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Our terms of reference required us to assess the suitability of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) for service in Somalia. Our approach to this task involves examining the specific suitability of the Canadian Airborne Regiment for the Somalia mission (mission-specific suitability). Was the CAR adequately manned, organized, equipped, and trained for that particular mission?
The inherent suitability of the CAR is also an important issue. Inherent suitability involves a consideration of several issues, including whether there is an appropriate correlation between the capabilities of the unit and the tasks assigned; adequacy of the organization in terms of command and control; and the adequacy of its resources, the nature of its training, discipline, and the attitudes of its members. Armed forces are composed of functional units, each with specific characteristics and capabilities. Each military unit is designed to be inherently suitable to perform certain types of tasks: air transport squadrons are suitable for air transport tasks, as mine hunting ships are suitable for mine hunting. Similarly, an infantry unit is the appropriate organization to launch an assault on a defended location. To say that a unit possesses inherent suitability, however, does not necessarily mean that a unit is in all respects suitable for every mission. It is at this point that every aspect of mission-specific suitability must be considered. The unit must be ready to assume its particular assigned mission.
Readiness is the state of preparedness of a unit to perform its assigned role. It is not enough that a unit be found inherently suitable to take on a mission of the kind that it ultimately is asked to perform. As regards its actual assignment, the unit must be able to demonstrate that it is operationally ready.
Finally, suitability cannot be assessed solely in terms of role, structure, resources or, indeed, readiness. Unless soldiers work together as a unit, trust and depend on one another, and strive for the same goal, they are unlikely to succeed in any endeavour they undertake. The degree to which there is unity or cohesion in a unit is a critical measure of its fitness or suitability for any mission.
Unit cohesion is the product of leadership, training, discipline, and high morale. It gives members of a unit the feeling that they can depend implicitly on their comrades. A strong and cohesive unit acts together under the direction of its official leaders. It is this sense of predictable dependability that gives a unit its strength, especially in stressful situations. On the other hand, a unit lacking in cohesion tends to act in an unpredictable manner, often on the direction of its informal rather than its formal leaders. Again, this tendency emerges most notably when the unit is under stress. Thus, fostering unit cohesion is a cardinal responsibility of leaders, and the degree of unit cohesion is a key measure of operational readiness and, therefore, of suitability.
Before a unit can embark on any mission, it must meet certain standards. These standards form the basis for our evaluation of whether the Canadian Airborne Regiment, in the fall of 1992, was fit to go on any mission.
A consideration of the suitability of the CAR would be incomplete without reference to its recent history and the effects of the reorganization of 1992. Against this backdrop we will consider the following questions, which all bear on the issue of the suitability of the CAR for service in any theatre: Was it a formed unit? Had it been assigned missions and tasks from a higher formation? Did it function as a unit? Was it adequately manned? We will then proceed to determine cohesion by addressing these questions: Was there a sound standard of leadership? Was there an acceptable standard of discipline? Did the leaders and subordinates act together? Was there excessive instability or turbulence? Was the unit suitably trained? Finally, we will address the inherent and mission-specific suitability of the CAR.
Some of the factors in determining a unit's suitability and cohesion for a given mission are assessed elsewhere in this report. For example, leadership, discipline, training, and the adequacy of manning are treated in separate chapters.
The move of the Canadian Airborne Regiment to CFB Petawawa in 1977,1 which was the subject of considerable controversy, resulted in manpower reductions and structural changes that significantly reduced the combat power of the Regiment.2 Also, the CAR lost its special status-exemption from external taskings -- a feature which differentiated it from every other unit of the Army. As a result, the CAR felt its combat readiness had been eroded. In 1982, LCol Harries, Deputy Commander of the CAR, wrote a paper describing the structure and operation of the Regiment at that time:
The truth of the matter is that the Canadian Airborne Regiment is simultaneously the best and worst organization in the army and, arguably, in the CF [Canadian Forces]. It is the best because the Regiment is a collection of very fit and very dedicated young Canadians who temporarily volunteer to leave the comfort, security and relative uniformity of more than a dozen parent Regiments, branches and trades to commit themselves to an elite which strives for the ultimate professional performance.... Notwithstanding its code and the soldiers who practice it, the Regiment is one of the worst organizations in the CF. This because the circumstances under which it must work and play and celebrate its heritage are complex, confused and illogical, and therefore frequently counterproductive...3
The paper argued that, among other things, the move of the Regiment to CFB Petawawa signalled the end of its operational capability as a ready force by its subordination to another formation headquarters. For example, although the role of the Special Service Force (SSF) since September 1980 had been that of a Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group in support of NATO, the CAR was specifically excluded from that commitment. This meant that for a large part of the year, SSF Headquarters was focused on issues not involving the Regiment.
The role of the Regiment was that of a ready, regimental-size force for the Defence of Canada Operations. However, it was impossible for the Airborne Battle Group to form a coherent and effective force by living and training together because the sub-units needed to carry out a full airborne operation of regimental size (i.e., gunners and engineers) were not part of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Rather, they now belonged to non-airborne units committed to CAST. The result was a perceived degradation of unity among unit, airborne battle group, and Special Service Force.4
Thus, from the perspective of the CAR, the reduced assignment of CAR as part of the Special Service Force created operational and organizational problems that inhibited the ability of the Regiment to effectively carry out its role as a quick reaction unit in defence of Canada's North. This situation fostered disharmony between the CAR and the SSF, and weakened the regimental structure of the CAR.
