 |  |  |
      |
| | |
|
As we have explained, the chain of command is an authority and accountability system linking the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to the lowest level of the Canadian Forces and back to the office of the CDS. It is also a hierarchy of individual commanders who take decisions within their connected functional formations and units. It is intended to be a pre-emptive instrument of command -- allowing commanders to actively seek information, give direction, and oversee operations.
A chain of command can be judged from two perspectives: as an instrument of command, exercised through the flow of orders and information, and as a hierarchy of related commanders. These two characteristics -- information transmission and the exercise of command and control by (usually) officers -- define a chain of command. The measure of a chain of command, therefore, lies in its reliability and effectiveness as a conduit to move information up and down the chain of authority, and as a personal expression of the skills, competence, and diligence of commanders. A rough instrument can disarm the finest commanders, just as the finest instrument can be wasted on indifferent officers. Ultimately, commanders are responsible for shaping the chain of command to their purposes and honing it to sharp perfection.
The chain of command also provides a mechanism for transmitting critical aspects of command authority and responsibility. A properly functioning chain of command helps senior officers understand what is happening in their commands and pinpoint weaknesses and problems. These discoveries can be made through routine inquiries and reports, by staff officers acting for commanders, and directly by the commander's inspections and visits to subordinate units. Whenever the chain of command is brittle or broken, commanders may be left without reliable information with which to make decisions. Ensuring the soundness of the chain of command is therefore a paramount responsibility of command.
The chain of command is not expected to be a mere transmission line between commanders; instead it is established to reinforce the authority of command and to allow officers to do their duty as prescribed in law and regulation. Therefore, when important orders and direction are passed from one level of command to the next, commanders are expected to review the orders for completeness and appropriateness and to take action to correct defects that come to their attention. Furthermore, they are expected to amplify orders to suit the circumstances of their commands and the strengths and weaknesses of their subordinate commanders. Finally, they must supervise implementation of their orders and oversee the successful completion of the assigned mission. The chain of command greatly facilitates these activities.
Before and during the deployment of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS), the chain of command in the Canadian Forces (CF), in our view, was found wanting in both these aspects. It failed as a communications system and broke down under minimal stress. Commanders testified before us on several occasions that they did not know about important matters because they had not been advised. They also testified that important matters and policy did not reach subordinate commanders and the troops or, when they did, the information was often distorted.
The chain of command was not functioning properly during the pre-deployment phase, either as a mechanism for passing information or as an effective command network. The failure of the chain of command at senior levels was particularly striking with regard to how commanders came to understand the state of the Airborne Regiment in 1992. Many senior officers in the chain of command, from MGen MacKenzie to Gen de Chastelain, testified that they were ignorant of the state of fitness and discipline of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). Yet they maintained even during the Inquiry that they had faith in the appropriateness of the CAR to undertake a mission because they assumed that it was at a high state of discipline and unit cohesion.
MGen (ret) MacKenzie testified that BGen Beno had not informed him of the serious and dangerous incidents of indiscipline within the CAR. He did not know that weapons and ammunition had been seized during a search of the unit barracks conducted by Maj Seward. Nor did he know that unauthorized weapons had been found in the possession of soldiers. MGen MacKenzie told us that he was unaware that 'Rebel' flags were flown routinely by soldiers in the CAR and that, indeed, 34 such flags had been seized by unit officers. He stated he was also ignorant of the fact that many soldiers and senior non-commissioned members had repeated problems of alcohol abuse in the weeks and months before deployment of the unit to Somalia. Finally MGen MacKenzie admitted that he did not know that members of the CAR openly displayed racist and extremist tattoos before their superiors.1
Even by itself, MGen MacKenzie's ignorance about the true state of discipline in the CAR is a cause for concern. But it is even more serious because the leaders' failure to recognize these facts or to investigate them adequately was compounded in early November 1992 after LCol Morneault was relieved of his command, in part because the CAR was undisciplined. At this point, there could have been no question, in our view, that the unit was in trouble. Still, none of the commanders attempted to seek out the facts of the Regiment's state of discipline.2 When MGen MacKenzie was asked during testimony whether "any people above you, any of your superiors" directed him to find out specifically whether the discipline problems that had existed [in the CAR] had been resolved, he answered, "No, sir."3
MGen MacKenzie was also unaware of other problems that should properly have come to his attention. For example, he stated before us that he had no knowledge of reservations about Maj Seward's ability to command 2 Commando.4 "In hindsight" MGen MacKenzie admitted before us that no "sane person could deny" that more should have been done by officers in the chain of command to tackle problems in the CAR prior to deployment.5 Yet we were astonished to find that no measures were taken by the senior officers to ensure that LCol Mathieu would be adequately warned about the problems in the unit when he assumed command.6
