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Our findings relate to deficiencies in the intelligence planning
process; the lack of doctrine on intelligence for peacekeeping
and peace enforcement missions; the quality of intelligence; and
the lack of appropriate direction from the chain of command.
Information is unevaluated material of every description that could be used to produce intelligence.
Military intelligence comprises strategic intelligence, combat intelligence and counter-intelligence.315 It is essential to the preparation and execution of military policies, plans and Operations.
Intelligence gathering is the process for collecting intelligence as a component of the decision-making process to participate in a mission and as a key element in operational planning.
Intelligence cycle is the sequence of events whereby information is obtained, assembled, evaluated, converted to intelligence, and disseminated.316
Strategic intelligence is intelligence required to formulate policy and military plans at the national and international levels.317
Combat intelligence is intelligence about the enemy, terrain and weather required by a commander to plan and conduct combat operations.318
This attitude might have been adequate for traditional peacekeeping operations, but in the post-Cold War era there is a need for intelligence capabilities more suited to new kinds of UN intervention.323 UN peacekeepers can now be involved in multifaceted operations, such as those in Somalia, where the social order has broken down and force may be used against UN troops and installations.324 To conduct peace Operations in such circumstances, both the UN and troop-contributing states need improved intelligence to make rational decisions about all aspects of a mission.
The Somalia operation made clear the need for a full range of
military intelligence, to understand the social and political
situation in Somalia and, particularly, to assess the potential
threats to troops in theatre. At the time, however, the UN was
still reluctant to acknowledge the need for intelligence gathering
and had no means of co-ordinating the receipt and dissemination
of such information.325 States providing troops thus
had to rely heavily on their own sources for intelligence.326
Although some member states have their own intelligence support
(primarily traditional combat intelligence), many of the troop-contributing
states' resources for maintaining accurate and current intelligence
on different parts of the world are inadequate. Countries that
do have their own intelligence support, typically for conventional
military operations, do not have appropriate procedures for collecting,
processing, and disseminating information for peace support operations.
At the time, the absence of doctrine me ant that intelligence staffs relied on intelligence doctrine for combat intelligence for conventional warfare, which was mostly unsuited to peace support operations,328 because this type of intelligence is concerned primarily with operational information about a designated enemy and much less with cultural and social information.
CF doctrine describes the primary objective of combat intelligence as "to provide friendly forces with timely, accurate intelligence about hostile dispositions, capabilities and intentions, geographic conditions, targets and meteorology while also denying friendly force information to an opponent"329 through tasks that include providing early indications and warnings, preparing battlefield intelligence, and situation development.330
For conventional combat operations, intelligence staff co-ordinate combat surveillance and intelligence collection, exploit captured enemy personnel and equipment, and provide imagery exploitation and counter- intelligence. In peace support operations, however, many of these tasks are inappropriate. For these operations, intelligence staff must monitor the activities of belligerent forces and other threats to assess the risks, monitor and obtain information on cease-fire and other agreements, and co-ordinate overt intelligence gathering about belligerent forces, economic conditions, history, political developments, and social conditions. This is meant to be a careful and rational system.333
1. In the direction phase, commanders determine the priority intelligence requirements and communicate them to intelligence staff, who then use existing material or gather further information and request other sources and agencies to collect information.
2. In the collection phase, sources and agencies gather and deliver information from reconnaissance and surveillance.
3. In the processing phase, the intelligence staff collate, evaluate, analyze, integrate, and assess information gathered.334 4. In the dissemination phase, intelligence is conveyed in an appropriate form and by suitable means to those who need it, in accordance with the following principles: clarity, conciseness, standardization, urgency, distribution, regularity, and security.335 Intelligence can be disseminated orally or in written reports, typically either intelligence reports or intelligence summaries.
During the pre-deployment period, intelligence staff assemble and prepare the intelligence organization and staff for the mission. All relevant data bases and material must be reviewed and checked for completeness and accuracy. Usually, area handbooks, describing general conditions in the theatre, are prepared.
