Such
an absence represents a clear and inexcusable failure by the military
leadership, particularly at the senior levels, given Canada's decades
of involvement in peacekeeping missions. The CAR staff went to great
lengths to attempt to compensate for this lack of doctrine,
guidelines, and materials.

The training plan for Operation Cordon did not adequately provide for
sufficient and appropriate training in relation to several non-combat
skills that are essential for peacekeeping, including the nature of UN
peacekeeping and the role of the peacekeeper; the Law of Armed
Conflict, including arrest and detention procedures; training in use
of force policies, including mission-specific rules of engagement;
conflict resolution and negotiation skills development; inter-cultural
relations and the culture, history and politics of the environment;
and psychological preparation and stress management. The failure of
the training plan to provide adequately for these non-combat skills
arose primarily from the lack of any doctrine recognizing the need for
such training, and the lack of supporting training materials and
standards.

Most of the CAR's training for Operation Cordon was conducted prior to
October 18, 1992. Although most categories of training outlined in the
training plans for September and October were covered, the lack of
training objectives, standards, and evaluation criteria made it
difficult for anyone involved to assess the level to which training
had been conducted or the proficiency levels achieved. In addition,
there were significant shortcomings due to lack of equipment and other
training resources.

Leaders at all levels of the chain of command, with the notable
exception of the Brigade Commander during the initial stages, failed
to provide adequate supervision of the training preparations
undertaken by the CAR for Operation Cordon.

Despite an apparent sensitivity to the need to establish an
appropriate tone and attitude for training preparations and the
mission, the CAR did not succeed in ensuring that these were in fact
conveyed to, and adopted by, personnel at all levels within the
unit. At least some components within the CAR remained overly
aggressive in their conduct and bearing during training
exercises. Eleventh-hour attempts to instil an orientation appropriate
for peace support missions cannot counterbalance years of
combat-oriented socialization.

There was confusion between the brigade and regimental levels as to
the purpose of Exercise Stalwart Providence, the CAR training exercise
conducted in the fall of 1992. Various perceptions of its purpose
existed during the planning stages: some saw it as simply a training
exercise, others believed it was an exercise to test the cohesiveness
of the subunits, and still others saw it as an exercise to confirm the
operational readiness of the CAR as a whole. It is our view that,
given the compressed time frame, the CO should have been left to run a
regimental exercise, rather than having been rushed into a
brigade-level test of operational readiness.

With such a short period between warning and deployment, there was
virtually no time to conduct preparatory training for Operation
Deliverance. There is no evidence to suggest that any consideration
was given to training requirements for the new mission by the
officials responsible for the decision to commit Canadian troops for
the new mission, nor is there any evidence of training guidance or
direction being provided to the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle
Group by higher levels of command. This represents a significant
failure.

No significant training was conducted by the CARBG after the mission
changed from Operation Cordon (a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI
of the United Nations Charter) to Operation Deliverance (a peace
enforcement mission under Chapter VII). Various prerequisites for the
proper planning and conduct of training - such as a clear mission,
theatre-specific intelligence, mission-specific rules of engagement,
training equipment and vehicles, and sufficient time to train - were
not available. There was no opportunity for the newly constituted
battle group to train together. The CARBG deployed to Somalia, on a
potentially dangerous mission, without adequate training and without
the battle group functioning as a cohesive whole. It was a matter of
good fortune that they were not challenged by a serious show of force
on their arrival in theatre: the results could have been tragic.

Our overall conclusion is that professional soldiers wearing the flag
of Canada on their uniforms were sent to Somalia not properly prepared
for their mission. They were unprepared, in good part, because of key
deficiencies in their training. The mission called for troops who were
well led, highly disciplined, and able to respond flexibly to a range
of tasks that demanded patience, understanding, and sensitivity to the
plight of the Somali people. Instead they arrived in the desert
trained and mentally conditioned to fight.

In seeking remedies for the future, we urge the Canadian Forces to
acknowledge the central role that generic peacekeeping and
mission-specific training must play in mounting peace operations. Our
recommendations in this regard are summarized at the conclusion of
this summary.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The phrase 'Rules of Engagement' (ROE) refers to the directions
guiding the application of armed force by soldiers within a theatre of
operations. The ROE perform two fundamentally important tasks for
Canadian Forces members undertaking international miss ions. First,
they define the degree and manner of the force to which soldiers may
resort. Second, they delineate the circumstances and limitations
surrounding the application of that force. They are tantamount to
orders.

The record shows that CF members serving in Somalia fired weapons and
caused the loss of Somali lives in several incidents. Individually and
collectively, these incidents raise critical questions surrounding the
ROE governing CF members in Somalia. Did the ROE anticipate fully the
range of situations where the application of force would be possible?
Were the ROE clearly drafted? Was information about the ROE passed
adequately along the chain of command? Were CF members properly
trained in the ROE?

In answering these questions, we come back again to failures noted
elsewhere in our report: lack of clarity surrounding the mission in
Somalia; inadequate time to prepare, giving rise to hasty,
ill-conceived measures; a chain of command that did not com municate
the ROE clearly to its soldiers; deficient training in the ROE
generally; lack of training in the mission-specific ROE before
deployment and in theatre; and indiscipline by CF members in observing
the ROE.

More specifically, we find that the ROE reached Canadian soldiers in a
piecemeal, slow, and haphazard manner. Multiple, inconsistent versions
of the soldier's card explaining the ROE coexisted in
theatre. Moreover, the inter-pretation of the ROE was chang ed
substantially during operations. The ROE themselves were substantively
weak and incomplete. They failed, among other things, to address the
crucial distinction between a "hostile act" and "hostile intent."

The interpretation and application of the ROE created considerable
confusion among the troops. The highly questionable interpretations
offered by commanders added to the confusion, as did the failure to
consider adequately the issue of the possible non- application of the
ROE to simple thievery and to advise the soldiers accordingly.

The training conducted in the ROE in the pre-deployment and the
in-theatre phases alike was inadequate and substandard. Indeed, our
soldiers were poorly trained in the ROE, having been confused, misled,
and largely abandoned on this crucial issue by their senior
leaders. These realities contributed directly to serious practical
difficulties in applying the ROE while Canadian operations in Somalia
were continuing, notably with regard to the March 4th incident.

Our recommendations are intended to clarify the development of
training for, and application of, rules of engagement and to lend
greater certainty to them.

OPERATIONAL READINESS

The Chief of the Defence Staff and subordinate commanders are
responsible and accountable for the operational readiness of the
Canadian Forces. This responsibility is particularly important
whenever units or elements of the CF are about to be committed to
operations that are potentially dangerous, unusual, or of special
importance to the national interest. Therefore, it is incumbent on
officers in the chain of command to maintain an accurate picture of
the state of the armed forces at all times and to assess the
operational readiness of CF units and elements for employment in
assigned missions, before allowing them to be deployed on active
service or international security missions.

Clearly, it was unlikely that the CDS and his commanders at Land Force
Command and Land Force Central Area could know the state of any unit
without some reliable method for checking operational readiness. Yet
the extant system, the Operational Readiness and Effectiveness
Reporting System (ORES) was unreliable, and little effort was made to
install a dependable process before the assessments for deployment to
Somalia commenced. Therefore, because the CDS and his commanders could
not and did not know the 'start-state' of any unit in 1992, they could
not reliably determine what training or other activities, including
resupply of defective equipment, would be necessary to bring any unit
to an operationally ready 'end-state' without a detailed inspection at
unit level. Moreover, because the specific mission for Operation
Deliverance was not known in detail until after Canadian Joint Force
Somalia arrived in theatre, no specific assessment of mission
operational readiness and no assessment of operational effectiveness
could be made before the force deployed.

These critical flaws in the planning process suggest that the staff
assessments and estimates that were completed at all levels of
command, and especially those prepared for the CDS at NDHQ, which he
used to advise the government on whether to commit the Canadian Forces
to Somalia, were essentially subjective and unreliable. Furthermore,
these flaws, combined with the lack of command and staff effort to
verify the exact condition of units, suggest strongly that subsequent
planning and the decisions and actions of senior officers and
officials were likewise arbitrary and unreliable.

We found that there is fundamental confusion within NDHQ and the CF
officer corps about the important distinction between a unit that is
ready to be deployed and one that is ready to be employed on a
military mission. The question that seems not to have been asked by
any commander assessing unit readiness was, "ready for what?" The
failure to make specific findings of mission readiness and the
confusion of readiness to deploy with readiness for operations are
major problems.

There was no agreement or common understanding on the part of officers
as to the meaning of the term 'operational readiness'. Therefore,
because the term had no precise meaning in doctrine or policy, the
words came to mean whatever officers and commanders wanted them to
mean at the time. In other words, any officer could declare a unit to
be operationally ready without fear of contradiction, because there
were no standards against which to measure the declaration.

Another contributing factor was the notion held by officers in the
chain of command that operational readiness is simply a subjective
measurement and solely the responsibility of the commander on the
spot. Commanders at all levels seemed content to accept on faith alone
subordinates' declarations that the CAR and the CARBC were ready
without any concrete evidence that they had tested the readiness in a
realistic scenario. MGen MacKenzie testified before us that "funny
enough [readiness is] not a term we use... within the Army;
historically, it is a commander's responsibility to evaluate
readiness" according to his or her own standards.

Commanders were satisfied to attribute all failures of readiness to
LCol Morneault's "poor leadership", even though other serious problems
in the unit and in its preparations were evident. While such a
sequence might be possible when, for example a commanding officer is
found to be unfit and no other readiness problems exist, this was not
the case in the CAR. Clearly, leaders failed to assess rigorously in
the field all aspects of mission readiness of the CAR after they
issued orders to the unit.

Immediately prior to the deployment, commanders at all levels of the
SSF LFCA, LFC, and NDHQ had ample reason to check the operational
readiness of the newly formed CARBG for its new mission and few
reasons to assume that it was operationally ready for the mission in
Somalia. However, no effective actions were taken by any commander in
the chain of command to make such an assessment or to respond properly
to orders to do so.

The lack of objective standards and evaluations, an unquestioning and
unprofessional 'can-do' attitude among senior officers, combined with
other pressures - such as a perception that superiors wanted to hurry
the deployment - can bring significant pressure on commanders to make
a readiness declaration that might not be made otherwise. There is
sufficient evidence to suggest that this occurred during preparations
for Operation Deliverance.

The problems evident in CARBG during its tour in Somalia occurred in
conditions far more peaceful than were anticipated before
departure. If our soldiers had encountered heavy armed resistance in
Somalia, CARBG's lack of operational readiness might well have
resulted in large-scale tragedy rather than in a series of isolated
disasters and mishaps, damaging as these were.

MISSION PLANNING

Volume 3 analyzes how planning for the Somalia mission generally was
conducted by officers and DND officials during 1991-93. It provides a
thoroughly documented case study of how Canada planned and committed
Canadian Forces to an international operation. Our recommendations
suggest how Canada might plan better for peace support operations in
the future.

On the whole, regarding the Somalia mission, we found that reckless
haste and enthusiasm for high-risk, high-profile action undermined due
process and rational decision making at the most senior
levels. Doctrine, proven military processes, guidelines, and formal
policy were systematically disregarded. What guidelines and checklists
that did exist were treated with little respect. The deployment
therefore began with an uncertain mission, unknown tasks, ad hoc
command arrangements, an unconsolidated relationship to U.S. command,
and unclear rules of engagement. An international commitment initially
conceived in the Canadian tradition of peacekeeping was hastily
reshaped into an ill-considered military operation for which the CF
and the troops it sent had little preparation.