LGen Reay testified that before September 1992, during the period when the decision to identify the Airborne Regiment as the unit to go to Somalia was being made, he was not aware of any concerns that BGen Beno had about LCol Morneault's leadership style. His first indication of trouble in the unit came from conversations with LGen Gervais and MGen MacKenzie in "late September or early October," but the only concern seemed to be LCol Morneault's weakness as unit trainer. Nevertheless, LGen Reay knew that "discipline was a small factor but a factor." Yet he testified that he took no action to inquire into this factor.7
LGen Reay testified that on or about October 3, 1992, he was informed by MGen MacKenzie that "clearly some disciplinary problems were emerging in Petawawa that needed attention and needed to be resolved."8 MGen MacKenzie testified that on or about October 5, 1992, he would have mentioned the illegal use of pyrotechnics and the torching of the car to LGen Gervais and LGen Reay and told them also that the incident had not been resolved.9 However, the Deputy Commander of Land Force Command (LFC), LGen Reay, maintained that he was unaware that members of the CAR had attacked the chain of command by burning the car belonging to the unit orderly sergeant (the Commanding Officer's off-duty representative) in early October. Incredibly, he testified that he remained unaware of the incident for months, even in his capacity as Commander LFC. He stated that he did "not recall ever being told specifically of the car burning episode and when I read of it in the de Faye Board of Inquiry I was really quite surprised because it was the first time that that specific incident was brought to my attention." Though LGen Reay was aware that the unit was in trouble in several respects, he, by his own admission, made no inquires of MGen MacKenzie or took any other action -- by reviewing command Military Police reports, for example -- to discover for himself the true situation in the CAR.10
The Commander Force Mobile Command/Land Force Command (FMC/LFC), LGen Gervais, testified that he was not aware of discipline problems in the CAR when he recommended it as the unit to go to Somalia. He testified also that even in mid-September, after discussing the situation in the CAR with BGen Beno, he knew nothing about any discipline problems. LGen Gervais had two further conversations with BGen Beno during the autumn of 1992, but according to his testimony, he was not informed of the disciplinary problems in the unit. When informed by his executive assistant soon after the event that a car burning had occurred at CFB Petawawa, LGen Gervais did not connect that incident to the CAR, nor did he seek any more information on the incident.11 In fact, even though as Commander FMC/LFC, he had easy access to many experienced staff officers, including Military Police officers, and routine incident reports, LGen Gervais remained ignorant of the true situation in the CAR until after his retirement from the Canadian Forces.12
BGen Beno was sufficiently concerned about the state of readiness of the CAR that he mentioned his doubts informally to LGen Gervais in September 1992. Later, on October 19, 1992, in his letter to MGen MacKenzie asking for the dismissal of LCol Morneault, he wrote specifically that "the battalion has significant unresolved leadership and discipline problems which I believe challenge the leadership of the unit."13 BGen Beno testified, however, that prior to that letter he had not mentioned the state of indiscipline in the CAR to any officer in the chain of command. Nevertheless, he did assume that the serious incidents which occurred in October 1992 were known to commanders, because he believed "that military police reports [of the incidents were] passed to the various headquarters which would include the area and the command [headquarters]."14
The former Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen (ret) de Chastelain, explained to us that "control and administration indicates or means that the control of how [the CF] are used and the day-to-day administration of them in terms of organization, supply, discipline, all come under the Chief of Defence Staff." When he was asked if such things as hazing rituals and the wearing of unauthorized and inappropriate clothing by members of the CAR suggested to him a breakdown in either discipline or leadership in the Airborne Regiment, Gen de Chastelain replied that he knew nothing of these matters until some-time in 1994. He admitted that had he known of the serious disciplinary problems in the unit, "I would have taken it up with the commander [LGen Gervais], and had he known that, I'm sure he would have taken it up with his [subordinates]." But Gen de Chastelain testified that he did not know anything about problems of indiscipline in the CAR in 1992.15
Gen de Chastelain emphasized that indiscipline in any unit is a serious matter. He made the point strongly "that in any case of a serious discipline problem within a unit, I think it is incumbent on the commander of that unit to let his immediate superior know that that has happened and what measures he has taken to fix it and that either he has fixed it or he needs further assistance." He admitted that if commanders had been aware that the issues of the change of command and discipline and the challenge to authority were linked, someone ought to have taken strong action. Nevertheless, Gen de Chastelain insisted that no negative information about the CAR came to him through the chain of command, through the so-called technical network, or through the police or security staffs at any time.16 This we find remarkable and a strong indication that the chain of command in the CF and the staff system in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) were unreliable.