In addition to preparing the intelligence organization, intelligence officers at the regimental level support pre-deployment training by briefing the troops and commanders on current intelligence assessments.336
As the situation changed, more intelligence was requested and received by NDHQ. In July 1992, the CDS directed the joint staff at NDHQ to conduct a feasibility study to determine whether the CF could provide a battalion to the Somalia mission.340 The threat assessment in this study identified mines and armed factions,341 described reports of widespread indiscriminate placement of mines in northern Somalia, and concluded that mines were likely in other areas. The threat of attack was assessed as highly likely, despite the fact that factional forces were ill-disciplined and poorly armed.
In the memorandum prepared for the Government outlining options, both External Affairs and National Defence advised a cautious approach, recommending incremental responses to the UN request, because the risks (assessed as medium to high) were still too uncertain, and there was great need for further exploration and assessment. A second UN technical mission went to Somalia in mid-August.342 By the end of August, NDHQ planning focused on an analysis of the north-east sector, near Bossasso, as a preliminary analysis of the overall situation in Somalia had already been completed. Much of the additional analysis considered only the viability of deploying the security battalion to the north-east sector.343
In late August, G2 staff prepared a preliminary intelligence estimate addressing factors concerning relief operations in Somalia for Air Command before it began Operation Relief, a humanitarian airlift operation.344 The report noted that the threat from armed factions was sufficiently high that personnel should stay within secure zones and that sufficient Military Police would be needed to provide security for aircraft, equipment, foodstuffs, and personnel.345 The estimate also contained important information about the social and political situation; the climate (e.g., recommending summer clothing); the need for medical staff and a medical evacuation plan; advice on ground, air, and water transport; and identifying the need for communications systems.
During August 1992, reports from the UN confirmed the broad scope of the proposed action in Somalia and warned of an anticipated strong reaction from parts of Somali society, given the degree of intervention recommended.346 As planning was expedited for CF involvement in the mission, G2 at Land Force Command Headquarters prepared intelligence briefs for the Commander and staff, but provided only basic intelligence, without evaluating the information in detail.347
The plan for the operation's intelligence support was set out in Force Mobile Command's contingency plan.349 According to the plan, FMC Headquarters would serve as the primary command point of contact with national agencies for intelligence and/or information in support of the operation. The G2 of the Special Service Force Headquarters identified intelligence production and training requirements and co-ordinated intelligence and/or information requirements.350 The initial general intelligence requirements were outlined as follows:
The complete int[elligence] cycle is operative before and throughout OP CORDON and includes a COMD Int[elligence] Estimate and Collection Synchronization Plan. Basic Intelligence documents/studies have been produced in response to anticipated needs. Current int[elligence] is disseminated through LFCHQ Daily Intelligence Highlights (DIH) and Periodic Intelligence Digests (PID). Additional int[elligence] requirements are mission specific and will be coordinated through LFCHQ with the appropriate agency in response to identified in[telligence] gaps/requirements. This HQ will also coordinate mil geo sp [military geographic support].
The intelligence annex to the contingency plan included an updated threat assessment, assuming that the initial area of operations was Bossasso. It emphasized high threat of attack from rogue elements under no central control; threat of being targeted by armed insurgents in search of food; and threat of other banditry.
We reviewed documents (not filed as evidence for security reasons) indicating that intelligence and/or information was received by Force Mobile Command in the fail of 1992 pertaining to social and political developments in Somalia at the time. We also saw updated assessments of continuing threats to UN personnel throughout the country and within Canada's proposed area of Operations.
Our review of the activities of these components of intelligence planning consisted of review of the documents filed at the hearings, those not filed for security reasons, and testimony from witnesses who commented on aspects or consequences of the planning process. For example, Capt Hope indicated that there had been little involvement by the chain of command in the intelligence planning process at the CAR level. We also found that despite the intelligence plan, dissemination of intelligence among the commands was clearly inadequate.351
Generally, Capt Hope planned without appropriate doctrinal guidance or adequate direction from the chain of command. He was left alone to develop an intelligence plan based on his own expertise in combat intelligence. Essentially, he was starting from scratch.354 His plan for the mission gave his CO all the information he could assemble from very limited sources concerning the 'enemy', the weather, and the terrain as a basis for planning and conducting operations.355
During the pre-deployment period, Capt Hope's primary function was to serve his CO, but he was also responsible for disseminating information to members of the CAR through regular briefings and developing materials to support cultural training for the mission. He was also involved in producing a phrase book; a Somali/English dictionary; and a soldier's handbook, including basic information on the weather, the terrain and Somali culture. He also arranged for Mr. Hassan, a Somali national, to speak to officers of the CAR about Somali culture.
