We advised BGen Ernest Beno that we would consider allegations that he exercised poor and inappropriate leadership in the pre-deployment phase by failing:

1. In declaring the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group operationally ready when he knew, or ought to have known, that such was not the case;

2. To notify his superiors of the nature and extent of the leadership and discipline problems of which he was aware, or ought to have been aware, within the Canadian Airborne Regiment prior to its deployment, and, in specific, to advise MGen MacKenzie of:
   1. his concerns about the state of discipline and the questionable attitudes of members of the Regiment as evidenced by:
      1. the fact that ammunition had been seized during a search conducted under LCol Morneault's command;
         
      2. the fact that 32 Confederate flags had been seized and that flag was regularly displayed on Base Petawawa;
         
      3. the fact that there were alcohol problems in the Regiment in the weeks and months prior to deployment;
         
      4. the fact that he had identified persons he thought should be left behind when the Regiment was deployed;
   2. the occurrence of the three October 1992 incidents;

3. To make provisions for the troops to be trained in or tested on the newly developed Rules of Engagement;

4. To provide adequate guidance to both LCol Morneault and LCol Mathieu as to how to prevent or resolve the discipline problems within the Regiment;

5. To ensure that LCol Mathieu resolved the disciplinary and leadership problems within the Regiment prior to its deployment.

6. To ensure that all Special Service Force members of Canadian Joint Force Somalia were adequately trained and tested in the Law of War or the Law of Armed Conflict including the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of armed conflict; and

7. In his duty as a Commander as defined by analogy to Queen's Regulations and Orders art. 4.20 and in military custom.
   

We now address these allegations in order.

1. Failure in declaring the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group operationally ready when he knew, or ought to have known, that such was not the case.
   

As the Commander of the Special Service Force (SSF), BGen Beno was responsible for assessing and personally satisfying himself on the state of readiness of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR), and to declare readiness only when he was satisfied that the declaration was fitting.¹ To discharge this responsibility, BGen Beno ought to have actively ensured through objective measures that the CAR was in fact operationally ready when he declared it so. He did not do this.

When BGen Beno declared the CAR operationally ready on November 13, 199², he knew that a number of notable problems in the CAR still existed and required significant attention.² Thus he knew, or ought to have known, that by November l³th very little had been done to address the very serious disciplinary incidents of early October.³ BGen Beno himself said that these incidents "challenge the leadership of the unit",⁴ and on this issue we take him at his word: he knew a concerted, deliberate intervention was required as a response, and he knew that no such intervention had taken place.⁵ He also knew that sub-unit leadership, at least with regard to Maj Seward and Capt Rainville, was not at a proper standard.⁶ He himself had advised LCol Mathieu to leave both men behind, and he ought to have determined if his advice had been heeded, which it was not.⁷ Nothing, in fact, was done in this regard. Finally, BGen Beno knew or ought to have known that the many training deficiencies noted in Stalwart Providence could not have been and were not resolved by November 13th. If he had put his mind to this matter, there was an array of circumstances he could have considered. He ought to have known that only four weeks had elapsed between the end of the training exercise and the readiness declaration, that the soldiers were on embarkation leave for two of these weeks, that much of the equipment required for further training was unavailable due to deployment preparations, that only a negligible amount of training had been performed after the training exercise, Stalwart Providence, that mission-specific rules of engagement (ROE) had yet to be issued, that the mission-specific training was inadequate, that the CAR had not trained as a regiment, that there was a lack of cohesiveness among units, that the soldiers had not been properly trained in respect of the Law of Armed Conflict, that the individual companies had not by that time been properly assessed by their new Commanding Officer (CO), and that the mere three weeks between the appointment of LCol Mathieu and the November 13th declaration was insufficient to allow for a sufficient integration of the new leader.

Despite this protracted list of obvious deficiencies in respect of discipline, leadership and training, each detail of which BGen Beno knew or ought to have known,⁸ and despite having himself stated on October l⁹th that because of such deficiencies the "unit is clearly not 'operational' and will not be so until [they] are resolved",⁹ BGen Beno declared the CAR operationally ready on November l3th. This was a serious failure.

BGen Beno's headquarters also issued a readiness declaration on December ¹⁰, 1992, for Operation Deliverance.10 This, too, was a notable lapse of judgement. Regarding this latter declaration, BGen Beno did not at any time personally assess the readiness of the Regiment in light of the significant changes resulting from the move to a Chapter VII United Nations mission, in light of the acute uncertainty over many aspects of the final deployment, and in light of the truncated, hasty planning conducted during pre-deployment preparations. No review was made by BGen Beno of the measures taken to redress any of the outstanding disciplinary concems,¹¹ and a comprehensive evaluation of the many training and administrative problems persisting throughout that period was not undertaken.¹² Despite these inadequacies, a readiness declaration was issued.