As discussed more fully in our chapter on discipline, problems within the CAR became apparent by the mid-1980s. This led the Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen Thériault, to order a study in 1985 to review disciplinary infractions and anti-social behaviour within Force Mobile Command (FMC), and, in particular, the Special Service Force and the CAR. This study, known as the Hewson report, after MGen Hewson, then Chief of Intelligence and Security, reached several important conclusions about the state of the Regiment at that time.5
On the question of command, the report described the Canadian Airborne Regiment as a unique, continuing "organizational phenomenon" that made it difficult for the regimental commander to exercise disciplinary authority.6 The Canadian Airborne Regiment was unusual in that under Canadian Forces Operational Order (CFOO) 3.21.5 it could be both a unit within the SSF or a formation operating independently, and the commandos could be either sub-units or units within an independent formation. The CFOO did not identify the commandos as units, but they were perceived as such. The Commander SSF found it necessary to designate as commanding officers each of the five officers commanding commandos, an awkward and unbalanced arrangement. The result was that five of the subordinates of the regimental commander had the same disciplinary powers as the regimental commander. Although practical arrangements evolved whereby the commanding officers voluntarily restricted their powers in deference to their regimental commander, MGen Hewson noted that this total reliance on an unofficial arrangement "must be detrimental to the due process of military law", and concluded that the organization was an impediment to discipline.7
LGen Belzile, Commander FMC, wrote to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in response to the report. He emphasized, in part, that commandos must continue to have unit status and be commanded by commanding officers. He warned, to little avail, that a failure to make these arrangements would impair morale in the Regiment and result in further anti-social behaviour.8
The three infantry commandos retained a separate and distinct character. This distinctiveness was encouraged in a number of ways: separate residences for each commando at CFB Petawawa, 'friendly' competitions such as athletics and, most importantly, a vertical command structure linking each commando to the level above it but not to other commandos. For example, the Airborne Indoctrination Course had formerly been held for all Airborne initiates collectively, but by 1991, each commando conducted its own indoctrination course.
The commandos acted in concert on training exercises. However, each commando platoon was responsible for a specific task and, consequently, members did not mix with each other during training. This may have enhanced cohesion at the platoon level but at the expense of fostering cohesion at the commando and regimental levels.
Testimony also showed that the commandos differed from one another. According to the Regimental Sergeant-Major, CWO (ret) Jardine, in 1992 the soldiers in 2 Commando were mostly young and single; most lived in quarters and exhibited somewhat less professionalism than members of 1 Commando and 3 Commando. The behaviour of the 2 Commando soldiers was aggressive, and CWO (ret) Jardine testified that 2 Commando seemed to have a love/hate relationship with the other commandos.9
There was an ongoing rivalry among all commandos, particularly in relation to 1 Commando, a Francophone unit. Although, CWO Jardine and others believed no particular antipathy existed between the Francophones and Anglophones,10 contrary evidence emerged. LCol Morneault observed tension between the two groups, but considered it to be normal, reflecting Canadian society.11 However, Maj Kyle observed that the announcement of 1 Commando's victory in the 'march and shoot' competition for that year failed to elicit even polite applause from the other commandos at the annual Christmas dinner -- an indication that there was something more negative than mere rivalry involved.12 Cpl Purnelle of 1 Commando noted that the Francophones in 1 Commando were not very concerned with what was going on in the other commandos, and there was generally little intermingling among platoons.13
Several witnesses criticized the structure of the CAR for its lack of integration of the commandos, contrary to the situation earlier in the Regiment's history. CWO Jardine believed that the structure of the Regiment -- in effect, the independence of the commandos -- made it difficult to deal effectively with discipline in 2 Commando. The structure of unit independence, he said, made the top of the regimental structure a "sort of guiding hand" to control the commandos. Thus, each commando had its own unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).14
Maj Seward, at that time the Officer Commanding (OC) of 2 Commando, testified that separating the commandos along strong regimental lines had not been wise, since such a system made unit cohesion difficult to attain.15 Similarly CWO Jardine testified that the change resulted in loss of control, as evidenced by the fact that the commandos were no longer working together.16 Moreover, Maj Kampman of the Royal Canadian Dragoons testified that since the rifle commandos had previously been trained essentially to operate independently in battle, he was concerned about the ability of the commandos to work closely together, after restructuring, as part of a more integrated unit. He observed that after Exercise Stalwart Providence in the fall of 1992, integration had not developed to the point where the commandos operated effectively together, although this was expected of companies in an infantry battalion.17
However, other witnesses, generally of more senior rank, disagreed with this assessment. For example, LCol Morneault said that the CAR had been acting effectively as a unit, even prior to the transition in the summer of 1992.18 Maj MacKay testified that despite differences among the commandos, there was a level of cohesion based on their belonging to the same organization and sharing the same maroon-beret spirit.19 The CDS, Gen de Chastelain, and the Commander of the Army, LGen Gervais, and others did not believe that the independence of the commandos in itself would affect the stability of the Regiment.20
Indeed, even in the wake of the Somalia deployment, the high command continued to support the regimental affiliations between regular infantry regiments and the CAR. In his 1993 response to the CDS's direction to examine leadership and discipline within the CAR, LGen Reay, at that time Commander of the Army, argued that manning the Regiment would become more difficult to sustain in the long term without the affiliation, although he did not explain why. He therefore did not recommend termination of the regimental affiliation between the regular infantry regiments and the CAR. He said that it was clear, however, that the commanding officer could not indefinitely retain the assigning of personnel to the sub-units along absolute regimental lines. For this reason, the commanding officer would eventually be granted the unfettered authority to determine the employment of every person in the Regiment.21 This in itself is clear evidence that in 1992 the commanding officer did not have the control over the Regiment that he should have had.
