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LCol Mathieu was first alerted to the possible deficiencies regarding these officers on the day he took command as CO of the CAR. At a briefing on that day, BGen Beno expressed serious reservations about Maj Seward and Capt Rainville, and recommended that LCol Mathieu leave them behind when the troops were deployed.1
LCol (ret) Mathieu stated that because BGen Beno did not give "any...specific reason why" he felt the two should not be deployed, he "began to do a bit of investigative work"2 to satisfy himself about the General's concerns. He spoke to the former CO about the officers, then subsequently reviewed the officers' personnel files.3 No more was done by him beyond these measures. Then, as a result of these 'investigations', LCol Mathieu concluded that the officers were satisfactory and that they should be deployed to Somalia.4 Indeed, he kept Capt Rainville as commander of the Recce Platoon, and took no further measures to confirm the competence of these two key officers after his initial assessment.
Regarding Maj Seward, LCol (ret) Mathieu added the qualification that he was hesitant to replace Maj Seward because "I figured that changing the CO was enough turmoil at that time."5 This passive attitude was displayed to the Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM), CWO Jardine, who also advised LCol Mathieu to relieve Maj Seward of command.6 CWO (ret) Jardine testified that LCol Mathieu responded to his advice by suggesting "there was nothing he could do about it at that time, it should have been done before he came into the Regiment."7 LCol Mathieu, in other words, implied that such matters as correcting deficiencies in sub-unit leadership were not his responsibility, but were those of the former CO, LCol Morneault. LCol Mathieu also told the RSM that concerning the matter of relieving Maj Seward, "Well, that's not within my realm, sort of, I'm just the new kid on the block here."8
Regarding Capt Rainville, LCol (ret) Mathieu testified that he in fact knew of both the incident at La Citadelle and the verbal reprimand administered by LCol Morneault.9 He ought to have known of the Gagetown incident, as it was referred to in the document evidencing LCol Morneault's verbal reprimand. He had access to BGen Dallaire's letter stating that Capt Rainville showed a "flagrant lack ofjudgment".10 Finally, he had received a letter from BGen Beno concerning the Journal de Montréal pictures, the final paragraph of which stated that BGen Beno had "grave doubts about this particular officer".11 LCol Mathieu responded to this letter with a call to BGen Beno, stating that BGen Beno "was satisfied with my reply".12 As regards the action he took against Capt Rainville, LCol (ret) Mathieu said he "discussed the matter in question"13 with the Captain, and was thereby satisfied that any concerns had been dealt with.
The actions LCol Mathieu took in dealing with the
leadership problems of Maj Seward and Capt Rainville were seriously
inadequate. He was told by his superior officer that the two should
be left behind, but treated this advice as dispensable under the
circumstances. He knew or should have known of the history of
problems relating to these two officers. He had access to documented
evidence that should have raised a serious question in his mind
as to whether these officers should have been deployed. Instead
of pursuing these matters, he resigned himself to the time constraints
he faced: he said he simply did not have the time to form his
own opinion.14 It seems to us that a responsible CO
in this situation would take seriously the solemn concerns expressed
to him by other officers, including his superior, and would have
taken the time to confirm whether these doubts had merit. Even
with a cursory examination, LCol Mathieu could not have but concluded
that these doubts had a strong bas is in reality given the nature
of the concerns expressed to him. He had at his disposal reports
from the training exercise, Stalwart Providence, the opinions
of the officers who had observed and interacted with Maj Seward
and Capt Rainville, and had his Commander's strong recommendation.
He also had access to personnel files which, at least in the case
of Capt Rainville, revealed obvious and serious discipline, judgement,
and leader ship flaws. Considering this, we fail to see why LCol
Mathieu did not give the matter of removing these officers more
serious consideration. When deployment is imminent, it is crucial
that a unit be staffed with competent, reliable, and balanced
officers. This should be an overriding concern to a CO, and LCol
Mathieu's actions regarding this issue show a serious failure
on his part to ensure that these problems were resolved.
LCol Mathieu also inherited a number of disciplinary
problems -- in particular, outstanding matters pertaining to the
incidents of early October -- when he assumed command and, through
his responsibilities as CO, was charged with the duty to ensure
these problems were resolved. He clearly know of these problems.
