LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL PLANNING

Logistical problems adversely affected the conduct of Canadian Forces operations in Somalia. The shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, a troop augmentation from 750 to 900, and two changes in area of operations should have been sufficient reason to delay the deployment until these changes could be assimilated. Instead, little thought was given to the implications of the fact that Operation Deliverance was a totally different kind of mission from Operation Cordon. Initially envisioned as a 'lean and mean' operation, requiring a bare minimum of supplies and equipment, it was not until Operation Deliverance personnel had begun to arrive in theatre that a decision was made to establish a base camp of a similar standard to that planned for Bossasso.⁴³³ However, neither logistical support nor materiel was available to achieve this goal.

Even so, the mission was not postponed. Transporting troops and the necessary supplies to Belet Huen, 350 kilometres away from HMCS Preserver created confusion and expense. The higher levels of leadership forgot or sacrificed a fundamental principle of logistics: send in the first line un- its with a three-day supply of the essentials (hard rations, ammunition, and fuel), but build up reserves of supplies and equipment on site before the operation becomes actively engaged.⁴³⁴ Political expediency and a desire to be visible on the world stage overrode all practical logistical concerns.

Before NDHQ issued the warning order for Operation Cordon on September 4,1992, Operation Python (for the Western Sahara) was the Canadian Airborne Regiment's most recent planning exercise for such a deployment.⁴³⁵ In an after-action report of July 17,1992, Maj Desnoyers described Operation Python as "a costly and confused non-event. Much of the logistic costs could have been avoided if a more systematic approach was taken."⁴³⁶ He added that NDHQ had before it "the opportunity now to produce a workable and improved system." This opportunity was squandered when it came time to make the hasty transition between Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. The potentially valuable lessons learned from Operation Python were forgotten in the chaotic planning for the rushed mission to Belet Huen. The after-action reports for Operation Python revealed what was to be a recurring theme: logistics planning suffered because information about the operation, available to the planners, contained gaps or did not reach ail relevant personnel. In an after-action report of June 16, 1992, LCol Prosser noted that only the CAR's Commanding Officer, Col Holmes, visited UN headquarters for a briefing about Operation Python, and that planning, preparing, and mounting operations would have proved easier if representatives of Land Force Command Headquarters, Land Force Central Area Headquarters, and Special Service Force Headquarters had accompanied Col Holmes.⁴³⁷

LCol Prosser also pointed to the lack of a Canadian reconnaissance of the Western Sahara. Normally, a detailed reconnaissance of a proposed area of operation should precede a deployment, and key participants from each party, along with experts with specialized knowledge in the use of local resources. He also identified a lack of logistics intelligence on possible areas of operation.

Inadequate logistics intelligence on are as of operation typified a broader failure to make full use of intelligence staff. LCol Prosser urged that G2 (Intelligence) staff participate in planning any operation from the warning order on.⁴³⁸

Co-operation is a fundamental tenet of logistical planning; however, the J3 Peacekeeping staff and the G4 Operations staff were not involved early in the planning process for either Operation Python or Operation Deliverance. Consequently, uninformed planning personnel led to costly mistakes and confusion. Similarly, they were unable to prepare proper estimates of supplies that would be needed, such as parts and types of petroleum, oils and lubricants.⁴³⁹ A situation report of November 12, 1992 confirmed that some equipment stocks from Operation Python helped to fill Operation Cordon's requirements.⁴⁴⁰

Information from UN Technical Team

Despite rampant infectious diseases, planners expected the contingent to procure local fish and vegetables. They grossly underestimated water provisions at only three litres per day for drinking and cooking, when each member of the contingent actually required a minimum of eight litres per day.

The port at Mogadishu was intact but had no services and required security pre cautions because of the presence of two rival clans. The airport was in need of repairs. Supply vehicles had to be guarded because of extensive thievery. Diesel fuel had to be obtained from suppliers in Mombasa or Nairobi.⁴⁴³ Diesel-powered vehicles reduced the variety and volume of fuel, oils. and needed,⁴⁴⁴ but such products purchased locally were costly and often dirty or contaminated. Plans anticipated that only small arms would be required and that no ammunition would be used for training. Obviously, the changeover from peacekeeping to peace enforcement mission would greatly change the quantity and type of ammunition needed.

A second UN technical mission visited Somalia between August 4 and 17,1992, but no CF members were included, even though the logistics and communications group visited 11 locations in Somalia, including Bossasso and Belet Huen. The key findings communicated to Canada confirmed the findings of the March-April reconnaissance.⁴⁴⁵

NDHQ's message of November 16, 1992 marked CFB Petawawa and CFB Halifax as supply bases for Operation Cordon. The major supply ship was to be HMCS Preserver.⁴⁴⁶ CFB Lahr, in Germany, was no longer an option. NDHQ correspondence in the autumn of 1992 suggests a clear intent to create a National Support Element.⁴⁴⁷ The intention was for the NSE to forward equipment and supplies to Canadian units upon receipt in Somalia. This second and third line support would offset CAR's loss of logistics capability from the previous summer.

Logistics Planning for Operation Cordon

There were opportunities to obtain information. From September 23 to 25,1992, Col Houghton, LCol Morneault, and Col Cox went to UN headquarters, where, they and representatives of other troop-contributing countries, were briefed, especially about the evolving situation in Somalia.⁴⁵⁰ From October 12 to 18, Col Houghton led a reconnaissance party of 17 to assess Somalia and Dijibouti for Operation Cordon. Among the party were representatives from J3 Peacekeeping, J4 Logistics, Maritime Command Headquarters, and Air Command Headquarters, and LCol Morneault of the CAR.⁴⁵¹

On October 28,1992, LCol Mathieu, the CAR's new Commanding Officer, submitted a report concerning the reconnaissance visit to Somalia of October 12 to 18, suggesting that Canadian logistics planners had spotted and addressed potential logistics problems.⁴⁵² Canada's national mission in Operation Cordon was to maintain security in the northeastern zone of Somalia, centred on Bossasso. Under Operation Cordon, HMCS Preserver, anchored off the port of Bossasso, would furnish in-theatre supply because of the meagre infrastructure in Somalia⁴⁵³ and the lack of a suitable airfield at Bossasso for delivering supplies .⁴⁵⁴ According to LCol Mathieu's report, Maritime Command representatives had verified that the port of Bossasso was too small to accept a ship the size of HMCS Preserver; nonetheless, the port could perhaps take a roll-on-roll-off ship.⁴⁵⁵ crossload Foreshadowings of problems with sustainment by the UN were also apparent in the report.

The concern is day 61. In discussions with the UN adm reps there was a great lack in detail on sustainment. While broad brush concepts were given there were no concrete details on rat [rations] resupply, CASEVAC [casualty evacuation] and POL [petroleum, oils, and lubricants].⁴⁵⁶

The report also stipulated that while the Canadian base camp was being built, HMCS Preserver would provide petroleum, oils and lubricants, water, equipment storage, and rear link communications. Ways of transporting CF members to Somalia were being contemplated: about 10 days were needed to deploy the advance party; HMCS Preserver could bring 50 persons as part of the advance party; and the main body would have to arrive by air and crossload onto CC-130s.⁴⁵⁷ HMCS Preserver would provide ail the services and facilities necessary, but could provide fresh fruit and vegetables for only the first seven days of operation.⁴⁵⁸ This raised health and morale concerns.

The operation order for Operation Cordon was issued on November 13, 1992. The main area of operations was Bossasso, with headquarters in Mogadishu, and Air Command was to provide sustainment airlift support twice a month from Canada. HMCS Preserver would sail on November 16th carrying fuel, fresh rations, water, medical supplies, and other services for the base camp at Bossasso as agreed upon by Force Mobile Command Headquarters and Maritime Command (MARCOM), and, co-ordinated by NDHQ and J3 Peacekeeping staff.⁴⁵⁹ The advance party and equipment would depart by air, to arrive in Bossasso at the same time as HMCS Preserver. The main equipment would be sent on a UN-chartered ship, while troops were flown over on UN-chartered aircraft. CARBG would deploy with equipment and sufficient first and second line supplies and resources to satisfy their immediate requirements. Commencing in January, a CC-137 would make twice monthly trips from Trenton, Ontario to bring supplies. Commercial air freight was considered another option.⁴⁶⁰ An initial 30 days of individual meal packs were required and 15 days' supply of bottled water. It was expected that fresh rations would be procured locally once reliable sources were established.⁴⁶¹

Three days later, the declaration of operational readiness would be made, despite outstanding equipment issues.⁴⁶² There had already been pressure to move quickly. On October 26, 1992, the UN had requested that Canada's advance party and infantry battalion deploy when possible.⁴⁶³ A maritime logistics detachment was added to co-ordinate logistics and engineering support from Nairobi or Mombassa and to provide and co-ordinate in-theatre sustainment by HMCS Preserver.⁴⁶⁴ The battalion's main body was deployable by December 20, 1992 on two conditions: the UN was to provide a roil-on roll-off ship in the port of Montreal on November 16, 1992; and the UN was to furnish the needed strategic and tactical airlift to complete the move to Bossasso.⁴⁶⁵

HMCS Preserver arrived off the port of Mogadishu on December 12, 1992, two days before the advance party arrived by air.

Supplies and Equipment Preparation for Operation Cordon

Change to Operation Deliverance and the Deployment

In both Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance, HMCS Preserver was to rest a few miles from the ports of Bossasso and Mogadishu respectively.⁴⁷¹ Various crucial items that were too large to fit into a CC-130 had to be transported by HMCS Preserver. Once HMCS Preserver reached Mogadishu, its three Sea King helicopters and two small craft moved supplies ashore.⁴⁷² Under Operation Cordon, the site of the Canadian base camp would have been only three kilometres inland;⁴⁷³ nonetheless, under Operation Deliverance logistics planners initially had to contemplate transporting supplies from HMCS Preserver to Baledogle, closer to 100 kilometres inland. When the location changed to Belet Huen, the only available supply route was an insecure road extending 350 kilometres from Mogadishu. Problems were compounded because no reconnaissance had been done of the proposed site.

On December 8th, three days after NDHQ's warning order, Canada concluded a memorandum of understanding with the United States on mutual support, agreeing to exert their best efforts, compatible with national priorities, in peacetime, emergency and active hostilities, to fulfill the other participant's requests for logistics support, supplies, and services.⁴⁷⁴ It remained unclear, however, precisely what logistics support the United States would provide. Canadian and U.S. officers gathered at Camp Pendleton, California, on December 14th and 15th to seek agreement on what the United States would furnish.⁴⁷⁵ Accord mg to Maj N.C. Heward's report, the Canadian battle group was to deploy self-sufficient for 60 days of operations; full echelon support would flow from in-theatre Canadian and U.S. resources as available.⁴⁷⁶ By December l8th it seemed likely that when the cargo ship reached Mogadishu, the U.S. Marine Force Service Support Group would help the CARBG move the sea containers to Baledogle.⁴⁷⁷

Operation Cordon's task force movement table was to specify how to load the ships; only small common sense changes were in consideration. The additional personnel and supplies required by Operation Deliverance would move entirely on a third ship or in combination with air transport.⁴⁷⁸ The logistics plan for Baledogle was to have in-theatre CC-130 aircraft, operating from Nairobi, ferry supplies from Mogadishu to Baledogle; after the Canadian vehicles arrived by ship, they would journey to Baledogle as well.⁴⁷⁹ By January 1, 1993, the U.S. Army force, including 10 Mountain Division Support Command and 13 Corps Support Command, would begin to arrive.

