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We find that LGen Gervais did not so inform himself, despite the fact that he knew or ought to have known of the possibility of serious deficiencies in the CAR's leadership. According to his testimony, he was advised three times in the early pre-deployment phase that BGen Beno was seriously concerned about the leadership of LCol Morneault. On August 26th, September 17th, and September 24th, LGen Gervais was specifically advised by BGen Beno of these leadership concerns, and that LCol Morneault might have to be replaced.1 Then on October 20th and 2lst in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, LGen Gervais was involved in discussions with MGen MacKenzie and MGen Reay about the removal of LCol Morneault, discussions that ranged superficially over the leadership, discipline, and training problems apparent under LCol Morneault's command.2
On each of these occasions, LGen Gervais was made aware of problems of a nature so serious as to possibly require the virtually unprecedented removal of a commanding officer (CO) in peacetime. Despite these clear warning signs, LGen Gervais admitted that he did not make specific inquiries. He did not request that his staff investigate the matter and report to him.3 His 'conversations' with BGen Beno, by his own admission, lacked detail. No notes by LGen Gervais were shown to us of these conversations. No minutes were taken of the Fort Leavenworth deliberations. And when it came to removing LCol Morneault, LGen Gervais failed to inform himself adequately about the new CO and took no greater action than to briefly inform his superior and to suggest that an immediate search for a replacement proceed.4
Neither did LGen Gervais follow up on this situation. He did not see the troops until mid-November 1992, and then, which seems alarming to us, made in writing a judgement on the readiness of the CAR in all respects for the forthcoming mission, even though no proper assessment had been undertaken.5
In view of the seriousness of the criticisms voiced to him, of the complex situation within the CAR, its past disciplinary problems, and the impending deployment, LGen Gervais should have taken active steps to confirm and monitor the mounting difficulties, or to require his officers and staff to do so and report to him in an accurate and timely fashion. He did not. Rather, he trusted his subordinates to supervise in his stead, and accepted seemingly without question the advice and actions they proposed. As such, LGen Gervais failed to discharge his responsibility to take active steps to impose his standards of leadership, discipline and training on his own troops.
Regarding the removal of LCol Morneault, LGen Gervais allowed circumstances to build to a crisis, substituting informal meetings for a focused review. As the senior officer responsible, LGen Gervais displayed a lack of leadership by acquiescing to advice without probing all the factors, despite his obligation to ensure a process that was fair to all parties concerned. He furthermore refused to institute a board of inquiry into the replacement of LCol Morneault.6 We find this a grave error on his part. A board investigation would have revealed the extent of the problems within the CAR, and would have ensured a fair examination of circumstances which, in our opinion, were not entirely free of suspicion. BGen (ret) Zuliani testified that he specifically requested that a board of inquiry be convened, but was turned down by the senior generals in the chain of command.7 In refusing to institute this process, LGen Gervais failed to act in a manner that would have fully informed each of the senior leaders of the facts underlying BGen Beno's concerns.
We might also note that LGen (ret) Gervais testified that he was not specifically aware of the discipline problems in 2 Commando, including the incidents of early October, until late March or early April 1993. LGen (ret) Gervais also testified that had he known about these incidents, he would have asked for the Special Investigation Unit to become involved and, if necessary, for individuals8 or a sub-unit9 to be removed from the CAR as unfit to be deployed.10
We accept this testimony, but note that it reveals the extent to which LGen Gervais failed in his duty to actively control and supervise. It also reveals the extent to which communications had broken down within the chain of command, and underscores the disturbing custom of laissez-faire command that seems to be at the root of this breakdown.
As one final point, we also find that LGen Gervais
failed to properly inform his superior, Gen de Chastelain, about
the matters developing within the CAR. Clearly, if LGen Gervais'
own knowledge of these matters was deficient, he could not adequately
inform his superior in a timely and complete fashion.
