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We advised Maj Anthony Seward that we would consider allegations
that he exercised poor and inappropriate leadership in the pre-deployment
phase of the Somalia mission by failing:
We now address these allegations in order.
As Officer Commanding (OC), Maj Seward was responsible for assessing
the state of discipline within 2 Commando (2 Cdo), and for rectifying
any problems prior to deployment. A commander must be vigilant
about disciplinary matters, and must actively pursue problems
when they arise. This Maj Seward did not do. In fact, he stated
that no such discipline problem existed. He explained that before
he took command as OC, MWO Mills had for some time been addressing
the discipline problems, specifically in 2 Cdo,1 and
that by the time he took command, "SgtM Mills had in fact
redressed the [discipline] situation in good part."2
As the incoming OC, he therefore did not need to exert himself
in any extraordinary way.
Even after the events of early October, when discipline had become
in Maj Seward's own words a "hot issue",3
Maj Seward did not think he had a discipline problem on his hands,
and consigned himself to a defensive stance toward those who thought
otherwise. He viewed these incidents as little more than the "problems
of young men with a lot of enthusiasm".4 The resolution
he sought amounted to little more than the alternate posting of
a few soldiers.
The evidence does not support Maj Seward's opinion that MWO Mills had adequately resolved the discipline problem by the time Maj Seward assumed control.5 Neither does it support Maj Seward's contention that he did not have a discipline problem either before or after the events of early October. Discipline was clearly a concern for those critically monitoring 2 Cdo during the length of Maj Seward's posting as OC.6 Hence, when OC command was passed to Maj Seward, he was briefed by Maj Davies on a number of outstanding disciplinary concerns,7 and a number of additional concerns emerged afterward. After the October incidents, Maj Seward knew that many officers, including the two directly senior to him, had become very concerned about 2 Cdo's state of discipline.8 In mid-November 1992, Maj Seward received advice from Col Gray and MGen Pitts concerning the "discipline problems" in 2 Cdo.9 Given such clear evidence to the contrary, Maj Seward's view that 2 Cdo lacked a discipline problem constitutes an error in judgement and represents the abrogation of a central element of his responsibility as an officer commanding: to ensure that the behaviour of his troops conformed to the disciplinary standard required of the Canadian Forces in overseas military operations.
Maj Seward also failed to notify his superiors of the leadership
and discipline problems which he should have recognized within
2 Cdo. In fact, any such communication as did occur flowed only
one way, downwards from levels higher than Maj Seward. BGen Beno
several times, weakly and in general terms, instructed LCol Morneault
to resolve the discipline problems in 2 Cdo, and LCol Morneault
in turn instructed Maj Seward to take corrective measures.10
Passage of information upward through the chain of command is
important to military functioning generally, and is especially
important in dealing with leadership and disciplinary problems.
To the extent that Maj Seward failed to address the problem of
discipline within 2 Cdo by not notifying his superiors, he failed
both in exercising proper leadership and in fulfilling his responsibilities
to the chain of command.
Maj Seward also failed to recommend to his CO that certain individuals with discipline problems be excluded from the mission. Maj Seward explained that at the time he assumed the position of OC, 2 Cdo was over-strength, and that the number needed to be reduced from the original 137 soldiers to a final count of 104.11 During this time, 2 Cdo found itself the object of disciplinary scrutiny. It is our opinion that a responsible OC concerned with the disruptive influence of recalcitrant or uncontrollable members could have used the reduction process to weed out those either proven or suspected to be disciplinary problems. This was also the opinion of BGen Beno, who, in seeking to assign responsibility for these problems to his subordinates, stated that the "OC of 2 Commando would have had the opportunity to -- more than ample opportunity -- to remove any numbers of individuals who he did not consider fit to deploy to Somalia."12
However, despite the serious concerns voiced to him about the
state of 2 Cdo discipline, and despite knowing in early October
1992 that the Commanding Officer, LCol Morneault, suggested 2
Cdo not be deployed to Somalia because of perceived disciplinary
problems,13 and knowing MWO Mills thought there to
be at least six "bad actors" within 2 Cdo, 14 Maj Seward
viewed the reduction process as an administrative detail of shuffling
soldiers from over- to under-staffed commandos. Though Maj Seward
knew that MWO Mills had identified seven soldiers who were potential
disciplinary problems, he removed only one "for disciplinary
reasons".15 Asked specifically whether he used
the reductions to "post out from 2 Commando people who may
be considered to have been problem children", Maj Seward
answered, "No."16 MWO Mills confirmed Maj
Seward's hesitancy to post out individuals from 2 Cdo.17
This again demonstrates Maj Seward's lack of leadership by failing
to respond to the various disciplinary incidents with decisive
remedial action.
Maj Seward failed to instill, through example, supervision, and
training, a proper attitude and professional competence in his
troops, particularly with regard to over-aggressiveness, respect
for the rule of law, and obedience to the Rules of Engagement
(ROE). Maj Seward knew of the criticisms of the aggressiveness
of his troops,18 and was himself personally criticized
for the aggressive nature of his training methods.19
Maj Seward also agreed that his approach to training was more
aggressive than in the other commandos.20 However,
in his testimony he consistently denied that his unique form of
training was inappropriate.21 We find this unacceptable.
