The key question in assessing the adequacy of the selection and screening of personnel for the Somalia deployment is whether the system, and those who operated it, took unacceptable risks -- either knowingly or negligently -- in the manning of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) (which made up more than 70 per cent of the Canadian Forces personnel who served in Somalia) and in deciding which members of that unit were suitable to participate in that mission. In answering the question, we must consider these processes in their proper context.

The public should be entitled to assume that members of our standing, professional armed forces who are employed in line units of the Regular Force, and who are available and eligible for peace operations, are sound and reliable individuals -- even in the absence of significant pre-mission screening. As discussed in Chapter 8, the Canadian Forces (CF) has a comprehensive and highly structured system for selecting, training and employing its members. While career progression and prospects differ, the path is the same for all members of a given military occupation. This standardization does permit a certain amount of faith that members of the forces are reliable, suitable and competent to perform their duties. However, such faith must not be blind; and those within the system must not allow themselves to become complacent, regardless of how highly developed it is.

Chapter 8 revealed certain gaps and limitations in the screening of CF recruits. Persons with potential for criminal and anti-social behaviour can and do slip into the system and, once inside, may even thrive for a time on some aspects of military life. Unlike the case in most police forces, a criminal record is not a bar to enrolment in the CF and individual recruitment centres have considerable discretion in assessing the significance of past criminal convictions. There are, moreover, significant restrictions on the uses that can be made of Young Offenders Act convictions in the recruit screening process.¹ Also, unlike applicants to many police forces, CF recruits are not normally subject to psychological stability testing and assessment.² Finally, information obtained during the security clearance process can be used only for that purpose and not for other administrative, disciplinary, or investigative purposes.³

Further, in terms of post-enrolment, there are widespread reservations within the CF about key aspects of the career management system, such as the fairness and effectiveness of the performance evaluation reporting system; the accountability of National Defence Headquarters career managers; and general perceptions that career management in the CF appears often to be more preoccupied with individual career development than with operational imperatives.⁴

This raises the pervasive and vexing problem of careerism. Careerism is the phenomenon whereby the individual's need or desire for career advancement in an institution takes precedence over the needs of the mission or the well-being and effectiveness of the institution. Careerism is inconsistent with the performance of duty in pursuit of the needs of the service. It is a problem that is by no means unique to the military. Nonetheless, the military, more than other institutions in society, has as part of its ethos -- and, indeed, part of its raison d'être -- the notion of sacrificing personal interest for the common good. Even more to the point, it is the military, more than almost any other institution, that prides itself on translating this ideal into practice. So we consider it appropriate, and indeed incumbent upon us, to comment on this phenomenon.

The precepts of careerism seem to have become entrenched in the attitudes of many members of the CF. This is particularly noteworthy in the upper echelons, where some senior officers have tended to hitch their stars to selected superiors, cultivated their performance to the personal standards of their bosses, and rationalized their actions -- and sometimes their sense of values, particularly loyalty - on the basis of their understanding of their bosses' imperatives. As discussed in Chapter 15 on leadership, this has had the effect of shifting individual senior officers to the transactional form of leadership, trading institutionally required qualities of transformational leadership for unduly loyal performance to the standards of their superiors.

It is only human, of course, for people to be concerned with the development and progress of their careers -- or for mentors to be concerned with the promotion of their protégés. Moreover, it is entirely appropriate for an institution to take an interest in the development and well-being of its employees, including the meaningful development of their careers with that institution. This is important not only for employee morale, but also in ensuring that talent and potential are fully exploited or, at least, not squandered. In the case of the military, the further dimension of this obligation rests on the concept that individuals are encouraged to forgo self-interest in favour of the group in the understanding that the group will look after them. Attention to rational career development therefore serves both institutional and personal interests. Indeed, the attention paid to personal and career development by the Canadian Forces is to some extent a worthy example for other employers and institutions. But to the extent that such concerns find systemic expression in the institution, it must be clear at all times that the interests of the institution come first and that considerations of individual career development are legitimate only to the extent that they coincide with the needs of the institution.

Unfortunately, we have seen strong evidence of careerism creeping into and distorting the integrity of the personnel system as well as other crucial systems of accountability. Potential candidates for important jobs in various units were excluded from consideration if they were likely to be promoted during the normal term of such a posting.⁵ In selecting someone to fill a key sub- unit command position in the Canadian Airborne Regiment in the summer before the Somalia mission, the most desirable candidate was sent on course by his parent regiment rather than to the CAR. The career manager and the member's regiment believed that a tour with the CAR at that time would delay the member's career advancement.⁶ In another case, a platoon commander in the CAR was allowed to continue with a course in the United States during critical pre-deployment training in the fall of 1992, leaving the platoon in the hands of the second-in-command.⁷

It is bad enough when line units take a back seat to the needs and preferences of individual candidates and their mentors and proxies. But careerism also contributed to a performance appraisal system that was overly reluctant to criticize and to record instances of shortcomings. It led to the downplaying of misconduct by subordinates and reluctance to take appropriate remedial measures in some cases. At its worst, careerism inspired the cover-up, or attempted cover-up, of serious incidents of negligent, and even criminal, misconduct.

So, while the phenomenon of careerism is often associated with the personnel and career development system, both its roots and its implications extend much further, with the potential to threaten all aspects of the institution.

In addition to these systemic gaps and shortcomings, the CF personnel system is subject to a variety of constraints that affect its capacity to screen and select members rigorously. First, recruitment and promotion in the military are a response to organizational and operational imperatives as well as to the relative merit of individuals.⁸ Vacancies in the authorized establishment must be filled. Second, in the appointments process, the best candidates for the job may not always be available. They may require further education, training, or work in a different position for their long-term career development.