After mid-January, U.S. transport could and would handle Canadian requirements.⁴⁸⁰ A military resupply flight would continue delivering materiel unique to Canadian needs to Nairobi every two weeks, and commercial shipping, by sea or air, would supplement these deliveries.⁴⁸¹

By December 27th, Canada had tentatively arranged for a transit area for storing sea containers at the Mogadishu airfield; co-ordination with the U.S. Navy Seabees to prepare the transit area for storage had already taken place. The transit area was to be ready by January 5, 1993.⁴⁸² Between December 28 and January 4, 1993, the CARBG's main body deployed to Belet Huen. Fifty-one CC-130 flights carrying personnel, equipment and supplies from Mogadishu and Baledogle arrived in Belet Huen during this interval. A sizeable airlift control element from Nairobi sent teams to ail three airfields to support aircraft loading and unloading. Information on arrival times was imprecise, and the contents of many loads were a surprise.⁴⁸³ The ships were approaching Somalia and were expected to offload in the port of Mogadishu from January 5th to 7th. The third ship was to reach Mogadishu between January l9th and 26th.⁴⁸⁴

Consequences of Inadequate Logistical Planning

The most serious flaws in planning logistical support resulted from pressure to launch the operation with just two weeks' notice. This left no lead time for planners to be briefed on operational intentions. No new logistical plan was conceived for Operation Deliverance; the Operation Cordon plan was simply adapted. To a certain degree, adapting the procedures, concepts, and infrastructure of Operation Cordon made sense, but superimposing one mission plan on another, without major policy analysis or revisions, did not. Good logistical planning should be pro-active. Planning for Operation Deliverance occurred over two weeks, while three months' preparation time was alloted for Operation Cordon.

Adding to the complexity caused by changes in the mission and location was the length of the communications and supply line from Canada to Belet Huen -- the longest line since the Korean War, 40 years earlier.⁴⁸⁵

The CARBG camp site was to be located over 350 kilometres from headquarters in Mogadishu. The connecting road was dangerous and the terrain hazardous. HMCS Preserver, the major supplier for CARBG was too far away for a quick transfer of supplies. Operation Cordon had been planned as an administrative mission, whereas Operation Deliverance was tactical. It was too late to reposition the stores and equipment for a tactical move.⁴⁸⁶

Execution of the mission was also complex because there was never a clear concept of what was required. Nothing was straightforward in communications down the chain of command. CARBG logistics planners were ignored when they suggested what equipment they would need and how it should be packed. J4 logistics staff for Operation Deliverance were not consulted or asked to formulate a logistical deployment plan. Numerous levels of headquarters overrode each other in giving orders, leading to poor supply accounting procedures, faulty equipment sent, and damaged equipment received without an adequate supply of technicians to carry out repairs. There was littie co-operation among the various planning staffs. It was difficult to know who was to set priorities. There were too many micro-managers and too little use of logistics liaison officers.

Self-sufficiency was a concern right from the outset. For UNOSOM, 60 days of essential resources had to be available. However, there was always a worry about who would provide supplies on day 61. When the mission changed to a U.S. -led operation, there had been no forecasting of what resources and supplies were needed. There was no system of continuous replenishment. Supplies and equipment had been budgeted for 750 persons, not 900. The National Support Element had been dropped from the mission because of the tight personnel ceiling. CARBG deployed without distinct second or third line logistic support; it was assumed, mistakenly, that the CAR's Service Commando could fulfil the role adequately. This later proved impossible when Service Commando was overwhelmed by the 384 sea containers sitting off the port in Mogadishu. This error in strategic planning was not corrected until the National Support Element reached Somalia in March 1993.

Rations and Water

Resolving the problems meant creating a dependency on the U.S. force, who had brought a large reserve of hard rations. Maj Gillam purchased some of this supply to feed Canadian troops and to function as a reserve until the supply ship arrived at the end of January. The promise of fresh rations within three weeks of landing never materialized; this was to be the longest CF deployment ever on hard rations, and it clearly affected morale. A combination of factors was cited as an explanation: the configuration of the camp did not allow for daily preparation of fresh rations, there were insufficient cooks to handle the volume, there was only one cooking and feeding facility, and there was no air conditioning or adequate refrigeration to reduce food spoilage.⁴⁸⁷ Sea containers were later discovered in Mogadishu with fresh rations that had never been distributed.⁴⁸⁸ Although some meats, cheeses and fruits began arriving from Nairobi in February,⁴⁸⁹ 2 Commando did not receive its first hot meal until March 29th.⁴⁹⁰ There was some resentment among the troops concerning the lack of fresh-cooked food. In his testimony, MWO Amaral noted that CARBG members compared their situation to that of the Italian contingent, who had regular fresh food and a working kitchen.⁴⁹¹

Hard rations provided only 14 days of menus, yielding inadequate variety for a six-month tour. Some of the food was intended to meet dietary requirements in arctic conditions (the coffee was not thirst-quenching, the jerky was too salty, and chocolate bars turned to mush in the heat). The troops had to ask their families to mail more appropriate items, such as pasta supplements and dehydrated soups.⁴⁹² Storage conditions were poor, and some individual meal packets spoiled from being left on pallets in the sun. Almost 6,000 breakfast and supper packets were withdrawn after soldiers became ill from eating the spoiled contents.⁴⁹³ 0f the 20 refrigeration units shipped to Somalia, 18 were in disrepair before leaving Canada, all arrived in poor condition, and only 10 could be made operational.⁴⁹⁴

Estimates of water requirements were inaccurate. There were significant water shortages at the beginning, and water consumption was restricted because of fears of a shortage.⁴⁹⁵ On arrival at Belet Huen, uncertain about how much water they were permitted to drink and how much to save, some soldiers became dehydrated and fainted on the six-hour march to the camp site during the hot daylight hours.⁴⁹⁶ It was not until 10 days after arrival that there was sufficient water for washing.⁴⁹⁷

Again, the force depended on the U.S. force to produce clean water. Reverse osmosis water production units did not arrive from Canada until mid-January,⁴⁹⁸ and the quality of the drinking water was tasteless and difficult to swallow.⁴⁹⁹ Initially there was no way to cool the water, so soldiers drank it without refrigeration -- the warm air heating the water to a temperature of approximately 45 degrees C.⁵⁰⁰

Miscellaneous Supplies and Equipment

Security was compromised by the lack of trip flares, tent lighting, and perimeter wire. Trip flares were used as a security warning signal around the camp perimeter, but once tripped they could not be used again, and replacements became a continuous problem. The stock aboard HMCS Preserver was rapidly depleted, necessitating constant reordering.⁵⁰⁴ During the predeployment phase, Maj Seward instructed MWO Amaral to order spotlights for perimeter lighting. In theatre, MWO Amaral continued to ask for perimeter lighting, but 2 Commando never received any.⁵⁰⁵ An important security miscalculation was the lack of sufficient perimeter wire, which had been ordered on the bas is of measurements for the Bossasso camp site, where the assessed threat was lower.⁵⁰⁶

The CJFS deployed with 30 days' supply of ammunition, based on the NATO low-intensity scale, as modified by Land Force Command Headquarters and approved by NDHQ,⁵⁰⁷ but it was sent separately from the troops, who arrived ahead of their ammunition to a potentially hostile environment.⁵⁰⁸ Maj Pommet noted in a report of April 17, 1993 that when the troops arrived in Mogadishu without their ammunition, transport personnel wanted to send them on to Belet Huen empty-handed. The situation was rectified by a platoon commander.⁵⁰⁹

Numerous other supplies were lacking for a variety of reasons. The troops were initially given steel helmets, which proved too hot for desert use and were not bulletproof.⁵¹⁰ When the Kevlar helmets arrived there were not enough for everyone. Poor advance intelligence meant there were few maps, and those given to the early patrols were poorly drawn and inaccurate.⁵¹¹ Patrols soon learned to navigate by memory.⁵¹²

Vehicles

In his testimony, Maj Kampman described the preparations for his squadron as "controlled chaos". He expressed concern about "going bare bones" and noted that he had to guess at the quantities for ammunition, fuel, weapons, and ancillary equipment to send along with the Cougars. The Cougars had not been expected to go on operations, so staff had not designed a field equipment table for a Cougar squadron on operations.⁵¹³ Maj Kampman stated that only 30 to 40 per cent of the vehicles were completely operational before deployment. Adding to this confusion, the squadron was given only hours to identify and collate their list of equipment and supplies, which then had to be rushed to the quartermaster.⁵¹⁴ Other equipment was added late to the list. Even after the task force movement tables were submitted, higher-level headquarters insisted on adding specialized equipment at the last minute, such as the 60-ton crane that the CARBG had already decided it did not need.⁵¹⁵ This forced the CARBG to reduce its fleet to stay within the 150-vehicle limit that had been imposed. It also meant that the movement tables became inaccurate and ceased to be useful. With so many levels of headquarters involved, Special Service Force Headquarters was not kept informed of these changes.⁵¹⁶

Transport of the vehicles was not co-ordinated with deployment of the main body of troops. The vehicles arrived between January 10th and 15th, which meant that CARBG's early security patrols had to be on foot.⁵¹⁷ Because there were insufficient vehicles to transport Canadian supplies from Belet Huen airport to the camp site, trucks had to be rented locally.⁵¹⁸ When the vehicles did arrive, some had problems requiring immediate repairs, and some were unusable because of damage resulting from storms during the Atlantic crossing.⁵¹⁹

One problem exacerbated another. Constant additions to and deletions from the vehicle fleet, even after movement tables were supposed to have been finalized, meant that appropriate numbers and types of parts were not sent.⁵²⁰ This caused particular havoc for the Grizzlies, which were not suited to the dusty and uneven desert terrain and required repairs. But the wrong spare parts had been sent. Repairs that could have been completed before deployment were not done, because the regimental armourer's tool kit had been packed, and no action was taken to borrow tools from another unit. As Maj Pommet noted, "We see the peacetime mentality -- that is, carry out repairs once you reach the scene."⁵²¹

Some of the vehicles required immediate repairs after unloading. Sgt Hobbs (maintenance supervisor, Royal Canadian Dragoons) testified that when the warning order was given on December 4th, all vehicles were assessed as "battle worthy", even though many repairs were required and could not be completed before the vehicles had to be loaded on December l8th.⁵²² In fact, the armoured vehicle fleet was in such a poor state of maintenance before the warning order, that two squadrons had to be stripped to assemble one completely operational squadron for deployment.⁵²³

Lack of spare parts and poor vehicle condition naturally affected maintenance. Heat, dust and poor road conditions caused frequent breakdowns. Over the course of the mission, 120 tires had to be replaced because of punctures caused by large thorns from local plants.⁵²⁴ Vehicles required daily repairs, but because of downsizing, the maintenance platoon was too small to handle both the continual repairs and the daily patrol missions.⁵²⁵