THE FAILURES OF SENIOR LEADERS

Volume 4 is the only one in which individual conduct is considered
separately from systemic or institutional activity. To be sure,
organizational failings merited our attention and emerge at many
points throughout the report in the detailed analysis of systemic or
institutional questions. However, this part of the report is reserved
for consideration of whether individual failings or shortcomings
existed in the Somalia deployment and whether individual misconduct
occurred. The curtailment of our mandate has necessarily required the
restriction of our analysis of individual shortcomings to the
pre-deployment and DGPA/document disclosure phase of our
endeavours. We informed those responsible for the in-theatre phase
that we would not reach findings on individual misconduct in respect
of that phase, and we withdrew the notices of serious shortcomings
given to them.

The first chapter of Volume 4 bears the title "The Failures of Senior
Leaders". The notion of leadership failure in this report involves the
application of the principles of accountability discussed earlier and
is informed by an appreciation of the qualities of leadership that we
describe in our chapter on that subject. However, one specific aspect
of failed leadership that is of importance in this discussion is the
shortcoming that occurs when individuals fail in their duty as a
commander.

The individual failures or misconduct that we describe were previously
identified and conveyed to individuals by means of the device referred
to as a section 13 notice. This is the provision in the Inquiries Act
stipulating that "No report shall be made against any person until
reasonable notice has been given to the person of the charge of
misconduct alleged against him and the person has been allowed full
opportunity to be heard in person or by counsel."

Recipients of section 13 notices received them early in our process
and before the witnesses testified. All section 13 notice recipients
were extended the opportunity to respond to their notices by calling
witnesses and by making oral and written submissions. This was in
addition to the rights they enjoyed throughout our proceedings to fair
and comprehensive disclosure, representation by counsel, and the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses.

The individuals whose actions are scrutinized in this volume of the
report are members of the forces who have had careers of high
achievement. Their military records, as one would expect of soldiers
who have risen so high in the CF are so far without blemish. The
Somalia deployment thus represents for them a stain on otherwise
distinguished careers. Justifications or excuses were advanced before
us that, if accepted, might modify or attenuate the conclusions we
have reached. These ranged from "the system performed well; it was
only a few bad apples" to "there will always be errors", from "I did
not know" or "I was unaware" to "it was not my responsibility" and "I
trusted my subordinates". We do not review these claims individually
in the pages of Volume 4, but we considered them carefully.

Another mitigating consideration is the fact that these individuals
can be seen as the products of a system that has set great store by
the can-do attitude. The reflex to say "yes sir" rather than to
question the appropriateness of a command or policy obviously runs
against the grain of free and open discussion, but it is ingrained in
military discipline and culture. However, leaders properly exercising
command responsibility must recognize and "assert not only their right
but their duty to advise against improper actions", for failing to do
so means that professionalism is lost.

THE MARCH 4TH INCIDENT

The shooting that occurred on the night of March 4, 1993, was a major
turning point in the deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. It
resulted in the death of one Somali national and the wounding of
another and may possibly have prepared the way for the tragedies of
March 16th. These events, in turn, could not be contained and resulted
in public ignominy for the Canadian Forces, leading eventually to this
Inquiry.

The shooting on March 4th was in itself the culmination of a dubious
interpretation of the Rules of Engagement to the effect that Canadian
soldiers could shoot at fleeing thieves or infiltrators under certain
circumstances.

The planning and execution of the mission by the CARBG's
Reconnaissance Platoon that night caused serious concern among some
other members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle
Group. Immediately after the shooting, Major Armstrong, the medical
officer who examined the body of Mr. Aruush, the Somali who died in
the incident, concluded that he had been "dispatched" and alerted the
Commanding Officer. In the days following, Major Jewer, the chief
medical officer, and Captain Potvin, the Padre, met with the
Commanding Officer to express similar concerns. Many suspected that
the two Somalis had been deceived, trapped, and shot, in violation of
the ROE. The authorities at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa
immediately expressed concern that the two men had been shot in the
back while running away from the Canadian compounds and that excessive
force might have been used.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the entire incident was the subject of
a cursory Summary Investigation agreed to by the Commanding Officer,
who designated a captain in his chain of command to report on the
incident. In other words, the Commanding Officer investigated his own
operational actions and decisions.

The Summary Investigation report concluded that the shooting was
within the ROE, absolved the Reconnaissance Platoon of any criminal
responsibility, and praised its work. This may have led other troops
to believe that all such incidents would be investigated in the same
spirit. In fact, in January and February there had been a number of
similar shootings at fleeing Somalis. There had also been known
instances of improper handling of prisoners, including the taking of
trophy-style photographs. All of these incidents had gone unpunished,
as did alleged beatings on the nights of March 14th and 15th, thus
possibly laying the groundwork for the brutal torture and killing of a
Somali teenager while in detention in the Canadian compound on March
16th.

Chapter 38 provides an exhaustive examination of the events of March
4th, the allegations subsequently made, the deficiencies of the
summary investigation, and the cover-up that ensued.

While this section makes specific findings, we reached one general
conclusion: the response of the chain of command to the
administrative, operational, and disciplinary problems manifested in
the March 4th operation was weak, untimely, inadequate, self-serving,
unjustifiable, and unbecoming the military leadership that our
soldiers deserve and the Canadian public expects. Integrity and
courage were subordinated to personal and institutional
self-interest. It is our belief, based on the evidence adduced before
us, that the failure of leadership immediately to address and remedy
the problems revealed by the March 4th incident may have made possible
the torture death of a Somali youth 12 days later.

OPENNESS AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO THE INQUIRY

In conducting our investigation, we encountered two unanticipated but
related obstacles that cast a large shadow on the degree of
co-operation exhibited by the Canadian Forces and the Department of
National Defence, in particular its public affairs directorate, in its
dealings with our Inquiry, as well as on the openness and transparency
of the Department in its dealings with the public. DND, through its
actions, hampered the progress and effectiveness of our Inquiry, and
left us with no choice but to resort to extraordinary investigative
processes in order to discharge our mandate appropriately.

The first obstacle relates to compliance by DND with our orders for
production of documents under the Inquiries Act, and the delays and
difficulties we faced in dealing with the Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team
(SILT).

The second obstacle, related to the first, concerns the manner in
which DND's public affairs directorate (referred to as the DGPA)
failed to comply with our order for disclosure and attempted to
destroy Somalia-related documents that we had requested. This matter
also involved probing DGPA's treatment of requests for information
about the Somalia incidents made by a CBC journalist, Mr. Michael
McAuliffe. This matter became a subject of concern for us since the
documentation requested by Mr. McAuliffe embraced information covered
by our order to DND for the production of documents.

Our terms of reference required us to investigate certain matters that
inevitably became intertwined with actions and decisions taken by the
Department of National Defence in responding to our orders for the
production of documents, and in processing Access to Information
requests regarding documents that were simultaneously the subject of
our investigation. As things turned out, these events lent further
weight to conclusions that we had reached concerning the poor state of
leadership and accountability in the upper echelons of Canada's
military - issues that became recurring themes throughout our
investigation and this report. These appear as the prevalence of
individual ambition, the blaming of subordinates, and blind loyalty to
the military institution over public disclosure and accountability.

The story of DND's compliance with our orders for production of
documents and later requests for specific documents might appear to
lack the drama of events in Somalia, but these issues evoke broader
policy concerns regarding leadership in the military, allegations of
cover-up, and ultimately, the openness and transparency of government
- concerns that are of great importance to those planning the future
of the Canadian Forces and, indeed, to government and Canadians in
general.

The Inquiries Act provides commissioners appointed under its terms
with broad powers of investigation and the right of access to any
information considered relevant to the subject under study. Actions
leading directly or deliberately to delay in producing documents or
the alteration of documents and files ordered for the purposes of
fulfilling a mandate under that Act should be viewed by all Canadians
as an affront to the integrity of the public inquiry process and to
our system of government. In that light, the story of noncompliance
with the orders of a public inquiry and the nature of the role played
by SILT in that story, which is recounted in Chapter 39, becomes all
the more shocking.

On a surface level, the events described in Chapter 39 suggest either
a lack of competence or a lack of respect for the rule of law and the
public's right to know. Digging deeper, the difficulties we
encountered involved tampering with and destruction of documents. The
cumulative effect of these actions on our work cannot be
overstated. We depended on the receipt of accurate information from
the Department on a timely basis in order to decide which issues to
investigate and how the hearings were to be conducted. The fact that
the production was not timely and the documents were incomplete to
such a great extent meant that the work of the Inquiry was delayed and
that our staff were constantly occupied with document-related issues.

Despite these obstacles, we were able to examine a number of issues
carefully and thoroughly. Although we made steady progress in our
work, the cumulative effect of the document-related setbacks was not
limited to inconvenience and delay. Ultimately, in conjunction with
other factors, the delay caused by document-related issues resulted in
the Government's sudden announcement directing an end to the hearings
and an accelerated reporting date. The unfortunate result was that
many important witnesses were not heard, and several important
questions that prompted the creation of our Inquiry remain unanswered.

It is clear that rather than assisting with the timely flow of
information to our Inquiry, SILT adopted a strategic approach to deal
with the Inquiry and engaged in a tactical operation to delay or deny
the disclosure of relevant information to us and, consequently, to the
Canadian public.

Perhaps the most troubling consequence of the fragmented, dilatory and
incomplete documentary record furnished to us by DND is that, when
this activity is coupled with the incontrovertible evidence of
document destruction, tampering, and alteration, there is a natural
and inevitable heightening of suspicion of a cover-up that extends
into the highest reaches of the Department of National Defence and the
Canadian Forces.

The seriousness of these concerns and their impact on the nature of
the investigation conducted by our Inquiry required that we recount
these events in considerable detail in Chapter 39.

MILITARY JUSTICE

In spite of the time constraints facing the Inquiry, it has been
possible to examine the full range of in-theatre and post-deployment
disciplinary incidents relating to Somalia. Having done so, it is
abundantly clear that the military justice system is replete with
systemic deficiencies that contributed to the problems we
investigated. Without substantial change to this system, it will
continue to demonstrate shortcomings in promoting discipline,
efficiency, and justice.

Essential to an understanding of the issues raised in Chapter 40 is an
appreciation of the extent to which the commanding officer is the
central figure in the military justice system. The commanding officer
has discretionary powers at most stages of the military justice
process - before and during investigations, prosecutions and
sentencing, and in the application of administrative and informal
sanctions. This discretion is pervasive, overwhelming, and largely
unfettered.

In short, a commanding officer who learns of possible misconduct can
convene a board of inquiry or order a summary investigation, a
Military Police investigation, or an informal review of the
allegation. Alternatively, the commanding officer may decide to take
no action at all.

If the commanding officer chooses to have alleged misconduct
investigated, the investigation may result in a recommendation for
action against an individual. Again, the commanding officer may
respond in any of several ways - among them disciplinary or
administrative action, or no action at all. If the commanding officer
chooses a particular course of action within the present disciplinary
system - summary trial, for example - he or she often holds further
discretionary powers.