He was briefed by BGen Beno on the unresolved disciplinary incidents
upon assuming command, but his actions suggest he did little to
settle the issues raised before him. Regarding the car-burning
incident, LCol Mathieu had received a preliminary MP report but
stated "we didn't do anything with it",15
the rationale being that a military lawyer once told him "you
don't touch [MP reports]. You look and you lay no charges with
[them] because it's no use."16
LCol (ret) Mathieu's testimony contrasts sharply with that of LCol Morneault on the suggested approach to resolving this incident. With respect to the list provided in the MP report, LCol Morneault stated "I would have tried at my level each and every one of these gentlemen", that he would have left behind any he had found guilty, with the possible exception of Cpl Powers, and that he had a "strong feeling" that he would have found all on the list guilty.17 LCo1 Morneault advised LCo1 Mathieu to use the MP reports in the manner suggested, and that he be resolute in pursuing these issues.18 LCol Mathieu did not follow this advice.
Eschewing the MP report, LCol Mathieu instead "chatted...a little" with Maj Seward about the incident but stated that nothing conclusive came as a result.19 In the end, the action taken regarding this incident was that "two sergeants who were a bit weak were transferred."20 Whether or not this was even initiated by LCol Mathieu was not made clear in testimony.
Regarding the other outstanding incidents, LCol Mathieu imposed disciplinary action that amounted to no more than shuffling a few members between the commandos.21 LCol (ret) Mathieu stated that he also had presumed the downsizing of the CAR occurring at the time would have weeded out the undesirable elements.22
Shuffling members between commandos and relying on the presumption that administrative downsizing would accomplish disciplinary goals is a thin basis on which to build disciplinary order. MGen (ret) MacKenzie himself testified that something more than a mere shuffle should have taken place.23 In our eyes, such 'action' amounts to inaction. What is perhaps worse is that behind LCol Mathieu's inaction lay a theory that problematic individuals make the best soldiers in theatre. He stated: "the people who make trouble generally at the disciplinary level, in the garrison, are generally your best elements when you go."24 Thus, perhaps it is not surprising that LCol Mathieu deployed with MCpl Matchee, Pte Brown, Cpl McKay, and Pte Brocklebank, all of whom were implicated in serious breaches of discipline in theatre, and ail of whom appeared on the MP lists that LCol Mathieu had received before deployment. Neither is it surprising that among these four, MCpl Matchee, who had a record of previous incidents, was promoted by LCol Mathieu before the troops were deployed.25
LCol Mathieu's attitude to the disciplinary problems
he faced, and the methods he employed to resolve them, are unacceptable.
A CO bears the primary responsibility for ensuring the proper
discipline of a unit. From his testimony, LCol Mathieu cared little
about the details of the problems he faced. Neither did he concern
himself with pursuing the problems to the proper outcome. ("I
presume they left the least desirable elements."26)
The methods he employed ("a small shuffle within"27)
were inadequate. The promotion, furthermore, of MCpl Matchee,
was a considerable error in light of events both before and after
he was promoted. Finally, to the extent that LCol (ret) Mathieu
disclaimed knowledge of pertinent events, or of persons thought
to have been involved in them, there is evidence that he was neglectful
in fulfilling his duties as CO. Obtaining such knowledge is crucial
to a CO's disciplinary function and must be made a priority in
all circumstances.
It was also LCol Mathieu's responsibility to adequately
assess and substantiate the declaration of operational readiness
of the CAR and the Canadian Airbome Regiment Battle Croup (CARBG).
This is a crucial assessment function that can be carried out
by active inquiry only; nothing less will suffice. We found nothing
in the evidence before us suggesting that any such inquiry was
carried out. The CAR was declared operationally ready for Operation
Cordon on November 13,1992, littie more than two weeks after LCol
Mathieu assumed command. In that period the only training that
occurred was described by Maj Seward as "of a filler nature",28
and of neither a kind nor duration upon which one could assess
operational readiness. Indeed, the troops were on embarkation
leave for two weeks. Maj Seward also testified that, in any event,
LCol Mathieu had "very little"29 involvement
with training.