The issuing of these declarations constituted a considerable failure on the part of BGen Beno.

2. To notify his superiors of the nature and extent of the leadership and discipline problems of which he was aware, or ought to have been aware, within the Canadian Airborne Regiment prior to its deployment, and, in specific, to advise MGen MacKenzie of:
   1. his concerns about the state of discipline and the questionable attitudes of members of the Regiment as evidenced by:
      1. the fact that ammunition had been seized during a search conducted under LCol Morneault's command;
         
      2. the fact that 32 Confederate flags had been seized and that flag was regularly displayed on Base Petawawa;
         
      3. the fact that there were alcohol problems in the Regiment in the weeks and months prior to deployment;
         
      4. the fact that he had identified persons he thought should be left behind when the Regiment was deployed;
   2. the occurrence of the three October 1992 incidents;

Underlying the present allegation are two important responsibilities of the Commander SSF. First, BGen Beno ought to have informed himself, by personal investigation or otherwise, of any leadership and disciplinary problems within the CAR during pre-deployment preparations. Following this, and as a function of proper communication within the chain of command, he then ought to have informed his superiors, especially MGen MacKenzie, in an accurate and timely fashion of the problems of which he had informed himself. These are important responsibilities that must be discharged in a competent manner. In default of such a discharge, a considerable erosion in the proper functioning of the command structure might occur.

BGen Beno's conduct in informing his superiors as he did was far below standard, and a critical weakness in the command chain occurred as a result. BGen Beno knew that there were acute leadership and discipline problems in the CAR. He knew that ammunition had been seized during a search ordered by LCol Morneault.¹³ He knew that several Confederate flags had been seized, and must have seen it displayed on the base premises.¹⁴ He knew of individuals who should not be deployed to Somalia.¹⁵ He was intimately aware of the three significant incidents of October 2nd and 3rd -- the disturbance at the junior officers' club, the expending of pyrotechnics at Algonquin Park and, especially, the torching of a vehicle belonging to the 2 Commando duty officer. He also knew the CAR had a significant history of disciplinary problems.¹⁶ Though he testified that he was unaware of any alcohol problems,¹⁷ he ought to have recognized the strong possibility that alcohol was partly responsible for the disciplinary problems within the CAR, and he ought to have known from his own observation that alcohol misuse was frequent, as it was easily detectable.

He also ought to have known that this alarming list of problems during the pre-deployment phase of an important overseas mission ought to have been communicated in a timely and accurate manner upward in the chain of command. But the communication that did take place was clearly inadequate. BGen Beno never spoke to MGen MacKenzie in full detail or MGen MacKenzie's Chief of Staff about the October incidents.¹⁸ He did not inform MGen MacKenzie that alcohol problems were apparent within the CAR.¹⁹ He did not inform MGen MacKenzie of the use of the Confederate flag or of the ammunition seizures, or of the list of individuals he had identified to be left behind. BGen Beno could recall no discussions with MGen MacKenzie about disciplinary problems after sending a letter on October l9th to him in which he briefly mentioned them.²⁰

Neither did he know what information may have been passed to LGen Gervais or MGen Reay, for, as he stated, he himself "did not deal with General Reay or General Gervais" and he himself passed "nothing" to them.²¹ We note in this context that BGen Beno was, on the other hand, quite eager to inform LGen Gervais -- on several occasions -- that LCol Morneault was failing in his command. This discrepancy, in our opinion, speaks for itself.

Had BGen Beno adequately informed MGen MacKenzie or any of the other senior leaders in greater and more complete detail of the many aspects of the many leadership and disciplinary problems in the CAR, both might have been dealt with effectively. In the complete absence of timely and accurate communications concerning important aspects of the unit to be sent overseas, we are at a loss to understand how BGen Beno could have expected the command chain to exercise the control and supervision proper to its mandate. It did not, and the result is not surprising.