Logistical Disorganization and Haste

One of the major consequences of deploying in haste was poorly documented movement tables and tables of organization and equipment. Determining the number of sea containers required was critical in determining how much shipping capacity would have to be chartered and what equipment would be packed and loaded in what order. However, the constant addition of large numbers of new items and the haste to stuff them into sea containers made it difficult to make an accurate count and ensure that loading took place in the right order.⁵²⁶ The after-action report of March 21, 1995 was critical of this approach. Although the CARBG was briefed on the importance of itemizing container contents, apparently whole containers were "stuffed with 20,000 lbs simply labelled 'military stores' "; determining the contents of the containers therefore cost time and resulted in delays in receipt of supplies. The Operation Cordon materiel list was never checked to remove supplies no longer needed once the mission moved to Belet Huen. No NDHQ staff check was carried out to assess changing requirements from Bossasso to Baledogle to Belet Huen.⁵²⁷

The issue is a lack of communication between Canadian Forces foreign traffic unit personnel and the CARBG. An after-action report of February 2, 1993 adds another dimension: when CAR members attempted to advise on how to load the ship, they were ignored by foreign traffic unit personnel.⁵²⁸

To alleviate some of the confusion caused by poor inventory, a manual locator system was initiated by the CARBG quartermaster. This proved somewhat ineffective because of time constraints in loading. Some materiel was shipped direct to Somalia without passing through the quartermaster's office and was therefore not added to the inventory. Even when these items reached their destination, there were too few supply technicians to manage supply accounting, due to the lack of a second and third line organization.⁵²⁹

Many difficulties caused by poor logistical planning could have been avoided had there been more integration and co-operation among the movement and supply staffs during the warning phase. Supplies and equipment were lost not only because manifests were inaccurate and not updated frequently, but also because of a lack of interconnecting communication at ail points from loading through unloading, a loss of visibility of the materiel once it was turned over to a commercial carrier, and improperly addressed documents.⁵³⁰ This latter problem me ant an extra burden of unloading and repacking for CARBG staff, who sometimes received materiel from Nairobi addressed to CJFS Headquarters in Mogadishu because these supplies had been mixed on the same pallet with items intended for the CARBG.⁵³¹ The pallets themselves were the wrong size, causing difficulties in loading from HMCS Preserver onto the CC-130s. Even unloading was slowed by the lack of traffic technicians or air movement personnel - casualties of the manning ceiling. Unloading was done by hand by HMCS Preserver personnel.⁵³²

The lack of combat service support marred the initial arrivals of both troops and supplies in Somalia. There was no one to track movements of stores and equipment or to deliver either to mission sites. The landing of the troops was so disorganized that no one had thought ahead about feeding them on arrival and before they began their first march, unacclimatized, in the hot sun. It was only through the ad hoc intervention of Maj Gillam's staff that the troops were given food and water before moving out.⁵³³

Lack of Communication and Chain of Command Confusion

The lack of communication and co-ordination had serious consequences at the operational level. When HMCS Preserver sailed, it lacked the necessary army maps. Moreover, the army and navy teletype computers were incompatible, because of poor communication between the ship and planning staffs. There were constant conflicts in decision making between the principal units (HMCS Preserver and the CARBG) and the hierarchy of staffs (Land Force Command, Land Force Central Area, and Special Service Force headquarters) involved in planning.⁵³⁶ Confusion resulted over which set of orders to follow. For example, LFCA and LFC headquarters confirmed early which stores had been identified as marked for loading on HMCS Preserver. These stores were to be shipped directly to Halifax, but when 5SF Headquarters later discovered that this was not possible, some stores ended up in CFB Petawawa.⁵³⁷

At other times, the judgement of the CARBG was questioned regarding its choice of deployment equipment, especially its decision to bring electrical generators.⁵³⁸ Priorities for loading cargo were constantly changing. There was little co-ordination in determining which items were high priority for HMCS Preserver or for air transportation. The CARBG was frequently not consulted in setting the priority list, and usually not notified about what equipment and supplies were to be downgraded.⁵³⁹ There was no National Support Element to take charge, monitor, and evaluate the tracking and loading of goods.

During the frenetic days after the warning order and before the loading of the final items, there were criticisms of confused orders, misdirection and micro-management. The vehicle maintenance unit, for example, had only seven days to repair the many poorly maintained vehicles for A Squadron, and the unit resented taking time from this urgent task to fill out detailed daily situation reports on its progress.⁵⁴⁰

Errors in Leadership

Three significant leadership shortcomings can be identified in the area of logistical planning. First, logistics planners were not sent to establish liaison with the U.S. force before deployment. Second, little logistical forethought was given to the decisions to move the area of operations from Bossasso to Baledogle to Belet Huen. Third, the need for a National Support Element to accompany the CARBG was ignored before the mission began and for three months afterward.

For Operation Cordon it was estimated that sufficient logistics support had been built in, particularly since HMCS Preserver could dock at Bossasso. Operation Deliverance altered all this, resulting in a heavy Canadian dependence on the U.S. contingent for supplies and logistical support (including everything from hard rations to vehicles). There was no longer a UN logistics chain to resupply the troops. A Canada-U.S. memorandum of understanding had been signed. Following a meeting between Col Labbé and LGen Johnson, a logistics team was sent to Camp Pendleton from First Canadian Division Headquarters on December 14, 1992 to work out the implementing agreement.⁵⁴¹ Col Furrie testified that there was no senior logistics officer on either of the teams sent to MacDill Air Force Base and Camp Pendieton. This was an oversight.⁵⁴²

Throughout the planning and warning phases for Operation Deliverance, there was a sense of urgency to get the mission off the ground, regardless of the state of readiness. On November Sth Col Furrie had sent a memo to the senior levels of NDHQ stating that the mission 'should be delayed because of numerous equipment shortfalls. Canadian stockpiles were geared to a European theatre rather than desert climate and terrain, so more time was required to compile items needed for Somalia.⁵⁴³ This warning went largely unheeded as the 'can do' attitude set in. The mission was to go on as planned unless a "showstopper" was identified. Among senior logistics officers, there was the feeling that the deployment could be slowed down only if some element that would have affected the safety and welfare of troops was entirely absent. This would have been difficult for the J4 to evaluate, since that office became aware of the change in mission only on December 4^th.⁵⁴⁴ Maj Gillam detected serious problems with the mission, but he remained silent because he believed that LFCA Headquarters or NDHQ would have anticipated these problems as he had and rectified them.⁵⁴⁵

When the CARBG was scheduled to deploy to Baledogle, it was planned that they would receive logistical support from U.S. 10th Mountain Division. However, when the location shifted to Belet Huen, the logistical estimate was made at the operational level in Somalia, and NDHQ was not informed. Col Furrie testified that he found out only after the decision had been made. He believed that Col Labbé's decision to go to Belet Huen was never scrutinized by NDHQ.⁵⁴⁶ Otherwise, an alarm would have been raised over CARBG moving out of the logistical reach of 10th Mountain Division. Maj Gillam worried less about the actual physical move to Belet Huen and more about the lack of continuing second line support once in camp.⁵⁴⁷ Nonetheless, he could not provide Col Labbé with "showstoppers". Col Labbé testified that he reviewed the options and assessed Belet Huen as a viable option even without a National Support Element. He was concerned by the 350 kilometres between Mogadishu and Belet Huen, but he ensured that CARBG received "first class service" and always had adequate combat supplies.⁵⁴⁸

If it is general practice to send a single unit overseas with built-in second and third line support, why was the logistical unit severed from the CARBG? If a combat unit requires extra logistical help to make it self-sufficient, why did it take more than three months for a National Support Element to be sent to Somalia? The likely answer is that the rigid personnel ceiling of 900 meant there was little room to manoeuvre once the numbers in the combat unit and its supporting squadrons and platoons were added up.

A second flaw in the planning led to the mistaken assumption that the small Service Commando unit could assume ail logistical responsibilities. Maj Gillam had suggested a National Support Element early in the planning for Operation Deliverance, but Col Labbé informed him that LCol Mathieu had assured him that Service Commando could provide adequate support.⁵⁴⁹ No one at NDHQ took the time to assess the consequences of this decision or to consider making the National Support Element a completely separate unit from the CARBG.⁵⁵⁰ When the Logistics Staff Assistance Team arrived in Somalia on February 19, 1993, LCol Carveth assessed logistics support as being in dire need of a 60 per cent augmentation in size and declared the mission in jeopardy if proper support was not sent.⁵⁵¹ Although Col Labbé had requested a national support element on January l9th, and several further requests were made in February, the unit did not arrive until March.

FINDINGS

• We find that no policy analysis or evaluation was undertaken to assess the logistical changes required for the change of mission from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance.
  
  Deployment should have been delayed until logistically, at least, everything was in a state of preparedness, including all equipment (especially vehicles) and supplies (especially those adapted for desert use). Supplies and equipment had been packed for 750 personnel, not the 900 personnel required for Operation Deliverance. There was no logistical reconnaissance of the Belet Huen camp site, and there was no host infrastructure on which to rely. NDHQ saw Operation Deliverance as a pared-down mission requiring a minimum of logistical support. When the decision was made to build the Belet Huen camp site, there were insufficient supplies. Senior J4 planners were not consulted in the initial planning process.
  
• Significant negative logistical effects flowed from moving the mission from Bossasso to Belet Huen. A 'can do' attitude prevailed. Senior J4 officers at NDHQ were not included in the logistical evaluation of the new site. The senior J4 officer in Somalia worried about providing sufficient second line support to Belet Huen, but Col I-abbé was confident that there would be no significant problems.
  
  At the Bossasso site, HMCS Preserver would have docked at the port and been able to meet ail major supply needs. Unloading would have been from ship to shore. Belet Huen proved more challenging, because land transportation was over 350 kilometres of rough and unsafe road between Mogadishu and Belet Huen. Consequently, most materiel had to be flown by CC-130s to the Belet Huen airfield. To complicate matters, haste in packing the sea containers in Canada resulted in poor supply accounting procedures and difficulty locating needed supplies.
  
• Essential items (such as hard rations) for 60 days were prepared and packed. It was expected that from Day 61 on UN suppliers would be responsible for all future replenishments. When the mission became the U.S.-led UNITAF, the Canadian Forces scrambled to provide needed supplies. Dependence on the U.S. contingent (who were well equipped) ensued for some essential items.
  
• A national support element was not included in the 900-person ceiling imposed on Operation Deliverance. This caused a serious void in second and third line support capabilities.
  
  Serious concerns were voiced before deployment about not sending a national support element to accompany the CARBG. They were repeated on January l9th by Col Labbé and reiterated by senior logistics planners in Ottawa in February. However, the NSE did not arrive in Somalia until March. The CARBG's Service Commando was assigned ail logistical responsibilities in theatre, even though it was drastically understaffed and overwhelmed by the scope of such tasks as unloading the 384 sea containers. The Service Commando could not meet the second and third line support requirements of the CARBG. Morale was undermined and unnecessary hardships were created by poor planning and supply choices, such as the lack of cold water, fresh food, and equipment and supplies suited to desert conditions. Fresh rations were promised to begin three weeks after deployment, but did not actually materialize until March, almost three months later.

CAMP LAYOUT

Figure 25.5: The CARBG camp at Belet Huen depicting the various compounds on either side of the Imparial Highway, a public road running through the camp. The original photograph was Exhibit "E" at the General Court Martial of Captain Rainville.

Our review of the evidence led us to conclude that the decentralized camp configuration had a serious impact on the conduct of operations in theatre. The layout negatively influenced security, basic operating procedures, and troop cohesiveness; it left areas open to infiltration, contributed to materiel shortages, and increased the chances of casualties from friendly fire.