In his 1993 paper, "The Way Ahead", BGen Beno, Commander of the SSF submitted before the de Faye board of inquiry the following comments on regimental affiliations:
The regimental method of manning 1, 2 and 3 Commando leads to a sense of independence. There is the potential for cliques to develop where otherwise undesirable individuals might be protected. Offsetting weaknesses in one sub-unit by moving personnel to another is generally not done because of current regimental affiliations.22
As of February 7, 1992, the Regiment had an established strength of 749 members. A proposed reorganization would entail a reduction to 601.23 At the same time, the units of the Regiment were to be formally disbanded and would become sub-units, although their existing names (1 Commando, 2 Commando, and 3 Commando) would be retained when referring to the three rifle companies of the new battalion.24 One unit, the Airborne Headquarters and Signal Squadron, would no longer exist.25
Col Holmes, the Commanding Officer of the CAR at the time of the transition, testified about the changes resulting from the restructuring. The nature of the Service Commando also changed. Before the change, the CAR could conduct operations and sustain itself for extended periods. Limiting the Service Commando to what was essentially a unit resupply organization, however, meant that it could only look after the needs of the Regiment for a very brief period. The Regiment had therefore lost its capability for self-sustainment. The Mortar Platoon was eliminated from the organization and a new weapons support company created.26 The CAR had been reduced to capabilities similar to those of a smaller line infantry battalion.
LCol Morneault described the transition as a huge team effort, involving much hard work by almost every leader in the Regiment. He pointed out that the transition eliminated the ability of the Regiment to operate without additional support. LCol Morneault looked forward to the Regiment becoming a battalion and the greater cohesion such a change would bring: "It would be a familiar structure to newcomers, coming from other infantry battalions; and, again, sometimes simpler is better."27
The restructuring and downsizing took time. When the warning order for Operation Cordon was received in early September 1992, the Regiment had not physically completed the transition. The Regiment was still turning in excess vehicles and equipment. Planned moves to new building locations had not been finished, nor had buildings been renovated. Also, the regulations, orders, and instructions for the Regiment had not yet been rewritten, although a plan had been drawn up for this purpose.28
Still, LCol Morneault concluded, to our surprise, that aside from the disruption caused by the turnover in personnel during the normal Active Posting Season (APS), the transition itself had no adverse impact on the Regiment.29 Given the extent of the transition and other activities, we must consider whether this assessment was accurate.
At the time of its deployment to Somalia, the role of the Regiment was to provide rapid-deployment airborne/air-transportable forces for operations in accordance with assigned tasks, primarily in support of national security and international peacekeeping. This role had remained unchanged since it was assigned in 1978. The operational tasks of the CAR were detailed in three Special Service Force (SSF) Defence Plans (DPs):
The CAR was capable of performing the first two tasks. On a tight schedule, it would have been difficult for the CAR to meet the task as a light infantry battalion, since this task required a slightly different organization and mix of equipment.
Although the CAR did have assigned roles and tasks, consideration of these nevertheless seemed to take a back seat to the restructuring of the Regiment in 1992. For example, by the time the CAR had been downsized to a battalion in June 1992, discussion was still continuing within Land Force Central Area, the Special Service Force, and the Regiment about the appropriate 'concept of employment' for the Regiment.
The purpose of the concept of employment was to detail the appropriate mission and implied tasks of the CAR and its affiliated combat support and combat service support elements.31 Land Force Command approved a final concept of employment for t he Regiment on November 4, 1992.32 It is clear that the Regiment was reorganized before it was given a new concept of operations. We believe it would have been more logical to develop the concept of employment first, and then design the unit to implement the concept.
In the new concept of employment, the primary role of the Regiment was to "provide a parachute-deployable, combat-capable force in support of Canadian interests at home and abroad." A secondary role was to operate as a light infantry battalion group in low- to mid-intensity operations or in peacekeeping operations anywhere in the world.33 The proposed organization for Active Posting Season in the summer of 1993 called for a regiment of 665 personnel, including a mortar platoon (unlike the restructured Airborne of the summer of 1992), and a direct fire support platoon (which had not been included in the original planning).34 A subsequent reorganization would be necessary after the Somalia deployment.
Before the deployment of the Regiment to Somalia, senior officers in Land Force Command Headquarters had recognized that to carry out its concept of employment, the Regiment needed additional integral components, including a mortar platoon and a direct fire support platoon. These were never added.
Moreover, under restructuring plans of November 1992, designed for implementation in 1993, the CAR was once again to become an independent unit capable of acting under national or allied control.35 The Regiment was to come under command of the Land Force Central Area (LFCA) Commander.36 BGen Beno, the Commander SSF, was concerned in the fall of 1992 about the plans for the independence of the Regiment, arguing that it should be left as a unit integral to the SSF and detached for tasking to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) or Area Headquarters as desired. He added: "If there was a battalion that needed...firm direction and leadership, it is the [CAR]."37
This lack of definition concerning concept of employment, role, and tasking contributed to the impression that the CAR was unsuitable for the Somalia mission.
The Hewson report emphasized the requirement for experienced, mature, and continuous leadership at section and platoon levels, but noted that the relationship between the soldiers and their immediate leaders had deteriorated badly over the preceding 10 years.38 A primary cause was the increase of tasking within Force Mobile Command, which meant that many of the junior leaders were away from the units for months at a time. The turbulence caused by this instability increased due to the need for leaders to attend career courses. Since they lacked effective leadership from junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), many soldiers looked to informal leaders among themselves. As is often the case when informal leadership emerges, many of the se informal leaders could not cope with the challenge in a responsible manner.39
The report also noted that although most of the NCOs were outstanding soldiers and leaders, from time to time weak junior NCOs, attracted by the airborne option, had joined the Regiment. They became liabilities contributing directly to a breakdown in discipline. Care had not been taken to ensure that only above-average NCOs, particularly junior NCOs, were chosen for service with the CAR.40 Moreover, it became clear that junior leaders were not equipped with the necessary tools to detect personality irregularities that might manifest themselves during training.41
Clearly, the Hewson report was concerned about deficiencies in leadership of the junior ranks and NCOs in the Regiment. However, while noting the instability within the CAR, MGen Hewson did not view the organizational structure, involving the organization of the Regiment around three independent commandos, as warranting change.