Military Police may also decide to investigate possible
misconduct. They can choose of their own accord to investigate and,
within the law, select their investigative methods. However, the
powers of Military Police are, in practice, limited because they are
in the chain of command. As well, other factors limit their
effectiveness in traditional policing roles: their relative lack of
investigative experience, their conflicting loyalties as soldiers and
Military Police, and the reluctance of superiors to allocate
sufficient investigative resources.

The role of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) in investigations and the
decision to prosecute is more limited than that of Military Police. In
discharging the responsibility to provide legal advice to the decision
makers in the military justice system, JAG officers may advise
Military Police or the commanding officer on the legality of a
particular investigative tool, or they may help determine the
appropriate charge. However, there is no requirement that JAG
representatives be involved in investigations or charging
decisions. JAG officers do, however, prosecute and defend CF members
for service offences in courts martial.

Chapter 40 identifies a broad range of difficulties, such as conflicts
of interest, command influence, and lack of independence, that arose
in investigating and responding to misconduct of CF members shortly
before, during, and after the deployment to Somalia, and describes the
conditions within the military justice system that contributed to
these difficulties. It discusses the factors limiting the
effectiveness and fairness of the military justice system, and,
ultimately, the ability of the CF to discharge its mandate. The
chapter argues for a significantly restructured military justice
system to remedy many of the shortcomings of the present system and
presents recommendations accordingly.

THE MEFLOQUINE ISSUE

Mefloquine is a relatively new anti-malarial drug, first made
generally available to the Canadian public in 1993. It is used both to
prevent malaria (that is, as a prophylactic) and to treat
malaria. Mefloquine is used in areas where the local strains of
malaria have developed a resistance to other anti-malarial
drugs. Somalia is one such place.

Some suggestion has been made to this Inquiry that mefloquine caused
severe side effects, including abnormal and violent behaviour, among
some Canadian Forces personnel in Somalia. We were not able to explore
fully the possible impact of mefloquine. This would have required
additional hearings dedicated specifically to the issue, which time
did not permit. However, we report here our general findings about
mefloquine and its possible impact on operations in Somalia.

It is clear that mefloquine caused some minor problems in Somalia, as
might be expected from a review of the medical literature. We learned
of several incidents of gastro-intestinal upset, vivid dreams,
nightmares referred to by soldiers as "meflomares", and inability to
sleep following the use of this drug. Side effects - or at least the
minor side effects, and possibly also the major side effects -
appeared to be most pronounced in the 24 to 48 hours after taking
mefloquine.

If mefloquine did in fact cause or contribute to some of the
misbehaviour that is the subject of this Inquiry, CF personnel who
were influenced by the drug might be partly or totally excused for
their behaviour. However, for reasons described more fully in Chapter
41, we are not able to reach a final conclusion on this issue. We can
offer only general observations about the decision to prescribe
mefloquine for personnel deployed to Somalia:


	1. DND's decision in 1992 to prescribe mefloquine for CF
personnel deployed to Somalia appears to be consistent with the
medical practice at the time. This view is based on medical literature
from that time suggesting that mefloquine was an appropriate
anti-malarial drug for troops in Somalia and that severe
neuropsychiatric symptoms were rare - in the order of one in 10,000 to
one in 13,000. U.S. troops also used mefloquine, although in a weaker
form. We cannot say, however, whether DND took adequate precautions to
ensure that persons susceptible to severe psychiatric disorders did
not receive mefloquine, since even in 1992 it was known that
mefloquine should not be prescribed to such individuals.

	2. At the time of the deployment, there seems to have been no
strong evidence that mefloquine might interact with alcohol to produce
or increase the risk of abnormal behaviour or to magnify such
behaviour. The possible adverse effects of mixing alcohol with
mefloquine were analyzed in detail in the medical literature only
after the Somalia deployment. DND, therefore, cannot be faulted for
failing to relate the consumption of alcohol to the use of mefloquine.

	3. More recent medical information suggests that severe
adverse effects from mefloquine used as a prophylactic are not as rare
as first thought, but views on this point conflict, and further
investigation may be necessary.

	4. Mefloquine use could have been a factor in the abnormal
behaviour of some troops in Somalia. However, one cannot begin to
determine whether mefloquine contributed to the behaviour of the
individuals in question without answers to the following questions:


		1. Did the members in question use mefloquine?

		2. Did any of the members in question receive a more
powerful 'treatment' dose of mefloquine? This would happen only if
they had contracted malaria. The more powerful treatment doses were
known even at the time of the Somalia deployment to carry a greater
risk of neuropsychiatric disorders than the weaker dose that most
troops received to prevent malaria.

		3. Did any of the members in question have a history
of psychiatric disorders that could increase the risk of severe side
effects from mefloquine?

		4. What day of the week did they take mefloquine? What
day or days of the week did their misbehaviour occur?

		5. Did they complain at any point about any symptoms,
mild or severe, that are now known to be associated with mefloquine?

		6. Did anyone notice abnormal behaviour by the members
in question in the few days after the latter consumed mefloquine? If
so, what was the behaviour? Is it reasonable to say that mefloquine
was or may have been a cause? Might some other factor instead have
caused or contributed to the behaviour (alcohol consumption, racist
attitudes, generally belligerent or aggressive nature of the
individual, stressful environment, official tolerance of extreme
behaviour)?  It is evident that further investigation is warranted
before any firm conclusions about the role of mefloquine can be drawn.

TRUNCATION OF THE INQUIRY AND THE UNFINISHED MANDATE

Under the revised terms of reference given to us in the aftermath of
the Federal Court of Canada decision characterizing as unlawful the
Governments decision to curtail our Inquiry, we were instructed to
report on the pre-deployment phase of the Somalia operation and were
given discretion to report on all other matters in our original
mandate to the extent that we deemed advisable. In compliance with
this adjusted mandate, our report describes in detail all the many
matters that we have been able to canvass in the time available. It
also traces the outline of what we were originally asked to
investigate but were unable to complete due to the truncation of our
work.

There is an obvious public interest in discovering the answers to
questions about the Somalia affair that remain unexplored.

Chapter 42 begins with an account of our efforts to gain the time
needed to do justice to the Inquiry's mandate. We go on to examine the
Governments decision to truncate that mandate. We conclude with a
review of the portions of the mandate that we were forced to abandon -
the Inquiry's unfinished business.

All these matters were taken into account in the request for an
extension of time that would have led us to report by December 1997,
as opposed to June 1997. We were ready to proceed with these matters:
issues and witnesses had been identified, and interviews of witnesses
had commenced.

We have fully investigated and completed the pre-deployment
phase. With respect to the in-theatre phase of the deployment we
received and considered sufficient testimony and extensive documentary
evidence pertaining to the vast majority of the matters specified in
our terms of reference. In this context, the extensive probing of the
shooting of two fleeing Somali civilians on the night of March 4,
1993, provided substantial, significant, and cogent evidence for the
fulfillment of almost all items of our terms of reference.

However, some of our work remains undone. We obviously could not
address, in full detail, the overall post-deployment response of the
chain of command to the problems encountered during the Somalia
mission, and the behaviour of senior officers and officials for the
purpose of assessing their personal accountability, because our
hearings were brought to an end before the most important witnesses
relevant to that issue and time period could be called. Our schedule
was aborted just as we were beginning to question the highest levels
of leadership of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National
Defence and to the allegations of cover-up with respect to some
incidents. An immediate result was the withdrawal of a number of
notices already sent to individuals warning them of possible adverse
comment on their conduct. Thus, we could address systemic issues
arising out of in-theatre and post-deployment events, but could not,
in our report, identify any individual misconduct or failings
involved. The Government's decision effectively allowed many of those
in senior leadership positions during the deployment to avoid entirely
accountability for their conduct, decisions, and actions during and
after the mission.

More specifically, we were not able to hear all relevant testimony of
the senior leaders who held the offices of Minister of National
Defence, Deputy Minister of National Defence, Judge Advocate General,
and Chief of the Defence Staff at the material times. These were the
very officials ultimately responsible and who would, in the normal
course of events, have been ultimately accountable for the conduct of
the deployment; the policies under which it was carried out; errors,
failures, and misconduct that may have occurred in its planning,
execution, and aftermath; and ensuring that appropriate responses were
made by the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence to
problems that arose or were identified.

We would also have called to testify the executive assistants and
senior staff in the offices of these senior officials and leaders, not
only to receive their evidence with respect to their own conduct and
that of their superiors and associates, but also to understand how
their offices were managed, the functions, roles and responsibilities
they and their staff were assigned and performed, and the policies or
standing operating procedures in place to guide the management of
their offices.

Government spokespersons frequently asserted that the decision about
whether and when to call senior leaders or officials to testify was
entirely our responsibility and within our discretion. They stated
that we could easily have called anyone we wished within the time
allotted to us to complete our work. One need only examine the terms
of reference drafted by that same Government to recognize immediately
how unrealistic these assertions were. Clauses relating to senior
leadership essentially directed us to examine their responses to the
"operational, administrative and disciplinary problems" encountered
during the deployment. In order to assess those responses, it was
first necessary to identify, independently and painstakingly, what the
problems were - and they were legion.

Had the military admitted to some of the problems at the beginning, it
would have simplified our work. But their persistent denial - until
overwhelming evidence was adduced in our proceedings and emerged from
incidents in Bosnia - made this exercise necessary. We would have been
justly criticized had we relied on the very leaders and investigators
whose conduct and responses we were examining and assessing to define
the problems for us. Even more, we would have been justly criticized
had we examined senior leaders about their possible involvement in a
cover-up without first establishing or receiving evidence from which
it could be inferred that a cover-up may actually have occurred or
been attempted; the nature and scope of any cover-up; what information
had been covered up; and how the leader in question might have
participated.

The Minister of National Defence at the time of the Government's
decision to truncate the Inquiry, Mr. Young, also asserted frequently
and to our amazement, that all that needs to be known about "what
happened" in Somalia is known. We continue to believe that important
facts concerning the deployment and its aftermath are not yet known or
remain obscure. We thought, because of its public statements, that the
Government also believed that it was essential, and in the interests
of the Canadian military and its renewal, to expose, understand,
confront, and analyze the facts publicly and in an independent,
non-partisan setting, as well as address all the important matters
raised in the terms of reference. Obviously, we were mistaken, as the
Government abandoned its earlier declared interest in holding to
account senior leaders and officials who participated in the planning
and execution of the mission and responded to the problems that
arose. Once again, history repeats itself, in that only the lower
ranks have been made to account for the marked failures of their
leaders.

We fear that the implementation of hastily crafted and mostly cosmetic
reforms, coupled with the abandonment of an interest in accountability
or an implementation of reforms unrelated to specific facts and
problems identified and assessed in a thorough, independent, and
impartial process, will serve merely to postpone the day of reckoning
that must surely come.

Although the truncation of our investigation and hearings has
prevented us from fully addressing some significant facts, problems,
errors, and failures arising out of the deployment, we have concluded
that it is our duty, and in the interests of the Canadian public and
its armed forces, at least to identify unresolved questions and issues
associated with some of the significant incidents that occurred. It is
to be hoped that these issues and questions will be addressed and
resolved and appropriate remedial measures taken.