Capt Hope testified that he searched out public sources of information, including encyclopaedias, articles, books, and television news reports from sources such as the Cable News Network (CNN). He contacted staff officers in the Intelligence Directorate at NDHQ, spoke with people employed by non-governmental organizations working in the area, and talked with a Somali national living in Canada who later came to brief the officers. Finally, he relied on information he obtained while on reconnaissance in Somalia in mid-October 1992.356 During the reconnaissance, Capt Hope recorded an hour-long video and completed a comprehensive intelligence report, which he later used to brief soldiers preparing for Operation Cordon.357 In short, this junior officer did the best he could to assemble useful information, acting largely on his own initiative and while under significant stress.
In addition to the background and cultural sources, Capt Hope also relied on the intelligence contained in two threat assessments received from the Director General of Intelligence at NDHQ, one in September 1992 and one in December 1992.358 These threat assessments were not mission-specific but identified threats in the operational zones of Somalia. According to LCol Morneault, the Regiment also received information from NDHQ in different forms on a daily basis.359
In the fail of 1992, Capt Hope briefed soldiers on the conditions in Bossasso, based mainly on the intelligence report following the reconnaissance. According to Capt Hope, the briefings were attended by almost all the soldiers who ultimately went to Somalia. Capt Hope considered the threat in Bossasso was "limited/low",360 in terms of both armed factions and other threats. One briefing focused on the factional forces in Somalia, their weapons, organization, and tactics, and the difficulties of distinguishing between them.361 The northeast was considered the most stable area in Somalia, with the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in firm control. The area was reasonably stable during the fail of 1992, although there was a possibility of periods of instability. The Commanding Officer of the CAR assumed it could operate in the area in co-operation with the SSDF as the governing faction.362
Although the CAR ultimately deployed to Belet Huen, Capt Hope believed that much of the information in his briefings to soldiers was relevant to that area as well, particularly information about the social and political situation. 363
In addition to the general intelligence briefings conducted by Capt Hope and his staff, officers and senior NCOs were briefed on conditions in the Bossasso area, the people, their languages, habits, and clan structure by a Somali national, Mr. Hassan. While the briefing was generally considered helpful,364 it was given only to a small group of officers. Soldiers were not afforded the same opportunity, nor did they receive information from the briefing, because LCol Morneault thought it was better to wait until they had more information specific to the area assigned to the Canadian contingent.365 While he fully intended to have Mr. Hassan return, LCol Morneault was relieved of his command, and there never was another briefing by Mr. Hassan for the Regiment.
Later, a member of the CF Reserves who had served in a relief
organization in Somalia briefed CAR officers and some SSF staff
on his experiences.366 A later report confirmed the
reliability of the briefing and included valuable information
about the area near Belet Huen.367 There was no evidence
that the information was disseminated to the soldiers in the CAR.
First Canadian Division Headquarters was chosen to provide joint force headquarters for the mission, with Col Labbé as the Commander. Neither Col Labbé nor staff at First Canadian Division Headquarters had been involved in any way in planning Operation Cordon. Col Labbé testified that throughout the fall of 1992, the division headquarters had focused on Yugoslavia, as there was a possiblity that a Canadian contingent might become involved there.370 Headquarters staff thus monitored intelligence reports mainly from Yugoslavia. When they were notified of the deployment to Somalia, they had to try to prepare a significant amount of intelligence in a very short time.
Despite the accelerated planning imperatives, the issue appeared not to be of major concern to Col Labbé, who testified that intelligence gathering was an "ongoing, long-term and short-term operation".371 He believed that he could rely on the United States, which was in charge of the operation and had agreed unofficially to share intelligence though to a limited extent.372 In his opinion, NDHQ did not need detailed intelligence to provide the warning order and specify the mission statement, as the only mission statement was to mount the force -- the real mission statement for the in-theatre operation came from the coalition Commander, LGen Johnston.373 Once Col Labbé accepted the assignment to Belet Huen, he then conducted the intelligence gathering and operational reconnaissance necessary to secure that objective.374 Weeks later, Col Labbé expressed dissatisfaction with the level of intelligence support received from UNITAF describing it as uneven and fragmentary.375 But in the absence of a national source, he was left to depend on this increasingly weak intelligence base.
