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LIEUTENANT-GENERAL (RETIRED) GORDON REAY

We advised LGen (ret) Gordon Reay that we would consider allegations that he exercised poor and inappropriate leadership in the pre-deployment phase of the Somalia mission by failing:
  1. To take steps or ensure that steps were taken to investigate and remedy the significant leadership and discipline problems of which he was aware, or ought to have been aware, within the Canadian Airborne Regiment prior to its deployment, and to notify his superiors accordingly;
  2. To advise that provisions be made for the troops to be trained or tested on the newly developed Rules of Engagement;
  3. To advise that an adequate reporting system dealing with operational readiness and effectiveness in the Canadian Land Forces be put in place;
  4. To ensure that a proper estimate of the potential implications of establishing the manning ceiling at 900 land (army) personnel was undertaken;
  5. [This allegation deleted pursuant to the order dated June 17, 1997 of Mr. Justice Teitelbaum of the Federal Court of Canada.]
  6. To ensure that all LFC members of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia were adequately trained and tested in the Law of War or the Law of Armed Conflict including the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of armed conflict.
We now address these allegations in order.
  1. Failure to take steps or ensure that steps were taken to investigate and remedy the significant leadership and discipline problems of which he was aware, or ought to have been aware, within the Canadian Airborne Regiment prior to its deplovment, and to notify his superiors accordingly.
As Deputy Commander and principal staff officer of Land Force Command (LFC) in the fall of 1992, MGen Reay carried the duties of gathering accurate and timely information concerning the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR), and of conveying this information to his commander. LGen (ret) Reay testified that it was his responsibility to represent the commander of the army when necessary, to act as Chief of Staff for LGen Gervais on major policy issues, and to ensure that all appropriate staff work had been completed. He was also responsible for ensuring that the staffs of BGen Vernon and BGen Zuliani were properly co-ordinated so that the information available to the commander was as complete as it could be.1 In view of these duties, it was incumbent upon MGen Reay to activeiy investigate, or to ensure that steps were taken to activeiy investigate, whether the CAR was free of deficiencies regarding its leadership, discipline, and training. It was his responsibility to fully inform himself of any concerns that came to light, and to then render considered advice based on his experience, or in some other way to ensure that any known problems were rectified. He knew or ought to have known that follow-up was essential to make certain that identified probiems had been resolved in order to reduce the possibility of in-theatre recurrence.

Despite knowing at an early stage, and aithough he was reminded subsequently, that problems within the CAR were mounting, we do not find that MGen Reay took any such active investigatory steps. Nor did he sufficiently ensure that problems were adequately rectified. MGen Reay knew from LGen Gervais in September of 1992 of BGen Beno's concerns about LCo1 Morneault.2 He knew in September, again from LGen Gervais, of concerns expressed about training and, albeit in sketchy form, about discipline.3 He knew in early October from MGen MacKenzie about the latter's concerns regarding LCol Morneault when on October 9th, he received a phone call conveying further concerns about training, operational readiness, and discipline.4

MGen Reay discussed these matters at Fort Leavenworth on October 20th. At the time, he was informed by MGen MacKenzie of major deficiencies within the CAR including inadequate training and assessment, unresolved leadership and discipline problems, lack of cohesion and efficiency. He also admitted that he may have seen BGen Beno's letter spelling out these deficiencies.5

MGen Reay was aware of serious leadership, training, and discipline problems within the CAR as early as September 1992. Although he had received "clear danger signals" that something was wrong in the CAR,6 which were repeated to him in October, he did not make any specific inquiries about the problems raised.7 He did not investigate. He did not inquire about details. Rather, he relied on information given to him by MGen MacKenzie and LGen Gervais.8 There is little evidence that he brought his judgement and experience to bear on the decision to replace the Commanding Officer (CO), or on the need to follow up and supervise proceedings after LCol Morneault's replacement. The decision to remove LCol Morneault was made quickly and raised no concerns for him. MGen Reay relied on BGen Beno and MGen MacKenzie to work things out, stating that "clearly they would come to us if they felt they couldn't deal with the problem themselves".9 When asked if he did not have an independent obligation to assess whether replacing the CO would effectiveiy resoive the problems, he argued that to do this, one needed to be told of the extent of the problem. And though he stated that MGen MacKenzie adequately explained the situation to them,10 he also added:

I don't think there is any doubt that was conveyed to us, but equally and with hindsight, had we known and had he known the full dimension of the problem it might have caused the chain of command to approach its resolution somewhat...differently.11
Clearly, MGen Reay was inadequately informed and should have realized this. As Deputy Commander of LFC, MGen Reay had the duty to support his commander by fully and accurately informing him of pertinent details. This he obviously did not do because he testified that he was unaware of the carburning incident, and LGen (ret) Gervais testified that he did not recall having been advised at all of disciplinary problems within the Regiment until after he had retired, some time in the spring of 1993.12

Furthermore, MGen Reay's participation in the refusal to convene a board of inquiry to investigate the circumstances of LCol Morneault's removal was a considerable error, and highlights the extent to which a habit of inactive control and supervision had taken root in the senior leadership. A board of inquiry would have brought to light the unusual circumstances of LCol Morneault's removal, and would have provided requisite information to all within the chain of command.

Finally, MGen Reay failed to inform himself adequately about the incoming CO. MGen Reay subsequently and quickly selected a new CO for LGen Gervais' approval, based on discussions with other leaders and without consulting any personnel records.13 He also failed to follow up after the change of CO to satisfy himself and his Commander that the serious problems in the CAR were rectified prior to deployment.