Col Joly, the Director of Infantry, testified in 1993 before the de Faye board of inquiry about the situation of the CAR prior to 1992. He identified a tradition of establishing a rotation among the regiments so that a senior colonel in each of the regiments who had formerly commanded a battalion would be appointed to command the Regiment. Also, a very good lieutenant-colonel was ordinarily selected as deputy commander. The regimental operations officer and regimental major were typically experienced majors with good prospects for promotion to lieutenant-colonel. The commanding officers of the commandos were considered to be leaders with excellent potential for future progression. The aim, in ideal terms, was to place the best leaders in the CAR so that t hey would, in essence, improve their leadership skills.42
This tradition of quality appointments changed with the downsizing of the CAR. The downgrading of the rank of the commanding officer position had a ripple effect, causing further reductions of ranks in other positions. At that point in time, according to Col Joly, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) majors were not of the highest calibre. (One senior officer had concluded that many of the CAR's field officers were older, and not of the mould that was traditionally expected in the Regiment) . Col Joly believed that when commanded by a full colonel, the CAR had been much better served in its assigning of personnel and recruitment because the colonel had participated in the Infantry Council process as an active co-equal, and had been able to garner the support of the regiments involved.
According to Col Joly, the CAR was a special unit, requiring care and attention; otherwise, by default, its quality and efficiency would suffer. The difficulty was that there had been a great deal of confusion brought on by downsizing, and "perhaps as part of this process, the Airborne Regiment has been a casualty in the way it has been manned, for reasons that are not clear but may be more of a parochial nature related to the regiments having other priorities in these changing times."43
In an overview probably written in late 1992, Col Joly also concluded that the Regiment had been manned "with second-and third-string majors, and the third-string ones clearly had no potential." He recognized the possibility that some of the personalities would not be able to cope in Somalia and anticipated that there might be some problems. Col Joly claimed that sometime in January 1993 he had sent a message to LCol Mathieu. The message raised concerns about seven of LCol Mathieu's majors. However, Col Joly stated that the intent had been misinterpreted by LGen Reay, who subsequently directed that his message be destroyed because it caused confusion. The issue was handled by normal staff action.44
In his testimony before us, Col Joly reiterated that the overall quality of the majors in the CAR, at least as far as the PPCLI was concerned, had been generally substandard and certainly below the outstanding level -- that is, in his words, "second" or "third string". By second string, he meant that the person would probably not gain command or be promoted to lieutenant-colonel or had not demonstrated the potential to be promoted. By third string, he meant that the person was not likely ever to be promoted. For the CAR, he said, strong leadership skills had been required, including, in the case of majors, the potential to become a lieutenant-colonel commanding officer of a field unit in the Canadian army.45
In addition to quality concerns, there was a concern regarding numbers. When the CAR was eventually deployed as the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) to Somalia, it did so under a manning cap of 845 personnel. To meet this restriction, difficult cuts were made. Needed personnel were left behind in Canada. The CAR was sent on a potentially dangerous operation with known shortages in areas such as line infantrymen, security forces, and combat support. They also went without an adequate reserve.
In fact, following the Somalia incidents, senior commanders severely criticized the leadership of the officers and NCOs in the CAR. LGen Reay, for example, commented that the poor quality of some of the regiment's officers and soldiers posted to the CAR in recent years, ultimately resulted in leadership shortcomings, indiscipline, and the emergence of a small lawless element within the Regiment.46
The reorganization of the CAR in 1992 was substantial.47 The preface to "The Canadian Airborne Regiment Transition Plan" describes the transition as involving:
...the simultaneous disbandment of five units; a change of command, the loss of 150 personnel; the reorganization of virtually every platoon in the regiment; the assimilation of Base personnel into our quarters, the RCR into our messes; and a normal posting cycle this summer. All the while we must continue to prepare our soldiers for a possible UN contingency...and prepare an extensive individual and collective training plan for this fall.48
This reorganization, in fact, interfered with the normal routine and appears to have continued beyond the summer into the fall of 1992. The Regimental Commander, Col Holmes, was ordered to minimize unit training as of May 29, 1992, to give the reorganization top priority.49 The board of inquiry convened to look into the change of command noted that when LCol Mathieu replaced LCol Morneault as Commanding Officer of the CAR in October 1992, and the Regiment had been reduced to battalion status, " some of the necessary follow-on activity [had] not yet been completed, particularly in the areas of role, organization, equipment and garrison accommodation."50 It also noted that the cumulative effect of Operation Python and Operation Cordon over the same time frame as the reorganization and reduction of the Regiment would necessitate a large stocktaking, and that the Regiment would face a daunting challenge to clean house after its return from Operation Cordon.51
What effect would this reorganization have on the capability of the Canadian Airborne Regiment to go to Somalia? Opinion on this issue was divided. Some senior military officers, including the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Commander Land Force Command (LFC) and his deputy testified that the restructuring was not so great as to prevent consideration of the CAR for selection. It appears that the further up the chain of command one went, the less seriously the problem was regarded.52
However, others of lower rank were much more critical. Col Holmes, the Commanding Officer of the CAR before LCol Morneault assumed command, criticized the restructuring of the CAR. On the question of whether the reorganization had impaired the ability of the Regiment to train for Somalia, he concluded: "From a soldier's perspective I would suggest no; from an administrative perspective, I must question whether the Regiment would be capable of undertaking the operation."53
The plan for the transition, he said, was more long than short term. Although some expertise remained in the Regiment as a result of the extensive training done for Operation Python, downsizing and the Active Posting Season nonetheless meant that a considerable number of new soldiers as well as officers needed to be brought up to the necessary level of expertise. The reorganization, in fact, extended into the fall. Moreover, the CAR had to reorganize and retool itself for Operation Cordon and, since it went to Somalia with armoured vehicles which were not part of the CAR's inventory, it had to re-equip again for the Operation Deliverance mission.