Before they deployed, designated personnel at First Canadian Division conducted an intelligence battle procedure in preparation for deployment.376 Intelligence was requested from the Director General of Intelligence at NDHQ, and maps were procured from Canadian and U.S. sources. Materials were obtained from the CAR and on the basis of reports received, a briefing package and a map were prepared for Col Labbé that included a geographic breakdown of the country by political factions; an initial order of battle by political faction and clan; an intelligence estimate of the situation at that time; a synopsis of political and military activities leading to the situation in Somalia at that time; biographical notes on the political and military leaders of the major factions; and an analysis of the area of operations.
On December 11, 1992, First Canadian Division received instructions
from NDHQ that intelligence support to Operation Deliverance would
be arranged through the National Defence Intelligence Centre (NDIC)
and that all command requirements should be co-ordinated through
NDIC rather than the deployed headquarters staff. Orders confirmed
also that standard intelligence procedures for a deployed force
headquarters applied, as opposed to those relative to peacekeeping
operations.377 These guidelines set the tone and outlined
the substance of the general intelligence plan for the operation.
Essentially, the direction was that:
Following receipt of the guidelines, First Canadian Division Headquarters issued the operation order for Operation Deliverance, including an intelligence annex that defined the intelligence problem, summarized the threat assessments, and outlined the priority intelligence requirements and the intelligence requirements.379
Capt Hope testified that the operation order annex dealing with
intelligence was a good general summary of the extent of the intelligence
available to the CF before deployment.382 The material
contained in the order, together with the recently acquired aerial
photos of Baledogle airfield, a sketch map of the Baledogle airfield
area prepared by the Americans, and the most recent threat assessment
from the Director General of Intelligence made up the general
range of intelligence documentation available for the mission
before deployment.383 But that was hardly enough information
on which to base planning for a potentially dangerous operation.
The general known threats facing the CJFS before deployment as noted by Capt Hope include the following:
1. Threat from Armed Factions, Local Militias and Bandit
Gangs
The most significant threat noted by Capt Hope before deployment was the threat of violence from armed factions.386 Quoting the annex to the operation orders, he emphasized the unpredictability of the security situation and the fact that, unlike the situation at Bossasso, little was known about how the armed factions would react to the introduction of coalition forces. The major factions in Somalia, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali National Front (SNF), while not positioned in the Belet Huen area, were nonetheless represented there through factional commanders and were actively engaged in fighting each other.387
Local militia forces, who were of the same tribe as Gen Aideed's USC forces, were perceived initially as a similar threat to the soldiers. Before deployment, the threat was assessed as high, because militia forces were in control of the area, and the CARBG would essentially be taking control away from them. The militia forces were encouraged to pull back by the local government, as it was believed beneficial to have coalition forces in the area. While in theatre, the threat was accordingly considered low.
Belet Huen turned out to be a key area for bandits, as it was located on the main route to Ethiopia, which was used for the smuggling of drugs, weapons and food from Ethiopia to Somalia. It was also near a group of USC Aideed forces to the north-east, whose lines of communication and supply ran from Mogadishu, past Belet Huen, toward the north. According to local non-governmental organizations, complete lawlessness was associated with these gangs, and it was hoped that the CF presence would bring some order to the area. The threat was considered high and largely unpredictable.388
2. Threat from Looters and Thieves
According to Capt Hope, the primary problem with looters and thieves was that they were expected to try to penetrate the perimeter of the camp and steal materials. There were also concerns that they might attempt to sabotage the force.
3. Threat from Political Agitators
Initially, concern focused on Islamic fundamentalists throughout Somalia. Information was received that the local groups in the Belet Huen sector were potentially dangerous, although it was later discovered that the group was not a threat.
4. Threat Resulting from Instability
Fighting among the local forces of the USC and the SNF could have broken out at any time. There was also potential for conflict between the USC and the local Hawaadle clan, or the Hawaadle clan and a coalition of a smaller group of tribes in the area. Finally, there had been threats against non-governmental organization (NGO) workers in the area.
5. Threat from Mines
Land mines were believed to be a major threat because of indiscriminate mining by the former Barre army.