And although the needs of the service are supposed to take precedence over individual career development,⁹ those institutional needs have both a long-and a short-term dimension to them. After all, it is in the interests of the CF that members with superior potential progress more rapidly so that their talents can be put to optimum use. Paradoxically, then, the more members excel in particular jobs, the more they will ultimately be needed elsewhere. The chain of command is responsible for establishing the proper balance between short-and long-term needs, always recognizing the primacy of operational readiness and effectiveness.¹⁰ Third, the military is subject to federal laws governing human rights and privacy which tend to restrict the potential intrusiveness of the military in vetting its members.¹¹ Finally, concerns about morale within the military also serve to restrain any impulse to overly aggressive screening and monitoring of CF personnel.

Recognizing these limitations, all members of the chain of command with personnel responsibilities must be vigilant and conscientious in discharging these responsibilities, including responding to lapses in discipline and professionalism by their subordinates. The personnel system is only as good as those who operate it. If those with personnel-related responsibilities simply rely on the other components of the system, or are otherwise lax in performing their duties, problems will inevitably develop and recur.

This is not to say, however, that the CF should be looking to get rid of members at the first sign of difficulty. The CF should continue to be, as some witnesses described it, "a rehabilitative institution". ¹² However, operational effectiveness and good order and discipline must be the priority, and the CF personnel system is not, and never will be, a substitute for diligence on the part of supervisors and commanders at all levels in discharging the full range of their personnel responsibilities. These include getting to know their subordinates -- their strengths and weaknesses; taking or recommending appropriate disciplinary or administrative action, or informal forms of counselling and guidance; conscientious and candid performance evaluation reporting; and recommending and appointing only the best available candidate for the job, based on appropriate criteria.

Thus the adequacy of the selection and screening of personnel for the Somalia deployment depended on the effectiveness of both the personnel system itself and the actions and decisions of individuals at all levels of the chain of command who were operating and overseeing that system.

We turn now to the particular processes used to select and screen personnel for the Somalia mission, including posting to the Canadian Airborne Regiment, and pre-deployment screening.

MANNING OF THE CANADIAN AIRBORNE REGIMENT

As indicated in Chapter 8, very few participants in an operation like the Somalia deployment are selected individually for that mission. The Force commander is the notable exception. Most other personnel are deployed because their unit is selected and dispatched by the national chain of command. Thus, in the case of the Somalia deployment, the quality of personnel selection for service in the Canadian Airborne Regiment was obviously crucial to the success of subsequent screening for the mission itself. It is to this aspect of the question that we turn first.

Selection Criteria for the Canadian Airborne Regiment

Apart from being parachute-qualified and volunteering for airborne duty, there were no formal standards for posting to the CAR. There was, however, a widely shared perception of the attributes considered desirable for Airborne personnel. It had long been recognized in Land Force Command (LFC) that the CAR had a special need for physically fit, experienced, and mature soldiers at all levels of the organization -- non-commissioned members, the junior leadership ranks, and the commando and regimental leadership alike. Yet these criteria were never formalized. What informal criteria there were and the rationale for them are discussed in more detail below.

The Special Challenge of Selecting Airborne Soldiers

Airborne forces, characteristically, need to be at a higher state of readiness than non-airborne troops. They need to be ready for action within 48 to 96 hours, and they are intended to be employed in areas where other ground forces do not have access and tend to operate in high-intensity situations on their own resources for short periods.¹³ These employment characteristics were reflected in the concept of operations for the CAR. The unit's conceived role included being ready for rapid deployment anywhere in Canada and being Canada's standby unit to conduct UN operations on short notice.¹⁴

As a result of this concept of operations and the demands of parachuting, there was generally a higher physical fitness requirement for Airborne soldiers.¹⁵ Because of these physical demands, service in the CAR was voluntary.¹⁶ Naturally, an applicant for service in the CAR had to be parachute- qualified, or had to be willing to become so.¹⁷

Given the CAR's planned operational role and the physical demands on its members, it was also generally recognized that Airborne soldiers needed to be somewhat more aggressive than other soldiers.¹⁸ But as one CF behavioural scientist wrote in a 1984 study, there is an implicit risk of inappropriate behaviour in an organization that selects for aggressiveness:

...it may be extremely difficult to make fine distinctions between those individuals who can be counted upon to act in an appropriately aggressive way and those likely at some time to display inappropriate aggression. To some extent, the risk of erring on the side of excess may be a necessary one in an organization whose existence is premised on the instrumental value of aggression and violence.¹⁹

Land Force Command was aware of the special challenges in selecting personnel for the Canadian Airborne Regiment well before the Somalia mission.²⁰ They knew that particular care had to be taken to ensure that experienced and mature personnel were appointed to the CAR -- including junior and senior leaders who could manage the natural enthusiasm and aggressiveness of Airborne soldiers.²¹

Informal Selection Criteria for Junior Ranks

It was widely acknowledged that soldiers should be posted to the CAR only after they had had the chance to adjust fully to military life through service with a regular infantry battalion after battle school.²² The Hewson study of 1985 found that, with the benefit of this prior experience, junior non-commissioned members (NCMs) exhibited better self-discipline during their Airborne service and were less apt to be led astray by misguided informal leadership or peer group pressure.²³ Land Force Command leadership at the time agreed with these recommendations and reiterated to the feeder regiments the Canadian Airborne Regiment's special need for mature non-commissioned members who had one to two years' experience in a regular infantry battalion, as well as above-average performance and excellent physical condition. However, it was consciously decided at that time not to insist on the rigid application of these criteria, for fear of being unable to keep the CAR at its required 90 per cent strength as a high-readiness unit, bearing in mind the voluntary nature of service with the Regiment.²⁴

Informal Selection Criteria for Leadership Positions and Impact of the 1992 Restructuring