3. Failure to make provisions for the troops to be trained or tested on the newly developed Rules of Engagement.

As the Commander SSF responsible for pre-deployment training preparations, BGen Beno ought to have ensured that the CAR was adequately trained and tested on the ROE developed specifically for the Chapter VII Somalia mission. In light of the uniqueness of this deployment, BGen Beno ought to have taken a personal interest in this issue to guarantee that all matters regarding the use of force were clearly understood, but he did not. He did not devise, direct or order any ROE training. He did not himself supervise any ROE training. Though he stated that he "pushed right to the last minute"²² for ROE to be issued, he was, in our opinion, unconcerned about the fact that no time remained from the time of issuance for any proper training to be conducted. According to BGen Beno, soldiers do not need to "be practiced in the specific Rules of Engagement",²³ and ROF training need amount to no more than a "mental exercise"²⁴ that "can be done in an airplane".²⁵

We do not agree with BGen Beno's opinions. Adequate ROE training cannot be performed "in an airplane". And it requires much more than a classroom-style "mental exercise". We furthermore find it difficult to credit BGen Beno's concerns that the troops did not have the Rules of Engagement during training, and that they did not have a lot of time to practise them in the environment of Petawawa.²⁶ Given his view of the relative unimportance of mission-specific ROE training, and his professed ideas concerning the nature of such training and what it should accomplish, he would have had little reason for the concern he claimed. He demonstrated no such concern in his actions: at best, BGen Beno did nothing more in respect of ROE training than to aid in the production of 'a soldier's card'.²⁷

BGen Beno had a duty to ensure that the members of the CAR fully understood the ROE and were adequately trained and practised in the ROE before deployment. He failed to discharge this duty.

4. Failure to provide adequate guidance to both LCol Morneault and LCo1 Mathieu as to how to prevent or resolve the discipline problems within the Regiment.

As an aspect of his responsibility to actively supervise his subordinates, BGen Beno ought to have provided adequate guidance to both LCol Morneault and LCol Mathieu regarding the serious disciplinary problems within the CAR. BGen Beno knew of the seriousness of these problems,²⁸ he knew that the CAR and especially 2 Commando had a history of disciplinary problems,²⁹ and he knew that little time remained before deployment to effectively deal with them. He also knew that a concerted, deliberate effort was required regardless of any such time constraints. Despite such knowledge, BGen Beno failed to intervene with the appropriate guidance.

With regard to LCol Morneault, BGen Beno ought to have supported his attempts to sort out discipline problems, and, in particular, ought to have either supported the plan to threaten to leave 2 Cdo behind or offered an alternative. BGen Beno did neither and flatly stated to LCol Morneault: "No, I will not support you. You are elevating the problem to my level. It is your problem, you sort it out."³⁰ However, we agree with LGen (ret) Gervais that the problem should in fact "have been sorted out within the brigade unit level",³¹ and furthermore that if it had been found to be "a bigger problem than individuals", as it was, the appropriate solution would have been to "leave the Commando out of the operation and replace it with another company".³²

It was incumbent upon BGen Beno to assume supervisory responsibility for these disciplinary problems and to involve himself in some perceptible manner in aiding LCol Morneault to resolve them. He did not.

When LCol Mathieu took over command of the CAR, BGen Beno again left the resolution of the serious disciplinary problems to the newly arrived CO. Beyond expressing reservations about the suitability of certain officers and making suggestions regarding the reassignment of a number of soldiers within the Regiment, BGen Beno's actions were insufficient to assist LCol Mathieu in resolving the disciplinary problems.

Neither did he offer guidance in terms of any deficiencies in LCol Mathieu's attempts to deal with them. Although these deficiencies were clearly apparent, BGen Beno did not monitor LCol Mathieu, though he ought to have, and did not appropriately advise LCol Mathieu on how a satisfactory resolution could be sought. He left the matter entirely in the hands of the new CO and did nothing himself after that point.³³

5. Failure to ensure that LCo1 Mathieu resolved the disciplinary and leadership problems within the Regiment prior to its deployment.

BGen Beno also ought to have actively involved himself and ensured that the discipline and leadership problems were in fact resolved before the troops were deployed.

