Our examination of the manner in which Canada's participation in operations in Somalia was planned is central to our report. In our mandate we were asked to inquire into and report on the "operations, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces and the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence in respect of the Canadian Forces deployment to Somalia" and, in relation to the pre-deployment phase, to examine "the mission and tasks assigned to the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG)" and the "effectiveness of the decisions and actions taken by Canadian Forces leadership at all levels to ensure that the CARBG was operationally ready, trained, manned and equipped for its mission and tasks in Somalia".¹ To meet this objective we began from the earliest indications that Canada might become involved in United Nations activities in Somalia and followed the political, diplomatic, and military planning that led eventually to the arrival of members of the Canadian Forces in Somalia.

Tracing this story comprehensively was a complex aspect of our Inquiry. The process is technical and demands first a basic understanding of how Canada responds to requests for assistance from the international community, principally from the United Nations (UN). Then we were required to study the policies and guidelines that direct public servants and military officers who prepare advice in such matters for governments. Finally, we were required to delve into the process by which Canadian Forces officers consider, assess, organize, plan, and mount military operations.

What we might have considered an appropriate response was not an issue at this stage of our deliberations. Rather, we began by placing laws and regulations, government policies, departmental norms and standards, and military doctrine, principles, and orders beside the actual actions and decisions of officers and officials. Thus we were able to assess whether these actions conformed to the norms set for officers and officials by governments and professional practice. From this point, it was possible to draw conclusions, about what occurred relative to what was required.

However, we were not restricted in our deliberations to this pattern of investigation alone. Where we discovered that no norms, policies, concepts, or doctrine guided actions, we remarked on this and drew conclusions. Moreover, where decisions and actions by senior officers and officials charged with planning Canada's activities in international affairs were found wanting, we also drew appropriate conclusions.

The result, therefore, is a well-documented explanation of how Canada plans and commits the Canadian Forces to international operations. It is mainly a report of how this activity was conducted by officers and officials in relation to the commitment to Somalia between late 1991 and 1993. The conclusions are significant, however, not only for Canadians' understanding of the planning of that mission and its impact on subsequent events, but also for how Canada might plan peace support operations for the Canadian Forces in the future. ('Peace support operations' is the generic term used in this report to describe the full range of mechanisms for conflict resolution and management, from preventative diplomacy to peace enforcement.)

MISSION PLANNING: THE POLITICAL ASPECTS

Political decisions lead military activities. Governments decide when and under what circumstances the Canadian Forces (CF) will be employed. Normally decision making involves two closely related planning stages: a political process to assess the national interest and a military feasibility process. The government decides the political objective, allocates resources, arranges foreign aspects of the deployment where necessary, and assesses and assumes any risk to Canada. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), as the military adviser to the government and head of the armed forces, assesses, in conjunction with the Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence, the proposed operation in light of defence policy; assesses the resources needed; determines whether the operation is within the capability of the CF; develops a concept of the operation and plan within the government's guide-lines or direction; then advises whether the CF can accomplish the mission.

Aspects of military planning can be undertaken concurrently with political decision making, but they must not pre-empt it. Nevertheless, the CDS is the government's sole military adviser, the principal professional expert who directly controls the military planning process and occupies a position of trust in the machinery of government. Governments can act without the advice of the CDS if they choose, but they open themselves to criticism if they do, especially if the mission fails. Any decision to employ the CF is in practice a responsibility shared between the government of the day and the CDS and for which the government is accountable.

CF deployments on international missions usually pass through independent, though concurrent, stages. First comes international diplomatic recognition of a problem demanding the use of armed forces. Interested or involved states attempt to define the problem, to develop consensus concerning how it might be addressed, and to build a coalition that will bring political and, if necessary, military force to bear. Interested parties may negotiate the resources and the resolve to confront the problem, and through multilateral or international organizational auspices, states can indicate how and where they will contribute to an international mission or operation.

Second and concurrently, Canadian political leaders, officials, and military officers may assist and join the diplomatic initiative to advise diplomats and the government, clarify issues, and assess situations before Canada makes any firm commitments. Officers and officials brief the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence about the risks involved, the cost of the mission in resources and people, its duration, the terms of troop employment, and other technical information and may offer recommendations. Advice would be framed by policy established by governments before a crisis develops or a request for use of the CF is made.

Parliament usually debates questions of war and peace and may pass resolutions supporting the government's actions. Recently, governments have followed this practice whenever the CF have been deployed abroad on peace support operations.

Third and finally, the government instructs supporting departments and agencies and orders the Chief of the Defence Staff to deploy the Canadian Forces.

MISSION PLANNING: THE MILITARY ASPECTS

Typically, the CDS anticipates a government's order to employ the CF and orders officers to plan, draft orders, concentrate units and resources, and train personnel at the same time as diplomats and governments prepare their part of the deployment. The CF has doctrine to guide officers through this process, and although officers need not follow the doctrine slavishly, each step in the process must be considered carefully. Where lack of time or other unavoidable circumstances preclude an adequate and prudent application of doctrine to a situation, other compensating measures must be adopted.

Effective staff work and supervision by senior officers ensure that the right unit, with proper orders, sufficiently supported, will arrive at the right place in time to complete the mission. However, if staff work is incomplete and commanders careless, missions are at risk and soldiers are put in danger. The final stage is the deployment itself, which can be complex and expensive.