It was also well understood that particularly strong leaders were needed to command Airborne soldiers.²⁵ For the regimental commander's position, there was the additional challenge of commanding personnel from different regiments and being able to bring them together to function as a cohesive unit.²⁶ The CAR's brigade commander observed in the fall of 1992 that the Canadian Airborne Regiment "is the hardest unit to command."²⁷ Hence, it was considered desirable that the commander of the CAR be an experienced unit commander.²⁸ In addition, the need for above-average, mature and conscientious non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and junior officers to temper the enthusiasm of Airborne soldiers was recognized several years before the Somalia deployment.²⁹

When the CAR was restructured in 1992 and downgraded to a status equivalent to that of a battalion, the position of regimental commander went from being a post-command appointment in the rank of colonel to a regular unit command in the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In other words, before the appointment of LCol Morneault in 1992, commanders of the CAR would have had previous battalion command experience with their parent regiments before commanding the CAR. But even though the unit Commanding Officer (CO) position was being reduced from colonel to lieutenant-colonel, there was some debate about whether it should become a first command or should continue as a post-command appointment.³⁰

Normally, a candidate for battalion command would have completed the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College course as well as the CF Command and Staff College course. Officers are selected to attend command and staff college while in the rank of major. They are selected in one of two ways: from the top half of the merit list for majors, or by the chain of command immediately following their tour as a sub-unit commander on the basis of superior or outstanding performance as assessed in their performance evaluation reports and by their regiments. They should also have commanded a rifle company and would normally have served in a series of staff appointments at various levels of Land Force Command.³¹

In the absence of official selection criteria for the position of commanding officer of the CAR, the NDHQ career manager for lieutenant-colonels in 1992, Col Arp, developed some unofficial criteria. According to these criteria, the successful candidate would be at the lieutenant-colonel rank (having been appointed to that rank within the last five years) in the combat arms, preferably infantry; would have prior successful command at the company level; would be at least functionally bilingual (since a third of the unit was drawn from the predominantly Francophone Royal 22^e Régiment); would have a desire to command; would have previous Airborne experience, preferably including an operational deployment; would have completed a range of combat and command courses (much of which would be implicit in achieving the rank of lieutenant-colonel); would have good potential for subsequent promotion; would be recommended by the relevant regimental council; and, ideally, would have previous command experience as a lieutenant-colonel.³²

Another consequence of downgrading the CAR to battalion status was that commanders of the CAR commandos went from being more senior majors -- with at least five to seven years in rank, with previous command experience in that rank (usually command of a rifle company in an infantry battalion), and who had commanding officer status -- to being more junior majors in their first command role in that rank.³³ Aside from losing the greater disciplinary powers of a commanding officer, the drop in the status of the appointment implied different qualifications and different assumptions about the command potential of the appointee. The incumbent went from being someone with previous company command experience as a major, and often senior officer education at the CF Command and Staff College, to being a junior major without senior officer training and without necessarily having commanded at the sub-unit level.³⁴ According to Col (ret) Joly, a former director of infantry and former regimental colonel of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, it is at the level of captain and especially major where "it becomes apparent who the best people are" and who should rise to command companies, battalions, and brigades. Hence, the 1992 reorganization of the CAR meant that command of the Canadian Airborne Regiment commandos went from being a job for senior majors with definite potential for higher command,³⁵ to being a proving ground for majors.

The Selection Process

The CAR was composed essentially of personnel posted from the three regular infantry regiments: The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) and the Royal 22^e Régiment (R22^eR). While some CAR members remained for several years, personnel were posted to the CAR with the expectation that they would return to their parent regiments.³⁶ Members had a career affiliation with their parent regiment, rather than with the CAR. This feature of service with the CAR was underscored by the fact that, since the late 1970s, the three line commandos of the CAR were manned strictly on the basis of regimental affiliation: 1 Commando by the R22^eR, 2 Commando by the PPCLI, and 3 Commando by The RCR.³⁷

The effect of this arrangement was that the parent regiments retained an oversight and advisory role for promotions and appointments in the Canadian Airborne Regiment.³⁸ So, for example, in the case of the appointment of the commander of 2 Commando, the appointee would be from the PPCLI and that regiment's representative, usually the regimental colonel, would consult with the career manager and the branch adviser and make the recommendation to Land Force Command Headquarters, subject to any objections by the CAR commander.³⁹

In the case of appointing the CAR commander, all three regimental councils would be asked for recommendations. The deputy commander of Land Force Command would meet with the three regimental colonels, and they would select the CAR commanding officer, subject to the approval of the Commander Land Force Command.⁴⁰ Generally, an attempt was made to rotate the appointment among the three parent regiments, although this was by no means strictly observed.⁴¹

Another distinctive practice was the so-called 'Airborne Offer' promotion. Since service in the Canadian Airborne Regiment was voluntary, it was sometimes necessary to allow a member to be promoted earlier than would otherwise be the case, to ensure that all positions in the CAR were filled at the appropriate rank levels.⁴² Land Force Command policy limited a member to one such promotion in a career.⁴³

Selection of NCMs for the CAR was an informal process within the parent regiments, involving infantry battalion COs and regimental career managers.⁴⁴ Each battalion kept a list of those applying for parachute training and Airborne service.⁴⁵ Although service with the CAR was voluntary, the parent regiment chain of command suggested it to an individual if they deemed it appropriate.⁴⁶

CWO Cooke, who served as NCM career manager for the PPCLI from 1991 to 1994, testified about the process for selecting soldiers for service in the Canadian Airborne Regiment.⁴⁷ Physical fitness and job performance were said to be the main selection criteria.⁴⁸ Regimental merit lists were consulted, and candidates had to pass a physical training test. Ideally, the candidate would have at least 18 months' service in the parent regiment before applying to the CAR. Candidates would also be expected to have completed a primary combat function course and a specialty qualification, such as reconnaissance patrol or mortar. An applicant's conduct was said to have been a factor in selection. According to CWO Cooke, if members selected for parachute training subsequently experienced disciplinary or administrative problems, they would be removed from the unit's list for Canadian Airborne Regiment service.⁴⁹ The most significant selection factor was the recommendation of the company commander and the company sergeant-major.⁵⁰ However, the battalion CO made the final recommendation.⁵¹