Col Holmes equated the process to the re-engineering of a medium-sized business: an organization with 750 people was being reduced to about 600 and the process was changing virtually every aspect within that organization, including personnel, equipment, vehicles, and administration.54 He stated: "So there's a lot of things in the equation here that in my view, contributed to the possibility of it being slightly off balance, if not more so."55
When asked whether tasking the CAR for the Somalia mission had been a wise choice given the tremendous changes in the organization, Col Holmes replied: "It would not have been my choice...it would have been difficult for anyone to pick up the pieces and b e ready to go in that short of order, in my view. That's my own personal opinion."56
Col Joly, who in 1993 was Director of Infantry at Land Force Command Headquarters, also pointed to deficiencies resulting from the downsizing. Given the various tasks assigned, the CAR had inadequate ready resources to undertake the full range of expected missions, not only domestically but also internationally. Consequently, some of the components needed to augment the CAR could not be adequately trained. Moreover, it would be difficult to bring the components together in the time allowed for deploying ( a seven-day response time). If committed to deploy without those resources, the CAR would have had serious difficulty performing its tasks.57
MGen (ret) Loomis, author of a recent book on the Somalia deployment, argues that the downsizing of the CAR rendered the CAR ineffective as a functioning regiment. He maintains that the central problem with the Regiment was that by the time it went to Somalia, "it was neither fish nor fowl, neither a brigade nor a conventional Canadian infantry battalion".58
According to MGen (ret) Loomis, as long as the CAR was a mini-brigade, with three different mini-battalions under their own commanding officers, with its own attached airborne artillery battery, engineer squadron and logistics unit under a regimental head quarters organized like a brigade headquarters, the situation was tolerable. However, if constituted in this way, every unit would be grossly under strength. In his view, when further reductions forced the CAR to be reorganized into an infantry battalion and partially mechanized for Somalia, it should have been dispersed back to its parent regiments. This would have ensured that the proper checks and balances of the regimental system were working.
The capacity of soldiers to work together as a unit is highly dependent on structure. The infantry battalion constitutes one of the most developed and reliable military structures. It features a chain of command -- the classic interrelationship between officers and NCOs -- and a place for every member of the unit.
Military analysts agree that cohesion is fundamental to the performance of an army unit.59 Leaders continuously encourage and build unit cohesion, especially during training exercises. Cohesion is instilled by emphasizing group loyalty and identification through ceremonies, common traditions, unique uniforms, and distinct practices. When a unit is warned for an operation, a commanding officer must make an extra effort to bring the unit together by providing a clear purpose for a unit's mission and by reinforcing through training, unifying procedures, orders, tactics, and other operating methods. It is critical during this period to demonstrate and exercise the formal leadership system or the authority of the chain of command to establish confidence in the leaders, and to eliminate questions about who is directing the unit in the field.
Any experienced officer asked to evaluate the cohesion of a unit would therefore look for evidence that members of the unit at all levels understand the unit's mission; are performing their tasks according to agreed standing operating procedures; and that orders and directions are flowing through the unit from top to bottom in an efficient manner.
To determine the level of cohesion in the CAR the following questions will be addressed. Was there a sound standard of leadership? Was there an acceptable level of discipline? Did leaders and their subordinates act together? Was there excessive turbulence ? Was the unit suitably trained?
In this section, we summarize some of the findings illustrating the level of leadership60 in the CAR and its impact on cohesion. Strong leadership is associated with high levels of cohesion.61
Leadership problems were evident at all levels. Officers in the chain of command had lost confidence in LCol Morneault and had him removed as Commanding Officer. The RSM, CWO Jardine, argued with LCol Morneault about the readiness of the unit and openly contradicted his Commanding Officer in front of warrant officers and sergeants.62
LCol Morneault was not the only officer whose ability as a leader was doubted by senior officers and others. Testimony before us shows that senior officers and some senior non-commissioned officers did not trust Maj Seward or consider him fit for duty in Somalia.63 BGen Beno remarked that he "would fire Seward based on [his] observations and what [he] heard from Col MacDonald," who conducted Exercise Stalwart Providence.64
Immediately before departure for Somalia, the CAR exhibited undisciplined behaviour, including the misuse of pyrotechnics, ammunition, and weapons, engaging in anti-social activities, and acting with hostility towards superiors. This behaviour can be attributed, at least in part, to failures by the unit leaders. Commanders and leaders were not only unable to maintain good order and discipline in the CAR, but were also unable to resolve these problems satisfactorily before the CAR departed for Somalia. Even as late as October 19, 1992, BGen Beno complained to MGen MacKenzie that "the battalion has significant unresolved leadership and discipline problems which I believe challenge the leadership of the unit."65
Officers were not the only poor leaders in the CAR. In 2 Commando, in particular, many non-commissioned officers were young, inexperienced, and demonstrated poor leadership. Two sergeants were found to be unsuitable and returned to their parent units six months after they were posted to the CAR. Another failed to report a soldier known to be involved in an unlawful activity. According to testimony, the RSM, CWO Jardine, was not respected by some soldiers and some officers.66
Indeed, leadership problems were so great that in late 1992, BGen Beno identified the deputy commanding officer, the officer commanding 2 Commando, the officer commanding the Reconnaissance Platoon, and as many as 12 NCOs as leadership risks whom he felt should not be deployed to Somalia. In his letter of October 19, 1992, recommending the replacement of LCol Morneault, BGen Beno wrote that LCol Morneault should be replaced "forthwith" because "for many reasons...including leadership and discipline problems...the Canadian Airborne Regiment is not a steady unit at this time.67
The CAR was experiencing signs of poor discipline,68 despite the remedies suggested in the Hewson report. This was particularly evident in 1 Commando (initiation rites) and 2 Commando (excessive aggressiveness, defiance of authority). There were also troubling incidents in 3 Commando, Service Commando, and Headquarters Commando, but nothing as remarkable as the others.