BGen Beno's letter of October 19th explicitly made the link between disciplinary incidents and challenges to authority, yet no action beyond dismissing LCol Morneault was taken by any commander.17 According to Gen de Chastelain's testimony, the commanders failed to inform him of serious matters as he would have expected, and they also failed to react appropriately to the problem. What is not clear is whether the failures were caused by oversight and carelessness or by a concerted effort within the LFC chain of command to hide the true situation from the CDS.
One senior officer at LFC headquarters, BGen Zuliani, did attempt to initiate a comprehensive investigation of the state of readiness and fitness in the CAR following the dismissal of LCol Morneault. He suggested in his testimony that LGen Gervais and his commanders were reluctant to explore the full extent of the problems in the CAR. He spoke directly with the Commander LFC shortly after LCol Morneault was relieved and asked that a board of inquiry be established to investigate the context in which the decision was taken and to root out any underlying weaknesses in the CAR. Specifically, he asked that the internal inquiry examine the circumstances that led to the relief of command of LCol Morneault; conflicts involving him and officers at the Special Service Force (SSF) Headquarters; incidents or conflicts within the CAR during the June 24-October 19, 1992 period; the process by which the chain of command was notified of the existence of various problems within the CAR; and the evaluation process that led to the decision to replace LCol Morneault.18 BGen (ret) Zuliani testified that his advice was first accepted by LGen Gervais, but later rejected following discussions with MGen MacKenzie and LGen Reay. Here, we see the chain of command explicitly rejecting an offer to discover the true extent of the problems in the CAR and, therefore, willfully remaining uninformed.
Throughout the period from early 1992 to the deployment of the CAR to Somalia in December 1992, several serious disciplinary problems -- one, at least, of a criminal nature -- occurred in the CAR. These incidents, among other things, were so significant that they led to the dismissal of the Commanding Officer of the CAR, itself a unique and remarkable event in Canada's peacetime army. Yet we were told that few officers in the chain of command, from MGen MacKenzie to the CDS, Gen de Chastelain, were even aware of the problems.
We are asked to believe that the scores of staff officers responsible for managing information from units for senior officers and commanders in SSF Headquarters, Land Force Central Area (LFCA) Headquarters, Land Force Command (LFC) Headquarters, and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) never informed them of these grave incidents. Indeed, we must assume that the specialized and dedicated MP reporting system, composed of qualified non-commissioned members (NCMs) and officers who routinely file police reports and investigations specifically for the use of commanders, failed to penetrate the chain of command. In other words, we must believe that the commanders did not know what was happening in their commands and therefore the chain of command failed. But the evidence is that the chain of command provided enough information that commanders ought to have been prompted to inquire into the situation and act.
During the planning and pre-deployment periods, the chain of command for Operation Deliverance began at Gen de Chastelain, passed to LGen Gervais, to MGen MacKenzie (after early September 1992), to BGen Beno, to LCol Morneault and, after his replacement on October 23, 1992, to LCol Mathieu.
During the deployment period, beginning in mid-December 1992, the structure of the chain of command was altered by the creation of CJFS under the command of Col Labbé. Therefore, at the moment of deployment and during the initial stages of operations in early January 1993, the chain of command, according to the CDS's orders, flowed from the CDS, Gen de Chastelain, to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Intelligence, Security and Operations (DCDS ISO), MGen Addy, to the Commander CJFS, Col Labbé, thence to the Commanding Officer of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, LCol Mathieu, and from him to the officers commanding the commandos and attached sub-units.
Subsequently, several key officers changed positions and assumed new responsibilities. Gen de Chastelain retired and was replaced by Adm Anderson on January 28, 1993. LGen Reay replaced LGen Gervais as Commander LFC in January 1993. MGen Addy was promoted and replaced as DCDS by VAdm Murray in late February 1993. The names changed, but neither the responsibilities of officers in those positions nor their command relationships to the CJFS changed at all.