In summary, the most significant threat noted was the possibility
of attack from opposing factions, primarily the USC faction led
by General Aideed, who was known to be anti-coalition and who
had previously been responsible for attacks on UN forces. Looters
and thieves were considered a lesser and endemic problem throughout
the country.
During the start-up period, things were extremely fluid. Officers did not know where they would be assigned, under whose command they would operate, or where CJFS Headquarters would be established. When Capt Hope arrived at Belet Huen, he met with the Operations Officer, Capt Kyle, and received his intelligence instructions from LCol Mathieu. After the briefing, he drew up a patrol plan and began the intelligence gathering process for the in-theatre phase.
No officer knew the Regiment was going to Belet Huen until shortly before they were ordered there. According to Capt Hope, they knew very little about the factions and activities in the Belet Huen region before deployment, because they had mainly prepared reports on the factions in the northeast region around Bossasso. Then they prepared for Baledogle, for which they received additional intelligence in the form of an intelligence summary, airfield photos, and maps. Other updates to the intelligence annex in the operation orders were received before Capt Hope's deployment in late December, many of which did not relate to Belet Huen, but related either to the central south portion of Somalia or to Baledogle.
Reports from NDHQ, in the form of operations notes, indicated
that the CAR received detailed information on Belet Huen as of
December 23, 1992.390 Under cross-examination by counsel
for the Government of Canada, Capt Hope recalled that there had
been some reports from an American who had recently been in Belet
Huen, but no further reports to help understand the situation
in Belet Huen. A report prepared by CJFS Headquarters on behalf
of Col Labbé, describing the proposed insertion of the
CAR advance party into Belet Huen on December 28, 1992, concludes
that the quality and quantity of intelligence support for the
proposed insertion were sufficient, remarking further that the
threat was low. This is surprising, given that Col Labbé
planned an air mobile assault to get the CAR into the area. In
Capt Hope's view, this approach was indicative of a significant
threat about which there was insufficient information. In his
view, the threat was high at the Belet Huen airfield on December
29, 1992.
the UN does not have information-gathering agencies... [It] is very dependent on national governments to provide it with information. And this we found was a real weakness...because the UN officials were either beholden to national governments whose information could reflect their own interests or more generally had no information themselves to work off.... The UN had actually very little to pass on to member states who were going to be contributing troops and usually the flow of information was the other way around.391
Despite the lack of doctrine, Capt Hope provided intelligence support to officers in charge of training the Regiment and to help prepare the soldiers for the situation in Somalia. Nevertheless, serious repercussions, reflecting on the accuracy, adequacy, and verification of intelligence, flowed from the lack of doctrine/guidance.
Although Capt Hope's efforts were commendable given the general lack of direction and guidance, in the light of testimony from many soldiers and officers, the adequacy of intelligence at the briefings was questionable.392
Few felt that they were sufficiently prepared for the social and political situation, while others had little recollection of the briefings. According to Maj Seward, the briefings were short and focused on concrete information about the climate and terrain, leaving little time for cultural/political issues.393 Finally, the information was disseminated mostly to officers.
Without doctrine, Capt Hope was required to develop his own plan and strategy for gathering and evaluating information, then disseminating it appropriately. According to Capt Hope, his principal source of information was a desk analyst for the Horn of Africa section at NDHQ. Apart from intelligence documents he received, the desk analyst appeared to be the key contact at NDHQ.394
Another consequence of the lack of doctrine identified by Capt Hope was the inadequate number of intelligence staff officers and non-commissioned members in theatre. Although the number assigned to the section was standard for the battle group establishment, it was inadequate to deal with the amount of information that had to be processed in theatre.395 Had there been more guidance about how to assess the number of personnel required, according to Capt Hope, more would have been included in the CARBG. There was no shortage of intelligence personnel in the CF generally at the time.