Postings of personnel from the parent regiments to the CAR were finalized at the annual infantry NCM merit boards. The boards were composed of all the battalion COs and regimental sergeants-major for the three regiments, who met to decide on promotions and extensions of service contracts. During these proceedings, participants met separately by regiment and conducted regimental business, including deciding on postings to the CAR.⁵²

The CAR commander always had the authority to return members to their original units if they did not measure up, but this was not done often. Essentially, the CAR had to trust the parent regiments to send the right people.⁵³

Tour lengths in the CAR varied, but generally the more junior ranks stayed for longer periods. The normal tour for an officer was two to three years; for senior NCOs it was generally two to four years. However, members could stay with the CAR indefinitely if they were willing to continue to volunteer for Airborne service.⁵⁴ Some NCOs did stay for many years. There was evidence, however, that this was often not a positive phenomenon for either the individuals or the CAR. It was felt to limit individuals' experience, perspective, and career advancement unduly and to create the potential for inappropriate situations of informal leadership.⁵⁵

Adequacy of the Manning of the Canadian Airborne Regiment at the time of the Somalia Deployment

We heard detailed evidence on the selection of particular individuals for key positions in the CAR in 1992.⁵⁶ This was a critical year for the Canadian Airborne Regiment in two ways. First, the Regiment was being reorganized from a regiment to a battalion. This had implications for how the unit functioned, both operationally and administratively.⁵⁷ Second, as we have seen, the reorganization had implications for the level of experience required of those occupying the key command positions -- all this at a time when the CAR would be deployed on its first UN mission in several years.⁵⁸

Evidence presented before us called into question the suitability or relative quality of a number of personnel selections for the CAR. In reviewing this evidence, it is not our purpose to criticize the individuals in question but to evaluate the process for manning the CAR, including the actions and decisions of those responsible for that process.

Evidence of Problems with the Process

At times, the personnel system seemed to rely blindly and bureaucratically on formal appraisals and was not responsive to other sources of relevant information that were often more revealing. A key tool in selecting CF personnel for promotions and appointments, the annual performance evaluation report, was known to downplay a member's weaknesses.⁵⁹ Yet they were heavily relied on, while informal yet often more candid comments were often ignored or rejected. For example, while LCol Morneault was given a 'superior' rating in 1991-92 as the Deputy Commander of the CAR by his superior, Col Holmes, the latter nonetheless had reservations about LCol Morneault's suitability to succeed him as Airborne Commander.⁶⁰ According to Col Holmes, the jobs of commander and deputy commander were different and required different strengths.⁶¹ He and the Brigade Commander at the time, BGen Crabbe, made their concerns known to Land Force Command.⁶² But MGen Reay and LGen Gervais preferred to rely on the career manager's assessment of the personnel records and the discretion of the regimental senate of the R22^eR,⁶³ or La Régie, which had nominated LCol Morneault for the job in the first place. By the same token, criticisms of the proposed selection of Maj Seward as Officer Commanding (OC) 2 Commando from his predecessor, Maj Davies, were ignored by the career manager and not forwarded to the chain of command.⁶⁴ Similarly, Maj Seward failed to heed a warning about Cpl Matchee when selecting him for a master corporal appointment just before the deployment.⁶⁵ In the case of Capt Rainville, his personnel files contained no references to la Citadelle or Gagetown incidents (see Chapter 18, Discipline), even though his Brigade Commander had recommended that his letter about the matter be placed on Capt Rainville's file.⁶⁶

Although 'the best person for the job' was supposed to be the prevailing ethic in CF appointments -- particularly for key posts, such as battalion and company commander -- a variety of extrinsic factors were allowed to influence the process.

At times, career management plans for individuals were permitted to take precedence over the needs of a key combat arms unit like the CAR. As we have seen, candidates likely to be promoted during the normal term of a posting were excluded from consideration,⁶⁷ and the preferred candidate for appointment as officer commanding 2 Commando was sent on a course instead of to the CAR in 1992. The career manager and the member's regiment thought that a tour with the CAR at that time would delay the member's career advancement.⁶⁸

More arbitrary administrative imperatives were also allowed to distort the selection process. For example, NDHQ refused to allow any exceptions to its decision not to promote any infantry captains in 1992. For the CAR, this resulted in two contenders for the 2 Commando OC job being dropped from further consideration -- one of whom was particularly highly regarded.⁶⁹

Even completely irrelevant factors, such as inter-regimental and national politics, were sometimes allowed to influence key appointment decisions. It was precisely these factors that resulted in the selection of LCol Mathieu over two other candidates,⁷⁰ both of whom had already commanded battalions successfully with their parent regiments,⁷¹ while LCol Mathieu had not.⁷² It was decided by the Commander Land Force Command, LGen Gervais, that the Royal 22^e Régiment should be given a chance to redeem itself following the relief of LCol Morneault.⁷³ It was also considered desirable to avoid a perceived slight to the R22^eR at that particular time because of the impending referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.⁷⁴ Amazingly, considerations of this type were allowed to carry the day even though the CAR was a few weeks away from its first UN mission in several years and the Land Force chain of command was aware of problems in the unit that had contributed to the highly unusual step of relieving the Commanding Officer of his command.⁷⁵

In selecting personnel for key leadership positions in the CAR, the chain of command showed considerable deference to the judgement of the regimental councils of the parent regiments. These bodies are outside the chain of command and are not accountable for their personnel selections. Yet, a career manager testified that the recommendations of regimental councils were practically decisive in matters of personnel appointments. While regiments normally have to live with the results of a poor choice,⁷⁶ even this constraint did not apply to external postings, such as those to the CAR. One might have expected that this would make the chain of command more inclined to review and second-guess the regiments' nominations for the CAR. But this was not the case.

