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With this enormous responsibility, it is necessary to have a considerable degree of delegation. The extent to which delegation creates its own direct responsibility, in the form of control and supervision, is discussed further in a separate chapter of this report.1 For present purposes, we note that many of the failings of the senior leadership, with the exception of specific failings relating to duties that cannot be delegated, can be characterized as inappropriate control and supervision.
Accordingly, although Gen de Chastelain is ultimately responsible for the failures that occurred below him, he is also responsible for what he did or did not do in allowing the failing to occur. In this respect, Gen de Chastelain's primary failure may be characterized as one of nonexistent control and indifferent supervision. Quite simply, at many points in his testimony, Gen (ret) de Chastelain appeared quite prepared to assume that all would have worked out if only because of the successes of his previous achievements and because of the trust he placed in the quality of those selected as his subordinates. This benign neglect, or unquestioning reliance, became so common under Gen de Chastelain's command that it became everyday practice throughout the chain of command below him.
Gen de Chastelain's non-existent control and indifferent supervision created
an atmosphere that fostered more failings among his subordinates. Time and
time again we heard evidence suggesting the relinquishment of active control
and supervision throughout the chain of command. It seems to us that where
the top commander within a command chain fails in important respects, those
failures will inevitably trickle down. A weakness at the top can thereby
easily find expression throughout. Moreover, inadequate control and supervision
downward leads necessarily to the inability to properly inform upward: the two
are closely linked and make possible a cascading effect in the multiplication of error.
As the CDS, Gen de Chastelain ought to have ensured that a comprehensive
estimate of Operation Deliverance requirements, grounded in a thorough
policy analysis, was produced and disseminated to all those properly
concerned, including, primarily, the Minister of National Defence and
the Cabinet. He did not do this. Rather, he directed and encouraged
Canadian involvement in Operation Deliverance with little more to rely
on than an assumption that equated Operation Cordon with Operation
Deliverance requirements, and brief written assurances that any additional
technical or logistical support of the new deployment agenda could be met. He stated:
I think the fact that we had accepted that [Operation Cordon] was doable and Canada should be involved was simply applied to [Operation Deliverance] too, once the operational assessment had been made that we could take part in it.2He followed on this point by stating that discussions on December 4th in an ad hoc committee of Ministers transpired "on the basis that we have the troops, we can do Chapter VI, this is not going to be that much different".3 No new estimate was done for Operation Deliverance, and analysis was limited to three cursory documents that presented inadequate assessments of troop and equipment requirements.
We fail to see, first, how such requirements could be properly ascertained without a full prior analysis of the mission mandate and tasks. Gen de Chastelain's methodology is erroneous for it amounts to putting the cart before the horse. Furthermore, the assumption that Operation Cordon analyses could be applied to Operation Deliverance was likewise in error. Operation Deliverance was not advanced as a simple humanitarian peacekeeping mission like its precursor Operation Cordon, but as a Chapter VII mission that, in one staff estimate, could involve armed conflict and attendant casualties.4
The CDS thus failed in his responsibility to the government and the CF by
failing to ensure a full and proper analysis, especially in view of the
changed nature of the mission. While clearly it was Cabinet that made the
final decision to participate in Operation Deliverance, this decision was
made on the options presented by the Deputy Minister and Gen de Chastelain,
who ought to have been aware of problems that would arise from inadequate
time, resources, and personnel to properly plan and execute a mission different
in nature from Operation Cordon.
As CDS, Gen de Chastelain shouldered ultimate responsibility for the command,
control, and administration of the CF. Accordingly, he ought to have known of
any significant leadership and discipline problems that may have affected
deployment for Operation Deliverance. From his position of authority, he ought
to have required of his subordinates that they adequately supervise units under
their command, that they report to him in a timely, accurate and comprehensive
manner, and that they intervene to provide advice, guidance, and remedial action
when the circumstances dictated. None of this occurred.
With regard to the removal of LCol Morneault, Gen de Chastelain did not know that concerns about LCol Morneault had been expressed by some senior leaders prior to his appointment as Commanding officer (CO).5 He did not know that concerns about LCol Morneault had arisen during preparations for Operation Cordon until the day before LCol Morneault's removal.6 His only concern upon hearing of these problems was whether a change of leadership would delay the deployment of the troops to Somalia. The only advice he requested and received on this point was from LGen Gervais, who advised him that deployment would not be delayed because a new leader would be appointed who would take full command of the unit. Despite the very unusual circumstances of removing a CO some days or weeks prior to a deployment for an overseas mission, Gen de Chastelain was satisfied with LGen Gervais' simple answer that it would not cause a delay.7 Gen de Chastelain did not determine the nature of the leadership problem that reportedly necessitated LCol Morneault's removal.8 He did not require that LGen Gervais, or anyone else for that matter, provide him with details about the situation, but satisfied himself with a briefing after the fact. He concerned himself only so much as to find out if the change of command had affected the departure schedule.9 On the whole, Gen de Chastelain was content to place absolute trust in his subordinates to keep him informed of an evidently serious situation.