We were told without further explanation and supporting evidence that "the Forces had an administrative concept of organization and command control...[and] still do."19 However, in our view, the confusion of responsibilities in NDHQ and the lack of precise definitions of command authority in the CF and in NDHQ are such that it raises worrisome questions about the reliability, or even the existence, of a sound concept of command in the CF generally.
LGen Addy recalled that "several incidents in the late 1980s...brought to light major planning and command and control shortcomings at the national level [of the CF]."20 Although LGen Addy believes that some command problems were resolved in 1991, he states that this was not the case regarding "command and control issues between the Environmental Commanders, the DCDS, and the Joint Force Commander."21 This is a very serious admission of a deep systemic weakness within the highest levels of the command structure of the CF because officers in these positions are the principal operational commanders and staff officers in the CF. By his own admission, LGen Addy knew of these problems when he became DCDS (ISO) in 1992 and was aware of these serious defects as early as 1986.22
LGen Addy also presented to us a document entitled, "Deputy Chief of The Defence Staff, Intelligence, Security, and Operations" to explain his terms of reference and describe his functions as DCDS (ISO) in 1991 and 1992. The document still reflects this confusion of responsibilities and ambiguity of command authority. It confirms the DCDS (ISO) as having "major responsibilities...as the focal point for planning, controlling, and coordinating the NDHQ Joint Staff" and that "he acts as a Commander of a Command for all peacekeeping units/formations. "23
Planning for Operation Deliverance circumvented in some respects the established chain of command of the CF. First, Gen de Chastelain, and his staff acting in his name, took all important decisions concerning the NDHQ CJFS command, organization, manning ceiling, logistical support, budget, deployment timings, mission statement, operations orders, rules of engagement, and public affairs issues. The commanders of commands served merely (and obligingly) as 'force generators' and advisers.
Second, on deploying the CJFS, Gen de Chaste lain established a unique and separate chain of command for the mission, which remained in effect until the mission was completed. Apparently, none of the formation commanders or their headquarters in the army, including the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, were considered capable of heading this mission or the appropriate choice for the task. So Gen de Chastelain authorized the creation of an ad hoc headquarters for Col Labbé.
Third, the selection and the appointment of Col Labbé as the Commander of CJFS was made by Gen de Chastelain, whose orders stated that Col Labbé would act under his direction (then under the new CDS, Adm Anderson, in late January 1993). Notwithstanding these orders, it is obvious from the evidence that from the beginning of the operation the Chief of the Defence Staff was only Col Labbé's notional superior, for it was in fact the DCDS who commanded Col Labbé in every important respect until the mission was completed.
Gen de Chastelain indicated in his warning order of December 5, 1992, that the "Commander Joint Force Headquarters has [operational command] in-theatre for employment (phase three)" and that the "[Canadian] joint force, when formed will be under the command of the CDS."24 This instruction is repeated in the CDS's subsequent operation order of December 9, 1992, with the additional remark that "operational control of elements of CJFS will be transferred to commander U.S. Combined Joint Task Force Somalia (CJTF-S)."25 But as the operation developed, the national chain of command as it extended into NDHQ became increasingly ambiguous. No witness could explain to us clearly and with confidence the national chain of command for Operation Deliverance.
In accordance with a Ministerial Organization Order (93073), a Canadian Forces Organization Order (CFOO) "to state the organizational status of the CJFS" was issued by Adm Anderson, the Chief of the Defence Staff, on February 10, 1993,26 assigning the CJFS to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. It confirmed Col Labbé's appointment and that he had operational command of the CJFS. The order made Col Labbé "responsible to the DCDS for the effective and efficient administration [and] for disciplinary matters of the CFJS", and for all matters involving policy. Moreover, the order also made the DCDS responsible for national aspects of technical support, financial matters, and contacts between the CJFS and other parts of the Canadian Forces. Routinely during the operation, Col Labbé reported to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and took all his orders from him.