Despite BGen Beno's testimony that LCol Mornault's failure to resolve the discipline and leadership problems factored significantly in the removal of LCol Morneault, BGen Beno concerned himself little with these problems subsequent to replacing LCol Morneault.³⁴ He in fact did no more than brief LCol Mathieu on the disciplinary situation and to suggest that certain officers not be deployed and that certain soldiers be reassigned within the Regiment. He then abdicated any further supervisory role and relied entirely upon LCol Mathieu's assurances that the issues had been properly dealt with. He did not inquire beyond these assurances but remained passive and uninvolved.³⁵

BGen Beno's passivity did not go unnoticed. LGen (ret) Gervais testified that BGen Beno was "not aggressive enough" and that "he should have been more direct" with respect to these disciplinary issues.³⁶ LGen (ret) Reay also testified that BGen Beno ought to have done more:

[A]s I look back, and I look back particularly at the brigade commander, I believe...that General Beno was not aggressive enough personally to satisfy himself that the problem [had] been resolved, or that suggestions that he had made were not necessarily being honoured.... I believe that there were some things that he could and should have done knowing what he did.³⁷

As a result of BGen Beno's passivity, and his failure to ensure personally that serious disciplinary problems were resolved before the deployment, these problems accompanied the CAR to Somalia.

6. Failure to ensure that all Special Service Force members of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia were adequately trained and tested in the Law of War or the Law of Armed Conflict including the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of armed conflict.

As a general in the Canadian army, BGen Beno ought to have known that an understanding of the Law of Armed Conflict and related military doctrine is essential for the lawful conduct of military operations, and that all soldiers should be familiar with these basic legal obligations in situations of potential or actual conflict. BGen Beno thus ought to have ensured that the CAR was adequately trained in these essential legal principles. He failed in his duty to do so.

Little attention was paid to Law of Armed Conflict training, and the relatively brief lecture given by Lcol Watkin on December 10, 1992, almost immediately before deployment, could not possibly communicate all the information needed by CF members to understand and apply the Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Convention doctrines.³⁸ Nor was the information given in this lecture adequately disseminated. Finally, even if it had been, such so-called dissemination is inadequate to the task, given the depth of understanding that soldiers must acquire concerning these fundamental principles. BGen Beno ought to have understood this and taken steps to remedy the deficiency.

7. Failure in his duty as a Commander as defined by analogy to Queen's Regulations and Orders art. 4.20 and in military custom.

Given our findings above concerning the leadership failures of BGen Beno, and in view of the importance of control and supervision within the chain of command, we conclude that BGen Beno failed as a commander.

1. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 8089.
2. Many of these problems are mentioned in his letter of October 19, 1992 requesting the removal of LCol Morneault. Document book 15, tab 18.
3. BGen Beno knew that the specific action taken amounted to little more than the posting out of six individuals for disciplinary reasons, but he did not know specifically who was left behind and for what reason. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7925,7929-7930, 7938-7939, 8096.
4. Document book 15, tab 18.
5. BGen Beno testified that he left the resolution of these matters entirely in the hands of LCol Mathieu, and that he did not inquire beyond LCol Mathieu's assurances that the problems were being resolved. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7929,7939, 7943. BGen Beno also rightly admitted responsibility for the actions LCol Mathieu took to resolve the problems. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8136.
6. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947-7948.
7. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7947-7948; Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts, vol. 168, pp. 34619-34625.
8. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7801, 7849-7851; vol. 41, pp. 7964-7965; Document book 15, tab 27.
9. Document book 15, tab 18 (emphasis added).
10. See DND026433.
11. BGen Beno relied entirely on LCol Mathieu's assurances. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7925,7929, 7939,7943, 8058: Testimony of LCol (ret) Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 168, pp. 34619-34668.
12. BGen Beno received "briefings" from LCol Mathieu regarding administrative preparedness. He also admitted that there was no table of organization and equipment prepared for Operation Deliverance, such table being a crucial component of administrative preparation. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7967-7969.
13. Document book 4, tab 4
14. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 42, p. 8134; Evidence of BGen Beno, BOI, vol. 2, p. 260. See Testimony of Maj Wilson who recalls having seen it on the base from time to time. Transcripts vol. 28, pp. 5415-5416.
15. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7918-7919.
16. See Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5737.
17. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7953-7954.
18. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 8065-8066; Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts, vol. 42, pp. 8317-8320.
19. Testimony of MGen (ret) MacKenzie, Transcripts vol. 43, p. 8481.
20. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8064.
21. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 8064.
22. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7977.
    
23. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7975.
24. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7975.
25. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7977.
26. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7977.
27. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, p. 7977.
28. See Document book 15, tab 18. Also see Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6973-6976.
29. See Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5737.
30. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, pp. 6975-6976.
31. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9759.
32. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9470.
33. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7925,7929, 7939,7943, 8058.
34. See, for example, Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, p. 7862.
35. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 41, pp. 7925, 7929,7939, 7943, 8058.
36. Testimony of LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9792.
37. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9038-9039.
38. We do not fault LCol Watkin for this.