In the review that follows we first consider the manner in which decisions about camp location and layout were made, then review the impact of the layout decision on key aspects of the operation, including security risks and troop safety, materiel shortages, and morale. We end with a brief summary of findings.

Selection of Camp Location

According to the testimony of Maj Mansfield, no formal decision-making process was followed by the CO of the CARBG to select the camp location. There was merely an informal discussion between the Commander and his staff advisers, who generally accepted the site as suitable for the mission.⁵⁵⁴ The decision about location was supposedly based on tactical positioning rather than security. A factor that allegedly influenced the position was that the location allowed Canadian troops to control important routes and block access to General Aidid in Mogadishu.⁵⁵⁵ Despite the lack of process, the decision about location does appear somewhat defensible (particularly if the road cutting through the centre of the camp is disregarded as a location issue). But even if the location decision was defensible, the rationale does not extend to justify the decision about the layout of the camp.

Selection of Camp Layout

• The length of the deployment -- whether days or months -- determines whether the configuration should be temporary or permanent.
• The purpose of the camp -- whether it was necessary to assume a defensive position, to build a home base, or an administrative site.
• Available resources -- whether sufficient supplies (such as perimeter lighting and wire) were available to build a more decentralized camp than the one envisaged for Bossasso.
• The security situation -- whether the camp could be protected from sabotage, thieves, and curious passers-by.
• The need for cohesiveness -- whether cohesiveness and communications between the commandos would be jeopardized if the units were physically isolated from each other.

The layout ultimately chosen consisted of small separate sections spread out over a distance of 1.5 kilometres, a layout that left the commandos widely dispersed. (Figure 25.6 shows the length and size of the camp relative to the Belet Huen area.) A triangular layout, the one used in training, would have concentrated ail of the CARBG in one secured area, with only one perimeter to defend. What factors were considered in laying out the camp in the decentralized manner, given that the troops had trained for a triangular layout?

Figure 25.6: Computer-generated scale diagram of the Belet relative to the surrounding area.

First it was believed that the camp at Belet Huen would not be permanent, and this was critical to initial plans for the layout.

Another thing was that at the beginning -- when we were establishing the camps, I knew, or I anticipated, that the camps would not be permanent. We were not all that permanent in fact.⁵⁵⁶

The fact that there were existing structures in certain areas was another factor. The locations of the engineers and service compounds were predetermined, because an infrastructure was already available,⁵⁵⁷ and the balance of the camps were set up around these two.

Finally, initial plans contemplated setting up islands of defence, sufficiently spread out to minimize the risk of indirect fire attacks.⁵⁵⁸ The theory was that if one camp was hit, the others would still be protected, unlike a single camp, which was considered far more vulnerable to indirect fire.

A triangular layout was dismissed by LCol Mathieu (at least for the size of the battalion in Somalia) as being too big. LCol Mathieu was of the opinion that a triangular compound would not be adequate for the materiel, vehicles and 900-person contingent. Moreover, he had read documentation to the effect that the exercises in Petawawa were not conclusive, so he dismissed the idea.⁵⁵⁹

Apart from these factors, it was not clear from the evidence whether other factors were considered, such as resource availability or cohesiveness.

Once the concept of the layout had been approved, decisions about which locations fell to which Commando took place while the troops were marching down the road leading to the Strada Imperiala. Each Commando selected its own spot; it was every Commando for itself. No instructions or directions were given by the Commanding Officer.⁵⁶⁰ At first, 2 Commando was supposed to share a compound with 3 Commando, but because a locally owned piece of land intervened, they had to move west, past the engineer compound, the fuel bladders, and the helicopters.⁵⁶¹

The reasons cited for the layout of the camp may have some merit, but they fail to satisfy us that the appropriate factors were given due consideration in the decision to lay it out in the manner chosen. We believe that some critical factors, such as cohesiveness of the unit and availability of resources, were neglected or ignored and that other factors such as the security situation were not afforded the appropriate weight or were misapplied, for example, the purpose of the camp.

Numerous officers and soldiers who testified at the hearings expressed pointed criticisms of the layout from many perspectives. Most expressed concern about security, because of the much enlarged perimeter area that would have to be defended and the vulnerability inherent in having an uncontrolled public road running through the centre of the camp and beside vital installations.⁵⁶² Some were of the view that the layout should have been restricted to the plan that they came prepared to execute, specifically the plan for "one large camp."⁵⁶³

Maj Mansfield found the layout unsuitable, even though he supported the choice of location. He was under the impression, following discussions with his superior, that the camp would be a single box-shaped or rectangular unit.⁵⁶⁴ He confirmed that either a triangular or a rectangular camp would have had advantages over the dispersed layout.

A single geometric camp would have been all of those things [simplicity, security, economy of effort, cohesiveness] be it triangular or square.⁵⁶⁵

Although LCol Moffat, Col Labbé's Chief of Operations, was reluctant to offer an opinion on the issue, under questioning he declared that the layout of the camp was simply "a layout of bivouac areas along a road, but not a defended position in the definition."⁵⁶⁶

Others were more openly disdainful. MWO Amaral stated, "it's a stupid set up and it doesn't make any sense."⁵⁶⁷ Sgt Little maintained that he lost respect for the Commanding Officer primarily because of the layout of the camp, which he believed to be "just foolish. There was no military value to it. It was dangerous, in my opinion, the way he had the camp set up."⁵⁶⁸

Maj Pommet expressed criticism in his after-action report on the operation, written in April 1993. He expressed his preference for a triangular layout, as it emphasized basic principles: simplicity, security, economy of effort, cohesiveness of the regiment and perimeter defence. He questioned the reasoning behind the decision, stating that it appeared to be attributable only to the priority that certain organizations gave to comfort.⁵⁶⁹

Conclusions

Effects on Security Operations

According to LCol Mathieu, decentralizing the compound increased security against indirect military attacks because of what he referred to as mutual support by soldiers from ail sections of the compound in the event of a siege.⁵⁷⁰ He believed that a dispersed layout increased security because it covered more territory and more approach access to the camp. He stated that once a single camp is attacked and breached, the enemy is inside, whereas the way this camp was laid out, if one section went down, the whole camp would not necessarily be defeated.⁵⁷¹

This view might have been reasonable if the perceived threat was only the risk of indirect fire, but it was clearly limited given the information available about the type of activities and threats fac mg the troops at Belet Huen. Although there were serious problems in the intelligence received before deployment, commanders and senior officers were nonetheless aware of endemic thievery and the use of small arms. The risk of drive-by shootings on the road running through the compound should have been considered high. Maj Pommet voiced this concern and added that the road passing through the Service Commando and Engineers camp left the site vulnerable to grenades tossed from the road. For thieves or others who intended harm to the camp, a quick escape route was available through the refugee village nearby.⁵⁷²

Moreover, the fact that each Commando was responsible for the defence of its own perimeter led to redundant defence systems and inefficient use of manpower in the circumstances. On this matter, Maj Vanderveer (the Officer Commanding Service Commando) wrote in his after-action report.

Having separate [commando] unes has increased security manpower [requirement] and also creates engagement problems. A single [regiment] camp would have reduced this problem. Because of [temporary depot for munitions] and in/out route and size of [Service Commando] six [personnel] are on security at any one time [each] night. This reduces numbers of [personnel available] to tulfili [support] functions to rifle [commandos].⁵⁷³

Maj Mansfield cited similar problems. On March 4th, he had to request assistance with security at the Engineers compound. According to him, standing guard interfered with the unit's work as engineers.⁵⁷⁴

The issue is best described by Maj Pommet in his after-action report.

The Regiment is currently spread over a distance of 1.5 km in various small camps, causing communications, supply and transport problems.. Several small camps pose additional security problems, such as guard duty and the need for redundant defence systems.... This point stems directly from the question of security. Because there are several camps, the [commandos] must provide their own perimeter security. They therefore have to use considerable manpower just for guard duty. Further, under the triangular formation, the riflemen were responsible for sentry duty, thereby ensuring that the specialists -- [medical assistants, vehicle technicians] and so on -- had the time needed to perform their primary duties, rather than standing guard duty.⁵⁷⁵

Security for the enlarged perimeter area was also affected indirectly by the shortage of wire. Accord mg to Maj Mansfield, the decentralized compound was far less secure because of a shortage of barbed wire, and soldiers were concerned about attack because they knew materiel shortages were weakening their defences. Moreover, the decision about layout was taken knowing that the threat was greater than in Bossasso.⁵⁷⁶

Col Labbé supported the layout decision, speculating that it had been made by balancing the risk of a conventional military attack against the need to deal with infiltration by looters or saboteurs.⁵⁷⁷ We found his testimony self-serving and unconvincing, his suggested rationale for the decision merely echoing the reasons expressed by LCol Mathieu.

Effects on Cohesiveness and Morale

None of this was available under the decentralized arrangement. According to LCol Mathieu, the decentralized layout allowed the commandos to come and go, minimizing disruption to others and enabling them to develop and live by their own schedules.⁵⁸⁰ But this was hardly conducive to promoting the interaction that fosters unit cohesiveness.

After ensuring the safety of the troops, a foremost concern should be their quality of life. Camp improvements should be made to enhance the conditions under which troops live and work. Maj Mansfield testified that he could have provided more facilities for the comfort of the troops, but that he encountered resistance to such suggestions from officers at headquarters, who maintained that this was not a long-term mission. His perception was that there was a general feeling that the Airborne soldiers were tough and did not require extra comforts.

The troops were living mainly on hard rations "to. . .minimize risk.. .from preparing food in the open."⁵⁸¹ Maj Gillam testified that the camp layout was one reason why the soldiers could get fresh-cooked meals only on a rotational bas is. Fresh meals were prepared in a single insulated, air-conditioned tent to reduce the risk of food spoilage. Consequently, each group had fresh rations only once a week.

Guard duty affected both morale and effectiveness. Because more guards were needed to secure the spread-out camp, fewer soldiers were available to patrol in Belet Huen or perform other tasks. As Maj Pommet pointed out in his after action report, specialists in the Service Commando and the Medical Platoon also had guard duty, which gave them less time for their primary duties.⁵⁸² More duties meant fatigue.⁵⁸³

The Eventuality of Friendly Fire

No orders were given relating to defence -- such as arcs of fire or arcs of responsibility -- or coordination in the event of a ground attack. Currently, the [Commandos] are defending themselves individually, with no coordinated mutual support and without even knowing what action to take if the need arises to help the [Service Commando], 3 [Commando] or the engineers.⁵⁸⁴

Although Maj Pommet had serious concerns about many aspects of the layout from the start, he never discussed them with LCol Mathieu until an incident in early March, when bullets fired from the Service Commando entered the i Commando area.⁵⁸⁵ That incident spurred Maj Pommet to action.⁵⁸⁶ The response was simply an instruction to the troops the following day to use their judgement before using their rifles.

To reduce the danger of friendly fire, LCol Mathieu's headquarters asked CJFS HQ for more shotguns to deal with the problem.⁵⁸⁷ The lack of shotguns became an important issue in the March 4th incident, when one Somali national was killed and another injured (see Volume 5, Chapter 38).