Maj Seward knew his troops were aggressive and that this aggressiveness
was a source of many disciplinary incidents. He ought to have
taken control of the situation and ensured that the aggressive
attitude was removed. He did not and, thus, failed in an important
respect as Officer Commanding (OC) of 2 Cdo.
As the OC of 2 Cdo, Maj Seward was responsible for ensuring that information was properly passed down to his troops. He did not accomplish this. In testimony, LCol MacDonald stated that the main problem 2 Cdo encountered during the training exercise, Stalwart Providence, "was the fact that information being passed on by my squadron commanders, by myself, and by [Maj Seward's] deputy commanding officer to him was not getting to his soldiers".22 LCol MacDonald based this conclusion upon personal observations, debriefs LCol MacDonald received from squadron commanders, and observations provided by his regimental second-in-command.23 Maj Kampman, who observed the training of 2 Cdo from a more direct vantage point, confirmed in his testimony that information relayed to Maj Seward did not reach his troops.24 Maj Kampman testified that he directly confronted Maj Seward with this issue on several occasions.25 Maj MacKay26 and Maj Kyle27 also confirmed that there was a failure in the passage of information. For his part, Maj Seward agreed that he had been told of the problem28 and, in one instance, agreed that the criticism was valid.29
The evidence is clear that Maj Seward failed in his task as OC
to adequately pass information down to his troops. We agree with
Col MacDonald that such failures in transmission constitute a
deficiency in the proper functioning of a military sub-unit, and
that the issue is an important leadership issue. Col MacDonald
further expressed the view that the deficiencies he saw in 2 Cdo,
including the senous problem concerning the passage of information,
was enough to warrant removal of Maj Seward as OC. In this vein,
he testified that "I told him I didn't think he was fit to
command the Commando and had he been working for me I would have
fired him."30 We agree that Maj Seward failed
to properly command and supervise his troops, and that his failure
regarding the passage of information was but an example of his
responsibility to ensure the effective operation of 2 Cdo's intelligence
capability. The problem was more squarely on Maj Seward's shoulders
the moment he was notified of it, especially because he was also
given clear instruction to fix it. He did not and must bear the
responsibility for failing to do. 50
Maj Seward also failed to foster effective relationships between himself and his officers, between himself and his senior non-commissioned officers, and among his senior non-commissioned officers. The evidence on this point is substantial. Maj Seward testified that although effective leadership at the unit level requires co-operation among the CO, the regimental sergeant-major (RSM), and the deputy commanding officer (DCO),31 he felt that two of the three were not the right people for the job. He thought that DCO Maj MacKay was not the right person to serve LCol Morneault, and that the RSM was unsuitable for the CAR.32 He also testified to other difficulties within the leadership ranks. He stated that the platoon warrant officers did not get along with MWO Mills.33 Maj Seward himself had an altercation with the RSM, CWO Jardine, and admitted that an "altercation between a field officer and a regimental sergeant-major is a very significant event, it doesn't happen on a regular occasion and it should not happen."34 CWO (ret) Jardine testified that he had a gut feeling that Maj Seward would cause problems,35 and Maj Seward testified in return that the commando sergeant-majors did not like CWO Jardine and that he thought CWO Jardine was disloyal to LCol Morneault.36 Maj Seward also had a shouting match with Capt Kyle.37 Maj MacKay's relations with Maj Seward were antagonistic: they had altercations as to whose commands should prevail.38 Maj Seward had a hostile relationship with Capt Mansfield, the Deputy CO of 2 Combat Engineer Regiment and, subsequently, OC of the Engineer Squadron in Somalia;39 the two reportedly spoke to one another only through intermediaries.40 Maj Seward did not trust Capt Kyle, Sgt Wyszynski, or Sgt Wallace.41 MWO Mills, who acknowledged that he acted as an adviser to the CO, and that he played a role in enforcing discipline in 2 Cdo, had an acrimonious relationship with WO Murphy, the officer in charge of discipline for 4 Platoon.42
This list of strained relations speaks for itself. Lacking any
evidence that Maj Seward pursued these difficulties in an attempt
to resolve them, this fifth allegation is fully substantiated.
Maj Seward was also responsible for ensuring that all members of 2 Cdo were adequately trained and tested in the Law of Armed Conflict, including the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of armed conflict. Prior to deployment, LCol Watkin provided a Law of Armed Conflict lecture to the officers, regimental sergeant-majors, and the commando sergeant-majors responsible for the deployment troops.43 The onus was on these officers to pass the contents of this lecture down to the soldiers.44
However, Maj Seward stated he did not synthesize LCol Watkin's
lecture and pass the information to 2 Cdo,45 despite
his concession that Law of Armed Conflict training is an important
and relevant form of training for soldiers sent in theatre. Maj
Seward also stated "in retrospect, that it's a lesson learned
and it would be a part of my recommendation that we conduct such
training".46
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