In Chapter 42 we outline further questions and issues we would have
asked and explored, if the truncation of our Inquiry had not occurred,
under the following general headings:


	- the February 17th riot at the Bailey bridge

	- The incident of March 4, 1993

	- The March 16th incident

	- The March 17, 1993 killing of a Red Cross guard

	- The detention of alleged thieves

	- The actions, decisions, responsibilities, and accountability
of senior officials

	- The Deputy Minister

	- The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Chief of the
Defence Staff

	- The Minister of National Defence

	- The Judge Advocate General

	- Further allegations of cover-up

	- Systemic issues All the unanswered questions raised under
these general headings were on our agenda and incorporated in the work
plan provided to the Government on November 27, 1996 along with
various scenarios for the completion of our work, one of which would
have committed us to providing a comprehensive report on all matters
in our terms of reference by the end of 1997. This proposal went into
considerable detail, outlining a schedule of hearings and providing a
list of important witnesses that we would call.

We were confident that we could examine all the issues outlined here
in a thorough and meaningful way, and complete our report by the end
of 1997 We were fully aware of the need for economy and efficiency in
public inquiries when we made this commitment. We had experienced
extreme frustration when delays encountered in obtaining important
documents and in investigating reports of the destruction of military
records forced us to ask for more time. Had it not been for these
unforeseen developments, we certainly would have completed our work in
little more than two years from the date of our appointment.

THE MILITARY IN CANADIAN SOCIETY

Just as the Somalia mission has caused an examination of the
relationship between military and civil authority, so too has it
afforded a review of the relationship between the military and
Canadian society at large. Such a review is important at this time,
given the impact of the Somalia deployment on the reputation of the
Canadian Forces and on the esteem in which Canadians have
traditionally held the military.

We take as a given that Canada, as a sovereign nation, will continue
to need a professional armed force to ensure its security. The purpose
of this chapter is to review the place of the military in Canadian
society. In doing so, it examines factors affecting the armed forces
in Canada, military characteristics and values, public affairs and
public relations, the purpose of the armed forces and their training,
matters such as aggressivity and discipline, respect for law, rights
and obligations, and, finally, the core values of Canada's armed
forces.

Nothing distinguishes the soldier from the civilian more strikingly
than the acceptance that one of the basic rights that may have to be
forgone in the national interest is the right to life. This
requirement to give up one's life for one's country is spoken of in
the military literature as "the clause of unlimited liability". This
is the essential defining or differentiating characteristic separating
soldiers from their fellow citizens.

This remarkable quality depends for its existence on two
conditions. The first is discipline, which begins with the example of
self-discipline that leaders impart. The leaders must be the first, in
terms of readiness, to sacrifice themselves for their troops. In
response, soldiers undertake to do their duty willingly, offering
their lives if need be. The second is respect for the military ethos,
with its emphasis on the core values of integrity, courage, loyalty,
selflessness, and self-discipline. Every military operation from Vimy
to Dieppe, Ortona to Caen, Kapyong to the former Yugoslavia has
reaffirmed the need for such an ethos.

Some contend that there is a danger that the ethos of the Canadian
Forces is weakening. Recent trends toward more civilian- and
business-oriented practices, although of assistance in the management
of DND, are seen by some within the military as having a negative
impact on the Canadian Forces. Their belief is that, as military
members attempt to accommodate not only the practices but also the
characteristics and values underlying those practices, essential
military values are being put at risk.

In light of the Somalia experience, it may not prove sufficient simply
to articulate an ethos and exhort soldiers to follow it. It would seem
that a more fundamental need exists for a confirmatory and probative
exercise to demonstrate that all soldiers, but particularly the senior
officers, live by the military ethos and personify its core
values. The military, led by its senior officers, needs to reclaim the
ethical high ground.

We urge the senior leaders of the Canadian Forces to redefine the
characteristics and values of the Canadian military and to establish
the capability to monitor itself on an ongoing basis. In that process
it will be critical to confirm those core values without which the
health of the military profession in Canada cannot be restored. In the
process of this reassessment, the CF leadership should be guided by
the imperative that they must be prepared to conduct operations in
peace and war in accordance with Canadian standards, values, laws, and
ethics.

Soldiers wear the official uniform of Canada. They display the
Canadian flag on those uniforms when on missions out of the
country. Society's expectations of the nation's flag-bearers are
indeed higher than for the average citizen. Those expectations include
the notion that soldiers serve as a symbol of the national character.

An enlightened public, we believe, will accept that its modern
military, even as it strives to be sensitive to changes in society,
cannot shift away from its core values. A failure of military values
lies at the heart of the Somalia experience. It is to be hoped that
the public, led by politicians and the media, will support the
military in its endeavour once again to occupy in the public
imagination its special position as a repository of the nation's
values.

THE NEED FOR A VIGILANT PARLIAMENT

Canada has begun a new relationship with its armed forces, one that
arguably requires greater involvement by members of Parliament and
Canadians generally in the direction, supervision, and control of the
Canadian Forces. Civil control of the military may be a defining
characteristic of liberal democracies, but it does not invariably
occur. Civil control of the military, whether it is operating in
Canada or abroad, should come from attentive citizens acting through
an informed, concerned, and vigilant Parliament.

There is a perceived need to strengthen the role of Parliament in the
scrutiny and development of defence policy. Moreover, it is possible
that this goal can be achieved by establishing an effective mechanism
in Parliament to oversee the defence establishment and by making a
few, but significant, amendments to the National Defence Act.

The quintessential condition for control of the military and all
aspects of national defence is a vigilant Parliament. During the
period between 1949 and 1989, the missions, tasks, organization, and
functioning of the armed forces were largely fixed by the
circumstances of the Cold War. The oversight of the armed services by
members of Parliament during this period was largely of a pro forma
nature. Since 1989, however, the Canadian Forces have increasingly
been called on to serve Canada in complex situations involving
uncertain alliances, where the missions or the applicable doctrine are
not always clear, and resources, too often, are inadequate.

Given this reality, Parliament must exercise greater diligence in
critically monitoring the terms agreed to, or set by, the government
for the employment of the Canadian Forces overseas, and safeguarding
members of the armed forces from unreasonable risks; it must also
monitor the operations of commanders and troops in the field. In 1994,
a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons
reported that "whatever our individual views on particular issues of
defence policy or operations, there was one matter on which we agreed
almost from the beginning - that there is a need to strengthen the
role of Parliament in the scrutiny and development of defence policy."
Proponents of a greater role for Parliament also see a need to
strengthen Parliament's involvement in other important areas of
national defence. Their argument proceeds on the basis that Canada
requires a modern and more effective mechanism for the greater control
of national defence, one that is better suited to a sovereign liberal
democracy and to the circumstances that the CF will most likely
encounter at home and abroad.

Conducting inquiries of this nature arguably should be Parliament's
responsibility, although it does not as yet do this. To achieve this
goal of more effective oversight, Parliament's mechanisms for inquiry
must be improved. A starting point in this regard, as discussed in
Chapter 44, might be to have the powers and responsibilities of the
Minister of National Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff and, in
particular, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, clarified in
law. We also recommend that there be a parliamentary review of the
adequacy of the National Defence Act every five years. This would also
strengthen the role of Parliament and ensure that it increases, while
also providing the military with increased access to Parliament.

CONCLUSION

It is inappropriate, at this point, to speak in terms of a conclusion
to the Somalia debacle. Our investigation has been curtailed, and
important questions remain unanswered. Somalia, unfortunately, will
continue to be a painful and sensitive topic for Canada's military for
years to come. There can be no closure to this subject until the
myriad problems that beset the Canadian Forces and the Department of
National Defence are addressed comprehensively and effectively.

We began this report by expressing our sincere hope that the Somalia
operation represented the nadir of the fortunes of Canada's
contemporary military, since there seemed to us to be little room for
further descent. Regardless of whether the Somalia mission represents,
in historical terms, the lowest ebb, the mission certainly revealed
much about the military's current low estate.

The stigma of failure must be attached to the Somalia deployment
because the mission failed in so many important ways. While it makes
for dispiriting reading, a review of our findings on fundamental
matters shows the extent of the morass into which our military has
fallen.

Leadership was central to our Inquiry, because at issue was the extent
to which the mission failed because of leadership
shortcomings. Throughout this report, we ask repeatedly whether what
ought to have been done was in fact done. Too often, our answer is
"no".

Accountability was ever before us, since the whole purpose of an
investigative inquiry is to provide a full accounting of what has
transpired. What the Government of the day and the Canadian people
were seeking from our Inquiry were our findings on the accountability
of senior CF officers and DND officials for the failures of the
Somalia mission. We provide principles of accountability to be used as
the yardsticks by which we assess the actions and decisions of senior
leaders. Again, too often, we find that those actions and decisions
were scandalously deficient.

Chain of command, if not effective, consigns the military enterprise
to failure. In our Inquiry, where the task is to examine and analyze
the sufficiency of the actions and decisions taken by leaders and the
effectiveness of the operation as a whole, the importance of an
effective chain of command is very clear. Regrettably, our conclusion
is that the chain of command, whether in theatre or in Ottawa at NDHQ,
failed utterly at crucial points throughout the mission and its
aftermath.

Discipline, whose chief purpose is to harness of the capacity of the
individual to the needs of the group, is initially imposed through the
rigours of training. The ultimate goal of military discipline is to
lead individual soldiers to the stage where they control their own
conduct and actions. The probability of success for a particular
mission will vary in proportion to the extent to which there is good
discipline among soldiers. In the lead-up to the deployment, as well
as in Somalia itself, that state of discipline among the troops was
alarmingly substandard - a condition that persisted without
correction.

Mission planning entails proper planning and preparation. Where
inadequacies occur in these areas, the conditions for mission failure
are created. Substantial planning failures and inadequacies were
manifest in such things as last-minute changes to the mission, its
location, the tasks involved, the rules governing the use of force,
the organization, composition and structure of the force, as well as
in shortfalls in logistical support, weapons and materiel, and force
training.

Suitability focuses on the qualities of the unit selected for service
in Somalia. With the selection of the CAR to serve in Somalia came the
need for us to evaluate the adequacy of that choice by senior
leadership, given such realities as recognized deficiencies in the
organization and leadership of the Regiment, the restructuring and
downsizing of the Regiment, the failure to remedy known disciplinary
problems, and the substantial turnover in personnel just prior to
deployment. Our examination of this question leads us to conclude that
the CAR was clearly unsuited, in the mission-specific sense, to serve
in Somalia.

Training is the bedrock of discipline and the foundation for the
professional image of the armed forces. Fundamental to the operational
readiness of a unit is the question of whether troops are well trained
to perform all aspects of the specific mission for which the unit is
being deployed. In this report, we have striven to answer the question
of whether the soldiers who were deployed to Somalia were properly
trained for their mission. This involved an assessment of the nature
and adequacy of the actual training received and the policies
underlying that training, together with an examination of whether the
performance of our soldiers could have been improved or enhanced if
they had been exposed to additional, more focused and sophisticated
training. Our conclusion regarding mission-specific training is that
on almost every count the Somalia mission must rate as a significant
failure.

Rules of engagement refer to the operational directions that guide the
application of armed force by soldiers within a theatre of operations
and define the degree, manner, circumstances, and limitations
surrounding the application of that force. Our task was to evaluate
the extent to which the rules of engagement were effectively
interpreted, understood and applied at all levels of the Canadian
Forces' chain of command. We find that the ROE were poorly drafted,
slow to be transmitted, never the subject of proper training, and
inconsistently interpreted and applied. Moreover, we found serious
deficiencies in the Canadian policy and procedures for the
development, formulation, and transmission of ROE.