The PPCLI knew that Maj Seward was not the best choice to lead 2 Commando.⁷⁷ The Commander of the CAR at the time, Col Holmes, also felt that the PPCLI could have done better in that case.⁷⁸ But when told that PPCLI would not put forward any more nominees, Col Holmes refrained from pressing the matter further, as he could have done.⁷⁹ The Commander and Deputy Commander of LFC, LGen Gervais and MGen Reay, were similarly disinclined to go beyond the Royal 22^e Régiment's nominations for commanding officer of the CAR in 1992.⁸⁰ This was in the face of actual concerns expressed by the outgoing CAR and Special Service Force (SSF) commanders with respect to LCol Morneault.⁸¹ Furthermore, after LCol Morneault was relieved, the new nominee of the R22^eR, LCol Mathieu, was accepted immediately even though he had not previously been selected to command one of its own battalions -- in contrast with the nominees of the PPCLI and The RCR.⁸²

Even when the NDHQ career manager, Col Arp, asked for more nominees from the R22^eR after questions had been raised in the LFC chain of command about LCol Morneault, the president of the R22^eR, BGen Zuliani, simply reconfirmed LCol Morneault's nomination and did not attempt to provide alternative candidates.⁸³

Furthermore, before the Somalia deployment, there were no official Land Force Command criteria for the key positions of commanding officer of the CAR and the officers commanding the commandos -- beyond the most obvious, such as holding the right rank and being parachute-qualified.⁸⁴ What unofficial criteria there were would be waived to accommodate regimental nominees. Neither LCol Morneault nor LCol Mathieu had previously commanded a battalion, even though this experience was desirable in a CAR commander.⁸⁵ Likewise, Maj Seward had not previously commanded a rifle company.⁸⁶ Yet, in all these cases, other candidates who had the desired attributes were available, or could have been made available.⁸⁷ In this context, it is worth noting that the CAR was the CF standby unit for rapid response and UN operations⁸⁸ and that combat arms unit commands (such as command of the CAR) were supposed to be among the CF's top staffing priorities, second only to UN force commands.⁸⁹

Another weakness in the personnel system was the manner in which the Delegated Authority Promotion System (DAPS) was applied to the CAR.⁹⁰ As described in Chapter 8, the DAPS allowed Land Force Command combat arms units to promote soldiers to master corporal who did not have the minimum prescribed time in rank but were otherwise qualified for the appointment.⁹¹ Master corporal is an important appointment, representing the first level of leadership in the CF,⁹² and NDHQ would authorize a DAPS only where the normal promotion system could not produce a sufficient number of them.⁹³ But the CAR had a practice of using the DAPS to avoid posting in master corporals from the parent regiments, thus allowing the unit to reward good performance among soldiers already serving in the CAR.⁹⁴ Unfortunately, because of the CAR's policy of manning commandos along the lines of parent regiment affiliation, this practice significantly reduced the selection base (from battalion to company). This in turn greatly increased the risk of promoting to a junior leadership position soldiers who had insufficient experience and maturity and who would be overly familiar with their subordinates⁹⁵ -- precisely the opposite of what the CAR needed, as indicated in the Hewson report.⁹⁶

Cpl Matchee was appointed to master corporal through the DAPS on November 30, 1992.⁹⁷ He received this promotion even though he had participated in the Algonquin Park incident of October 3, 1992;⁹⁸ he was removed from a section at the request of the sergeant commanding that section just before deployment because his behaviour and attitude were disruptive;⁹⁹ and his platoon warrant officer and platoon commander objected to the appointment because of concerns about his attitude and discipline.¹⁰⁰ Cpl Matchee's platoon second in command even recommended to the Platoon Commander, Capt Sox, and the Company Sergeant-Major for 2 Commando, MWO Mills -- and through them to Maj Seward -- that Cpl Matchee be left behind during the forthcoming deployment to Somalia.¹⁰¹

Evidence of Problems with CAR Personnel

Land Force Command long knew of the special need for mature and experienced soldiers and leaders in the CAR, and the Hewson report of 1985 provided an explicit and detailed reminder to LFC of these needs. The chain of command also knew that the CAR depended on the three regular infantry regiments to meet these needs by sharing their best personnel¹⁰² and that this situation created at least the potential for a conflict of interest, since the regiments had an obvious interest in keeping as many of their better soldiers and officers as possible.¹⁰³ Further, the 1991-92 reorganization meant that for the first time, key leadership positions in the CAR would be open to persons who had not already been selected for equivalent positions in their parent regiments.

Despite these warnings and signals, and although the CAR had been designated as Canada's standby unit for emergency UN operations, key figures in the LFC chain of command would later concede that insufficient care had been taken in selecting personnel for the Airborne Regiment.¹⁰⁴

There was evidence of persistent suspicions that the parent infantry regiments deliberately sent less than their best personnel to the Airborne Regiment, or sent those they found too aggressive.¹⁰⁵ For example, despite the excessive actions of Capt Rainville during exercises while he was serving with the R22^eR in 1991-92- actions that the chain of command considered inappropriate at the time -- he was posted to the CAR in 1992. The CAR was not even informed of these incidents until Capt Rainville had been with the unit for a few months.¹⁰⁶ To give another example, Pte E.K. Brown apparently got drunk and broke a window in his barracks in Calgary on the eve of his departure for Petawawa.¹⁰⁷ While appropriate officials in 2 Commando were made aware of this, it certainly did not delay his new posting.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, in the case of Cpl Matt McKay, given that the DND's Special Investigation Unit had information about his activities in 1990¹⁰⁹ and that a photograph of him giving a Nazi salute had been published in a Winnipeg newspaper,¹¹⁰ together with the fact that his platoon commander in the PPCLI had counselled him about his association with such organizations,¹¹¹ it is likely that his parent unit was aware of his involvement with racist groups when they posted him to the CAR.