  1. Failure to advise that provisions be made for the troops to be trained or tested on the newly developed Rules of Engagement.
As Deputy Commander of LFC, MGen Reay ought to have ensured that the rules of engagement (RE) were produced in a timely fashion in order that the troops could be properly trained in them. He was obliged, accordingly, to ensure that National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) was aware that a sufficient amount of time specified by him was required, to press the NDHQ to produce the ROE within that time, and to rectify any insufficiencies that may have emerged in the process.

He did not do this. He did not require any change in schedule to facilitate an earlier production of the ROE. Evidently, he did not think earlier production was required. Though he was aware that the ROE were not ratified until December 11, 1992, on the day the advance party was to be deployed, and only two days before the advance party was in fact deployed, he felt there was adequate time to familiarize all the soldiers with the ROE, and properly train them on the ROE.14 He stated that the ROE could have been taught to the forces an hour or two at night, or during a deployment flight.15

We do not accept MGen Reay's inaction regarding such a critical issue as the production of ROE. MGen Reay failed to appreciate the fundamental importance of adequate ROE training, and the need for having adequate time for that purpose. He passively and unacceptably allowed events to occur as they did. He did not emphasize to his commander and to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) that more time was needed and, thus, failed in discharging his responsibility.

  1. Failure to advise that an adequate reporting system dealing with operational readiness and effectiveness in the Canadian Land Forces be put in place.
As the principal staff officer in LFC, MGen Reay ought to have ensured that an adequate operational readiness system was in place and that a requirement for a formal declaration of operational readiness for Operation Deliverance was ordered. He ought then to have satisfied himself that such declarations were in fact made and made legitimately, and should have ensured follow-up through staff action to remedy any deficiencies uncovered.

He did not do this. First, he ought to have known that the existing operational readiness reporting system was flawed. MGen Reay had been alerted to the serious leadership problems and the numerous disciplinary incidents within the Regiment. Given the short time frame between the time he was alerted, and MGen MacKenzie's declaration of operational readiness, MGen Reay should have known that everything could not have been rectified within that time and that deficiencies in the reporting system must therefore have existed. Instead of pursuing this matter, and despite knowing the importance of operational readiness declarations,16 MGen Reay chose to rely on MGen MacKenzie's declaration with an unquestioning acceptance,17 and without appropriate action to ensure that any deficiencies had been remedied. We find this an unacceptable failure.

Second, the LFC warning order for Operation Deliverance dated December 5, 1992, did not require that the Battle Group be declared operationally ready.18 Despite LGen (ret) Reay's admission that this was an oversight,19 there is no evidence suggesting he did anything to remedy this situation. LGen (ret) Reay believed that despite the oversight, there would have been no doubt that an operational readiness declaration of a sort was required and transmitted when LFC transferred the Battle Group over to the Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS) command. However, the formal declaration of operational readiness for Operation Deliverance that issued from LFC occurred after the advance party was deployed.20 He therefore failed to ensure that a formal declaration based on an objective assessment of the CAR's readiness was prepared and forwarded.

  1. Failure to ensure that a proper estimate of the potential implications of establishing the manning ceiling at 900 land (army) personnel was undertaken.
As an element of his larger responsibilities as Deputy Commander, MGen Reay ought to have made certain that a proper estimate of the potential implications of the ill-considered manning ceiling was undertaken. MGen Reay did not do this. Neither did he attempt to ascertain how the 900-personnel number was reached. In his testimony he stated that one possible reason for the number is that "900 is a nice round number".21 Nor could he remember with any certainty what he did to attempt to increase the number. He stated that "I'm almost certain that I had one or two discussions with General Addy",22 but then indicated that his underlying attitude was one of passive resignation: "when all was said and done certainly in the month of December was a pretty clear statement that that's the ceiling and you must work within it."23

This attitude is unacceptable to us. MGen Reay bore the important responsibility of ensuring that all aspects of the deployment process were carefully considered. He ought to have either taken a personal interest in this matter, or directed one of his many subordinates to investigate and then inform him of the results.

  1. [This allegation deleted pursuant to the order dated June 17, 1997 of Mr. Justice Teitelbaum of the Federal Court of Canada.]
  2. Failure to ensure that all members of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia were adequately trained and tested in the Law of War or the Law of Armed Conflict including the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of armed conflict.
As Deputy Commander and principal staff officer of LFC in the fall of 1992, MGen Reay ought to have ensured that all members of the CJFS were adequateiy trained and tested in the Law of Armed Conflict before they were deployed to Somalia and that sufficient time was provided for these activities. He did not do this. We know that the Canadian troops received inadequate training in the Law of Armed Conflict, that the soldiers received no written materials on the subject, and that they were generally unprepared in theatre for situations about which they ought to have been knowledgeable. We therefore find that MGen Reay failed to adequately direct and supervise the training on the Law of Armed Conflict for peace support operations.

NOTES

  1. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8940, 8941-8942.
  2. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 9006.
  3. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcript vol. 45, p. 9005.
  4. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 9007-9008; this included the throwing of pyrotechnics; Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, who testified that he informed senior officers at LFC HQ of the throwing of pyrotechnics and the car-burning incident, Transcripts vol. 43, pp. 8525-8528.
  5. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcript vol. 46, pp. 9029-9035, 9026-9027; see also Document book 29, tab 7.
  6. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 9006.
  7. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 9010.
  8. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9039.
  9. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9039-9040.
  10. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9032.
  11. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9035.
  12. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9029-9031, 9192-9199.
  13. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 9019.
  14. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9134-9136.
  15. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9135-9136.
  16. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9128.
  17. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9132.
  18. Document book 30, tab 22.
  19. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9126-9128.
  20. December 18, 1992, Document book 32D, tab 9.
  21. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9100.
  22. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9114.
  23. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, p. 9114.
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