Operational readiness entails a rigorous and comprehensive assessment
of whether an assigned unit is ready to mount its mission in an
operational theatre. In some sense, the concept embraces all the
matters described to this point. If a unit is led by competent and
accountable leaders who respect and adhere to the imperatives of the
chain of command system; if the soldiers serving under these leaders
are properly recruited and screened, cohesive, well trained and
disciplined; if they have a clear understanding of adequately
conceived and transmitted rules of engagement, then one can have
confidence that this is a unit that is operationally ready to deploy
and to be employed. To our deep regret, we came to negative
conclusions about each of these elements and found that the Canadian
Airborne Regiment, in a fundamental sense, was not operationally ready
to deploy and be employed for its mission.

Cover-up has been used in this report to describe a deliberate course
of conduct that aims to frustrate broader moral, legal, or public
claims to information and involves a purposeful attempt at
concealment. In the military, laws and regulations impose specific
duties in relation to reporting, retaining, or divulging
information. In our inquiry, the reporting of significant incidents in
theatre and the adequacy of the investigations prompted by such
reports revealed the existence of one kind of cover-up, while the
alteration and falsification of documents and the manipulation of
access to information processes led to another. Also, a third variety
emerged, as many of the documents to which we were entitled and that
were pledged publicly to us by leaders, both governmental and
military, reached us with deliberate tardiness, or in incomplete form,
or not at all. We found deep moral and legal failings in this area
when we unearthed the origins of cover-up in both the incident of
March 4, 1993, and in our examination of the public affairs
directorate of DND.

It gives us no satisfaction to have employed the vocabulary of shame
in describing what has transpired. We believe that there is no less
direct yet honest way to describe what we have found. Little honour is
to be found in this failure.

The failure was profoundly one of leadership. Although in this report
we have identified some individual failings - primarily in relation to
the pre-deployment phase of the mission - the failings that we have
recounted in the greatest detail have been those that concern
organizational or group responsibility for institutional or systemic
shortcomings. The CF and DND leaders to whom this applies are those
who occupied the upper tier of their organizations during the relevant
periods. The cadre of senior leaders who were responsible for the
Somalia mission and its aftermath must bear responsibility for
shortcomings in the organization they oversaw.

The senior leadership about which we have been concerned are an elite
group. Until now, theirs have been lives of achievement, commendation,
and reward. We are sensitive to the fact that implication in an
inquiry such as ours, with its processes for the microscopic
examination of past events and issues, can be a deeply distressing
experience. Some who were members of this select group at the relevant
time may even complain of having been tarred with the Somalia
brush. We have little sympathy for such complaints. With leadership
comes responsibility.

Many of the senior leaders about whom we have spoken in this report
have retired or moved on to other things. In our view, this can only
be to the good of the armed forces. It is time for a new leadership to
emerge in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces,
and it is time for that new leadership to move the forces in a new
direction. Our dedicated and long-suffering soldiers deserve at least
this much.

In our report, we make hundreds of findings, both large and small, and
offer 160 recommendations. While what we propose is not a blueprint
for rectifying all that ails the military, if the reforms we suggest
are conscientiously considered and acted on with dispatch, we believe
that the healing process can

Recommendations

Table of Contents

	1. Leadership

	2. Accountability

	3. Chain of Command

	4. Discipline

	5. Personnel Selection and Screening

	6. Training

	7. Rules of Engagement

	8. Operational Readiness

	9. Mission Planning

	10. Military Planning

	11. Openness and Disclosure

	12. Military Justice

	13. Conclusion


RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 15 - LEADERSHIP

We recommend that:

15.1&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff adopt formal criteria,
along the lines of the core qualities of military leadership, other
necessary attributes, and indicative performance factors set out in
Chapter 15 of this Report, as the basis for describing the leadership
necessary in the Canadian Forces, and for orienting the selection,
training, development and assessment of leaders.

15.2&nbsp&nbsp The core qualities and other necessary attributes set
out in Chapter 15 of this Report be applied in the selection of
officers for promotion to and within general officer ranks. These core
qualities are integrity, courage, loyalty, selflessness and
self-discipline. Other necessary attributes are dedication, knowledge,
intellect, perseverance, decisiveness, judgement, and physical
robustness.

15.3&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff adopt formal criteria
for the accountability of leaders within the Canadian Forces derived
from the principles of accountability set out in Chapter 16 of this
Report, and organized under the headings of accountability,
responsibility, supervision, delegation, sanction and knowledge.

15.4&nbsp&nbsp The Canadian Forces make a concerted effort to improve
the quality of leadership at all levels by ensuring adoption of and
adherence to the principles embodied in the findings and
recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry regarding the selection,
screening, promotion and supervision of personnel; the provision of
appropriate basic and continuing training; the demonstration of
self-discipline and enforcement of discipline for all ranks; the chain
of command, operational readiness and mission planning; and the
principles and methods of accountability expressed throughout this
Report.

Chapter 16 - ACCOUNTABILITY

We recommend that:

16.1&nbsp&nbsp The National Defence Act, as a matter of high priority,
be amended to establish an independent review body, the Office of the
Inspector General, with well defined and independent jurisdiction and
comprehensive powers, including the powers to:


	1. evaluate systemic problems in the military justice system;

	2. conduct investigations into officer misconduct, such as
failure to investigate, failure to take corrective action, personal
misconduct, waste and abuse, and possible injustice to individuals;

	3. protect those who report wrongdoing from reprisals; and

	4. protect individuals from abuse of authority and improper
personnel actions, including racial harassment.

16.2&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister
of National Defence institute a comprehensive audit and review of:


	1. the duties, roles and responsibilities of all military
officers and civilian officials to define better and more clearly
their tasks, functions and responsibilities;

	2. the adequacy of existing procedures and practices of
reporting, record keeping, and document retention and disposal,
including the adequacy of penalties for failures to comply; and

	3. the duties and responsibilities of military officers and
departmental officials at National Defence Headquarters in advising
government about intended or contemplated military activities or
operations.

16.3&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff incorporate the values,
principles and processes of accountability into continuing education
of officer cadets at the Royal Military College and in staff training,
command and staff training, and senior command courses. In particular,
such education and training should establish clearly the
accountability requirements in the command process and the issuance of
orders, and the importance of upper ranks setting a personal example
with respect to morality and respect for the rule of law.

16.4&nbsp&nbsp To strengthen the capacity of Parliament to supervise
and oversee defence matters, the National Defence Act be amended to
require a detailed annual report to Parliament regarding matters of
major interest and concern to the operations of the National Defence
portfolio and articulating performance evaluation standards. Areas to
be addressed should include, but not be limited to:


	1. a description of operational problems;

	2. detailed disciplinary accounts;

	3. administrative shortcomings;

	4. fiscal and resource concerns; and

	5. post-mission assessments.

16.5&nbsp&nbsp The National Defence Act be amended to require a
mandatory parliamentary review of the adequacy of the act every five
years.

16.6&nbsp&nbsp The Queen's Regulations and Orders be amended to
provide for a special and more effective form of military career
review procedure to deal with cases of intimidation and harassment
related to the Somalia deployment and this Commission of Inquiry.

16.7&nbsp&nbsp Such special career review boards be entirely
independent and impartial committees and contain representation from
outside the military, including judges or other respected members of
the larger community, to ensure transparency and objectivity in this
process.

16.8&nbsp&nbsp Decisions of these special career review boards be
subject to a further effective review by a special committee of the
House of Commons or the Senate or a judge of the Federal Court.

16.9&nbsp&nbsp In the event that a finding is made that reprisals have
occurred and career advancement has been adversely affected, a
mechanism for redress be available.

16.10&nbsp&nbsp For the next five years, an annual report reviewing
the career progression of all those who have testified before or
otherwise assisted the Inquiry be prepared by the Chief of the Defence
Staff for consideration by a special committee of the House of Commons
or the Senate.

16.11&nbsp&nbsp A specific process be established, under the purview
of the proposed Inspector General, designed to protect soldiers who,
in the future, bring reports of wrongdoing to the attention of their
superiors.

16.12&nbsp&nbsp The Queen's Regulations and Orders Article 19 and
other official guidelines and directives be amended to demonstrate
openness and receptivity to legitimate criticism and differing points
of view, so that members of the military enjoy a right of free
expression to the fullest extent possible, consistent with the need to
maintain good order, discipline, and national security.

Chapter 17 - THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

We recommend that:

17.1&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff:


	1. confirm in doctrine and in orders that the chain of command
is the sole mechanism for transmitting orders and directions to the
Canadian Forces;

	2. confirm in doctrine and in orders that staff officers are
never part of the chain of command and have no authority to issue
orders except in the name of their respective commanders; and

	3. in the case of a specific operation, improve existing
mechanisms for reviewing, confirming and publishing the chain of
command.

17.2&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that technical
networks, such as legal, medical or engineering specialist networks,
do not interfere with or confuse the chain of command between
commanders.

17.3&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish general
concepts and principles for the command of Canadian Forces contingents
on international operations. These concepts and principles should then
be instilled through training and used to frame particular orders for
commanders of specific missions.

17.4&nbsp&nbsp For greater clarity, and to remedy deficiencies in
existing practices1 the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all
commanders of Canadian Forces contingents destined for international
operations are given operations orders concerning the chain of
command:


	1. within the contingent;

	2. between the Canadian Forces contingent and allied
commanders; and

	3. between the deployed contingent and the Chief of the
Defence Staff or subordinate commanders.

17.5&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff conduct national
training exercises routinely to test and evaluate the Canadian Forces
chain of command in likely or planned operational settings.

Chapter 18 - DISCIPLINE

We recommend that:

18.1&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff institute an official
policy on screening aspirants for all leadership positions, beginning
with the selection of master corporals:


	1. identifying self-discipline as a precondition of both
commissioned and non-commissioned officership; and

	2. providing for the evaluation of the individual in terms of
self-discipline, including the ability to control aggressive and
impulsive behaviour.

18.2&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the
importance, function and application of discipline be taught in all
officer leadership training, including Royal Military College, staff
and command college courses, and senior command courses.

18.3&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff modify the performance
evaluation process to ensure that each individual's standard of
self-discipline is assessed in the annual performance evaluation
report form, along with the individual's performance in applying
discipline when exercising authority.

18.4&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish the head of
Canadian Forces personnel (currently the Assistant Deputy Minister
Personnel) as the focal point for discipline at the senior staff level
in National Defence Headquarters, with advice and support from the
Director General of Military Legal Services and the Director of
Military Police. To this end, the head of personnel should establish
and review policy on discipline, monitor all Canadian Forces plans and
programs to ensure that discipline is considered, and assess the
impact of discipline on plans, programs, activities and operations,
both as they are planned and regularly as they are implemented.

18.5&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff emphasize the importance
of discipline by reviewing frequent and regular reports of the
Inspector General, and by requiring the head of personnel to report at
least monthly at a Daily Executive Meeting on the state of discipline
throughout the Canadian Forces, both inside and outside the chain of
command, and by personally overseeing any necessary follow-up.

18.6&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine
and practice that discipline be identified as a determining factor in
assessing the operational readiness of any unit or formation.

18.7&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine
and practice that during operations, all officers and non-commissioned
officers must monitor discipline closely; and that the head of
personnel oversee and, at the end of each mission, report on
discipline.

18.8&nbsp&nbsp To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, the Chief
of the Defence Staff undertake regularly a formal evaluation of the
policies, procedures and practices that guide and influence the
administration of discipline in the Canadian Forces.

