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His responsibilities included intelligence, security,
and operations. The major responsibilities of the position included
advising on and promulgating operational direction to the CF and
monitoring CF activity; establishing standards for and monitoring
the effectiveness and efficiency of the CF intelligence, security,
and operations activities; maintaining an operational readiness
system on a forces-wide basis to indicate the operational effectiveness
of the CF relative to approved missions and tasks; acting as a
commander of a command for all peacekeeping units/formations;
and developing and recommending operational training standards
for all environments and services in joint operations.1
MGen Addy was responsible for ensuring a thorough
and timely military estimate for Operation Deliverance was produced,
and to alert the CDS to the need for a military estimate that
ensured due consideration of all the military implications of
participating in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Because he
failed in this responsibility, the Canadian Airbome Regiment Battle
Group (CARBG) was committed without a clear mission; without an
assessment of the tasks it would face, without confirmation of
force composition, logistics, or extra support requirements; and
without due regard to the time needed for adjusting preparations
and additional training for the CARBG. Despite whatever political
or bureaucratic pressures may have weighed upon him and his staff,
MGen Addy ought to have ensured that a thorough and timely military
estimate for Operation Deliverance was completed. A 1996 draft
report on the J-Staff system within National Defence Headquarters
(NDHQ) noted that poor mission definition and improper timing
created significant problems for the CF and the J Staff; that
CF capabilities and CF operational planning requirements did not
always appear to be considered appropriately; and that a lack
of specific military advice for mission definition of military
operations impaired the ability of the J Staff to plan and execute
military operations.2 MGen Addy neglected his responsibility
with the consequences listed above.
MGen Addy was responsible for maintaining a readiness
system on a forces-wide basis for the purpose of assessing the
operational effectiveness of the CF relative to approved missions
and tasks. However, senior officers shared the belief that the
system was deficient and therefore could not serve the evaluation
and reporting needs of the Somalia deployment.3 He
should have taken steps to ensure through extra staff effort that
an interim system was in place which, as a minimum, would have
alerted his commander to the true state of the Canadian Airbome
Regiment (CAR) and CARBG. It was MGen Addy's responsibility to
assure himself, first, that an adequate system to evaluate operational
readiness was put in place; and second, to use his critical expertise
to assess the validity of readiness declarations in light of established
criteria.
But MGen Addy demonstrated a passive attitude throughout. He did not obtain reports on a regular basis concerning the training being conducted and the state of discipline. For example, he first heard of the CAR's training problems when the de Faye board of inquiry reported accordingly.4 However, MGen Addy ought to have been informed at a point in time when remedial action could viably have been pursued. Instead, because he did not seek to know, he did not hear. Thus, even when he heard of concems about leadership in the CAR in October 1992. he did not ask for additional details.5
Moreover, MGen Addy demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward the declarations of operational readiness of both the CAR and CARBG. He was unconcerned that the CAR was declared operationally ready on November 13, 1992, just a few weeks after the replacement of its Commanding Cfficer.6 He was unconcerned that readiness declarations made their way up the chain of command after the advance party had been deployed and before troops had had time to train in the Rules of Engagement (ROE).7 In fact, though he ought to have been more concerned at best, he spoke with Col Labbé in a minimal and cursory fashion, before the troops and Col Labbé himself were deployed.8 Such passivity in these exceptional circumstances is inexcusable.
Furthermore, even though it was his duty as Deputy
Chief of the Defence Staff, Intelligence, Security and Operations
(DCDS (ISO)) to be the eyes and ears of the CDS, he remained nonetheless
uninformed and, therefore, could not and did not advise his commander
in an accurate and timely fashion.
Although he ought to have, MGen Addy did not know
of the leadership and discipline problems within the CAR, and
did not make any inquiries that would have properly informed him.9
When he learned of the change in the CAR's commanding officer,
he ought to have fully informed himself of the situation, but
instead relied passively on the information provided to him by
his staff and LGen Gervais and MGen Reay. He passively assumed
that if any problems requiring his attention had arisen, the relevant
person would have informed him.10
We do not accept MGen Addy's passivity and neglect.
He should have ascertained the precise circumstances of LCol Morneault's
removal, determined whether matters of discipline and operational
readiness were at issue, and assessed what remedial action was
necessary. And he should have ensured that he was accurately informed
on such matters as the disciplinary problems within the CAR so
that he could provide, in a tangible manner, any necessary guidance
on resolving deficiencies.
MGen Addy knew or ought to have known that the CAR
was facing serious discipline problems during the pre-deployment
phase, but he only first became aware of such problems during
the de Faye board of inquiry of 1993. MGen Addy knew the CAR was
facing a leadership crisis, but failed to inform himself as to
whether the problem had been solved by the means suggested by
his subordinates. Instead of actively supervising these matters,
he simply relied on his subordinates. He stated:
Q. Again, would it be a matter of assuming that unless you heard to the contrary things were going fine?A. That is correct. Because until the troops are declared operationally ready to the Chief they are basically the Commander of the Army's problem and if there are any internal problems, I'm sure he would have solved them.11
MGen Addy knew that the production and dissemination of the ROE occurred in a rushed manner near the end of the pre-deployment phase, but nonetheless was satisfied that there was sufficient time for the soldiers to become familiar with them.12 That there was no opportunity for training on the ROE before deployment did not concern him; he appeared to fully expect that there would be training on the Rules of Engagement in theatre.13 In addition, MGen Addy knew at the time of deployment that a mission statement for Operation Deliverance had not been articulated, and ought to have known that this represented a failure in planning.
Indeed, proper planning and preparations for Operation
Deliverance ought to have been a primary concern for MGen Addy.
As the principal operations staff officer, he was responsible
for taking an active, personal interest in the three remaining
items mentioned above, for ensuring that adequate procedures were
in place to properly execute the requirements relating to them,
and to inform himself adequately so that any apparent problems
could be remedied in a timely and appropriate manner. In particular,
he ought to have ensured that the ROE for Operation Deliverance
were published and disseminated to the troops with enough time
to permit proper training in them. He did not fulfil these important
responsibilities, but passively left matters to develop without
his guidance. He therefore neglected to properly supervise the
matters for which he was principally responsible.
As we have stated previously in
this report, the CF lacked an appropriate operational readiness
reporting system during the pre-deployment phase of the mission
to Somalia. As the principal staff officer for operations, MGen
Addy was responsible for ensuring that an adequate operational
readiness reporting system was put in place before the Canadian
contingent was deployed. Considering that the preparations for
the mission were rushed, that the original CO for the CAR was
removed, that the mission changed midstream to a Chapter VII mission,
and that disciplinary, training, and leadership problems were
well apparent, it was incumbent upon MGen Addy to institute a
readiness reporting system at the first opportunity and before
the troops were deployed. He did not do this, and the troops were
deployed without a proper readiness declaration. We find this
an unacceptable abdication of his responsibility.
As the principal staff officer for operations, MGen
Addy ought to have issued training instructions, doctrines, and
manuals on the Law of Armed Conflict before the Canadian troops
were deployed to Somalia, and with enough time for them to adequately
train in them. He did not do this. We know that the Canadian troops
received inadequate training in the Law of Armed Conflict, that
the soldiers received no written materials on the subjects, and
that they were generally unprepared in theatre for situations
about which they ought to have been knowledgeable. We therefore
find that MGen Addy failed to provide adequate direction and supervision
to ensure the adequacy of Law of Armed Conflict training for peace
support operations.
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