Similarly, according to his testimony, he knew nothing of the fail 1992 discipline problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) until the day he was informed of the concerns expressed about LCol Morneault. He did not know of the Confederate flag being flown by 2 Commando,10 or of major disciplinary incidents such as those of October 2 and 3, 1992, or of deficiencies in the training of the CAR.11 In fact, the only time he was told of disciplinary problems was on December 1, 1992 at a farewell Christmas lunch in Petawawa, when he was told that six soldiers were being left behind for disciplinary reasons, and that the problems had been resolved.12 Gen (ret) de Chastelain reluctantly admitted that the chain of command was not working properly, in that as CDS, he would want to know of serious disciplinary problems and how they were being addressed.13
Gen de Chastelain simply did not know in great detail of any of the above important matters. With his limited knowledge came a failure to act, to direct, and to command. Furthermore, his minimal inquiries encouraged subordinates to copy his uncritical faith in subordinates, to remain passive in their approach to supervision and reporting, and to rely on a custom of reactive intervention.
In this, Gen de Chastelain failed to discharge his responsibilities as CDS. He could
have brought to bear through his personal presence and example the considerable weight
of his experience and high office in order to directly impress upon his troops the
standards of discipline, conduct, and professionalism which he expected of them. He
could have done so, but he did not.
Gen de Chastelain was unaware, but should have known, of the serious leadership and
discipline problems plaguing the CAR up until the time of its deployment. Gen de
Chastelain knew that the Rules of Engagement (ROE) were rushed to completion on
December 11th,14 and should have known that this late timing left inadequate
time for proper training on the ROE, but was nonetheless unconcerned.15
He was similarly unconcerned that the Canadian troops had trained on ROE promulgated
for the Yugoslavia mission, even though that mission differed in significant respects
from what could be expected of Operation Deliverance.16 Gen de Chastelain
had read the Operation Deliverance ROE very carefully, line by line, before approving
them, and he should have known that the wording left an undesirable degree of
uncertainty, especially with regard to the interpretation of "hostile intent"
and the proportionate use of force in the context of property theft.17
Gen de Chastelain knew that the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) was deployed with two Military Police and believed that this number was acceptable, but he should have known at the planning stage, especially with the prospect of significant numbers of detainees, that it was not.18 Gen de Chastelain knew the CAR was deployed without an adequate mission definition, but should have known that such a deficiency violated basic precepts of military planning. Gen de Chastelain knew of the manning ceiling and was instrumental in deciding upon it, yet took the position that the limit was satisfactory unless informed that there were "show-stoppers".19 This shows his indifference to the placing of a ceiling on the mission and its impact on the proper planning of the mission.
We find that Gen de Chastelain bore a primary responsibility to ensure that planning
and preparations for Operation Deliverance were driven by military imperatives, were
properly prioritized, and were carried out in a professional and competent manner.
This he did not do. He allowed monetary and political considerations to motivate
important decisions regarding the Canadian contingent. He did not assert his leadership
to ensure that military priorities were articulated, fixed, and followed. Thus, he did
not foster a critical attentiveness to things military. Rather, he allowed important
aspects of the planning process, including the six elements mentioned in this subsection,
to develop without serious consideration for proper military functioning and without the
careful supervision required of the Commander of the CF. In this respect, Gen de
Chastelain is to be held accountable for each of the above failings, for he was
responsible more than anyone else for the disabling practice of command which they evidence.
Gen de Chastelain should also have ensured that an adequate operational readiness
reporting system was in place at the time of planning Operation Cordon and Operation
Deliverance. As CDS, he did not have time to inspect every unit in the CF personally
and, therefore, depended on an operational readiness reporting system or reports from
his subordinate commanders. Though he knew that the system for determining operational
readiness had for a long time been considered inadequate, he held no meetings with his
commanders to formally assess the operational readiness of the CF or Land Force Command
(LFC) at any time during the planning phase or before deployment to Somalia. Gen de
Chastelain chose instead to rely passively on a flawed system. He accepted the
operational readiness declaration for Operation Cordon at face value, and stated
that there was no reason for him to inquire about it "unless I didn't have confidence
in the commanders to tell me what I needed to know or not unless I happened to know
something that they may have missed, and neither of them was the case."20
He similiarly accepted the operational declaration for Operation Deliverance at face
value. He should have resolved this systemic problem, which relied on declarations
about operational readiness without an established standard of measurement and
methods of reporting. Again, Gen de Chastelain failed to adequately ensure that
subordinates at LFC would put in place effective systems to monitor operational
readiness.
As the CDS, Gen de Chastelain ought to have ensured that all members of
the Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS) were adequately trained and tested
in the Law of Armed Conflict before they deployed to Somalia, and with
enough time for adequate training in them. He did not do this. We know that
the Canadian troops received inadequate training in the Law of Armed Conflict,
that the soldiers received no written materials on the subject, and that they
were generally unprepared in theatre for situations about which they ought to
have been knowledgeable. We therefore find that Gen de Chastelain did not
adequately ensure that direction, supervision, and instruction regarding
training in the Law of Armed Conflict for peace support operations were
provided, or that all members of the CJFS were adequately trained.
Given our findings above concerning the leadership failures of Gen de Chastelain,
and in view of the importance of control and supervision within the chain of
command, we conclude that Gen de Chastelain failed as a commander.
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