Chapter 20 - PERSONNEL SELECTION AND SCREENING

We recommend that:

20.1&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff enforce adherence to the
following principles in the Canadian Forces promotion and appointment
system:


	1. that merit be a predominant factor in all promotion
decisions; and

	2. that the operational needs of the Service always have
priority over individual career considerations and administrative
convenience.

20.2&nbsp&nbsp To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, and to
avoid minimization or concealment of personnel problems, the Chief of
the Defence Staff modify the Performance Evaluation Report system to
ensure that a frank assessment is rendered of Canadian Forces members
and that poor conduct or performance is noted for future reference by
superiors (whether or not the matter triggers formal disciplinary or
administrative action).

20.3&nbsp&nbsp The proposed Inspector General conduct periodic reviews
of appointments to key leadership positions in the Canadian Forces to
ensure that the proper criteria are being applied and that such
appointments are as competitive as possible.

20.4&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that good
discipline is made an explicit criterion in all promotion and
appointment decisions.

20.5&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff develop formal criteria
for appointment to key command positions, including unit and sub-unit
commands, deviation from which would require the formal approval of
the Chief of the Defence Staff.

20.6&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that, for any
future composite combat arms unit (such as the Canadian Airborne
Regiment):


	1. formalized criteria for selection to the unit are
established;

	2. the Commanding Officer have maximum freedom in selecting
personnel for that unit; and

	3. the Commanding Officer have maximum freedom to employ
personnel as the Commanding Officer deems appropriate.

20.7&nbsp&nbsp Canadian Forces Administrative Orders 20-50 and 20-46,
which deal with the screening of Canadian Forces personnel for
overseas deployments, be amended to:


	1. place priority on discipline as a criterion for selecting
personnel for overseas deployment;

	2. make consideration of the behavioural suitability
indicators mandatory; and

	3. make it clear that although the behavioural suitability
indicators listed in Canadian Forces Administrative Order 20-50, as
well as the option of referring cases for assessment by behavioural
specialists, can assist commanding officers in screening personnel for
deployment, they in no way displace or qualify commanding officers'
responsibility or accountability for screening personnel under their
command.

20.8&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and issue clear
and comprehensive guidelines to commanders at all levels regarding
prohibited racist and extremist conduct. The guidelines should define
and list examples of racist behaviour and symbolism and should include
a list and description of extremist groups to which Canadian Forces
members may not belong or lend their support.

20.9&nbsp&nbsp The Canadian Forces continue to monitor racist group
involvement and affiliation among Canadian Forces members.

20.10&nbsp&nbsp The Department of National Defence and the Canadian
Forces clarify their position on the extent of their obligations under
applicable privacy and human rights laws in screening applicants and
members of the Canadian Forces for behavioural suitability, including
racist group affiliation.

20.11&nbsp&nbsp The Department of National Defence and the Government
of Canada review their security policies and practices to ensure that,
within the limits of applicable privacy and human rights legislation,
relevant information concerning involvement by Canadian Forces members
or applicants with racist organizations and hate groups is shared
efficiently and effectively among all responsible agencies, including
the chain of command.

20.12&nbsp&nbsp The Department of National Defence and the Canadian
Forces establish regular liaison with anti-racist groups to obtain
assistance in the conduct of appropriate cultural sensitivity training
and to assist supervisors and commanders in identifying signs of
racism and involvement with hate groups.

Chapter 21 - TRAINING

We recommend that:

21.1&nbsp&nbsp The Canadian Forces training philosophy be recast to
recognize that a core of non-traditional military training designed
specifically for peace support operations (and referred to as generic
peacekeeping training) must be provided along with general purpose
combat training to prepare Canadian Forces personnel adequately for
all operational missions and tasks.

21.2&nbsp&nbsp Generic peacekeeping training become an integral part
of all Canadian Forces training at both the individual (basic,
occupational and leadership) and collective levels, with appropriate
allocations of resources in terms of funding, people and time.

21.3&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff order a study to
determine how best to integrate the full range of knowledge, skills,
attitudes and values required for peace support operations at all
stages of individual and collective training for both officers and
non-commissioned members.

21.4&nbsp&nbsp The Canadian Forces recognize, in doctrine and
practice, that peace support operations require mental preparation and
conditioning that differ from what is required for conventional
warfare, and that the training of Canadian Forces members must provide
for the early and continuous development of the values, attitudes and
orientation necessary to perform all operational missions, including
peace support operations.

21.5&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the
development of comprehensive training policies and programs for peace
support operations makes greater use of a broad range of sources,
including peacekeeping training guidelines and policies developed by
the UN and member states, and the training provided by police forces
and international aid organizations.

21.6&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff order that the mandates
of all Canadian Forces institutions and programs involved in education
and training be reviewed with a view to enhancing and formalizing
peace support operations training objectives.

21.7&nbsp&nbsp Recognizing steps already taken to establish the Peace
Support Training Centre and Lessons Learned Centres, the Chief of the
Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination of and allocation
of adequate resources to the following functions:


	1. continuing development of doctrine respecting the planning,
organization, conduct and evaluation of peace support operations
training;

	2. development of comprehensive and detailed training
standards and standardized training packages for all components of
peace support operations training;

	3. timely distribution of current doctrine and training
materials to all personnel tasked with planning and implementing peace
support operations training, and to all units warned for peace support
operations duty;

	4. timely development and distribution of mission-specific
information and materials for use in pre-deployment training;

	5. systematic compilation and analysis of lessons learned, and
updating of doctrine and training materials in that light;

	6. systematic monitoring and evaluation of training to ensure
that it is conducted in accordance with established doctrine and
standards; and

	7. provision of specialist assistance as required by units in
their pre-deployment preparations.

21.8&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff oversee the development
of specialist expertise within the Canadian Forces in training in the
Law of Armed Conflict and the Rules of Engagement, and in
intercultural and intergroup relations, negotiation and conflict
resolution; and ensure continuing training in these skills for all
members of the Canadian Forces.

21.9&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the time and
resources necessary for training a unit to a state of operational
readiness be assessed before committing that unit's participation in a
peace support operation.

21.10&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff integrate a minimum
standard period of time for pre-deployment training into the planning
process. In exceptional cases, where it may be necessary to deploy
with a training period shorter than the standard minimum, the senior
officers responsible should prepare a risk analysis for approval by
the Chief of the Defence Staff. In addition, a plan should be
developed to compensate for the foreshortened training period, such as
making provision for the enhanced supervision of pre-deployment
training activities, a lengthened acclimatization period, and
supplementary in-theatre training.

21.11&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff confirm in doctrine and
policy the recognition of sufficient and appropriate training as a key
aspect of operational readiness.

21.12&nbsp&nbsp Contrary to experience with the Somalia deployment,
where general purpose combat training was emphasized, the Chief of the
Defence Staff confirm in doctrine and policy that the pre-deployment
period, from warning order to deployment, should be devoted primarily
to mission-specific training.

21.13&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine
and policy that to facilitate pre-deployment training focused on
mission-specific requirements, units preparing for peace support
operations be provided, on a timely basis, with:


	1. a clearly defined mission and statement of tasks;

	2. up-to-date and accurate intelligence as a basis for
forecasting the conditions likely to be encountered in theatre;

	3. mission-specific Rules of Engagement and Standing Operating
Procedures; and

	4. a sufficient quantity of vehicles and equipment, in
operational condition, to meet training needs.

21.14&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish mechanisms to
ensure that all members of units preparing for deployment on peace
support operations receive sufficient and appropriate training on the
local culture, history, and politics of the theatre of operations,
together with refresher training on negotiation and conflict
resolution and the Law of Armed Conflict, as well as basic language
training if necessary.

21.15&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine
and policy that no unit be declared operationally ready unless all its
members have received sufficient and appropriate training on
mission-specific Rules of Engagement and steps have been taken to
establish that the Rules of Engagement are fully understood.

21.16&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that training
standards and programs provide that training in the Law of Armed
Conflict, Rules of Engagement, cross-cultural relations, and
negotiation and conflict resolution be scenario-based and integrated
into training exercises, in addition to classroom instruction or
briefings, to permit the practice of skills and to provide a mechanism
for confirming that instructions have been fully understood.

21.17&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish in doctrine
and policy that an in-theatre training plan be developed for any unit
deploying on a peace support operation. The plan should provide for
ongoing refresher training and remedial training in areas where
deficiencies were noted before deployment and be modified as required
to meet changing or unexpected conditions in theatre.

21.18&nbsp&nbsp Canadian Forces doctrine recognize the personal
supervision of training by all commanders, including the most senior,
as an irreducible responsibility and an essential expression of good
leadership. Canadian Forces doctrine should also recognize that
training provides the best opportunity, short of operations, for
commanders to assess the attitude of troops and gauge the readiness of
a unit and affords a unique occasion for commanders to impress upon
their troops, through their presence, the standards expected of them,
as well as their own commitment to the mission on which the troops are
about to be sent.

Chapter 22 - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

We recommend that:

22.1&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff create a general
framework for the development of Rules of Engagement to establish the
policies and protocols governing the production of such rules.

22.2&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and promulgate
generic Rules of Engagement based on international and domestic law,
including the Law of Armed Conflict, domestic foreign policy, and
operational considerations.

22.3&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish and implement
policies for the timely development of mission-specific Rules of
Engagement and ensure that a verification and testing process for the
Rules of Engagement is incorporated in the process for declaring a
unit operationally ready for deployment.

22.4&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that the Canadian
Forces maintain a data bank of Rules of Engagement from other
countries, as well as Rules of Engagement and after-action reports
from previous Canadian missions, as a basis for devising and
evaluating future Rules of Engagement.

22.5&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff develop standards for
scenario-based, context-informed training on Rules of Engagement, both
before a mission and in theatre, with provision for additional
training whenever there is confusion or misunderstanding.

22.6&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff develop and put in place
a system for monitoring the transmission, interpretation and
application of the Rules of Engagement, to ensure that all ranks
understand them, and develop an adjustment mechanism to permit quick
changes that are monitored to comply with the intent of the Chief of
the Defence Staff.

22.7&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that any change
in the Rules of Engagement, once disseminated, result in further
training.

Chapter 23 - OPERATIONAL READINESS

We recommend that:

23.1&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that standards
for evaluating individuals, units and elements of the Canadian Forces
for operational tasks call for the assessment of two necessary
elements, operational effectiveness and operational preparedness, and
that both criteria be satisfied before a unit is declared
operationally ready for any mission.

23.2&nbsp&nbsp To avoid confusion between readiness for employment and
readiness for deployment on a particular mission, the Chief of the
Defence Staff adopt and ensure adherence to the following definitions
throughout the Canadian Forces: Operational effectiveness is a measure
of the capability of a force to carry out its assigned
mission. Operational preparedness is a measure of the degree to which
a unit is ready to begin that mission. Operational readiness of any
unit or element, therefore, should be defined as the sum of its
operational effectiveness and preparedness.

23.3&nbsp&nbsp Contrary to the experience of the Somalia mission, the
Chief of the Defence Staff ensure, before any Canadian Forces unit or
element of any significant size is deployed on active service or
international operations, that a formal declaration is made to the
government regarding the readiness of that unit to undertake the
mission effectively.

23.4&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish a staff, under
CDS authority, to conduct no-notice tests and evaluations of the
operational effectiveness and preparedness of selected commands, units
and sub-units of the Canadian Forces.