Similarly, before deployment, commanders failed to appreciate the need for interpreters. This had a major impact on the conduct of operations both generally and from an intelligence perspective. As is common in these types of operations, much of the information Capt Hope relied on in theatre was gathered from individuals.396 Apart from the usual limitations of this type of intelligence, Capt Hope had the additional problem of having to rely on interpreters to obtain information from the local population. Since they had no interpreters initially, they had to use interpreters brought by the U.S. forces. When the CARBG finally hired their own, they hired unwittingly from only one tribe, and this affected both the efficacy of interpretation and the nationals' perception of Canadian Forces personnel. Although they later hired other interpreters, this time from a cross-section of tribes, they encountered other problems. They had to adjust for clan bias in interpreting information gathered by this method, and none of the interpreters would work at night, creating a serious problem during the entire operation.397
Thus, for example, Capt Hope was generally unable to question infiltrators detained at night and was therefore unable to gather information about their intent directly from infiltrators, who were generally released the next morning after being held overnight. They were thus unable to get a clear idea of the nature and extent of the thievery problem.398
A critical aspect of intelligence work in support of the operation was understanding the nature of the threat confronting the CF in theatre. A major problem facing the troops was the significant number of infiltrations. Capt Hope thought the motive behind the infiltrations was an intelligence problem, although the general feeling among the troops was that the main motive was simply theft. Capt Hope looked at them from a different perspective, trying to assess whether the threat was more significant. He was receiving intelligence reports from Mogadishu and was thus monitoring the situation from a different, more cautious perspective.399
According to Capt Hope, some of the problems facing the troops in theatre could have been alleviated by a requirement that intelligence personnel deploy more quickly, in advance of the troops, so that they could assemble intelligence and disseminate it before the deployment commenced.400 This is the usual CF method, but it was not followed in the Somalia deployment.
According to the testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, the Canadian humanitarian relief sector in Somalia included a very complex set of clan relations and political factors. He knew that it was extremely difficult to get accurate information because the situation was so politicized.401 This situation made it crucial that the CJFS have appropriate procedures for gathering and evaluating information. It was clear that neither capacity existed.
Although the intelligence unit of the Special Service Force was directed to serve as the focal point in support of the operation, by identifying intelligence production and training requirements and by co-ordinating intelligence and/or information requirements,404 there is no evidence before us to indicate involvement by SSF G2 Intelligence staff in that capacity. Instead, Capt Hope appeared to be almost solely responsible for intelligence support training, and in our view he received inadequate guidance and assistance from NDHQ in developing this support. He was responsible for the instructions for preparing the Somalia handbook, which was based on information he had gleaned from his review of open sources on Somalia and from his consultations with the desk analyst at NDHQ.
It is not clear whether the information provided in briefings by Capt Hope, Mr. Hassan, and the former reservist were subjected to the appropriate scrutiny by senior officers and, if so, by what process. Other briefing sessions were conducted after the October reconnaissance and ought to have been considered relatively reliable. However, as Dr. Menkhaus pointed out, information received from human intelligence in Somalia varied according to the clan an individual belonged to and therefore varied in accuracy.407 Ultimately, much of this information was of little value, as it pertained only to the Bossasso area.
The eclectic mix of information as a source for intelligence on Somalia led to an unhealthy reliance on media reports, particularly from CNN. Both Capt Walsh and Capt Hope used news footage to describe events in Somalia.408 Many witnesses indicated that they received all or most their information from CNN reports,409 since before the training exercises, very little other information was available. According to Col MacDonald, much of their information was coming from the networks.410 Maj Kampman, who commanded the CARBG's armoured squadron, held a similar view.411 The relevance of information from media accounts was questionable, as much of the footage was believed to be from Mogadishu, where conditions were notably different from conditions in Bossasso.412
While media reports had a major impact on the troops, according to Maj Pommet, Officer Commanding 1 Commando, the impact should have been mitigated by relating media reports to actual conditions in the area of operation. Although officials at NDHQ did nothing to allay the impact of media images, Maj Pommet took if upon himself to correct erroneous perceptions.413 His efforts, however, were directed only to troops under his command, who accounted for less than a fifth of the force.
In our view, reports from the news media -- untempered by information about actual conditions in the area where they were to be deployed -- might have led some soldiers to believe that when they arrived in Somalia they would find an 'enemy' ready for battle. Commanders should have been conscious of this possibility and taken steps to counter it.