The training conducted for Operation Deliverance, and LCol Mathieu's involvement in it, were similarly scant. The schedule covered only 10 days in duration,30 and the training was intended to provide at least some exposure to the operational requirements of the new mission. However, considering the short duration, this exposure was very restricted, and the general perception of officers and soldiers was that events were far too hurried. LCol (ret) Mathieu himself shared this opinion, but added that he did not exert his influence to achieve a change of pace because "I had a schedule to stick to, I was told 'that's what you're going to do.' In the army, I follow orders; so I went."31 He furthermore stated that if he had advised that his Regiment was not ready, "Well, they would have said 'bye-bye' Mathieu, and brought in someone else."32 When questioned further on the ramifications of a rushed preparation, LCol (ret) Mathieu testified that the CAR was in any event designed "to be deployed at all times",33 and that rushed circumstances did not pose a serious obstacle. He therefore agreed that when an order issues from the higher echelons, a 'can do' attitude is the appropriate response.34
From the evidence, LCol Mathieu did nothing to assess
or substantiate the operational readiness of the CAR or the CARBG
before deployment. He was minimally involved in the scant pre-deployment
training conducted during his command, and by his own admission
was able to observe very little of the operational capabilities
of his troops. Furthermore, he did not question the time constraints
placed upon him, and was content to deploy simply with the preparation
that could be arranged in the time available. He did not run his
own regimental exercise, and did not command his troops in a simulated
environment. LCol Mathieu bore the primary responsibility for
ensuring that the CAR was operationally ready after he took over
command from LCol Morneault. It was his responsibility to express
any concerns about the operational readiness of the unit and to
alert the chain of command accordingly. Without an adequate assessment
of the CAR's training preparedness, LCol Mathieu failed in one
of his important tasks as CO.
As the primary officer responsible for training,
LCol Mathieu ought to have ensured that the members of the CARBG
were trained and tested on, and had an adequate understanding
of, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Operation Deliverance prior
to deployment. To facilitate this training, he ought to have pressed
National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) for an early production of
the ROE. Having taken command on October 26th, LCol Mathieu had
two months to actively pursue these matters. According to the
evidence, however, LCol Mathieu did not actively pursue this matter.
In his testimony, he stated that the ROE were received only very late in the deployment process. Members of the advance party received their ROE for Operation Deliverance on December l2th, just as they were about to deploy, and the main body received them "as they were getting their final administrative arrangements before their departure".35 Regarding the advance party, LCol (ret) Mathieu explained that "if there hadn't been a blizzard on the night of the 11th, we would have left without ROE."36 LCol (ret) Mathieu also explained that the late timing was of little consequence because ROE training is an inherent part of basic soldier training. The soldiers being deployed therefore had a presumptive knowledge of the ROE.37
To our amazement and consternation, LCol (ret) Mathieu also stated clearly that the actual rules of engagement per se are a formality more than anything else. When asked if he felt the soldiers were prepared adequately in the ROE, LCol (ret) Mathieu replied that training occurred in practical situations, on the ground.38 "Training goes on continuously."39 He added, furthermore, that the soldiers "had 36 hours to read them, to read their stuif",40 and that they were reminded frequently of the ROE in the orders groups they attended. This, in his mind, comprised adequate ROE training. When asked whether in this "training" hypothetical situations or scenarios were posed to the soldiers, LCol (ret) Mathieu stated, "you'd have to ask the commando OCs what they did, because I spoke about it with them."41 Regarding his own personal command input into this training process, LCol (ret) Mathieu stated that he asked his OCs "if they were confident that their men understood the Rules of Engagement".42 They told him they were, and although LCol Mathieu did not know how they gained this confidence, he was in any event satisfied with their responses.
We do not accept LCol (ret) Mathieu's explanations
regarding proper methods of ROE training. Neither do we find acceptable
the methods he actually employed, or his acceptance of the timing
for the production of the ROE. As Capt Walsh stated, ROE should
be produced "as early as possible in the mounting phase...
[T]here is no time to pull out a card at the last minute."43
It is furthermore unacceptable that ROE training was left to a
36-hour period during which the soldiers were left "to read
their stuff". ROE training is an important deployment matter,
and a CO can never trust that it has occurred "on the ground".
Furthermore, that LCol (ret) Mathieu would state that "you
would have to ask the commando OCs what they did" only suggests
that he really did not know the degree to which the soldiers felt
comfortable in their knowledge of the ROE, whether they actually
knew them, and whether they were in fact adequately trained to
respond to scenarios they would face while in Somalia. These are
ail important aspects of ROE training, and are responsibilities
that fell squarely on the shoulders of LCol Mathieu as CO of the
CAR. LCol Mathieu, however, did not fulfil these responsibilities.