23.5&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff order that national and
command operational orders issued to Canadian Forces units tasked for
active service or international operations state precisely the
standards and degrees of operational effectiveness and operational
preparedness demanded of individuals, sub-units, units, and
commanders.

23.6&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff standardize format,
information, and directions concerning declarations of operational
readiness and require such declarations to be signed by commanders.

23.7&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish clear,
workable and standard measurements of operational effectiveness and
preparedness for individuals, sub-units, units, and commanders in
units and formations of the Canadian Forces.

23.8&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff replace the Operational
Readiness Evaluation System with a more reliable and efficient process
aimed at collecting information about the effectiveness and
preparedness of major units of the Canadian Forces for assigned
operational missions.

23.9&nbsp&nbsp The new readiness reporting system be capable of giving
the Chief of the Defence Staff, senior commanders and staff officers a
real-time picture of the effectiveness and preparedness of major
operational units of the Canadian Forces for their assigned tasks.

23.10&nbsp&nbsp The new operational readiness reporting system
identify operational units as being in certain degrees of
effectiveness and preparedness, such as high, medium and low, and in
certain states of readiness, such as standby-ready and
deployment-ready.

Chapter 24 - MISSION PLANNING

We recommend that:

24.1&nbsp&nbsp The Government of Canada issue new guidelines and
compulsory criteria for decisions about whether to participate in a
peace support operation.

24.2&nbsp&nbsp The Government of Canada define clearly the respective
roles and responsibilities of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade and the Department of National Defence in the
decision-making process for peace support operations.

24.3&nbsp&nbsp In briefings or advice to the Government relating to
participation in a peace support operation, the Government of Canada
require a comprehensive statement of how the peace support operations
guidelines and criteria apply to the proposed operation.

24.4&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff develop Canadian Forces
doctrine to guide the planning, participation and conduct of peace
support operations.

24.5&nbsp&nbsp The Government of Canada establish a new and permanent
advisory body or secretariat to co-ordinate peace support operations
policy and decision making.

24.6&nbsp&nbsp The Government of Canada adopt the policy that Canadian
participation in United Nations peace support operations is contingent
upon:


	1. completion of a detailed mission analysis by the Chief of
the Defence Staff each time Canada is asked to participate in a peace
support operation; and

	2. inclusion in the mission analysis of the following
elements: a determination of troop strengths, unit configuration,
resource requirements, and weapons and other capabilities.

24.7&nbsp&nbsp The Government of Canada, as part of its foreign and
defence policy, advocate reform within the United Nations,
particularly in the following areas:


	1. development of a process to ensure that the mandates of
United Nations operations, as adopted by the United Nations Security
Council, are clear, enforceable and capable of achieving the goals of
the mission; and

	2. development of a process to enhance the current planning
structure at the United Nations to improve co-ordination of peace
support operations through proper development of concepts of
operations and strategic planning.


Chapter 25 - MILITARY PLANNING

We recommend that:

25.1&nbsp&nbsp To redress the planning problems earmarked by the
Somalia mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff reinforce the
importance of battle procedure (the process commanders use to select,
warn, organize, and deploy troops for missions) as the proper
foundation for operational planning at all levels of the Canadian
Forces, and that the importance of systematic planning based on battle
procedure be emphasized in staff training courses.

25.2&nbsp&nbsp Contrary to recent experience, the Chief of the Defence
Staff enunciate the principles that apply to planning, commanding and
conducting operations by the Canadian Forces in each international
operation where these differ from national principles of planning,
commanding and conducting operations.

25.3&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all states
of command, such as national command, full command and operational
command, are defined on the basis of Canadian military standards and
criteria.

25.4&nbsp&nbsp For each international operation, the Chief of the
Defence Staff issue clear and concrete orders and terms of reference
to guide commanders of Canadian Forces units and elements deployed on
those operations. These should address, among other things, the
mission statement, terms of employment, command relationships, and
support relationships.

25.5&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff clarify the duties and
responsibilities of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and, in
particular, identify precisely when the Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff is or is not in the chain of command.

25.6&nbsp&nbsp In light of the Somalia experience, the Chief of the
Defence Staff assert the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff
under the National Defence Act, to establish better "control and
administration" of the Canadian Forces, taking appropriate steps to
ensure that the Chief of the Defence Staff has adequate staff
assistance to carry out this duty.

25.7&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff provide commanders
deployed on operations with precise orders and unambiguous reporting
requirements and lines to ensure that Canadian laws and norms are
respected.

25.8&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all plans
for the employment of the Canadian Forces be subject to operational
evaluations at all levels before operational deployment.

25.9&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish standing
operating procedures for


	1. planning, testing and deploying Canadian Forces in domestic
or international operations; and

	2. the conduct of operations by the Canadian Forces in
domestic or international operations.

25.10&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish principles,
criteria and policies governing the selection, employment and terms of
reference for commanders appointed to command Canadian Forces units or
elements in domestic or international operations.

25.11&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff conduct training and
evaluation exercises to prepare and test staff procedures, doctrine,
planning and staff officers in National Defence Headquarters and in
the chain of command.

25.12&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff establish a uniform
system for recording decisions taken by senior officers during all
stages of planning for operations. The records maintained under this
system should include a summary of the actions and decisions of
officers and identify them by rank and position. The records should
include important documents related to the history of the operation,
including such things as estimates, reconnaissance reports. central
discussions, orders, and casualty and incident reports.

25.13&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff or the Chief of the
Defence Staff's designated commander identify and clarify the mission
goals and objectives before commencing calculation of the force
estimate.

25.14&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff base the force estimate
for a given mission on the capacity of the Canadian Forces to fulfil
the demands of the operation, as determined after a mission analysis
has been completed and before recommending that Canadian Forces be
committed for deployment.

25.15&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff develop a formal
process to review force requirements once any Canadian Forces unit or
element arrives in an operational theatre.

25.16&nbsp&nbsp To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, before
committing forces to an international operation, commanders should:


	1. clearly establish the military mission as well as the tasks
necessary to achieve the mission;

	2. return to the practice of preparing military estimates
before developing the organization and composition of forces to be
employed in operational theatres;

	3. be required to undertake a thorough reconnaissance of the
specific area where the forces are to deploy; and

	4. accept that in the interests of deploying a force that is
appropriate, well balanced and durable, proper estimates of the
requirements be completed before forces are committed and personnel
ceilings are imposed.

25.17&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff develop specific
doctrine outlining the intelligence-gathering process for all peace
support operations, to be separate and distinct from the doctrine
covering intelligence gathering for combat. This doctrine should
include:


	1. a statement confirming the purpose and principles of
intelligence gathering for all peace support operations, from
traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Where required, a
differentiation would be made between the strategic stage, the
decision-making stage, and the operational planning stage of the
operation;

	2. a statement confirming the sources of information
appropriate for use in the intelligence-gathering process;

	3. a section outlining anticipated use of intelligence in
peace support operations, during both the decision-making stage and
the operational planning stage;

	4. a section outlining the intelligence planning process
during the various stages of planning, establishing what needs to be
done and by whom, including any procedures required to develop an
intelligence plan for the mission or intelligence support for the
training of troops; and

	5. a section describing the dissemination process for all
stages, including the manner of dissemination and the personnel
involved.

25.18&nbsp&nbsp The Government of Canada urge the United Nations to
expand its peacekeeping planning division to include an intelligence
organization within the secretariat that would serve to co-ordinate
the intelligence required for peace support operations, including
maintenance of an information base on unstable regions available for
use by troop-contributing countries.

25.19&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that planning
doctrine includes appropriate assessment methodology to determine
sufficient numbers of intelligence personnel and intelligence support
personnel (interpreters) for the operation. In accordance with
existing doctrine, the presence of intelligence personnel in the
advance party should be ensured.

25.20&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff develop guidelines and
procedures for ensuring that cultural training programs are
appropriately supported by the intelligence staff by providing
adequate and appropriate resources for the intelligence staff well in
advance of the operation.

25.21&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that sufficient
resources are available and adequate guidelines are in place for
intelligence staff to foster self-sufficiency in the area of
intelligence planning and to discourage over-reliance on other
intelligence sources.

25.22&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff review the organization
and process for intelligence planning to ensure maximum communication
and efficiency in the intelligence-gathering and dissemination
processes.

25.23&nbsp&nbsp To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, the
Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that logistical planning is
finalized only after the mission concept is developed, the size and
composition of the Canadian contingent is estimated, and a full
reconnaissance of the area of operations has been undertaken.

25.24&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff provide guidelines
stipulating that sufficient time be taken to assess any changes in
areas of operation. Such guidelines should include the stipulation
that military considerations are paramount in decisions to change the
proposed mission site after materiel has been packed and logistics
planning completed for the original site.

25.25&nbsp&nbsp When a change in mission is contemplated, the Chief of
the Defence Staff ensure that new logistical contingency plans are
completed before the new mission is undertaken.

25.26&nbsp&nbsp The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that a National
Support Element (that is, an integrated logistics support unit) is
included as a separate unit at the commencement of every mission
undertaken by the Canadian Forces.

Chapter 39 - OPENNESS AND DISCLOSURE

We recommend that:

39.1&nbsp&nbsp The Department of National Defence ensure that the
National Defence Operations Centre logs are properly maintained, by
implementing the following:


	1. an audit procedure to ensure that standing operating
procedures provide clear and sufficient guidelines on the type of
information to be entered and how the information is to be entered;

	2. an adequate data base system, which includes software
controls to ensure accurate data entry in each field and appropriate
training for operators and users of this system; and

	3. increased system security to an acceptable standard
compatible with the objective of national security, including
restricting access to authorized persons using only their own accounts
and passwords and extending the use of secure (hidden) fields to
identify persons entering or deleting data.

39.2&nbsp&nbsp The Department of National Defence and the Canadian
Forces take steps to ensure that an adequate record of in-theatre
operations is created and preserved thereafter by:


	1. establishing better systems and procedures to ensure a more
complete and permanent record of events, including the recording of
each day's activity or inactivity, so that every date is accounted
for, to avoid the appearance of non-reporting or deleted records;

	2. training soldiers to appreciate the importance of the log
and diary and their responsibility to follow proper procedures in
creating, maintaining, and protecting the record;

	3. providing better procedures for supervising the maintenance
of records in theatre to ensure adherence to established procedures;

	4. improving the integration of secure data collection and
storage systems to ensure the integrity of records created; and

	5. ensuring that data banks are sufficient and include
accurate information concerning individual taskings; the start and
finish dates of each log and diary; and the location of records.

39.3&nbsp&nbsp The Department of National Defence take the following
steps to promote openness and transparency:


	1. require the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the
Chief of the Defence Staff to


		1. instil by example and through directives the
importance of openness in responding to requests made under the Access
to Information Act;

		2. ensure that military and civilian personnel in the
Department of National Defence are better trained to respond to Access
to Information Act requests, particularly with regard to legal
obligations and procedures; and

		3. ensure that staff fully understand the requirement
to report, as a significant incident under existing regulations, any
suspected document alteration or improper response to Access to
Information Act requests;


	2. begin consultations with the Information Commissioner,
within three months of the submission of this report to the Governor
in Council, to determine the most effective way of improving
departmental responses to Access to Information Act requests; and

	3. ensure that public affairs policy and practices reflect the
principles of openness, responsiveness, transparency and
accountability expressed throughout this report.