In accordance with his responsibilities as commander
of the army, LGen Gervais ought to have ensured that the proper
training in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) was conducted before
the troops were deployed to Somalia. This he did not do. The evidence
suggests that he took no personal interest in ensuring that such
training took place, and did not inform himself as to what training
had occurred, where it was conducted, and whether it may have
been adequate in fully familiarizing the Canadian soldiers on
the principles they required. LGen (ret) Gervais testified that
the issues of ROE production and training were not brought to
his attention.11 He furthermore stated that late production
of the ROE "can be overcome" and that "there is
always time to...practise the Rules of Engagement. "12 He
also stated that such practice can take place "during the
deployment while you are on an aircraft."13
We do not agree with LGen Gervais' notion of proper
ROE training, and we do not accept his inaction in not informing
himself on the state of ROE training during pre-deployment, on
whether enough time was permitted for training before deployment,
and as to what remedial action was planned to remedy any deficiencies.
In these circumstances, in which LGen Gervais ought to have known
because of the time frames allotted that ROE training would be
inadequate, active supervision and control on his part were called
for. His neglect in this manner is unacceptable.
As we have stated previously in this report, the
CF lacked an appropriate operational readiness reporting system
during the pre-deployment phase of the mission to Somalia. As
the Commander of Land Force Command (LFC), LGen Gervais was responsible
for all aspects of the training process, including those dealing
with the important issue of operational readiness declarations.
As such, he ought to have ensured that an adequate operational
readiness reporting system was put in place before the Canadian
contingent was deployed. Considering that the preparations for
the mission were rushed, that the original CO for the CAR was
removed, that the mission changed mid-stream to a Chapter VII
mission, and that disciplinary, training, and leadership problems
were well apparent, it was incumbent upon LGen Gervais to institute
a readiness reporting system at the first opportunity and before
the troops were deployed. He did not do this, and the troops were
deployed without a proper readiness declaration. For his part,
LGen Gervais relied on the chain of command and his confidence
in his officers to assure him that the troops were ready.14
We find this an unacceptable abdication of his responsibility
to ensure that an objective foundation existed for confirming
readiness effectiveness and reporting.
As the Commander of LFC, LGen Gervais bore the direct
responsibility of ensuring that a proper estimate of the potential
implications of the ill-considered National Defence Headquarters
(NDHQ) manning ceiling was undertaken. He did not discharge this
responsibility. In his testimony, he stated that he did not know
"how the 900 was capped".15 He could not
recall what discussions took place in regard to the 900 figure,
and stated with little certainty that "I probably had a discussion
with the Chief of the Defence Staff about 900 being -- our initial
assessment being about right."16 LGen (ret) Gervais
said he "probably" discussed the actual figure with
the CDS, and that he thinks he "would have said" that
the figure was reasonable, but that, in the end, the manning cap
"is just not something that was discussed in the kind of
detail you perhaps are alluding to at my level".17
We find LGen Gervais' passive acceptance of the manning
cap, and his inaction in investigating its implications or attempting
to change it, unacceptable. He was the Commander of LFC, and important
matters bearing directly on the possible success of a mission
are matters that should be discussed at his
"level". Short of this, LGen Gervais ought to have directed
his staff to perform a thorough and timely investigation into
the implications of the cap, and to have their results communicated
to him so that he could take any required action. But LGen Gervais
did neither of these, and the manning cap went virtually unchallenged
from the senior leaders.
As Commander of LFC, LGen Gervais was ultimately
responsible for ensuring that his troops were adequately instructed
in the international conventions governing the Law of Armed Conflict.
As we have noted in a previous chapter, the training that occurred
was inadequate. We therefore find that LGen Gervais failed in
his responsibility to adequately control and supervise this important
aspect of his command. Given the change to a Chapter VII mission,
LGen Gervais ought to have known that training in the Law of Armed
Conflict was especially important for the Somalia mission. He
should have known that the Canadian troops would encounter a detainee
problem. Despite this, however, he did not maintain the supervision
and control necessary to ensure that the proper training for such
problems took place and must bear responsibility for this failure.
Given our findings above concerning the leadership
failure of LGen Gervais, and in view of the importance of control
and supervision within the chain of command, we conclude that
LGen Gervais failed as a commander.
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