According to CWO Jardine, regimental sergeant-major at the time, an official from the PPCLI with whom he spoke in the early 1990s suggested that they made a point of not sending their best soldiers to the Airborne.¹¹² Moreover, there was evidence that at least one of the parent regiments was reluctant to take back non-commissioned officers who had been with the CAR for a number of years when this was suggested by the CAR commander and the regimental sergeant-major.¹¹³

Maj Seward alleged that the previous commander of 2 Commando had deliberately sought inferior NCOs from the PPCLI for the Airborne to achieve a better distribution of performance evaluation report (PER) ratings among senior NCOs in 2 Commando.¹¹⁴

Although he testified that he felt that the screening of soldiers from the R22^eR was generally adequate, the Officer Commanding 1 Commando in 1991-93, Maj Pommet, indicated that, on at least one occasion during his tenure, a soldier was sent to 1 Commando while on counselling and probation. This is contrary to CF regulations. Maj Pommet sent the soldier back to his original unit.¹¹⁵

Also in contrast to the spirit of the Hewson report, there was evidence that the parent regiments would often try to use the CAR as a training ground for NCOs. If an NCO did well, he would sometimes be called back and replaced by someone less experienced.¹¹⁶ LCol (ret) Mathieu testified that he felt that the battalions of the parent regiments would sometimes use the CAR as a "training centre" for soldiers presenting discipline problems in garrison.¹¹⁷

Whether the Airborne was used as a dumping ground for problem personnel or not, it is clear that the parent regiments did not always send the right people to the CAR. Moreover, at least in the case of the PPCLI, a number of key people in the LFC chain of command and in the parent regiments were aware of this in the period leading up to the Somalia deployment.¹¹⁸

Despite the Hewson report's emphasis on the CAR's particular need for mature and experienced personnel, a number of witnesses indicated that, at least in the early 1990s, the Airborne was receiving too many soldiers -- both NCMs and NCOs -- who were younger and less experienced than had formerly been the case.¹¹⁹ Maj Seward, (the OC in 2 Commando in 1992-93) for example, noticed a much greater proportion of privates among the NCM ranks when he took over 2 Commando in the summer of 1992, than during his previous tour in the late 1970s.¹²⁰ Moreover, some soldiers were still being sent to the CAR fresh from regimental battle school, even though this was generally considered undesirable.¹²¹

In particular, the calibre of the selections from the PPCLI in the late 1980s and early 1990s seemed to decline.¹²² Correspondingly, 2 Commando -- which consisted entirely of members from the PPCLI -- was experiencing discipline problems throughout this period. Key personnel in the CAR, the PPCLI, and the LFC chain of command were aware of this, or came to be aware of it at some point.¹²³ Despite the efforts of 2 Commando's Company Sergeant-Major, MWO Mills, to reassert discipline in the sub-unit during the previous year, Maj Seward conceded that 2 Commando definitely had more than its share of discipline problems in 1992-93.¹²⁴ Personnel of that commando generated more charges and administrative action, both at CFB Petawawa and in Somalia, than any other sub-unit of the CAR.¹²⁵ Moreover, it was predominantly 2 Commando members who were the subjects of general courts-martial arising from events in theatre.

Nor were the problems confined to the junior ranks. Senior NCOs in 2 Commando seemed to lack the experience and maturity of those in other commandos.¹²⁶ During preparations for the Somalia operation in the fall of 1992, two sergeants had to be replaced.¹²⁷ Maj Seward had problems with another sergeant who had advised a soldier to delay coming forward to confess his involvement in setting off illegally obtained military pyrotechnics at the junior ranks' club in early October of that year.¹²⁸ Maj Seward also had problems that fall with a warrant officer who had failed to follow his directions while in command of his platoon during training.¹²⁹ Significantly, two officers (Maj Seward and Capt Sox) and two senior NCOs (Sgt Boland and Sgt Gresty) from 2 Commando were among those court-martialled in relation to the beating death of a civilian prisoner in Somalia on March 16, 1993. Both Maj Seward and MWO Mills had to be replaced by LCol Mathieu during the deployment.¹³⁰

LCol (ret) Mathieu testified that, after the March 16th incident, he realized that the PPCLI had sent weak leaders for the top three posts of 2 Commando in 1991-92: the officer commanding, the second-in- command, and the company sergeant-major. ¹³¹

Yet the suitability of Maj Seward as Officer Commanding 2 Commando was an issue even before the March 16th incident. Several officials, including the PPCLI's regimental colonel, were dissatisfied with the selection of Maj Seward in the first place, or at least felt that PPCLI should have been able to come up with a better candidate.¹³² During preparations for the Somalia mission, the Commanding Officer of the Royal Canadian Dragoons -- which was helping the CAR with a pre-deployment training exercise -- and the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno, both recommended to the CAR CO that Maj Seward be replaced.¹³³ Later, during a review of the personnel files of CAR majors conducted during the mission, Land Force Command concluded that Maj Seward did not meet the newly established criteria for Airborne Regiment majors. ¹³⁴

During the Somalia deployment, Maj Seward was a disappointment to his CO, LCol Mathieu.¹³⁵ He discharged his weapon accidentally on one occasion and was convicted of negligent performance of duty; he was later given a reproof by LCol Mathieu for this incident as well as for failing to control his soldiers on certain occasions; and after the beating death of a civilian detainee by 2 Commando soldiers, LCol Mathieu replaced Maj Seward and sent him back to Canada.¹³⁶ Maj Seward was later court- martialled in connection with that homicide for having instructed his subordinates to abuse prisoners as a deterrent to infiltrators to the camp. He was convicted of negligent performance of duty and sentenced to a severe reprimand.¹³⁷ On appeal to the Court Martial Appeal Court, his sentence was increased to three months' imprisonment and dismissal from her Majesty's Service.¹³⁸ Maj Seward's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.¹³⁹