LCol Mathieu did not disagree that the chance of friendly fire was greater with a decentralized camp, but he nonetheless maintained that greater weight was given to other factors, such as proximity to the road, because supply trucks could not be driven on unsound ground.⁵⁸⁸ To deal with the risk of friendly fire, LCol Mathieu said that the soldiers could always hide in the trenches to defend themseives.⁵⁸⁹

We find the response and approach to the possibility of friendly fire both simplistic and elementary. The potential for friendly fire is of major significance to the safety of troops. A simple admonishment to watch where you are firing is insufficient to address safety concerns. The fact that a decentralized layout was more vulnerable to the risk of friendly fire than a triangular layout is apparent and ought to have been a factor in the decision about camp layout.

Effects on Materiel Shortages

In response to these complaints, LCol Mathieu countered that they only received the materiel that had been allotted for Operation Cordon, which was to have had a non-tact ical permanent compound. In his view, even with a less decentralized camp, there would not have been sufficient materiel to meet ail the security needs identified.⁵⁹¹

After realizing that the new camp layout was larger than anticipated, Maj Mansfield raised a concern about the shortage in barbed wire in informal discussions with LCol Mathieu. The answer was that Canadian Forces were tapped into the U.S. contingent's supply system, and because of that, there was the potential to obtain additional wire.⁵⁹² However, no extra wire was ever obtained from this source.

The dispersed camp layout also created problems in getting electrical power to every unit. Again, when the supplies were packed in Canada, everything was measured for the dimensions of the Bossasso camp.⁵⁹³ Maj Mansfield was not sure he would have enough cable to bring power to everyone. He had to use point generation systems, meaning that each Commando had a small generator, an arrangement that was maintenance-intensive and generated fluctuating power after a few weeks.⁵⁹⁴ Although some supplies were eventually received, 2 Commando never did receive any perimeter lighting.⁵⁹⁵

Given the supplies that were available to the Engineers and their relative isolation from the other commandos, Maj Mansfield stated, the dispersed layout put a strain on his men. The problem did not appear sufficiently serious for him to tell his Commanding Officer that he was unable to perform his duties.⁵⁹⁶ The attitude was to "Do the best that you can widi the resources that you have."⁵⁹⁷

Once again we find that the problem of materiel shortages was met with indifference. The significance of the issue for troops who were confronting risk in insecure conditions was not seriously acknowledged.

Loss of Confidence

FINDINGS

• Although the deployment of Canadian troops to Somalia was a tactical deployment under anticipated threat, the camp was configured more along the lines of an administrative site, rather than a defended position.
  
  
• Appropriate factors were not given due consideration in the decision to lay out the camp in the manner chosen. Some critical factors, such as cohesiveness of the unit and the availability of resources, were neglected or ignored, while other factors were not afforded the appropriate weight (the security situation) or were misapplied (the purpose of the camp).
  
  
• camp layout emphasizing basic principles of simplicity, security, economy of effort, the homo geneity of the Regiment, and perimeter defence would have been a more appropriate layout for this operation.
  
  
• The decentralized layout required increased security resources and personnel. This left the troops exhausted because of extra duties. It also left the camp more vulnerable to infiltration and terrorist attacks.
  
  
• The camp was so configured as to be susceptible to friendly fire. Such an incident occurred in early March 1993, when bullets from Service Commando entered the First Commando site.
  
  
• Supplies of barbed wire and perimeter lighting were insufficient for the decentralized layout. Materiels had been calculated for the Bossasso site where the threat assessment had been lower.
  
  
• The decentralized layout provided inadequate facilities to cook and prepare fresh rations. As a result, fresh meals were served centrally, on a rotational basis, only once a week for each group. This affected morale.
  
  
• The dispersed layout of the camp isolated the commandos, particularly 2 Commando, and discouraged unit bonding and cohesiveness.
  
  
• The dispersed layout of the camp undermined the confidence of the soldiers in their leaders.

Recommendations

25.26 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that a National Support Element (that is, an integrated logistics support unit) is included as a separate unit at the commencement of every mission undertaken by the Canadian Forces.