Chapter 40 - MILITARY JUSTICE

We recommend that:

40.1&nbsp&nbsp The National Defence Act be amended to provide for a
restructured military justice system, establishing three classes of
misconduct:


	1. Minor disciplinary: Any misconduct considered minor enough
not to warrant detention, dismissal or imprisonment should be
considered minor disciplinary misconduct. Examples might include a
failure to salute and quarrelling with another Canadian Forces
member. Minor disciplinary misconduct would not include service
offences now listed in the Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&O)
108.31(2);

	2. Major disciplinary: Any misconduct considered serious
enough to warrant detention, dismissal or imprisonment should be
considered major disciplinary misconduct triable only by a court
martial. This would include infractions such as some of those listed
in QR&O 108.31(2). Examples might include being drunk while on sentry
duty during a time of war, insubordination and showing cowardice
before the enemy. Major disciplinary misconduct would not include
crimes under the Criminal Code or other federal statutes; and

	3. Criminal misconduct: Any misconduct that would constitute a
crime and is to be the subject of a charge under the Criminal Code or
other federal statute or foreign law, and triable only by court
martial or a civil court.

40.2&nbsp&nbsp To prevent abuse of the commanding officer's discretion
to determine into which class the misconduct falls, there be
formalized safeguards provided for in the National Defence Act and
regulations, including the possibility of independent military
investigations into the misconduct, the authority of an independent
military prosecutor to lay a charge for criminal misconduct arising
out of the same incident, and the oversight performed by an
independent Inspector General.

40.3&nbsp&nbsp The National Defence Act be amended to provide clearly
that any individual in the Canadian Forces or any civilian can lay a
complaint with Military Police without fear of reprisal and without
having first to raise the complaint with the chain of command.

40.4&nbsp&nbsp The Queen's Regulations and Orders be amended to
circumscribe the discretion of a commanding officer with respect to
the manner of conducting summary investigations to ensure that these
investigations are conducted according to the guidelines in Canadian
Forces Administrative Order 21-9, dealing with general instructions
for boards of inquiry and summary investigations.

40.5&nbsp&nbsp The guidelines in Canadian Forces Administrative Order
21-9 be amended to provide that


	1. summary investigations be restricted to investigation of
minor disciplinary misconduct or administrative matters;

	2. those conducting summary investigations have some minimum
training standard in investigations, rules of evidence, and the
recognition of potential criminality;

	3. those conducting summary investigations have a specific
duty to report matters of potential criminality directly to Military
Police; and

	4. those conducting summary investigations be free from any
conflict of interest.

40.6&nbsp&nbsp Military Police be independent of the chain of command
when investigating major disciplinary and criminal misconduct.

40.7&nbsp&nbsp Military Police be trained more thoroughly in police
investigative techniques.

40.8&nbsp&nbsp All Military Police, regardless of their specific
assignment, be authorized to investigate suspected misconduct of their
own accord unless another Military Police investigation is under way.

40.9&nbsp&nbsp Control of the conduct of Military Police
investigations of major disciplinary and criminal misconduct be
removed from the possible influence of the commanding officer or the
commanding officer's superiors. Military Police attached to units or
elements of the Canadian Forces should refer major disciplinary and
criminal misconduct to the Director of Military Police through
dedicated Military Police channels.

40.10&nbsp&nbsp The Director of Military Police oversee all Military
Police investigations of major disciplinary and criminal misconduct
and report on these matters to the Solicitor General of Canada.

40.11&nbsp&nbsp The Director of Military Police be responsible and
accountable to the Chief of the Defence Staff for all Military Police
purposes, except for the investigation of major disciplinary or
criminal misconduct.

40.12&nbsp&nbsp Commanding officers have the power to request Military
Police to investigate any misconduct, but commanding officers have no
power to control the method of the investigation or limit the
resources available to Military Police conducting investigations.

40.13&nbsp&nbsp The Director of Military Police and all Military
Police under the command of the Director have a system of ranking
different from the general Canadian Forces system, so that Military
Police are not seen or treated as subordinate to those they are
investigating.

40.14&nbsp&nbsp Professional police standards and codes of conduct be
developed for Military Police.

40.15&nbsp&nbsp To give effect to these new policing arrangements,
Military Police be given adequate resources and training to allow them
to perform their tasks.

40.16&nbsp&nbsp Adequate numbers of appropriately trained Military
Police accompany Canadian Forces deployments.

40.17&nbsp&nbsp In general, the results of investigations into all
types of misconduct - minor disciplinary, major disciplinary or
criminal - be reported to the commanding officer of the unit or
element to which the Canadian Forces member concerned belongs.

40.18&nbsp&nbsp Results of investigations of major disciplinary and
criminal misconduct be reported to an independent prosecuting
authority under the direction of the Director General of Military
Legal Services.

40.19&nbsp&nbsp Control of the decision to charge for major
disciplinary or criminal misconduct be removed from the commanding
officer and vested in an independent prosecuting authority.

40.20&nbsp&nbsp The commanding officer have the right to lay charges
for minor disciplinary misconduct.

40.21&nbsp&nbsp An independent prosecuting authority decide whether to
lay charges for major disciplinary and criminal misconduct and have
the responsibility for laying charges.

40.22&nbsp&nbsp The prosecuting authority be independent in
determining whether to charge and prosecute. However, guidelines
should be developed to assist in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.

40.23&nbsp&nbsp Military Police serve as advisers to the independent
prosecuting authority, but have no authority themselves to lay
charges.

40.24&nbsp&nbsp Commanding officers have no authority to dismiss
charges laid by the independent military prosecutor.

40.25&nbsp&nbsp The independent military prosecutor have authority to
lay charges for minor disciplinary offences when the prosecutor deems
it useful to prosecute multiple acts of misconduct, including minor
disciplinary misconduct, at the same trial.

40.26&nbsp&nbsp An accused person have a right to counsel when
prosecuted for major disciplinary or criminal misconduct.

40.27&nbsp&nbsp The standard of proof at a trial for major
disciplinary or criminal misconduct be proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.

40.28&nbsp&nbsp There be no right to counsel in respect of minor
disciplinary misconduct, since detention, dismissal or imprisonment
would not be a possibility, but the right to counsel may be permitted
at the discretion of the commanding officer.

40.29&nbsp&nbsp The standard of proof at a trial of minor disciplinary
misconduct be proof on a balance of probabilities. An accused person
may be compelled to testify at a trial of minor disciplinary
misconduct.

40.30&nbsp&nbsp Accused persons charged with misconduct carrying a
possible penalty of five years' imprisonment or more should have the
right to elect trial by jury before a civilian court.

40.31&nbsp&nbsp Punishments such as fine options, community service
and conditional sentences, which have been made available in the
civilian criminal process, be available within the military for minor
and major disciplinary and criminal misconduct.

40.32&nbsp&nbsp Formal rules be established to permit appeals of
summary trials of minor disciplinary misconduct by way of redress of
grievance.

40.33&nbsp&nbsp All Canadian Forces members convicted at summary
trials be served with a notice stating that an application for redress
of grievance is available to appeal their conviction.

40.34&nbsp&nbsp The Queen's Regulations and Orders be amended so that
the Minister of National Defence has no adjudicative role in redress
of grievance matters.

40.35&nbsp&nbsp The National Defence Act be amended to


	1. replace the office of the judge Advocate General with two
independent institutions:


		1. the office of the Chief Military judge, to assume
the judicial functions now performed by the office of the judge
Advocate General; and

		2. the office of the Director General of Military
Legal Services, to assume the prosecution, defence and legal advisory
roles now performed by the office of the Judge Advocate General;


	2. specify that the office of the Director General of Military
Legal Services consists of three branches: a Directorate of
Prosecutions, a Directorate of Advisory Services, and a Directorate of
Legal Defence;

	3. provide that the Director General of Military Legal
Services report to the Minister of National Defence;

	4. provide that the Chief Military Judge and all other judges
be civilians appointed under the federal Judges Act; and

	5. state that judges trying serious disciplinary and criminal
misconduct are totally independent of the military chain of command.

40.36&nbsp&nbsp The National Defence Act be amended to establish an
Office of the Inspector General, headed by an Inspector General with
the following functions relating to military justice:


	1. Inspection: Inspections would focus on systemic problems
within the military justice system.

	2. Investigations: The Inspector General would receive and
investigate complaints about officer misconduct and about possible
injustices to individuals within the Canadian Forces. Among the types
of officer misconduct the Inspector General could investigate are the
following:


		1. abuse of authority or position (for example,
failure to investigate, failure to take corrective actions, or
unlawful command influence); and

		2. improper personnel actions (for example, unequal
treatment of Canadian Forces members, harassment including racial
harassment, failure to provide due process, reprisals).


	3. Assistance: Among the Inspector General's functions would
be to correct or assist in correcting injustices to individuals.

40.37&nbsp&nbsp The Inspector General have the power to inspect all
relevant documents, conduct such interviews as may be necessary,
review minor disciplinary proceedings and administrative processes,
and make recommendations flowing from investigations.

40.38&nbsp&nbsp Any person, Canadian Forces member or civilian, be
permitted to complain to the Inspector General directly.

40.39&nbsp&nbsp To the extent that the regulations and orders
contained in the Queen's Regulations and Orders and Canadian Forces
Administrative Orders can be made public without compromising
overriding interests such as national security, the QR&O and CFAO be
published in the Canada Gazette .

40.40&nbsp&nbsp Adequate numbers of legal officers be deployed with
units to allow them to perform their respective functions -
prosecution, defence, advisory - without putting them in situations of
conflict of interest.

40.41&nbsp&nbsp Legal officers receive increased training in matters
of international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict.

40.42&nbsp&nbsp Legal officers providing advisory services be deployed
on training missions as well as actual operations.

40.43&nbsp&nbsp Legal officers providing advisory services guide
commanding officers and troops on legal issues arising from all
aspects of operations, including Rules of Engagement, the Law of Armed
Conflict, Canadian Forces Organization Orders and Ministerial
Organization Orders.

40.44&nbsp&nbsp Legal officers providing advisory services educate
Canadian Forces members before and during deployment on local law, the
Law of Armed Conflict, and Rules of Engagement.

40.45&nbsp&nbsp A Law of Armed Conflict section of legal officers be
established and staffed as soon as possible within the office of the
Judge Advocate General and moved to the office of the Director General
of Military Legal Services once that office is established.

CONCLUSION

We recommend that:


	1. The Minister of National Defence report to Parliament by
June 30, 1998 on all actions taken in response to the recommendations
of this Commission of Inquiry.

	2. The transcripts of our proceedings, as amplified and
illuminated by the credibility findings in this report, be examined
comprehensively by appropriate authorities in the Department of
National Defence and the Canadian Forces, with a view to taking
appropriate and necessary action with regard to witnesses who by their
actions and attitude flouted or demeaned:


		1. their oath or solemn affirmation;

		2. their military duty to assist the Inquiry in its
search for the truth in the public interest;

		3. the trust and confidence of Canadians in them; or

		4. the officer's commission scroll, which expresses
Her Majesty's special trust and confidence in a Canadian officer's
loyalty, courage and integrity.


	3. Save for those individuals who have been disciplined for
actions in relation to the deployment, all members of the Canadian
Forces who served in Somalia receive a special medal designed and
designated for that purpose.