Problems with the suitability of key personnel were not confined to 2 Commando and the PPCLI during this crucial period. Many people in the unit questioned the appropriateness of CWO Jardine (from The Royal Canadian Regiment) as Regimental Sergeant-Major -- or at least found him difficult to work with.¹⁴⁰ Some also questioned whether The RCR could not have come up with a better candidate than Maj MacKay for Deputy Commanding Officer of the CAR.¹⁴¹ He, along with Maj Seward and the Officer Commanding Service Commando, Maj Vanderveer (from the PPCLI), was found not to meet the newly announced LFC guidelines for CAR majors in March 1993.¹⁴² While LFC found no fault with the performance of Maj MacKay and Maj Vanderveer, it was felt that both lacked battalion command potential, and Maj MacKay was older than the optimal age for a CAR major (35).¹⁴³

Another source of problems was the CAR's Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, Capt Rainville, who was posted to the Airborne from the 2nd Battalion of the Royal 22^e Régiment in the summer of 1992. The SSF and CAR's Commanding Officer found out several months later that Capt Rainville had been involved in some troubling incidents during exercises in the winter of 1991-92. During training operations at CFB Gagetown, he had been too aggressive in his treatment of 'prisoners of war'. In February 1992, he exceeded his authority in conducting a simulated raid on la Citadelle in Quebec City to check security at that site. He used prohibited or restricted weapons to threaten and frighten security guards into opening the vault where weapons were stored. Civilian police were called, and the incident was reported in the news media. The incident became the subject of a significant incident report to higher headquarters.¹⁴⁴ In a letter to BGen Beno, Capt Rainville's superior commander, BGen Dallaire wrote that Capt Rainville had shown a serious lack of judgement.¹⁴⁵ BGen Beno instructed LCol Morneault to give Capt Rainville a verbal warning.¹⁴⁶

Later, there were newspaper photographs of Capt Rainville with knives strapped to his belt, contrary to dress regulations.¹⁴⁷ The Journal de Montréal published an article where Capt Rainville is reported as conveying the impression that Airborne Regiment soldiers were trained or had a mandate for such activities as assassinations, kidnappings, and counter-terrorist operations.¹⁴⁸ BGen Beno recommended to both LCol Morneault and LCol Mathieu that they seriously consider leaving Capt Rainville behind during the Somalia mission.¹⁴⁹

In Somalia, Capt Rainville planned and led the security patrol that resulted in the shooting death of one Somali civilian and the wounding of another on the night of March 4,1993. He was court-martialled and acquitted of unlawfully causing bodily harm and negligent performance of duty in relation to this shooting.

The CAR even had problems with the two commanding officers supplied by the Royal 22^e Régiment in 1992-93. Neither LCol Morneault nor LCol Mathieu was at the top of the Regiment's command list, and neither had been offered command of a R22^eR battalion.¹⁵⁰ LCol Mathieu had been a lieutenant-colonel for seven years at the time, so it was highly unlikely that the Royal 22nd Regiment had any intention of ever offering him command of one of its battalions.

Only four months after LCol Morneault took command of the CAR, the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno, formally requested that LCol Morneault be relieved of command. BGen Beno indicated that he could not declare the unit operationally ready as long as LCol Morneault remained CO.¹⁵¹ He believed that LCol Morneault did not properly appreciate the unit's training priorities and failed to involve himself sufficiently in the direction of the training.¹⁵² As a result, the unit was behind in its training for the mission, according to BGen Beno.¹⁵³ The Commander SSF also noted problems with internal unit cohesion, as well as "unresolved leadership and discipline problems which... challenge the leadership of the unit."¹⁵⁴ BGen Beno recommended that LCol Morneault be replaced, and his superiors in the LFC chain of command accepted the recommendation.¹⁵⁵ The Commander Land Force Command, LGen Gervais, took the decision to relieve LCol Morneault of command on October 20,1992.¹⁵⁶ He was succeeded by LCol Mathieu a few days later.

LCol Mathieu led the unit during the Somalia deployment, but he was relieved of his command in September 1993 and charged with negligent performance of duty in relation to orders, given while the CAR was in Somalia, concerning the use of deadly force. LCol Mathieu was twice acquitted of this charge by a general court-martial, and he took voluntary release from the CF in October 1994.

In general, there was significant dissension and a lack of confidence among key personnel in the CAR's chain of command, both before and during the deployment. The following account is by no means exhaustive. The Base Commander at Petawawa and head of the Canadian contingent for United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), Col Cox, and the Brigade Commander, BGen Beno, did not get along with LCol Morneault. LCol Morneault thought that his Operations Officer, Capt Kyle, was inexperienced. For his part, Capt Kyle, along with BGen Beno and the latter 5 Operations Officer, Maj Turner, did not have confidence in LCol Morneault; the same officers also lacked confidence in the Officer Commanding 2 Commando, Maj Seward, as did the Officer Commanding the CARBG's Engineer Squadron, Capt Mansfield. Maj Seward, for his part, distrusted the Deputy CO, Maj MacKay, and Capt Kyle. There were significant problems between Maj Seward and the Regimental Sergeant-Major, CWO Jardine, and even his own Company Sergeant-Major, MWO Mills. Indeed, most of the other senior personnel in the CAR -- including the officers commanding the other commandos, the company sergeants-major, the platoon warrant officers, and the senior NCOs -- seemed to have a problem with CWO Jardine. There was also mistrust between CWO Jardine and MWO Mills and between CWO Jardine and the senior NCOs of 2 Commando.¹⁵⁷

Senior NCOs, warrant officers and officers need to have confidence in each other and must, at the very least, have open lines of communication between and among themselves. Those in positions of responsibility need timely information on -- among other things -- the state of discipline and morale among the soldiers as well as other personnel matters. Inevitably, there are occasions when, for example, platoon warrant officers or company sergeants-major prefer to raise a matter with the next higher non-commissioned member in the unit, rather than directly with the officer to whom they report. They may even have problems with that officer. Therefore, a good level of trust and communication throughout the NCO/warrant officer network, as well as in the formal chain of command is essential in a unit. We found it particularly disturbing that in the CAR, and especially in 2 Commando, there was significant evidence of problems on both fronts.

