We advised LCol Paul Morneault that we would consider allegations that he exercised poor and inappropriate leadership in the pre-deployment phase of the Somalia mission by failing:

1. To adequately organize, direct, and supervise the training preparations of the Canadian Airborne Regiment during the period from the receipt of the Warning Order for Operation Cordon until he was relieved of command; and

2. In his duty as Commander as defined by analogy to Queen's Regulations and Orders art. 4.20 and in military custom.

We now address these allegations in order.

1. Failure to adequately organize, direct, and supervise the training preparations of the Canadian Airborne Regiment during the period from the receipt of the Warning Order for Operation Cordon until he was relieved of command.
   

As the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) until October 23,1992, LCol Morneault bore primary responsibility to ensure that training was conducted appropriately during that time with regard to factors relevant to a peacekeeping mission. Training is fundamental to deployment preparations, and is the principal activity through which leadership is exercised, attitudes conveyed, and operational readiness ascertained. Those who bear responsibility for training are therefore expected to pay particular attention to its proper supervision, ensuring that the conduct of training is adequate and appropriate, and that its progression follows a carefully articulated plan.

Accordingly, personal supervision is of utmost importance and must be made one of the highest priorities in the matter of training, if not the overall priority, for it is on the CO that the greatest responsibility for training fails. We find, however, that LCol Morneault failed to meet this important responsibility in two respects. First, he failed to inculcate in his commandos, through the design of an appropriate training plan and through adequate direct supervision, an attitude suitable to a peacekeeping mission.

As a first point, and by his own admission, LCol Morneault dedicated only 15 to 20 percent of his time to supervising the training of his troops.¹ This is, simply stated, an insufficient amount of time spent in direct supervision. Despite his other numerous responsibilities, LCol Morneault was the only person who could realistically assess the extent and adequacy of his personal involvement. At a minimum, then, he should have requested, at the appropriate time and with the proper urgency, changes to the sequence of events and circumstances he faced to allow a full, hands-on involvement in the in-field training experience. He did not do this. Though he sent a letter to BGen Beno expressing some concern on this matter,² the letter was sent far too late, when realistic remedial opportunities were limited and when the chance to impress upon his troops his own personal standards had been largely spent.

Furthermore, LCol Morneault knew his troops were training for a Chapter VI United Nations peacekeeping mission, and he knew or ought to have known that such missions require a broader knowledge base than normal general purpose combat training permits. Despite this, he allowed 2 Commando (2 Cdo) to train in a manner far too focused on general purpose combat skills, and with a level of aggression not in keeping with a peacekeeping mission. LCol Morneault himself admitted that 2 Cdo spent too much time on general purpose combat training, and did not complete the tasks it was assigned.³ LCol Morneault also knew of 2 Cdo's aggressiveness.⁴ He was furthermore warned several times by a number of officers that 2 Cdo was too aggressive. Maj Pommet warned him,⁵ as did his training officer Capt Kyle, who told LCol Morneault very early in the training period that "there was a potential problem with the type of training 2 Cdo was conducting",⁶ and that the Commando seemed overly aggressive. The Regimental Sergeant-Major, CWO Jardine, also expressed concern to LCol Morneault about Maj Seward and 2 Cdo's training. He viewed Maj Seward's use of aggressive attack simulations as inappropriate and, specifically, felt 2 Cdo's problems stemmed from "leadership at the OC level".⁷ Finally, LCol MacDonald told LCol Morneault after Stalwart Providence that Maj Seward was not fit to command and that 2 Cdo was much too aggressive.⁸

We find that LCol Morneault knew early in the training period that 2 Cdo had problems with leadership and aggressiveness, and that these problems were closely linked. He was the primary officer answerable for training, and bore the responsibility of ensuring that pertinent and adequate training was conducted by the appropriate officers commanding (OCs). If any of the OCs were found lacking, it was incumbent upon LCol Morneault to make the required changes. But LCol Morneault did not make these changes. Moreover, the evidence suggests that little was done by him to correct the deficiencies of which he was aware. In response to Capt Kyle's criticisms, he stated that, other than verbal cautions to Maj Seward to tone things down,⁹ he "didn't want to interfere with the commandos -- his OCs' training activities", and that "he was not interested in getting involved to sort that issue out at that point".¹⁰ Capt Kyle was naturally surprised by this response given that "a potential problem had been identified to a commanding officer regarding one of his sub-units" and that LCol Morneault "did not appear to take it serious".¹¹

LCol Morneault responded similarly to LCol MacDonald's criticisms of Maj Seward and 2 Cdo. He told him that he did not want his hands tied with regard to Maj Seward and requested that LCol MacDonald remove critical comments about Maj Seward from a letter LCol MacDonald was to send to BGen Beno.¹² LCoL MacDonald deleted the reference as LCol Morneault requested, and no subsequent action was taken to correct the serious deficiency in 2 Cdo's leadership as noted by LCol MacDonald. Though LCol Morneault was relieved of command almost immediately after this incident, and cannot be held responsible for others' inactions, his direction to LCol MacDonald prevented immediate action from being taken against Maj Seward, and for this he is accountable.

LCol Morneault also failed to adequately instruct his OCs on the aim, scope, and objectives of the training they were to conduct, and failed to include a proper statement of these in the training plan he designed. From his own personal experience, and from the training he received at staff college, LCol Morneault should have known such a statement to be beneficial. He also should have known that a written direction clearly establishing priorities within an overall training concept is an important feature of training direction. He did not do this, and it is not surprising, therefore, that cohesiveness within the CAR's sub-units suffered as a result. On this point, one of the more serious criticisms arising from Stalwart Providence was that the three commandos operated independently without the cohesion required of a regimental unit.¹³ Cohesion develops in accordance with clear training direction issued from the CO, and is ensured only when the CO personally supervises the execution of that direction. LCol Morneault did neither.

We therefore find that LCol Morneault failed to assert his leadership and, thus, to instill, through his presence and adequate supervision of training, a proper attitude and professional competence in his troops, particularly as regards over-aggressiveness, and that he failed to make every effort to draw his unit together as a cohesive whole.

2. Failure in his duty as Commander as defined by analogy to Queen's Regulations and Orders art. 4.20 and in military custom.

Given our findings above concerning the leadership failures of LCol Morneault, and in view of the importance of control and supervision of training for overseas missions, we conclude that LCol Morneault failed as a commander.

NOTES

1. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7068.
2. See Document book MOR3, tab 3.
3. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7107.
4. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7106; Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4823.
5. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7106.
6. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcript vol. 21, p. 3808.
7. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 25, p. 4775.
8. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcript vol. 26, pp. 4985-4986.
9. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7106; vol. 38, p. 7361; Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 30, p. 5757.
10. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3808-3809.
11. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, p. 3809.
12. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 6995.
13. Document book 15, tab 27.