Yet the testimony of both LGen Addy (DCDS (ISO) until late February 1993) and VAdm Murray (DCDS through the remainder of the deployment) contradicts doctrine and illustrates the obvious ambiguity in the command relationships between Col Labbé and NDHQ. LGen Addy testified that "in joint operations the tasked command is required to prepare the forces, they select them, they declare them operationally ready to the [CDS] at which time they are handed over to the [CDS] and on his behalf I would be acting as the commander of the command for him." He explained that the CJFS existed officially only as it arrived in theatre, and that was where the formal change in command occurred. "Until it is all deployed [in theatre] it isn't there, but the elements thereof, as they come in theatre, come under my command through the commander joint task force."27 When asked directly, at what date he assumed command of Col Labbé and the CJFS, LGen Addy replied, "when the joint force [was] deployed."28 Therefore, by his own testimony and according to CF doctrine and common sense, LGen Addy was in command of Col Labbé.
VAdm Murray testified that:
I have no difficulty saying that I was the one principally responsible for the conduct of operations in Somalia. That is certainly true. But I think, to be absolutely accurate and precise, we should.. have a clear understanding of what command and control relationships actually existed in that scenario. And in that scenario, the commander in-theatre, Colonel Labbé, was responsible to the commander in Ottawa, the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Anderson. As Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, I functioned on Admiral Anderson's behalf and oversaw the operation. So in a formal command and control sense, the commanding relationship was between Colonel Labbé and with me functioning on behalf of Admiral Anderson in terms of operations.29
He emphasized, however, that the "formal relationship in the chain of command for Col Labbé" was to the CDS, but always "through me." However, VAdm Murray could not have been "the one principally responsible for the conduct of operations in Somalia" without being the de facto commander of the operation in Somalia. In a military organization, "in a formal command and control sense," responsibility and command are indivisible.
It is clear to us that this kind of ambiguity in the command arrangements of the CF cannot be permitted. If it were allowed, then accountability, and thus civil control of the military, would suffer. Officers either command or they do not. Once LGen Addy and VAdm Murray were given control of the execution of the operation and the force commander, they became part of the chain of command for all practical purposes and, consequently, assumed command responsibilities. Moreover, neither doctrine nor custom allows staff officers to command units, and attempts to bend this concept, even (or especially) at the highest levels of command, distort and obscure responsibility and accountability. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the command of CJFS above Col Labbé was unclear and that, particularly at NDHQ, the fundamental importance of establishing unambiguous command relationships was not well understood or practised.
It is not as though the issue of problems in the structure for the command and control of the CF on operations in Canada and overseas was new to leaders. Studies ordered by the CDS as early as 1985 to inquire into the continuing confusion in NDHQ concerning operational planning, confirmed this issue. One of these warned the CDS and the Deputy Minister that NDHQ could not be relied on to produce effective operational plans or as a base for the command and control of the CF in operations.30 In 1988, the weaknesses in plans for CF operations near Haiti prompted yet another study into authority and planning responsibilities in NDHQ. This report found: no agreed upon concept for the operation of the CF in wartime; that NDHQ was inappropriately organized for command functions; that the responsibilities of the CDS and DM were blurred; and that "the most complex issue dealt with" was the relationship between the DCDS and the commanders outside Ottawa. None of these problems was resolved satisfactorily.31
A report prepared for the CDS and the Deputy Minister in September 1992 confirmed that these problems had not been properly addressed. Among other things, the evaluators found "undue complexity in the current command and central structure.. .and too much room for misinterpretation." Further, "the evaluation [showed] that there is a critical need for a simplified command and control structure, one which will bring to an end the current ad hoc approach."32 Thus, from their own studies and experiences, senior CF officers should have been well aware that the existing structure for the command of the CF was, at least, suspect and required their careful attention as Operation Deliverance was being planned.
In our view, the chain of command failed also as an instrument of command. For example, the commanders who were ordered to prepare the troops for the Somalia mission appeared content to allow the CDS and his staff at NDHQ to control every critical decision regarding the mission. Nevertheless, any of these officers could have intervened at any time in the planning process if they were at all concerned about the plan, the selection of commanders, the command and logistical arrangements, or the resources that were to be deployed to Somalia. They had a particular opportunity to influence the course of events when Gen de Chastelain issued his operations order, because that event should have caused them to review at every level the adequacy and completeness of the orders they received before they issued their own orders to the formations and units under their command.