Instead, his contribution was the publication of an aide-mémoire
card that was subsequently handed out to his soldiers.
As the officer primarily responsible for training,
LCol Mathieu was responsible for determining whether the CAR had
been sufficiently trained and was knowledgeable in the Law of
Armed Conflict, and he ought to have remedied any deficiencies
noted. It seems to us that LCol Mathieu was personally well trained
to identify such deficiencies, as he should have been. In a paper
written by him in 1984, entitled "New Horizons:
Law of War Training for the Canadian Forces: A Luxury or a Necessity",44
Maj Mathieu stated that the chain of command must be trained "to
a high level of knowledge through formal lectures and seminars
conducted as part of unit officers' and senior noncommissioned
officers' training".45 The chain of command "must
also be taught not to tolerate any deviation from the provision
of the conventions and to enforce the meaning of the law".46
If it is not, he concluded, "the CF could be faced with potential
situations similar to the 'My Lai Incident' in future conflicts
if the state of law of war training remains at its present low
standard".47
Regarding the actual training conducted, LCol (ret) Mathieu said he arranged for the officers and senior non-commissioned officers to attend a lecture given by LCol Watkin on December 10th.48 Further, he requested that officers brief their respective chains of command and soldiers. LCol Mathieu did not, however, conduct courses and did not put his soldiers through practical exercises on the treatment of detainees.49 Rather, he assumed that a soldier would know what to do. When LCol (ret) Mathieu was then asked to note that several soldiers testified to not knowing what LCol Mathieu presumed they should know, he replied:
You may have fallen victim to the soldier's first defence. When in doubt, play the fool. Because when you go into the army, you learn to treat prisoners with dignity. Because prisoners are pretty simple. You capture them, you secure them. If they are injured, you take care of them.... It's as simple as that.50
This confusion does not accord with the more appropriate standards espoused by Maj Mathieu in his 1984 paper, and it does a disservice to the soldiers for whom LCol Mathieu was responsible. Furthermore, it relinquishes responsibility for ensuring an adequate state of knowledge in favour of relying on the exigencies of varied training programs over long periods of time, none of which, as the evidence suggested, emphasized either the Geneva Conventions or the Law of Armed Conflict. Even regarding the December l0th lecture, LCol Mathieu was remiss in his responsibilities. He stated that LCol Watkin merely passed out reading materials to the officers dealing with the basic principles. He also stated that "those officers pass it on, they disseminate the information."51 LCol (ret) Mathieu was obviously speaking from theory, for he did not know that Maj Seward of 2 Commando did not "disseminate the information".52 He also stated that he was "pretty sure" that the seminar information "must have filtered down" to the appropriate levels. However, no evidence of any such 'filtering' was presented during the hearings, and there is no evidence that LCol Mathieu took appropriate and reasonable steps to ensure or to verify that the information had been passed down and understood. For his part, Maj Seward stated that he received no instruction to pass the contents of the lecture on to his soldiers.53
The training conducted by LCol Mathieu on the Geneva
Conventions and the Law of Armed Conflict was inadequate. So,
too, was his knowledge of what training or information was actually
given to the soldiers. LCol Mathieu merely
relied on assumptions which proved to be unfounded.
The troops were not comfortable with their knowledge of the Geneva
Conventions as he assumed they were. They obviously did not all
know how detainees should be treated and, in fact, did not evidence
any standard treatment procedure in theatre, where detainee problems
were numerous.54 Moreover, neither direction nor guidance
was given to the OCs by LCol Mathieu, who again relied on assumptions
that a certain course of training would be conducted. This behaviour
does not suit the standard required of a CO, who must take an
active role in shaping the training of a unit, and must devise
standards against which to assess the adequacy of such training.
In not conscientiously and responsibly ensuring that the Law of
Armed Conflict was understood and that there was adequate training
on the subject matter, LCol Mathieu failed to assume his responsibilities
as a commander toward his men and the military.
Given our findings above concerning the leadership
failures of LCol Mathieu, and in view of the importance of control
and supervision within the chain of command, we conclude that
LCol Mathieu failed as a commander.
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