NOTES

1. Canadian Forces, Land Formations in Battle (DLCD, 1987), pp. 3-3-1 to 3-3-10. See also Col. Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32724.
2. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 33774.
3. Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College (CLFCSC), "Course Brief" (November 1995), p. 4-3/11.
4. Land Formations in Battle, p. 3-3-2, paragraph 5.
5. CLFCSC, "Course Brief", p. 4-1/11.
6. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 166, p. 33980.
7. CLFCSC, "Course Brief", p. 4-8/11.
8. Operational Staff Procedures, vol. 2, Staff Duties in the Field (June 1993), B-GL-303- 002/FP-002, pp. 9-13 and 9-14. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32728-32734.
9. FMC OPO 01, "Operation PYTHON CCMINURSO" , July 29, 1991, document book 123, tab 4.
10. Document book MOR2, tab 12, p. 1/2.
11. Document book MOR2, tab 12.
12. Operation PYTHON After Action Report, LCol Prosser for Commander, Land Force Central Area Headquarters, June 16, 1992, Document book 9, tab 15.
13. Maj J.M.P. Desnoyers (A G1/G4 Ops), Memorandum: Operation PYTHON After Action Report, July 17, 1992, Document book 9, tab 16.
14. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1483.
15. Technical mission report (March-April).
16. UN Security Council, The Situation in Somalia, Report of the Secretary-General, S/23829/Add. 1, April 21, 1992, Document book 9, tab 12.
17. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol.8, p.1484.
18. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1486.
19. Technical mission report (March-April).
20. The Situation in Somalia, Document book 9, tab 12, p. DND 004985.
21. For details of Col Houghton's views on the technical team and its report, see Transcripts vol.44, pp.8661-8678.
22. Document book 9, tab 14. See also Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, pp.8678-8679.
23. Transcripts vol.44, p. 8703.
24. Document book 9, tab 20.
25. Document book 9, tab 19.
26. Document book 9, tab 23.
27. Document book 9, tab 18.
28. Estimate of the Situation: FMC Forces Available for Security Operations in Somalia, Version no.2, July 29, 1992, p.2/7.
29. Estimate of the Situation, p. 5/7.
30. Estimate of the Situation, p.6/7.
31. Memorandum, Option Analysis Somalia: Probable Tasks and Forces Available, July 29,1992, Document book 9, tab 22, p.2/S.
32. Option Analysis Somalia, p.2/5.
33. Estimate of the Situation, Document book 9, tab 25.
34. This attitude is borne out by evidence presented later in this section.
35. Document book 9, tab 27.
36. Document book 9, tab 27, paragraph 17.
37. Document book 27, tab 18.
38. Document book 9, tab 28.
39. Document book 9, tab 28, p.6/6.
40. Confidential: Briefing Note for the CDS on Provision of Land Forces to Somalia, August 25, 1992, Document book 11, tab 14.
41. See Technical Team Report, August 4-17, 1992, Document book 11, tab 6.
42. Confidential: Briefing Note for the CDS on Provision of Land Forces to Somalia, p.2.
43. Referred to in Confidential: Briefing Note for the CDS on Provision of Land Forces to Somalia.
44. Confidential: Briefing Note for the CDS on Provision of Land Forces to Somalia.
45. Document book 10, tab 5.
46. Document book 10, tab 21.
47. Document book 10, tab 21.
48. Document book 10, tab 12.
49. Document book 10, tab 12.
50. Document book 10, tab 12.
51. Document book 10, tab 19.
52. FMC Draft Contingency Plan Operation Cordon, Document book 12, tab 16.
53. FMC Contingency Plan: Operation Cordon Plan Summary, and FMC Draft Contingency Plan 01: OP CORDON.
54. FMC Draft Contingency Plan 01: OP CORDON, p. 1/8.
55. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraph 16.
56. Document book 27, tab 6.
57. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraph 25.
58. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraph 28.
59. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraph 33.
60. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraphs 34 and 36.
61. Document book 28, tab 12.
62. Document book 28, tab 12.
63. Document book 28, tab 13.
64. WNGO 01 - Operation Cordon, September 6, 1992, Document book 1 10B, tab 6.
65. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3617.
66. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7046. On September 8,1995, the annexes from the draft plan, Document book 10, tab 28, giving guidance on training and the rules of engagement, were sent to LCol Morneault from SSF Headquarters.
67. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3714.
68. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9415.
69. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8988-8893.
70. Land Force Command, After Action Review: Operation HARMONY, Operation CAVALIER, Operation DELIVERANCE, Document book 61A, tab N, p. C-S/il.
71. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9415-9417.
72. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8986.
73. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8989.
74. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8990.
75. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8988.
76. Document book 32B, tab 5.
77. Document book 32B, tab 4.
78. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3541.
79. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3541-3542.
80. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3543; Document book 32B, tab 5.
81. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3542.
82. Document book 32B, tab 5.
83. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7752-7753 and 7810.
84. Document book 36, tab 2.
85. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 22, pp. 4147-4148.
86. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4184-4185.
87. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4206-1207.
88. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4225-4226.
89. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 22, pp. 4144-4145.
90. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3841-3842.
91. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3528-3530.
92. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4960-4962.
93. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 3990.
94. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 3991.
95. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4199-4200.
96. See testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, pp. 8719-8773.
97. Document book 16, tab 12.
98. Document book 29, tabs 1, 5, and 10. The CDS was absent from NDHQ on duty at the time.
99. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8718.
100. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8723.
101. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8732.
102. Reconnaissance Report, October 27, 1992, Document book 16, tab 12, p. DND 005851.
103. Reconnaissance Report, Notes on Meeting with Gen Shaheen, pp. DND 005865-005866.
104. Briefing to VCDS/DEPUTY MINISTER -- 21 October 1992, Document book 16, tab 12, pp. DND 005879-005881.
105. Document book 17, tab 7
106. Document book 59, tab 9.
107. Document book 17, tab 7.
108. Document book 59, tab 9.
109. LFCA, Operation Cordon, Operations Order 01, November 26,1992.
110. Document book 59A, tab 2.
111. LFC, Operation Order 01, November 19, 1992, Document book 59, tab 9.
112. Document book 19, tab 13.
113. Document book 110A, tab 6.
114. Document book 19, tab 6.
115. Document book 19, tab 7.
116. Document book 19, tab 6. See also Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripu vol. 46, pp. 9080-9087.
117. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9638.
118. Testimony of Gen de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10043.
119. Testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 10, pp. 1975-1976.
120. Testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 10, p. 1995.
121. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 947-948 (emphasis added).
122. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripu vol. 9, pp. 1706-1707.
123. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1706-1707.
124. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1737-1738.
125. Testimony of Col O'Brien, Transcripts vol. 10, pp. 1930-1931.
126. Testimony of Col O'Brien, Transcripts vol. 10, pp. 1934-1935.
127. Document book 32.1, tab 31.
128. Document book 20, tab 5.
129. Document book 20, tab 29.
130. Document book 59A, tab 18.
131. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32743.
132. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32749-32751.
133. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32752.
134. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32753.
135. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32753-32754.
136. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161. pp. 32744-32745.
137. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32749-32751.
138. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol 161, p. 32763.
139. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol 161 pp. 32764-32766
140. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol 161 pp. 32759-32780
141. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol 161 p. 32780
142. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcrtpts vol 161 p. 32784
143. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol 161 pp. 32790 32791
144. Document book 110, tab 7; testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32805.
145. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32809-32810.
146. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32818.
147. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32770.
148. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 32901.
149. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 32907.
150. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripu vol. 162, p. 32915.
151. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 32916.
152. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, pp. 32943-32944.
153. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32904.
154. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, pp. 32952-32953.
155. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32849-32850.
156. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32841.
157. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32835-32836.
158. Memorandum, Col O'Brien to Distribution, J-Staff Tnp Report OP Deliverance/ UNOSOM I & II-7 Mar 93, March 16, 1993, pp. 2/16,7/16 and 8/16.
159. "Operation Deliverance: Final Report of Lessons Learned", Document book 62E, tab 18.
160. "Operation Deliverance: Final Report of Lessons Learned".
161. "Afrer Action Report - Operation DELIVERANCE", Document book 6 1C, tab 1, p. 2/7.
162. "Land Force Command Afrer Action Review: OP HARMONY, OP CAVALIER, OP CORDON, the After Action Review Summary: Operations HARMONY, DELIVERANCE AND CAVALIER", Document book 24, tab 8, p. 3/8.
163. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9211-9212.
164. LFC, After-Action Report: Operation Deliverance, p. C7/1 1.
165. Document book 9, tab 28, p. 6/6.
166. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10192-10198.
167. Testimony of Gen de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10073.
168. Document book 10, tab 5, p. 1.
169. Document book 11, tab 3.
170. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, p. 1770.
171. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, p. 1694.
172. Testimony of Col O'Brien, Transcripts vol. 10, p. 1927.
173. Testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, pp. 5593, 5634.
174. Document book 31A, tab 34, p. DND 002526.
175. Testimony of Maj Wilson, Transcripts vol. 28, p. 5355.
176. Testimony of Maj Turner, Board of Inquiry, vol. 11, p. 220.
177. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20351.
178. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10045.
179. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10193, 10198.
180. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10073.
181. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10198.
182. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10080-10081; and Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10198.
183. Notes for consideration, Col Caron, December 5, 1992, Document book 30, tab 23, p. 1.
184. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripu vol. 20, pp. 3647-3648; and Col Joly, Transcripts VOl. 16, p. 2916.
185. Operation Deliverance Organization and Establishment, December 5, 1992 (not filed, DND 079067).
186. Document book 30, tab 22, pp. DND 099157-099158.
187. When LGen Gervais established the 870/30, split he had not yet met with Col Labbé. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9645. NDHQ took little notice of how the CARBG/CJFS HQ numbers were apportioned: testimony of Gen <ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol.50, p. 10079.
188. Document book 30, tab 44, p. 1.
189. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32874.
190. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32859-32860.
191. Testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, p. 5580.
192. First Canadian Division, Operation Deliverance After-Action Report, Document book 61A, tab O, p. D2-5.
193. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 33094.
194. Testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, pp. 5646, 5591.
195. CFP 300, The Army, B-GL-300-000/FP-000, April 1984, pp. 3-10, 3-11.
196. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9555; and LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9648.
197. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9553-9554.
198. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10198.
199. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10198.
200. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10080.
201. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10193-10194.
202. Afrer-Action Report, Operation Deliverance, Document book 61 C, tab 1, pp. 2/7, B1-2.
203. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4535.
204. Document book 30, tab 43, p. DND 008385.
205. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32884-32887.
206. Document book 20, tab 20, p. 1-2.
207. Testimony of Maj Wilson, Transcripts vol. 28, p. 5326.
208. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. D-1.
209. Document book 3 lA, tab 33, pp. D-2, D-3; testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20353.
210. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. 3-4.
211. Document book 61, tab 2, p. DND 030754.
212. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. D-6.
213. Document book 61, tab 1, Serial D, p. DND 003363.
214. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 3208-3209.
215. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. DND 002746, point 10, p. DND 002757, point 2.
216. Document book 61C, tab 1, p. B2-1.
217. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19923.
218. Testimony of Capt Hope. Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20022-20028.
219. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. 3.
220. Document book 61D, tab 1B, p. DND 348699; Document book 109, tab 1, pp. 2-3.
221. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. 4.
222. Document book 61C, tab 1, p. B1-1; testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, pp. 5581-5582.
223. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169; Document book 30, tab 43, p. DND 123749.
224. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19594-19609.
225. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169.
226. Document book 61C, tab 1, Serial 22, p. DND 190471.
227. Canadian Forces, Inantry, volume 1, The Infantry Battalion in Battle, March 31,1992, p. 3-2-1.
228. SSF Headquarters, Operation Deliverance Warning Order 01, December 5,1992, p. 2.
229. SSF Headquarters, Operation Deliverance Operation Order 0l (Op 001), December 10,1992, p. 1.
230. Op O 01, SSF 3/6, DND 038056.
231. Board of Inquiry, Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, vol. III, pp. 525-526 (Exhibit P-20.3).
232. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2094, chart: CDN AB REGT BN GP-OP CORDON.
233. See Transcripts vol. 1, pp. 111-113. However, LCol Calvin never served with the CAR; see p. 113 and Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1420-1421.
234. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. III, p. 525. For an overview of the CARBG, see also the testimony of LCdr Bastien (National Defence Operations Centre), Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, pp. 206-207; and Col Ross, Transcript of Policy Hearing, June 19,1995, pp. 273-274. See also Ron Pupetz, ed., The Canadian Joint Forces in Somalia 1992-1993 Jounral, "In the Line of Duty" (1994), pp. 15-16.
235. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3337 (Exhibit P-20.11).
236. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V; pp. 1187-1188 (Exhibit P-20.5).
237. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096 (Exhibit P-20.6).
238. DND, "Backgrounder - Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group Operation Deliverance" (December 1992), p. 1.
239. Testimony of LCol Calvin, Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1420-1421.
240. Testimony of LCol Calvin, Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1422-1423; see also p. 1425.
241. See testimony of LCol Caivin, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1422; and DND, Infantry, vol. 1, The Infantry Battalion in Battle (1992), p. 2-2-1.
242. DND, The Infantry Battalion in Battle, p. 2-2-1.
243. DND, The Infantry Battalion in Battle, p. 2-2-1.
244. Transcripts, vol. 8, p. 1426.
245. Transcripts, vol. 8, p. 1427.
246. Transcripts, vol. 8, p. 1428. See also Pupetz, In the Line of Duty, p. 221.
247. DND, Operational Training, vol. 2, Unit Administration (1987), p. 2-2-4.
248. Transcripts, vol. 8, p. 1429.
249. Exhibit P-85.5, chart of Headquarters Commando; and Exhibit P-20.6, Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096.
250. DND, The Infantry Battalion in Battle, p. 2-2-2.
251. See "Operation Deliverance After Action Report -- Military Police Operations", pp. 4/19-5/19, Exhibit P-205.5, Document book 61E, tab 5; and testimony of MCpl Godin at Board of Inquiry, vol. 3, p. 710.
252. Testimony of LCol Calvin, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1432.
253. Transcripts, vol. 1, p. 122.
254. Transcripts, vol. 1, pp. 122-123.
255. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096.
256. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 207.
257. Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1430-1431.
258. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096.
259. Testimony of Capt Rainville, Transcript of the General Court Martial of Capt Rainville, vol. 6, p. 1042, Exhibit P-31.6.
260. Transcripts, vol. 8, p. 1431; see also vol. 1, p. 125.
261. DND, Infantry vol. 3, Section and Platoon in Battle (1976), p. 3-4.
262. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, p. 1188.
263. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3335.
264. Transcripts vol. 1, p. 121.
265. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3335.
266. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096.
267. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1436; and Exhibit P-85.6, "1, 2, and 3 Commandos" (chart).
268. Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1438-1439.
269. Transcripts vol. 1, p. 120.
270. Transcripts vol. 1, p. 120.
271. Transcripts vol. 1, pp. 115-117.
272. Transcripts vol. l, p. 114.
273. Transcripts vol. 1, p. 115.
274. Exhibit P-85.7, "Service Commando" (chart). LCol Calvin explained at the hearings that the company quartermaster "parallels the regimental quartermaster responsible for the provision of beans and bullets to this particular commando": Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1442.
275. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3335.
276. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1442. See also Pupetz, In the Line of Duty, p. 214.
277. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1442. See also Pupetz, In the Line of Duty, p. 229.
278. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1444.
279. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, pp. 402-403.
280. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 402.
281. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1445.
282. Testimony of Maj Lelievre at Board of Inquiry, vol. 2, p. 400; Board of Inquiry, vol. 6, p. 2096.
283. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, pp. 399-400.
284. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V; p. 1188.
285. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 400. On the two postal clerks, see Document book 41, tab 9, p. DND 007642.
286. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1445.
287. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V; pp. 1187-1188.
288. Exhibit P-85.8, "A SQN RCD--1 AB FD SQN" (chart).
289. Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1448,1449; DND, "Backgrounder - Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group Operation Deliverance", p. 2.
290. Board of Inquiry, vol. VI, p. 2096.
291. Transcript of General Court Martial LCol (ret) Mathieu, 2nd trial, vol. 3, p. 459 (Exhibit P-243.2).
292. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V; p. 1188.
293. Transcripts vol. 8. pp. l450-1451.
     
294. Pre-Deployment Daily Executive Meetings, Document book 32.1, tab 32. See also message from LCol Arbuckle (liaison officer at U.S. Central Command), Document book 32, tab 21; HQ CJFS SITREP 009, December 23, 1992, Document book 32, tab 21; Dan Alvis, "The Other Side of Somalia -- an American View", Defence Policy Review 14/18 (October 4, 1996), p. 2; and Document book 51, tab 2, p. DND 309549.
295. Testimony of Maj Moffat, Transcripts vol. 97, p. 19043.
296. Testimony of Capt Hope at Board of inquiry (CARBG), vol. Il, p. 518.
297. Testimony of Capt Yuzichuk at Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. III, p. 683.
298. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5260. On the importance of the interpreters, see Document book 63C, tab 2.
299. Testimony of Maj Moffat, Transcripts vol. 97, pp. 19043 and 19045.
300. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV; pp. 947-948.
301. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1711-1714.
302. See Col Labbé, "Overview of Comd CJFS Pre Deployment Activities for Op Deliverance", p. DND 383074.
303. Maj L.W Gillam, "Logistics Overview of Operation Deliverance", Document book 63F, tab 13, p. 2.
304. Sitrep 002, Document book 41, tab 2.
305. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3337.
306. Testimony of LCol Calvin, Transcripts vol. 1, p. 114.
307. Testimony of Maj Kyle at Board of Inquiry, vol. 3, p. 526. See also Pupetz, In the Line of Duty, pp. 89, 222 and 224.
308. Gillam, "Logistics Overview of Operation Deliverance", p. 1.
309. Gillam, "Logistics Overview of Operation Deliverance", p. 4.
310. Gillam, "Logistics Overview of Operation Deliverance", p. 8.
311. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 404; see also pp. 408-409.
312. See Col. Labbé, "Third Line Support -- Canadian Joint Force Somalia", December 11,1992, p. 1/2.
313. DND, Intelligence, vol. 2, Combat Intelligence, second draft, p. 1-1, B-GL-3 15-002/ET- 001.
314. Combat Intelligence, p. 1-1.
315. For a full description of combat intelligence doctrine, see Combat Intelligence, p. 1-2.
316. An in-depth description of the intelligence cycle as it relates to combat intelligence is found in Combat Intelligence, Chapter
317. Although this manual reflects current doctrine in the area, according to the director general (Intelligence), it also applied to the period of the CF deployment to Somalia. The manual goes into considerable detail about the intelligence cycle and combat intelligence as it pertains to conventional warfare and the responsibilities of the various levels of army organization. The application of these processes to peace support operations would be difficult (Briefing for Inquiry staff, January 15,1997).
318. Combat Intelligence, p. 1-3.
319. Combat Intelligence, p. 1-3.
320. Peace support operation is the generic term for activities in international crises and conflict resolution and management in which the CF may be involved. They include activities conducted in support of preventive diplomacy, peace making, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace building, and peace enforcement operations
321. Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adeiphi Paper 281 (London: Brassy's, 1993), p. 43.
322. Robert E. Rehbein, Informing the Blue Helmets: The United States, UN Peacekeeping Operations and the Role of Intelligence (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996), p. 69.
323. Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 39. According to the testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20117, before the Somalia deployment, intelligence officers were not allowed to refer to themselves or be identified as such, for fear of compromising the neutrality of the UN force.
324. New forms of civil unrest and upheaval have surfaced since the end of the Cold War, stemming in part from assertions of nationalism and ethnic or religious strife. The UN has thus been called to intervene in new and varied ways. For a detailed account of the characteristics of the new peacekeeping missions, see Volume 1, Chapter 10 of this report.
325. Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping", Survival 36/3 (Autumn 1994), p. 174.
326. Since then, the UN has established the 24-hour Situation Centre in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, consisting in part of the Information and Research Unit, set up to co-ordinate requests for information from their data base from field commanders or to other member state missions for assistance. See Rehbein, Informing the Blue Helmets, p. 30.
327. According to Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1332-1333, the UN had very little information on Somalia to disseminate to foreign contingents