Senior commanders are not compelled to pass on orders with which they disagree. They have customary discretionary powers to try to influence their superiors' decisions and to ask for clarification of orders and directions, especially when commanders are concerned with the safety of their troops or the plans for their employment. For example, Gen de Chastelain testified, with regard to rules of engagement, that when he was "satisfied [with the ROE] they would be issued to the commander who would then put them into effect with the caveat that if he found anything in these Rules of Engagement that did not meet his requirement he could come back and ask for changes."33
The commanders took no significant action in this regard, however, nor did they question or modify the plan or orders produced at NDHQ. The commanders, therefore, at a minimum, acquiesced in the disruption of the chain of command and ought to be held accountable and responsible for the consequences of the orders they did issue.
Not only did the chain of command function improperly in passing information upward to commanders, but it also failed as a mechanism to pass orders, instructions, and "concepts of operations" to subordinate commanding officers, especially during the planning for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. As noted in the chapter on mission planning, the chain of command proved cumbersome and ineffective in many cases and neglected CF doctrine developed especially to facilitate the passage of orders. As well, officers complained that the chain of command became confused and cluttered because many officers failed to respect it, and because of the intrusion on it of so-called 'technical networks'.
For example, BGen Crabbe, Commander of the Special Service Force in 1991, issued his planning guidance for Operation Python to the commander of the CAR, Col Holmes. He specifically warned Col Holmes to obey only orders issued by the Commander SSF, because he worried about a tendency in many CF agencies and headquarters to become involved inappropriately in the planning and execution of operations. If there was one major lesson to be learned from previous operations of this nature, it was the need to maintain a clear and inviolate chain of command.34
In addition, officers declared for example, that the chain of command was too convoluted; that too many officers at NDHQ were involved in the vetting of what should have been routine demands; and that senior staff officers at NDHQ were calling the CAR directly or vice versa. Members of the CAR also violated the chain of command upward but defended the action because of necessity. In his after action report, Col Holmes complained:
The Cdn AB Regt was frequently chastised, sometimes quite harshly, for not passing information up, or for violating the [chain of command]. This we did. We had to! The information flow from the [chain of command] was next to non-existent. Routine [Situation Reports] did not start arriving until well into the mounting process. In-theatre information was nonexistent until the CAR managed to send an LO (liaison officer) for a two week visit. We had numerous diplomatic, military, and UN sources that were not exploited [by NDHQJ for the benefit of the CAR. It was also obvious that after a significant delay in deployment, staffs at the higher level started to lose interest in the operation despite the Regiment's continued commitment.35
Other officers complained that it was improper to dispense with tried and true procedures concerning chains of command, lines of communication, and the delineation of responsibilities.
For example, Maj Desnoyers, a senior staff officer at LFCA Headquarters wrote:
As we have introduced additional levels of staff to the chain of command we have failed to redistribute the responsibilities so that in peace, minor ops and war the same devolution is apparent. Policy decisions should be made at higher levels and detail should be the business of lower levels with no more than the normal 'consider two down' rule being applied. This fault is equally true of NDHQ as it is of FMC or the LFAs [Land Force areas] and must be tackled if we are to produce a system in which all concerned know their function. Without such enforced compliance, chaos will continue to reign with ad hoc arrangements for each class of, if not each individual, operation.36
As discussed elsewhere in this report, the chain of command from NDHQ to Col Labbé failed early. He was appointed to command the CJFS although he was inexperienced, was outside Canada during the pre-deployment period, took no part in the pre-deployment planning, training, and supervision of the force, and was given only five days to prepare himself and his headquarters for this dangerous and unusual operation. The selection of Col Labbé by the CDS, even if he had well-founded faith in Col Labbé's ability, is open to question and placed inordinate demands on Col Labbé, even though he was obviously highly motivated to seize the opportunity the command presented to him.
A critical function of commanders is the selection of subordinate commanders at whatever level. Commanders have to be diligent in selecting commanders to lead members of the CF and they cannot simply rely on faith and trust and then hope inexperienced subordinates will perform well. "Hope is not a method," and mere faith in subordinates is not command.