The factors that contributed to discipline problems included the quality of some junior officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs); high turnover rates and out-of-unit taskings; mistrust and dislike among some of the officers and NCMs; a tendency to downplay the significance of disciplinary infractions; and the continuing capacity of CAR members to evade responsibility for disciplinary breaches.
In order to attain cohesion, a unit must demonstrate that it can function effectively in a disciplined fashion by promoting recognized standards of conduct. As we indicated elsewhere, this was not the case in the CAR.
The command relationship between BGen Beno, Commander of the SSF, and LCol Morneault, Commanding Officer of the CAR, deteriorated throughout the fall of 1992 to the extent that BGen Beno eventually recommended the replacement of LCol Morneault.
Conflicts between senior officers seldom go unnoticed. Some staff members within both SSF HQ and CAR HQ were aware of the differences of opinion between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault. This caused additional stress between the two headquarters and was counter-productive to a strong sense of cohesion.
Evidence of low unit cohesion in the CAR immediately prior to its deployment to Somalia was presented to us by other witnesses as well. Among other indicators of poor relations and cohesion within the CAR, they described a significant degree of tension an d distrust between some officers and non-commissioned officers.69
An officer's task is the command of a unit or sub-unit. The officer is responsible for leading and for devising plans to achieve the objectives for which the officer has been assigned. Those who lead must provide inspiration to their soldiers and be responsible for their well-being. The officer is also responsible for all the paperwork and administration of the officer's organization.
The NCO is responsible to the NCO's superior officer for the day-to-day running of the platoon, for discipline, for seeing that the troops are ready at the right place at the right time, with the correct equipment to carry out the officer's plan. As the e yes and ears of the officer, the NCO is responsible for keeping superiors informed of the morale, discipline, and well-being of the soldiers and acts as an intermediary between the lower ranks and superiors. The NCO is also responsible for seeing that the officer's policies and commands are passed on down the ranks.
The team of officer and NCO should embody the ideal working relationship at every level of the organization. The officer-NCO relationship represents the nexus between the officers and the troops and the quality of this relationship determines the overall success of the hierarchy. If the officer and NCO can work together co-operatively and transmit a positive impression to the soldiers and to those higher in the hierarchy, there is much less stress on the structure.
The importance of NCOs was emphasized by senior Canadian officers who testified that because officers pass through a unit more quickly than NCOs, the enforcement of discipline within a unit often rests on the shoulders of the regimental sergeant-major, sergeants-major, warrant officers, sergeants, and master corporals. These NCOs have a closer familiarity with the soldiers in the unit. If there is a strong regimental sergeant-major or a strong cadre of NCOs, leadership problems disappear or are minimized. If these leaders are weak, however, problems will arise. Therefore, an important aspect of unit cohesion is the ability of NCOs and officers to co-operate with and trust one another.
Many critical observations were made about the officer-NCO relationship within the CAR before its deployment to Somalia. Maj Kampman of the Royal Canadian Dragoons observed that the more frequent rotation of officers than of NCOs in the CAR made it very difficult for officers to impose their control and their command on their sub-units. Thus, almost by default, the senior NCOs became the old hands in the unit to whom the soldiers looked for leadership. 70
Maj Seward, Officer Commanding of 2 Commando, observed a change in the composition of the Regiment between his first tour with the CAR while it was at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Edmonton, and his later experience in the Regiment in 1992. Notably, in 1992, the soldiers did not have the infantry qualification-level courses that were available to soldiers in the 1970s and 1980s. There were also more privates than corporals, and the soldiers were younger. This suggests the need for superior NCOs.71
The Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM) was concerned that the authority of NCOs was being eroded. He testified that he disagreed with the posting-out of two sergeants from 2 Commando. The RSM, CWO Jardine, believed that these NCOs were not accepted, and that there was pressure from above (Maj Seward) and below (the junior ranks) to get rid of them.72
CWO Jardine testified that he found it appalling that someone in authority had not known of or taken steps to prevent the controversial hazing or initiation rites involving 1 Commando personnel in 1992, given that orderly corporals, orderly sergeants, and the orderly officers within the CAR itself were on duty in all the barrack blocks. CWO Jardine perceived a problem in the fact that the commando orderly sergeants living in the quarters were actually master corporals and were fairly young. Because they s hared the same quarters, they socialized with the soldiers: "You could be socializing with the soldiers at night and the next day you would be out telling them what to do." According to CWO (ret) Jardine, the master corporals should have been segregated from the corporal and private ranks.73
As well, there were numerous instances of poor judgement and bad advice from senior NCMs. For example, when Cpl Powers of 2 Commando first admitted to being responsible, at least in part, for the Kyrenia Club incident, he was advised by his sergeant not t o come forward at that time. In CWO (ret) Jardine's view, such advice was "totally wrong".74
The quest for excellence and the spirit of competition, when properly harnessed, are positive forces. However, when they are uncontrolled and differences are allowed to fester, they can be counter-productive. In a cohesive unit, differences of opinion are quickly and diplomatically confronted and constructive criticism is encouraged and issues resolved. In a unit lacking cohesion, these problems remain uncorrected and can become divisive.
The level of distrust and conflict emerged clearly from the evidence of the officers and non-commissioned members who appeared before us. In a unit it is not imperative that all individuals like each other, but they must have mutual respect and trust. Unfortunately for the CAR, there was a significant level of distrust and conflict between officers and NCOs. As a result, cohesion suffered greatly.76
The examples offered in the preceding section represent only a small part of the overall picture of dysfunctional interpersonal relationships within the CAR presented to us. The image of strained relationships and conflicting views among so many of the officers and NCOs of the Regiment is striking, particularly in light of the singularly weak response of the senior leadership to these problems in the days leading up to the deployment to Somalia.