Only a small part of the operation required conventional combat skills. Soldiers expecting a military operation found themselves doing social work, policing, riot control, and endless negotiations in a context of intricate clan tensions. They had little training for or information on this type of work.417 Many of the troops were inadequately briefed on Somali culture, leading to inappropriate behaviour on their part.418 The CF Somalia handbook contained only three paragraphs on Somali culture, which were short, simplistic and so defensive that the effect would have been to poison rather than foster relations with the local population.419
Canadian soldiers in Mogadishu believed that they had to treat every clan member as a potential threat, because they were unable to identify who was hostile to diem. After incidents of rock throwing directed at CJFS Headquarters in early February, feelings of isolationism and frustration intensified. According to Maj Moreau, in charge of security for CJFS Headquarters, soldiers became increasingly removed and potentially more aggressive toward the local population.420
With the change from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, many soldiers became even more confused about what to expect in theatre. Although many were aware that they were no longer going to Bossasso, most did not know that they were assigned to the Belet Huen sector until they arrived in Mogadishu. Even before the change to Belet Huen, they were confused about what threat existed. They were aware that everyone was armed, but they did not understand clearly what that meant in terms of their security.421
Sgt MacAuley, a section commander for 2 Commando, testified that he was told to expect anything and as a result didn't know what to expect. Although he acknowledged that there was not a great deal of time to gather intelligence on Belet Huen, more information on the town and better maps would have been extremely beneficial.422
Describing his reaction to a patrol at night, Sgt MacAuley maintained that their early concerns were about mines and booby traps. He described a nighttime patrol as being, "like walking into the twilight zone; it was nothing we had seen before."423
Although Sgt Godfrey testified that he felt prepared for the mission, much of his testimony indicated otherwise. He maintained that there were no specific briefings on Belet Huen and that the maps they were given were poorly drawn.424 He confirmed that instructions given before they left for Somalia were unclear, and that the troops were uncertain about what to expect when they landed. They had been told that there might be hostile forces when they got off the plane, and the original plan was to fan out once they landed at Belet Huen airport, with guns in full view.
According to Maj Pommet, the 2 Commando members loaded their rifles a few minutes before landing,425 but by the time they arrived, the airport had been secured by U.S. forces.426 The temperature was 45OC, and on the march from the airport, many were carrying more than 100 pounds of equipment for the six-hour walk. There were cases of dehydration, owing to the fact that the soldiers were not sure of the length of the march, so were unable to gauge how long their water supplies would have to last.427 Careful intelligence assessments beforehand might have prevented these types of command errors and oversights.
We agree with the view of Maj Kampman and the strong criticisms expressed by the soldiers who testified before us. The entire intelligence process was flawed by serious deficiencies in direction, doctrine, co-ordination, and quality control. The consequences were far-reaching as the mission changed in nature: troops in the field did not know where they were going or what to expect when they got there, and especially how to relate to members of the local population with whom they came into contact. We find that the low value placed by officers and officials at senior levels on intelligence before, during, and after deployment was a contributing factor to the serious incidents that occurred.
More specifically we find that:
(a) Capt Hope, the CAR Intelligence Officer, was compelled
to develop an intelligence plan for the mission based on combat
intelligence doctrine. No guidance was readily available to assist
him in planning intelligence support for the regiment or to assist
in regimental training.
(b) Commanders and senior staff officers failed to recognize
the need for additional intelligence staff in theatre.
(c) Commanders and senior staff officers failed to appreciate
the need for interpreters. This affected the intelligence organization
in theatre and the conduct of operations generally. Although they
were able to hire Somali nationals for the job, intelligence staff
encountered problems with this arrangement. First, they had difficulties
adjusting for clan bias in interpreting the information. Second,
none of the interpreters would work at night, which created a
serious gap in intelligence operations.
(d) As a result of the problem with interpreters, intelligence staff were unable to question infiltrators detained at night and were unable to gather information about the purpose of infiltrations directly from infiltrators. They were thus unable to get a clear idea of the nature and extent of the problem of thievery.
(e) Commanders and senior staff officers failed to require
that intelligence staff be sent with the advance Party, a step
that could have alleviated some of the problems in theatre. They
could have gathered information and formulated intelligence for
the force before deployment commenced.
(f) The humanitarian relief sector assigned to Canadian forces
was characterized by a very complex set of clan relations and
political factors, and it was extremely difficult to get accurate
information because the situation was heavily politicized. This
situation made it crucial to have appropriate procedures for gathering
and evaluating information. Neither capacity existed.
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