The CAR was disrupted in mid-1992 by its continuing reorganization under the direction of a chain of command rife with internal dissension and distrust. Major Seward, the officer commanding 2 Commando, complained that orders were confused and information was not being passed down the line to him.37 This type of problem continued during training and was mentioned as a problem in the evaluation of Exercise Stalwart Providence. The exercise director, Col Macdonald, testified that he "was concerned that the debriefs and the evaluations, assessments that we were doing were not being passed down to every soldier in the battalion."38 He believed that this was a significant problem in a unit about to undertake a UN mission:
To conduct this type of mission, all the soldiers have to have every bit of information available to the battalion, because they may be the lead person on that convoy escort or they may be the first person on a site. And we were feeding in points that we felt each soldier had to have and, in some cases, that did not get down to the soldiers who needed that information.39
The cause of the problems in the chain of command was more complex than simple errors of procedure and experience. WO Murphy testified that distrust of the leadership in the regiment was "causing dissension amongst the noncommissioned officers."40 There was also a significant breakdown in communications between MWO Mills and Maj Seward, which further compromised the passage of information and the integrity of the information circulating in 2 Commando. As a result, the inevitable and usually benign informal chain of command that exists in all organizations became especially active and disruptive. Capt Koch testified that in his opinion "soldiers looked more towards their senior NCOs, their warrant officers, than to their officers" for information and leadership. 41 The dissension in the ranks and especially in 2 Commando led to open challenges to leaders, symbolized in some instances by the flying of the rebel flag in barracks after such a practice had been banned by officers.42
The problems in the command relationship between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault, discussed elsewhere in this report, inevitably affected the working relationship between officers in SSF Headquarters and the CAR. Maj Kyle testified that he noticed that his Commanding Officer, LCol Morneault, was "very, very concerned" about the amount of attention that BGen Beno was giving to regimental training, in the sense that BGen Beno was interfering in CAR affairs. Maj Kyle also complained that he thought senior staff officers at SSF Headquarters were distorting his information.43
Maj Turner testified that he observed the working relationship between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault often. On more than one occasion he noted that BGen Beno was critical of the Commanding Officer's priorities and methods of command. For example, he was present when BGen Beno conveyed to LCol Morneault his opinion that "he thought the priority of the CO's effort should be on training and that the table of organization and equipment [on which the Commanding Officer was working at the time] was best left to one of his staff officers."44 Maj Turner reported that "Gen Beno himself was feeling some frustration with [LCol] Morneault and in the course of a conversation did confide in me that Colonel Holmes had had reservations about the appointment of [LCol] Morneault." It was remarkable that a commander would express his lack of confidence in one of his commanding officers to a staff officer. Surely the remarks upset the relationship and trust between LCol Morneault and senior staff officers at SSF Headquarters.
During the summer and autumn of 1992, the CAR was in turmoil, not only because it was preparing for overseas duty, but also because it was in the throes of a fundamental reorganization compounded by an annual posting in and out of personnel. Moreover, on October 23, 1992, the Commanding Officer was relieved of command, a stunning blow to the unit's confidence. Yet no officer in the chain of command visited the unit to critically assess its readiness or to gauge the morale of the soldiers. Leadership from the chain of command was lacking when it was most needed.
Armed forces allow commanders extraordinary powers over the lives and safety of Canadians and give them control over lethal weapons and their use. Officers also are trusted to defend society, sometimes with deadly force. Civil control of the armed forces through officers given authority over military units depends on a clear delineation of responsibility and accountability in the armed forces and between the armed forces and civil authorities. For these reasons, the concepts of command, authority based in law, and the chain of command -- linked authority defined in degrees -- evolved early. They have been the hallmark of civil-military relations and military organization for centuries.
There is no evidence that the concept of a chain of command is faulty. Indeed, evidence suggests that governments should insist on an easily identifiable, direct, and unencumbered chain of command in the Canadian Forces. If the chain of command is not entirely unambiguous, then accountability for decisions and actions in the CF will not be obvious, and that is a danger to civil control of the armed forces.
There is considerable evidence that the chain of command, during both the pre-deployment and the in-theatre period, failed as a device for passing and seeking information and as a command structure. On one occasion at least, commanders rejected an offer that might have informed them of serious problems in the CAR. These failures can be attributed to commanders, but not to the concepts of command or the chain of command.
There is also considerable evidence that the actions and skills of junior leaders and soldiers overcame many of the defects in the chain of command, allowing the operation to proceed. This is especially true during the period when Operation Cordon was cancelled and Operation Deliverance was authorized and deployed.
17.1 The Chief of the Defence Staff:
17.3 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish general concepts and principles for the command of Canadian Forces contingents on international operations. These concepts and principles should then be instilled through training and used to frame particular orders for commanders of specific missions.
17.4 For greater clarity, and to remedy deficiencies in existing practices, the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all commanders of Canadian Forces contingents destined for international operations are given operations orders concerning the chain of command:
|
Search | Help | Français | Comments | D-NET
Home (C) Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 1997 |