Our evidence shows that the mission-specific training provided to the CAR for its tour of duty in Somalia was poorly planned, poorly delivered and, in some instances, clearly inadequate.77
Surprisingly, a systematic approach to the training of peacekeepers was almost totally absent in the CF. Training on peacekeeping-related matters was left to the ad hoc exigencies of pre-deployment training. Adding to this deficiency was the fact that the CAR received insufficient support and consideration from NDHQ, Land Force Command Headquarters and Land Force Central Area Headquarters during its pre-deployment preparations.
Training is an important aspect of cohesion. It serves to instil the personal self-confidence that individuals need to do their job. Training builds trust by demonstrating the value of teamwork. Without proper training, teamwork, and unit cohesion suffer.
In the days leading up to its deployment, the CAR was characterized by instability or turbulence, possibly due to a high turnover rate of personnel in the unit. Instability results from postings in and out, the movement of personnel from one position to another within the Regiment, and readjustments made when individuals leave their positions to take career courses. Other reasons for turnover include high priority taskings outside the unit, the need to augment training establishments, and the need to fin d individual replacements for other peacekeeping missions. Typically, in peacetime, the number of personnel in a unit is well below the number required in times of war. Also, when preparing to embark on peacekeeping missions, some reorganization is always necessary. As a result, there is always more work to do in a unit than there are people to do it. Excessive turnover and less than adequate resources can cause breaks in the chain of command and may adversely affect cohesion in a unit.
The Canadian Airborne Regiment not only experienced a change in leadership at the commanding officer level but three of the four commando OCs were also changed.
Within 2 Commando itself, from 1990 to the summer of 1993, the commanding officer or officer commanding changed six times and the sergeant-major was changed four times.78 Similarly, a considerable turnover of the corporals and privates occurred in 1991 and a substantial turnover of officers and non-commissioned officers took place in 1992.79 The CAR, which had just undergone a major reorganization, was profoundly affected by the turnover in positions within 2 Commando.
Maj Seward testified that when he took over command in 1993, 2 Commando consisted of about 136 persons of all ranks, of whom about 50 per cent had changed during the Active Posting Season of 1992. Most of the changes had occurred at the rank of private and corporal. Also, two of the three platoon commanders had changed, although the platoon warrant officers had not.80
The selection of the Canadian Airborne Regiment also raises the issue of whether such units are inherently suitable for peacekeeping or peace-making operations.81
A defence publication lists air mobility, quick reaction, flexibility and lightness of arms as characteristics that set airborne forces apart from more conventional forces.82
A former commander of the Airborne, LGen (ret) Foster, identified several other characteristics that are, in his view, unique to an airborne regiment: a high state of readiness (available within 48 to 96 hours); independence; ability to dramatically increase in size; an enhanced rank structure; maximization of fire power; an exceptional fitness requirement among soldiers; and a direct line to the senior commander.83
Despite this list of impressive qualities, LGen (ret) Foster conceded that generally speaking, the past operations of the CAR had not required the specific characteristics he had listed.84 He denied, however, that the CAR had been a regiment in search of a mission, one that could be considered a luxury. Instead, he compared the CAR to an insurance policy, in that it was ready to go and was cost-effective.85
The question remains whether paratroops, as opposed to other infantry, are appropriate for peacekeeping or peace-making activities. Equally important, from the perspective of the Somalia operation, is the question of whether paratroopers believe themselves to be appropriate for such activities.
An American study conducted on the attitudes of paratroopers as peace-keepers, presented data pointing to a potential incompatibility between the parachutists' creed and what the study refers to as 'the constabulary ethic'. The same study also indicated a greater potential for problems such as boredom among such troops on peacekeeping missions.86 This conclusion is supported by a 1990 examination of peacekeepers in the Sinai which concluded that although paratroopers had served well as peacekeepers, a "significant minority" had experienced attitudinal conflicts with the constabulary ethic.87
Another American study published in 1985 suggested that the ability of paratroopers to adapt to peacekeeping operations depended largely on the expectation of career enhancement. According to this study, paratroopers who expressed a positive orientation toward a combat role and negative feelings about undertaking a peacekeeping assignment, could nonetheless adapt to the relative passivity and boredom of peacekeeping operations, provided such assignments were perceived to be career-enhancing.88
The studies of American paratroopers suggest that many, albeit a minority, felt that peacekeeping could not be effectively performed without the use of force; that peacekeeping did not require special skills; and that peacekeeping was not the kind of job that paratroopers should be called upon to do. Such soldiers were seen as likely to question the appropriateness of a peacekeeping mission for their unit. Inasmuch as the CAR trained regularly with its allied counterparts, it is possible that these attitudes may have influenced some members of the CAR or that they may have had such attitudes quite independent of any outside influence. It is the responsibility of leaders to see to the elimination of such attitudes.
Mission-specific suitability simply means that the unit selected for a mission was chosen on an appropriate selection basis and, when properly prepared for its mission, was capable of conducting the mission successfully.