THE INQUIRY'S APPROACH

The question we consider is whether the Canadian Forces were deployed with due consideration for all aspects of the mission to Somalia, and whether soldiers and officers in units were given a fair chance to do their duty within the norms of military doctrine and practice.

This chapter reports comprehensively on all aspects of mission planning in relation to Canada s commitment to Somalia. It begins with a detailed review of the government structure for advising on international commitments and for preparing plans in the diplomatic and the military field. This is followed by an investigation of the decision to participate in the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), and later in the UN-authorized but U.S.-led mission known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). In this opening section the focus is on the key factors that encouraged the government to accept a mission for the Canadian Forces and that ultimately shaped the military plan.

We then go on to review and explain the CF system, process, and procedures for planning operations. The CF has an established doctrine for operational planning, developed from warfare. This doctrine provides the basis for training, especially in staff colleges, and for staff organizations, and is applicable at all levels of command. A fundamental concept underpinning the planning system is the notion that commanders are responsible for establishing the mission for operations and for every facet of planning. In other words, according to doctrine and custom, the military plan for any operation is the commander's plan.

Then we examine the development of the operational plan for the Somalia deployment. This review begins with plans and orders issued in 1991 for Operation Python, the Canadian contribution to the UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and follows the changes in that plan to create plans for Operation Cordon and then Operation Deliverance. This history is important, because the final plan resulted from an unsteady manipulation of operational concepts and partly prepared plans for earlier operations.

The military planning process and the actions and decisions of leaders are then traced through National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), to Land Force Command (LFC), Land Force Central Area (LFCA), the Special Service Force (SSF), and finally to the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). Here we can see plainly the confusion of aims and concepts, the misapplied or outdated doctrine, the professional compromises, and the command inattention that led to a wholly inadequate operational plan for the deployment and employment of the Canadian Forces in Somalia.

Military planning should identify the most appropriate units for the mission at hand. It should also reveal where units need to be reinforced with troops, weapons, and other resources. In the section on force structure we examine the critical decisions made by the CDS and commanders relating to the strength of the force that would be deployed. Here we concentrate on the issue of the so-called manning ceiling, an arbitrarily imposed limit on the commitment. In the remaining sections we review and analyze planning decisions concerning military intelligence and logistical support. Finally we consider one aspect of the early deployment of the CARBG in Somalia, the decision respecting the layout of the camp.

KEY FINDINGS

Findings are presented throughout the text in this volume, while recommendations are located at the end of each chapter. Significant key findings are outlined here as a guide to readers as they consider the text.

We reviewed the decision-making process in effect in 1992 and were dismayed by the lack of explicit doctrine articulating the process at NDHQ for responding to requests for Canadian Forces involvement in peace support operations. While defence policy required that certain criteria be taken into account in decisions, no formal process was in place to give effect to such policy. Thus when we traced the negotiations about and preparations for UNOSOM, the proposed United Nations-led deployment, we found that the planning process (with one exception) - though conducted in accordance with loosely acknowledged ad hoc procedures, including a review of the mission to determine CF capability - was concluded without adequate reference to government policy. The exception pertains to the initial decision not to accede to the UN request in April 1992, which we find was taken credibly and on reasonable grounds - that the situation and arrangements were insufficiently safe and secure to risk Canadian participation until at least that aspect of the criteria for a traditional peacekeeping operation could be met. We found further that the issue of security remained a key factor through-out the process leading to the decision to join UNOSOM.

However, with respect to Canadian participation in the Unified Task Force Somalia, the U.S.-led peace enforcement operation, we found a marked deterioration in the integrity of Canada's decision-making processes. UNITAF represented a radical escalation of the deployment in terms of mandate, mission, size, structure, authority, rules of engagement, and cost. Yet the decision to commit the CF was taken in a few days, on minimal analysis that paid no attention to even the doctrine and processes that had characterized the initial decision.

The documents we examined and witnesses we heard indicated that the decision to join hinged on the supposed readiness of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR)/Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) and the fact that a Canadian ship was already en route to Somalia. The analysis had little to say about the fact that UNITAF involved our troops in potentially greater risks, under a more war-like UN Chapter VII mandate, with correspondingly enhanced rules of engagement, at costs borne by Canada rather than the UN.

Instead, we heard testimony about a focus on the readiness of the troops and a concern for how the decision would be received by the public. We believe that an attitude enunciated by the Chief of the Defence Staff, at the time, Gen John de Chastelain, was widespread during the decision-making process: "a role that was seen to be secondary would not sit well with the troops, with me, with the Government or with Canadians."²

We saw reckless haste and enthusiasm for high-risk, high-profile action undermining due process and rational decision making at the most senior levels. Doctrine, proven military processes, guidelines, and even policy were disregarded. What guidelines and checklists existed were treated with little respect. The deployment of the CF therefore, began with an uncertain mission, unknown tasks, ad hoc command arrangements, an unconsolidated relationship to U.S. command, and unclear rules of engagement. An international commitment reshaped into conceived originally in the Canadian tradition of peacekeeping was hastily reshaped into an ill-considered military operation for which the CAR/CARBG had little preparation.

NOTES

1. Commission of Inquiry, Terms of Reference, P.C. 1995-442.
2. CDS Note to file, December 7, 1992, Document book 32A, tab 9.