Furthermore, the CAR experienced serious discipline problems while in theatre, as demonstrated by 10 general courts-martial involving personnel of all rank levels in the unit (see Table 20.1).

In addition to the courts-martial, personnel were sent back to Canada during the mission for disciplinary reasons in five cases, including the Mortar Platoon commander and a warrant officer. The mission was also plagued with a high number of accidental weapons discharges, 18 of which resulted in charges against CARBG personnel, including three master corporals, a lieutenant and a major (Maj Seward, the Officer Commanding 2 Commando).¹⁵⁸
Table 20.1: Courts-Martial

Table 20.1: Courts-Martial (cont'd)

FINDINGS

At the time of the Somalia deployment, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) had not been well served by the personnel system, especially the process for manning that unit. Inadequacies in these processes and deficiencies in the actions and decisions of those responsible for their operation significantly contributed to the problems experienced by the CAR in 1992 and 1993.

• Performance evaluation reports, which form the basis of key decisions concerning a member's career development (promotion, appointments, and selection for courses) were known to downplay a candidate's weaknesses. Yet they were relied on heavily, even blindly, in promotion and appointment decisions.
• The chain of command repeatedly ignored warnings that candidates being chosen for important jobs were inappropriate selections.
• As a matter of common practice, career managers refrained from passing on comments about candidates when they were made by peers or subordinates. Nor did they accept advice from officers about their replacements.
• Except for formal disciplinary or administrative action, information about questionable conduct on the part of CF members was not normally noted in files or passed on to subsequent superiors.
• There were no formal criteria for selecting candidates for key positions, such as the unit commanding officer and officers commanding sub-units.
• Land Force Command waived its own informal criteria in order to accommodate the parent regiments' nominees, even though candidates who met the requirements more fully were available, or could have been made available.
• Representatives of the regimental councils of the parent regiments, who are outside the chain of command and therefore unaccountable, had too much influence in the process. This was particularly problematic for the CAR, since these officers were virtually the only source of nominees from their regiments for postings to the CAR, and since any repercussions of a poor choice would be felt by the CAR and significantly less by their own regiments.
• In the appointment process, individual career management goals were too often allowed to take precedence over operational needs.
• Bureaucratic and administrative imperatives also were allowed to dilute the merit principle in the appointments process and override operational needs.
• In some cases, the chain of command allowed completely irrelevant factors, such as inter-regimental and national politics, to influence key appointment decisions.
• Although the CAR was known to require more experienced leaders than other units, in 1992, the chain of command knowingly selected less qualified candidates for key positions in the CAR when better candidates were available, or could have been made available.
• The Delegated Authority Promotion System (DAPS) promoted less experienced soldiers to master corporal -- an important rank, representing the first level of leadership in the Canadian Forces.
• The CAR abused the DAPS by using it to avoid posting in master corporals from the parent regiments, and promoting from within instead. Unfortunately, because of the lack of mobility of personnel between the CAR's three rifle commandos, this practice meant that DAPS appointments in the CAR were much less competitive than those in the parent regiments. In the parent regiments, a new master corporal was selected from anywhere in the battalion, whereas in the CAR, the commanding officer was effectively limited to choosing from a company-sized sub-unit. This practice increased the risk of selecting junior leaders at the NCO level with insufficient experience who were overly familiar with the soldiers they would then be called on to supervise.
• Cpl Matchee was appointed to master corporal through the DAPS, even though he already satisfied the basic prerequisites for that promotion through the normal route and had not been successful in competition with his peers; he had participated recently in the Algonquin Park incident of October 3,1992; and even though the second in command of his platoon and his platoon commander raised concerns about the appointment -- and even questioned his suitability for deployment to Somalia.
• There were problems with appointees to leadership positions in the CAR in 1992-93: two COs, one officer commanding a commando, and a commando sergeant-major were replaced. One of those COs and the OC, along with two platoon commanders and two section commanders, were court- martialled in connection with events in Somalia.
• It was generally recognized by Land Force Command well before the Somalia deployment that the CAR was a special unit with a particular requirement for mature and experienced leaders at all levels -- senior NCOs, as well as platoon, company, and unit command positions. Yet by the time of the Somalia deployment, there was an apparent trend toward younger and less experienced soldiers and junior leaders. Promotion practices such as the so-called 'Airborne offers' which used promotions to fill vacancies in the CAR, and the Delegated Authority Promotion System -- particularly as it was used in relation to the Airborne Regiment -- contributed to this trend.
• There were no strict standards for selection of soldiers for the CAR.
• While the CAR could veto selections and post soldiers back to parent regiments, initial selection of soldiers for the CAR was entirely in the hands of the sending units.
• The informal selection process for the CAR -- operated, as it was, by the sending units and regiments -- left the CAR vulnerable to being used as a dumping ground for overly aggressive or otherwise problematic personnel.
• Despite the recognized need of the CAR for more mature soldiers, some soldiers with a record of recent misconduct were sent to the CAR.
• Parent regiments would call their best NCOs back from the CAR and send less exerienced replacements; in other words, they used CAR as a training ground.
• The feeder battalions were in a conflict of interest when it came to sending their top-quality personnel, and the CAR undoubtedly suffered when parent regiments experienced particular shortages of such people.
• The practice of manning the CAR commandos according to regimental affiliation aggravated the impact of personnel problems in parent regiments by preventing the CAR from drawing more heavily from the healthier regiments.
• The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry experienced a slump in personnel quality in the early 1990s. As a result of the system of selecting for the CAR, this had a direct impact on 2 Commando.
• In general, despite warnings in the 1985 Hewson report about the CAR's special need for mature and experienced soldiers and leaders, Land Force Command and the parent infantry regiments too often failed in their duty to the CAR in this respect.