One factor cited as favouring the CAR's selection for Somalia was the Regiment's designation as Canada's UN standby unit, and the high state of readiness that this designation implied. Many witnesses emphasized the CAR's standby status as a major factor in its selection.89
Gen (ret) de Chastelain, in response to criticism of the choice of the CAR for peacekeeping missions, pointed out that the CAR had been the UN standby unit for more than 20 years and had done "exemplary service in Cyprus during the Turkish landings in 1974". He added, "We should not apologize in any way for the [CAR] being a UN force."90 He was supported by LGen Reay, Commander of Land Force Command, who saw the paratroop nature of the Regiment as an additional advantage in its selection as the UN standby unit.91
The instructions for designating a UN standby unit are found in the CDS's 1990 "Direction to Commanders 1990-96", and contain the CDS's personal and primary operational direction to the Canadian Forces. The mission of Mobile Command was to maintain combat-ready general-purpose land forces to meet Canada's defence commitments. Among Mobile Command's tasks was the need to contribute to land forces as directed in support of international peacekeeping obligations.92
According to NDHQ Instruction DCDS/85, in keeping with government policy to support peacekeeping operations, the Canadian Forces was required to maintain at an advanced state of readiness, for deployment anywhere in the world, a force designated "PK" standby unit, comprising three components:
The view of the Canadian Forces in the late 1980s, it appears, was to deploy operational units on peacekeeping duties. The Final Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/90, Peacekeeping,93 stated:
During the Cold War there was an apparent reluctance to reduce the effectiveness of formations and units by removing components for peacekeeping duties. This concern was exacerbated by the 1970s when a number of Canadian peacekeeping contributions had come to comprise primarily support personnel committed to long-term operations. In turn, the option was seen to lie in the creation of ad hoc units and sub-units for peace-keeping, drawing on support trades from across the CF. Recently, there has been a trend back to deploying contributions drawn from a formed unit. Sources stated that this was related to a number of factors: superior unit cohesion and performance; the end of the Cold War; UN requests for a better balance of combat and support contributions; and, usually, finite six-month mandates.94
The capability to deploy quickly, in accordance with the status of a UN standby unit, was one of the factors in the selection of the CAR for Somalia. However, as matters developed, despite its status as a light infantry unit specializing in deployment by parachute, there was nothing in the designation of the CAR as Canada's UN standby unit that uniquely suited it for the Somalia mission.
Although, in theory, the CAR could have deployed within seven days, it was highly questionable whether it was capable of conducting the mission in Somalia immediately after the seven-day deployment period. LCol Morneault testified that although the CAR could have deployed within the seven-day period, its preparation for the mission would have been less well done; thus, any declaration of operational readiness would have been delayed until the unit was in theatre.95 LGen (ret) Foster testified that peacekeeping missions often took from weeks to months to be put in place, "So that's not a 48-hour to 96-hour kind of business."96
Ordinarily, the seven-day notice period meant that the CAR would be basically equipped with the soldiers' personal equipment and the weapon systems that they could carry into a mission area. However, the Somalia deployment called for the kind of equipment that was suited to the work of a mechanized battalion. Therefore, large quantities of equipment not normally belonging to the CAR had to be transferred to the unit, packed into sea containers, and loaded onto ships. Also, members of the CAR had to be trained to a new role as a mechanized unit. As a result, the CAR could not possibly deploy within seven days for the Somalia operation and, initially, 30 days' warning was given.97
In our view, the lack of objective standards for declaring operational readiness98 and a perceived rush to deploy caused a premature declaration of operational readiness of the CAR.
The CAR had major defects that hindered its operational readiness. It was in the midst of a fundamental reorganization in addition to a change in its concept of operation. The reorganization had been taking place for some time but all the issues involving the new organization had not been resolved. Although primarily trained as an airborne light infantry battalion, it was expected to operate in Somalia as a mechanized infantry battalion, a considerably different concept.
The difficulty in making this adjustment was seriously downplayed. Only rudimentary training had been completed, and then, only at the section and platoon levels. The cohesion necessary to employ the commandos in support of each other and the integration of the infantry and armoured resources were never exercised. Had the CAR been forced to deploy as a battle group or combat team (believed to have been a distinct possibility prior to their departure from Canada), it would have done so without the benefit of any familiarization training or common standing operating procedures. Also, the logistics concept needed to support the operational concept was neither practised nor tested.
This chapter has discussed two significant aspects of military operations: suitability and cohesion.
To be suitable for any type of deployment, a unit must meet certain conditions, be properly formed, have properly assigned missions and tasks, and be adequately manned. We have found that the CAR was not a properly formed infantry battalion because it was beset by organizational stresses and limitations of a kind that should not have been placed on an infantry battalion. In addition, compounding the CAR's difficulties was the fact that the CAR was not properly manned because due care and consideration were not taken in selecting many of the key personnel, especially the leaders.
To possess the cohesion necessary for deployment to Somalia, the CAR had to meet certain conditions: it had to possess sound leadership and exercise acceptable discipline; it also had to have leaders and subordinates act in concert. This could only occur with proper training and relative stability in the ranks.
We found significant leadership failings, at several levels, which were serious enough to weaken the cohesion of the CAR to the point that it ceased to operate effectively. In this regard, there was less than an acceptable level of discipline which, in turn, reduced the level of cohesion in the CAR. The leaders and their subordinates failed to act in unison and, in many cases, were in conflict. These shortcomings also served to reduce the level of cohesion within the CAR.
Although, in theory, the CAR was inherently suitable for the mission to Somalia, its actual state of leadership, discipline, and unit cohesion rendered it unfit for any operation in the fall of 1992.
From a mission-specific perspective the CAR had been improperly prepared and inadequately trained for its mission, and by any reasonable standard, it was not operationally ready for employment on Operation Deliverance.
Although the CAR may have been suitable for its mission by virtue of the fact it was a major combat arms unit, its dysfunctional organization, poor cohesion and low mission suitability rendered it unsuitable for deployment to Somalia.
An armed force is a body of men organized to achieve its ends irresistibly by coordinated action. Cohesion is, therefore, the essence of its being.See also James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 171, quoted in Cotton, "A Canadian Military Ethos":
Before anything else, we must recognize that a functioning military requires bonds of trust, sacrifice, and respect within its ranks, and similar bonds of support and respect between an army and the nation it represents.See also, Col (ret) Reuven Gal, "Unit Morale: From a Theoretical Puzzle to an Empirical Illustration -- An Israeli Example", Journal of Applied Social Psychology 16 (1986), p. 559:
[T]he strength of unit cohesion has been shown, time and time again, to be a key factor in the soldiers' level of morale and combat efficiency...
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