     because the UN does not have information-gathering agencies [and it . . . is very dependent on national govemments to provide it with information. And this we found was a real weakness... because the UN officiais were either beholden to national govemments whose information could reflect their own interests or more generally had no information themselves to work off. The UN had actually verv little to pass on to member states who were going to be contributing troops and usually the flow of information was the other way around.

328. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19928-19929.
329. Doctrine pertaining to combat intelligence at the time of the Somalia operation is found in CFP 315(2) Supplement 1 - Combat Intelligence Operations and Training. The current manual on combat intelligence doctrine, which is the source for most of the material in this section, is Intelligence, vol. 2, Combat Intelligence, second draft, p. 1-1, B-OL-315- 002/ETOOl.
330. Combat Intelligence, p. 2-1.
331. For a complete list of the tasks and a more detailed description of the six tasks, see Combat Intelligence, p. 2-1.
332. For a detailed list of G2 staff responsibilities, see Combat Intelligence, Annex C, Chapter 3.
333. For a detailed list of the responsibilities of the battle group intelligence officer, see Combat Intelligence, Annex D, Chapter 3.
334. Current doctrine sets out the responsibilities of intelligence staff and the procedures to be followed to a certain extent. See Combat Intelligence, pp. 20-2 to 20-6.
335. Combat Intelligence, pp. 5-14 to 5-18.
336. Combat Intelligence, pp. 5-18 to 5-19.
337. In 1992, doctrine for joint and combined operations was found in CFP(J) 5(4), Canadian Forces Joint and Combined Operations Doctrine (Interim). Current doctrine for joint and combined operations is found in B-GO-005-004/AF-000, effective April 6, 1995, and is essentially a codification of previous conventional doctrine.
338. Col Houghton, director of peacekeeping at National Defence Headquarters at the time, testified about the situation in Somalia during the period of the UN technical mission. Col Houghton confirmed reports of no government infrastructure or central authority, Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8676. See also the technical mission report (March-April), Document book 9, tab 1l.
339. When UNOSOM was first established, only the military observers were agreed to by the ruling factions in Mogadishu. The security force was referred to only in principle. It was generally acknowledged that such an arrangement would place the observers at greater risk. See briefing note, ADM (Pol & Comm) to CDS and DM, April 28,1992, Document book 60, tabs 16 and 17.
340. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9920
341. Somalia Threat Assessment, July 29, 1992, Document book 9, tab 24, p. 4.
342. Note on Options for a Canadian Response to the Crisis in Somalia, August 5,1992. Document book 27, tab 21, pp. 5-6. The report noted that with anarchy prevailing, the UN forces could encounter small-arms fire from groups attempting to raid or otherwise interfere with relief supplies. Compliance by armed factions with UN humanitarian plans was seen as unlikely at that time, yet important in determining the level of risk to which the UN troops might be exposed.
343. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1504.
344. Preliminary Intelligence Estimate, prepared by 02, August 5,1992, Document book 65A, tab 1.
345. Preliminary Intelligence Estimate, p. 16.
346. Telex, Col Fraser, PRMNY, to EXTOTT, August 23, 1992, Document book 27, tab 33. Gen Aideed had recently agreed to the deployment of the Pakistani battalion, and only after protracted negotiations. There was legitimate concern that once he heard of the additional troops assigned to headquarters in Mogadishu, a strong reaction would follow.
347. Minutes, DEM, August 25,1992, Document book 32.1, tab 4. See also Somalia Area Brief, August 21,1992, prepared by 02, Document book 11, tab 13, which provided basic intelligence on Somalia, including sections on political, social, geographic and military intelligence, and information on the state of the economy and infrastructure.
348. FMC Draft Contingency Plan Op Cordon, Document book 12, tab 16, annex C, p. C-1/2.
349. FMC Draft Contingency Plan, annex C, p. C- 1/2.
350. FMC Draft Contingency Plan, annex C, p. C- 1/2.
351. DCDS, Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21,1995, Document book 62E, tab 180, pp. 17,18, 27.
352. As Intelligence Officer with the CAR, Capt Hope testified at great length about doctrine, intelligence gathering, intelligence dissemination, and the resulting problems. His testimony with respect to intelligence can be found in Transcripts vols. 102 and 103.
353. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20113. At various points in his testimony, Capt Hope raised this issue and indicated serious concerns about the inadequacy of the doctrine, noting that he had yet to see the recently prepared doctrine on intelligence for low-intensity operations.
354. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20120. When he first received notification that the CAR would be deployed to Bossasso, he spoke to someone in the intelligence corps who specialized in plans and doctrine and was advised that no doctrine was available at the time. He received some advice, however, regarding the basics of operation.
355. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19967.
356. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19916.
357. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19916.
358. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19935-19936.
359. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7084.
360. See the intelligence report annex to the reconnaissance report, Document book 16, tab 12, annex D, p. 4.
361. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19940.
362. Intelligence report annex, pp. 3-4.
363. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19917-19919.
364. Several officers found the briefing useful. See the testimony of Maj Mackay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6397-6399. LCol Morneault found the briefing excellent and indicated that his intelligence officer was able to get a complete map of the country broken down by clan; testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7078.
365. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7080.
366. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 4001.
367. Document book, LCol Momeault 2, tab 4.
368. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19938.
369. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19938-19939.
370. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32744-32745.
371. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32796.
372. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32796.
373. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32820.
374. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32801.
375. As expressed in the CJFS headquarters war diary, February 18,1993, Document book 51, tab 3, p. 10/19. The entry noted:

     Reporting of the area to the northeast of Belet Huen has not been forthcoming and aIl efforts to obtain coverage have met with little success. As the region flanks the CDN HRS and contains the bulk of hostile combatant forces in the area it is vital to have a detailed understanding of the daily situation. We have indications that this information is available at UNITAF but not being disseminated to CJFS.

376. Much of the information concerning the intelligence activities of the First Canadian Division was drawn from the Operation Deliverance After Action Report on Intelligence prepared by First Canadian Division, 3350-52-27 (J 2), December 1993, but not filed with the Inquiry because of the classified nature of some of the information in it. The portions referred to in this part are noncontroversial and non-classified.
377. Intelligence Support Direction and Guidelines, BGen Doshen, Director General Intelligence, Document book 65, tab 1.
378. Document book 65, tab 1, annex A.
379. Document book 21, tab 14, annex B. But note that the direction given Col Labbé was primarily for CJFS Headquarters intelligence personnel, as the information requested focused on the Mogadishu area, not Belet Huen.
380. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20114-20115.
381. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20116.
382. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19942.
383. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19946-19949.
384. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19935-19936. Note however that the threat assessments were not filed in evidence at the Inquiry because of the classified nature of the information in them.
385. Document book 20, tab 14, p. B-1-6.
386. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19955-19957.
387. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20173 and following.
388. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20176-20177.
389. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19950.
390. "Ops Notes, 23 Dec, CDS Briefing Book, Cp Deliverance", Document book 23, tab 1, p. 1382. See also the exchange between Capt Hope and counsel for the government of Canada on this issue in Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20160-20162.
391. Testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, p. 1333.
392. Many of the witnesses testified about the inadequacy of pre-deployment training on the situation in Somalia.
393. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 32, pp. 6093-6095.
394. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19930-19931.
395. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19927.
396. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19959.
397. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p 19923.
398. See generally the discussion about this point in the testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20024-20032.
399. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20030.
400. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20115.
401. See, generally, testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1287-1382, especially pp. 1380-1382.
402. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20147.
403. DCDS, Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21,1995, Document book 62E, tab 180, pp. 17, 18, 27.
404. FMC Draft Contingency Plan, Document book 12, tab 16, annex C, pp. C-1/2 to C-2/2.
405. Final Report of Lessons Learned, p. 18.
406. 5SF, Operation Cordon/Deliverance After Action Report, February 2,1993, Document book 61, tab 13H, p. A-i 1/17
407. See, generally, testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1287-1382.
408. See the testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2377-2378, regarding the use of taped newscasts for training; and Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19940, regarding intelligence briefings.
409. MWO Mills testified that the soldiers kept their "eyes glued to CNN", Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4345.
410. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4952.
411. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5153.
412. According to Maj Pommet, the reports revealed mainly violence and looting in Mogadishu, where the threat was far more serious. In Bossasso, things were calm and stable: Transcripts vol. 182, p. 37522.
413. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21309-21312.
414. Cpl Pumelle testified that the reality of what they faced in Somalia was a shock to them all: Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6839-6840.
415. Testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1346-1347.
416. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5163-5164.
417. Testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1345-1346.
418. Testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1351-13522.
419. Dr. Menkhaus cited by way of example the warning in the handbook that locals with weapons must be considered dangerous. According to Dr. Menkhaus, however, almost all Somalis were carrying weapons at the time to protect their herds: Transcripts vol. 7, p. 1362.
420. Testimony of Maj Moreau, Transcripts vol. 52, pp. 10351-10353 and 10385-10387.
421. Testimony of WO Labrie, Transcripts vol. 53, pp. 10609-10612.
422. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10744-10745.
423. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, p. 10675.
424. Testimony of Sgt Godfrey, Transcripts vol. 54. pp. 10787-10812.
425. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21366-21368.
426. This was confirmed by most of the soldiers, many of whom were advised just hours before they left that there could be trouble upon their arrival in Belet e. They landed in combat gear, fully armed, and took position. See testimony of Capt Poitras, Transcripts vol. 52, pp. 10411-10412.
427. Testimony of Sgt Godfrey, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10788-10793.
428. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 28, pp. 5302-5303. Maj Kampmans concerns are explored later in this chapter.
429. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, pp. 33038-33039.
430. Testimony of LCol Moffat, Transcripts vol. 97, p. 18923. Note, however, that LCol Moffat did not substantiate this assertion.
431. A glossary issued by Force Mobile Command (November 1, 1991) defines logistics as follows:

     The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

     a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel;

     b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel;

     c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and

     d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (AAP-6(S))
     

     (ADTB Note: In Canadian operations, the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel are not logistics functions). Land Force Command, Operational Staff Procedures, vol. 2, Staff Duties in the Field, Supplement 3, Army Glossary (B-GL-303-0021Jx-z03), p. L-12. Under this definition, logistics is related to but distinct from the The Materiel Assets Lexicon (Supply and Services Canada, 1992) defines materiel as

     Movable property and aIl assets, including equipment and stores, other than money and real property. It comprises: raw materials and manufactured products, short-term consumable items, small durable items such as cameras, medium-sized items such as office equipment and furniture, and large items such as vehicles and aircraft.

