Volume 1 sets out the major themes to be explored within our report. Included in that Volume is a discussion of some of the principles which we consider to be fundamental to the proper functioning of the military. Following that, we investigate the systems, structures and relationships the Canadian Forces had in place at the time of preparing for and deploying to Somalia. Next, we recount in narrative form the story of what we learned about the Somalia deployment. The complete story was pieced together with meticulous care from the testimony and documentation that was available to us.

At important junctures in that narrative we identify for the reader events which, in our view, signal system malfunction. Those points are warning signs - precursors of issues to be explored in detail in our analysis and findings. Thus, in Volumes 2, 3, 4, and 5 we analyze the details of deviations from the benchmark principles and themes. These Volumes contain the essential distillation of the Inquiry's labours. In Volumes 2, 3, and 5 we discharge our mandate by exploring the issues we were charged to investigate, making findings with respect to problems encountered, and offering recommendations to repair a system which allowed such problems to occur. In Volume 4, we investigate the failures of senior leaders with respect to the pre-deployment phase and with respect to disclosure of information and destruction of documents.

In spite of the truncation of our mandate, we have been able to effectively address almost all the points in our terms of reference, although not necessarily to the extent initially contemplated. Even as modified at the eleventh hour, our terms of reference give us latitude to report, at our discretion, on whatever we felt we had properly canvassed. Certainly, with more time we could have carried our investigation even further. Our unfinished mandate is discussed in Chapter 42 in Volume 5.

Our chosen themes and principles are tightly interwoven both in terms of their theoretical treatment and the on-the-ground realities to which they refer. Foremost among them are leadership and accountability, which to a great extent underlie all the others. (These are discussed in detail in Chapter 15 and Chapter 16 in Volume 2). We have gone to great lengths to research, study, and delineate our understanding of how these twin pillars uphold the functioning of the military within a free and democratic Canadian society.

We have examined how these ideals should be realized in the structure and functioning of the chain of command (Chapter 17 in Volume 2), and maintained through the exercise of discipline (Chapter 18 in Volume 2). We note in particular how the entire hierarchy of the military is linked by responsibility and accountability. Interlinked duties extend outwards from each officer in every direction: upwards to higher command, outwards to fellow officers, downwards to the officers and soldiers under their command. They are not limited by specific orders or tasks: military tradition also demands that officers inform their superiors faithfully and fully and that senior officers support those junior to them with proper supervision and oversight.

The success or failure of a mission is directly attributable to how well it is planned. Therefore, knowing the events of the weeks and months before the incidents that sparked our Inquiry is essential to understanding the systemic failures that created the circumstances which allowed certain dishonourable incidents to take place. Accordingly, we explore the various component elements of mission planning: how the military gathers intelligence and information, how higher command determines the suitability of forces for their assigned tasks (Volume 2, Chapters 19 and 20), how training is planned and implemented (Volume 2, Chapter 21), and, in particular, how Rules of Engagement are created, promulgated and impressed upon the troops (Volume 2, Chapters 21 and 22).

All these elements of mission planning contribute to operational readiness. Therefore, we placed great importance on investigating how the Canadian Forces (CF) determines that a unit is ready to be committed for action, specifically examining the systems and relationships that were in place during 1992 at the time of the Somalia operation (Volume 2, Chapter 23).

We also looked at policing and prosecutions within the system of military justice (Volume 5, Chapter 40). In so doing, we paid particular attention to the powers and responsibilities of commanding officers and the notion of command influence in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions. We also examined the security and investigative functions of military police, especially regarding how they are deployed and what constitutes appropriate strength for different kinds of operations. These considerations in turn led to an examination of the structural and institutional adequacy of prevailing arrangements within the office of the Judge Advocate General.

One of the basic themes explored in this report relates to openness and the disclosure of information (Volume 5, Chapter 39). As we carried out our probe, we were forced to use valuable time, that had been reserved for other purposes, to confront problems of inadequate information disclosure by Department of National Defence (DND) that were affecting the efficacy of our work. At the outset, we expected to investigate how information had been actively or passively withheld from those who should have known about the incidents that initiated our Inquiry. Alarmingly, we were subjected to a process of obfuscation and denial that was strikingly similar to that which we were charged to investigate. The allegations of cover-up that we pursued are of particular concern in that they extend beyond the domain of the military to affect the rights of all Canadians in a free society.

In the chapters which follow, we present our disturbingly negative assessment of what transpired in the Somalia deployment. Our analysis explores the problems that beset the Somalia mission and infected the structure and functioning of the CF.

Three lengthy chapters, two describing a process (mission planning in Volume 3, Chapters 24 and 25) and the other, an event (the March 4th incident, Volume 5, Chapter 38) merit a word of explanation. These chapters are essentially case studies of what can go wrong. The mission planning analysis and the March 4th incident each, in its own way, illustrates the multiple failures that occurred at virtually every turn of this operation. They demonstrate vividly a mission so ill-conceived that many Canadians will wonder why consequences even more shocking than those that led to this Inquiry did not happen or have not come to light.

In the end, following our analysis of the key issues we offer conclusions about what happened and why, and make a number of recommendations. We found a multiple of contributing reasons for the incidents in Somalia that must be of concern to the government and addressed at every level of the military and the Department of National Defence. But in essence, we found that the twin pillars - leadership and accountability - became so undermined that they no longer fully supported the roles and functions of the Canadian Forces.