432. National support element is a generic term identifying personnel who, for the duration of an operation, link Canada to the support of whatever force is being supported, independent of that force's own resources: Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19472.
433. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20352.
434. Gillam, "Logistics Overview", Document book 63F, tab 13, p. 9.
435. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3407; and Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10172.
436. Document book 9, tab 16, point 3d.
437. Document book 9, tab 15.
438. Document book 9, tab 15, p. 3.
439. Document book 9, tab 15, p. 6.
440. Document book 17, tab 3, p. 4.
441. Technical mission report (March-April), paragraph 5.
442. Document book 16, tab 18, p. 3/6.
443. Technical mission report (March-April), paragraph 9.
444. Report of the Technical Mission to Somalia, August 4-17,1992, Annex 8, Logistic Evaluation for Peacekeeping Forces, Document book 11, tab 6, pp. 51-62.
445. Technical mission report (August), Annex 5, Activities of the Technical Team, pp. 32-37; Annex 8, Logistic Evaluation for Peacekeeping Forces, pp. 48-51; and Annex 9, Logistics: Accommodation, pp. 51, 55-56.
446. Document book 17, tab 8, p. DND 006857-006858.
447. Document book 28, tab 12, p. DND 111436; Document book 20, tab 16, p. DND006856.
448. Document book 15, tab 2, p. 8.
449. Document book 15, tab 2, p. 9.
450. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, pp. 8702-8703.
451. Document book 29, tab 10, Annex A, p. DND 123602.
452. "Op Cordon ADM Recce Report", Document book 15, tab 21, p. 3.
453. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1505.
454. Document book 16, tab 10, p. DND 001519, point 2.
455. "Op Cordon ADM Recce Report", p. 3.
456. "Op Cordon ADM Recce Report", p. 4.
457. "Op Cordon ADM Recce Report", pp. 4-5.
458. "Recce Report Somalia, 12-18 October 1992", Maritime Section, Annex C, Logistics, Document book 29, tab 1, p. C-4.
459. Document book 17, tab 7, pp. 4,7
460. Document book 17, tab 8, pp. 5, 6.
461. Document book 17, tab 8, p. 8.
462. "Op Cordon-Op Ready Declaration", Document book 17, tab 9.
463. Document book 16, tab 5, p. DND 002210, point 2.
464. "MARLANT OPORD 23/92", Appendix 2 to Annex N, DND 086440, p. N2-1.
465. Document book 16, tab 5, pp. DND 002210-002212.
466. Document book 14, tab 14, p. 3.
467. Document book 24, tab 1, Annex A, p. A-i.
468. Document book 24, tab 1, Annex A, p. A-i 4.
469. Document book 22, tab 14, pp. DND 007691, 007697.
470. Document book 22, tab 17, p. DND 007685.
471. Document book 15, tab 21; Document book 62E, tab 18.
472. Document book 22, tab 6, p. DND 006727.
473. Document book 31A, tab 30, p. DND 108339.
474. Document book 20, tab 22, p. 5, section III, paragraph 1.
475. Document book 31A, tab 25, p. DND 082643, point 1.
476. Document book 31A, tab 25, p. 1.
477. Document book 22, tab 6, pp. DND 006727-006728.
478. Document book 30, tab 22, p. DND 099155.
479. Document book 22, tab 6, p. DND 006727.
480. Document book 22, tab 6, p. DND 006728.
481. Document book 22, tab 6, p. DND 006729.
482. Document book 23, tab 19, p. DND 007543, point 3A(1).
483. Testimony of Maj GiIlam at Board 0f Inquiry (CARBG), vol. 11, p. 414.
484. Summary of Operation Deliverance Situation Reports, Document book 23, tab 25, p. 2.
485. Gillam, "Logistics Overview", Document book 63E tab 13, p. 1.
486. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21, 1995, Document book 62E, tab 18, p. 3.
487. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19595-19604.
488. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21471-21472.
489. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20599.
490. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, p. 10700.
491. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 206oe-20601.
492. Col Joly, "Director Infantry Post Visit Report", April 19,1993, Document book 63F tab 11F, p. 15-17.
493. Message, date unknown, but sometime after March 23, 1993, Document book 63E, tab 14.
494. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20353-20354, 20366, 20371.
495. Testimony of WO Labrie, Transcripts vol. 53, p. 10611.
496. Testimony of Sgt Godfrey, Transcripts vol. 54, pp 10790-10793.
497. Testimony ofCapt Poitras, Transcripts vol. 52, p. 10425.
498. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20374-20375.
499. Joly, "Director Infantry Post Visit Report", p. 16.
500. Testimony of Capt Poitras, Transcripts vol. 52, p. 10427.
501. Report by Maj Pommet, April 17,1993, Document book 61A, tab 1, p. DND 013011.
502. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10696-10697.
503. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20329.
504. Testimony at General Court Martial of LCol Mathieu (First Trial), Transcripts vol. 3, p. 484.
505. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20578-20581.
506. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20318-20319.
507. "Adm O Admt 3 - Op Deliverance", February 10,1993, Document book 63D, tab 13, p. 14.
508. Operation Deliverance Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21, 1995, Document book 62E, tab 180, p. C-29.
509. Maj Pommet, "Report, Operation Deliverance, Part 1", Document book 61A, tab 1, p. DND 013002.
510. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10685-10686, 10717-10718.
511. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10676-10687.
512. Testimony of Sgt Godfrey, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10811-10812.
513. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5221, 5240.
514. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5222, 5241.
515. SSF, After Action Report Operation Cordon/Deliverance, February 2,1993, Annex A, Document book 61, tab H, p. A-14.
516. SSF, After Action Report, p. A-15.
517. Testimony of WO Labrie, Transcripts vol. 53, p. 10618.
518. Testimony of Capt Powell, Transcripts vol. 101, p. 19884.
519. Testimony of Capt Poitras, Transcripu vol. 52, p. 10447.
520. BGen Beno, Op Cordon/Deliverance After Action Report, February 2,1993, Document book 24, tab 1, p. A-17.
521. Maj Pommet, "Report, operation Deliverance, Part 1", pp. DND 013008-013009.
522. Testimony of Sgt Hobbs, Transcripts vol. 55, pp. 10902.
523. LCol MacDonald, "Op Deliverance Prep, Lessons Learned", December 18, 1992, Document book 22, tab 8, p..2.
524. Testimony of Sgt Hobbs, Transcripts vol. 55, pp. 10940-10941, 10943.
525. Maj Pommet, "Report, Operation Deliverance, Part 1", p. DND 013009.
526. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21,1995, Document book 62E, tab 18F, Annex B, pp. B-8 and B-9.
527. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, pp. C-75, C-80.
528. BGen Beno, Op Cordon/Deliverance After Action Report, Februarv 2,1993, Document book 24, tab 1, Annex A, p. A-16.
529. Op Deliverance After Action Report, November 4,1993, Document book 61D, tab lB, Appendix 4 to Annex B, p. B4-4.
530. Op Deliverance After Action Report, p. B4-4.
531. Airflow Cargo Message, February 2,1993, Document book 63D, tab 3, p. 1.
532. Maj Gillam, 'Logistics Overview", Document book 63F tab 13, p. 2.
533. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19565-19566.
534. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21, 1995, p. C-67.
535. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, p. C-67.
536. Marlent Headquarters, Halifax, Operation Deliverance Lessons Learned, February 19,1993, Document book 31A, tab 42, pp. DND 087610, 087692.
537. BGen Beno, Operation Cordon/Deliverance After Action Report, February 2,1993, Annex A, p. A-12.
538. Maj Weicker, Operation Deliverance After Action Report, February 11,1993, Document book 61, tab K, p. A-3.
539. Maj Vanderveer, Service Commando After Action Report Deployment, February 25,1993, Document book 61, tab 21, p. 2-3.
540. LCol Macdonald, Operation Deliverance Prep, Lessons Learned, December 18, 1992,
541. Testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, p. 5634.
542. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19449.
543. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, pp. 19424-19425.
544. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19428.
545. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, p. 19584.
546. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, pp. 19463-19465.
547. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19586-19587.
548. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32968-32969,
549. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, p. 19544.
550. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19475.
551. Maj Gillam, "Logistics Overview", Document book 63F tab 13, p. 7; and telex, LCol Carveth to LCol Furrie, February 1993, Document book 63F tab 8, p. 4.
552. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20568.
553. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34876, 34878.
554. See testimony 0f CWO Jardine, Transcripts vol. 105, p. 20890, who believed that the ground was dictating how they would set up camp; and Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20308, 20309, who was also supportive of the location, though critical of the final plans for the camp layout.
555. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34884, 34885.
556. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34875 (translation).
557. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20558-20559.
558. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34878.
559. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34864. Col Labbé testified that he discussed the outcome of the train mg with LCol Mathieu because he wanted to know whether the triangular compound could be used in Bossasso, but since the outcome of Stalwart Providence training was not conclusive, the idea of using this type of compound was abandoned: Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 33053.
560. Testimony of MWQ Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20561, 20564.
561. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20560-20562.
562. See, for example, testimony of MWQ O'Connor, Transcripts vol. 109, pp. 21781-21783; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5163-5165.
563. Testimony of MWO O'Connor, Transcripts vol. 109, p. 21783.
564. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20315, 20316.
565. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20333.
566. Testimony of LCol Moffat, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19390.
567. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20563.
568. Testimony of Sgt Little, Transcripts vol. 110, p. 22097.
569. Maj Pommet, "Report -- Operation Deliverance -- Part I", April 17, 1993, Document book 61A, tab lA.
570. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34847-34848.
571. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34862-34863.
572. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21408.
573. Document book 61, tab 24, paragraph b.
574. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20333-20334.
575. Document book 61A, Tab lA.
576. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20319.
577. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, 20333-20334.
578. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21398 21399.
579. Document Book 61A, Tab 1.
580. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34849.
581. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19601-19603.
582. Document book 61A, tab 1.
583. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21400.
584. Document book 61A, tab 1.
585. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21405-21408.
586. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21406.
587. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 33044.
588. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34859.
589. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34880-34881.
590. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20322.
591. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34854-34855.
592. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20322.
593. Testimony of CWO Jardine, Transcripts vol. 105, p. 20902.
594. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20327-20328.
595. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20578.
596. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20336.
597. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20322.