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We advised Gen Jean Boyle that we would, in our final report,
consider allegations that he exercised poor and inappropriate
leadership in the post-deployment phase of the Somalia mission
by:
We address each allegation in turn but, before doing so, it is necessary to provide some essential background concerning Gen Boyle's involvement in the management of the Somalia crisis.
The CDS and the DM entrusted Gen Boyle with the responsibility to monitor and control the public affairs operations and the release of information with respect to the Somalia mission and the crisis it generated. At that time, that is, in the fall of 1993, Gen Boyle occupied the position of Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications) (Associate ADM (Pol & Comm)) within the public affairs branch at DND.
On September 27, 1993, a working group, led by Gen Boyle, was created called the Somalia Working Group, composed of senior staff such as the staff officers of the Minister of National Defence (MND) and the CDS. It operated under his direction until June or July 1994.2
The office of this Working Group ensured central control of all internal and external documentation regarding Somalia by recording, reviewing, and assessing the information contained.3 It thoroughly reviewed the Somalia-related Military Police investigations, the de Faye board of inquiry findings and recommendations, as well as some 700 documents that the Board of Inquiry processed or filed. It also processed more than 50 Access to Information requests regarding the Somalia affair and it co-ordinated the responses to the media requests for more information. Finally, it provided advice to the Minister of National Defence, the Deputy Minister, and the Chief of the Defence Staff.
As head of the Somalia Working Group, Gen Boyle had a detailed and intimate knowledge of all important information that flowed from the Canadian Forces in Somalia to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), was aware of all the decisions taken at various levels that affected Canadian Forces in Somalia, and had access to all the information that flowed from NDHQ to the forces in Somalia. No other individual had a clearer grasp of these details or a more comprehensive overview of the entire situation as it unfolded. He described himself as "l'éminence grise" with respect to Somalia issues whthin the Department.4 In his capacity as head of the Somalia Working Group, he had direct access to both to the DM and the CDS.5
On April 6, 1995, a Directorate, the Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team (SILT), was established by directive of the CDS. Although the Directorate was established in the ADM (Pol & Comm) group, it is interesting to note that the Directorate was to report not to the ADM (Pol & Comm), Dr. Kenneth Calder; but directly to Gen Boyle, who was the Associate ADM (Pol & Comm).6
On July 1, 1995, MGen Boyle was promoted to LGen and moved from the position of ADM (Pol & Comm) to the position of Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) (ADM (Per)). However, the reporting channel for SILT did not remain, as one would have expected, with Gen Boyle's successor in the post of Associate ADM (Pol & Comm); rather, it moved on with him.7 Indeed, the new position of Special CF/DND Adviser was created, and LGen Fox was called from retirement to occupy the position. In fact, LGen Fox was tasked with the duty of developing the CF/DND position in relation to our Inquiry, and to superintend all activities of SILT.8
This position of Special CF/DND Adviser was created under the joint signature of the CDS and the DM. Here again, what is interesting to note regarding Gen Boyle is the fact that the Special Adviser, rather than reporting to the DM and the CDS, was to report to the DM and to the ADM (Per), who was Gen Boyle. Although the directive creating SILT in April 1995 required that SILT, under the direction of Col Leclerc, report directly to the Associate ADM (Pol & Comm), this new directive creating the position of Special Adviser in June 1995 in effect amended the SILT directive and ensured that the Special Adviser who, from then was to superintend SILT would continue to report to Gen Boyle in his new capacity as ADM (Per).9
In January 1996, LGen Boyle was promoted to General and became the CDS and, from that moment on, the Special Adviser reported to him, although the directive creating his position continued to stipulate that LGen Fox was to report to the ADM (Per). It is worth noting that the original explanation given as to why the Special Adviser was to report to Gen Boyle as ADM (Per), rather than to the CDS, was that the latter would be called as a witness before the Inquiry and it would be better if he did not personally monitor the relationships of SILT with the Inquiry. Yet, when Gen Boyle became the CDS he kept control over both the Special Adviser and SILT; although it was obvious that he would have to account before this Inquiry for his management of the Somalia crisis.10
To summarize, the responsibilities for SILT and the Special Adviser to the CF/DND followed Gen Boyle from his position as Associate ADM (Pol & Comm), to his position as ADM (Per), to his position as CDS.11 Gen Boyle was thus involved, albeit in various capacities, in virtually every action and decision taken by the chain of command with regard to and in reaction to the Somalia mission and its aftermath.12 He exerted strict control over any public release of Somalia-related material or information whether these were press releases, backgrounders, Response to Queries (RTQs), or Media Response Lines (MRLs).13
We turn now to the allegations.
Alteration of Documents14
In September 1993, Mr. Michael McAuliffe, a CBC reporter; made a telephone request for copies of existing RTQs relating to Somalia. It was eventually agreed at the Directorate General of Public Affairs (DGPA) that Mr. McAuliffe would unofficially and informally be given a number of altered RTQs.
Indeed, the oral and documentary evidence heard and filed at our hearings clearly reveals a concerted and deliberate decision taken by the Director General of Public Affairs, Mr. Gonzales, and his subordinates to alter the format of the RTQs requested by Mr. McAuliffe.15 The alteration consisted of the deletion of the information identifying the originator of the RTQs, those who had approved the RTQs, as well as sensitive information contained in the comment and background sections of the documents. The reformatting of the documents by computer was done in such a way that the documents would appear to be full and complete.16
We are satisfied on the basis of the evidence adduced that Gen Boyle was a party to the decision to informally release altered documents to the requester, and gave his concurrence to such a process.17
In testimony before us, Mr. Gonzalez, who at the relevant time was the Director General, made reference to a meeting involving Gen Boyle and Dr. Calder in which the informal release of altered documents to the reporter was discussed. The agreement was that the reporter would be given only the issue and response sections of the RTQs.18 Mr. Gonzalez stated: "I left that meeting with the clear understanding that I had their concurrence in principle...".19
Subsequently, Mr. Gonzalez prepared a memorandum, dated October 26, 1993, with copies of the original RTQs attached. These were seen by Gen Boyle who agreed to the release of the issue and response sections of those RTQs.20 This memorandum bears a handwritten note ("we spoke") from Gen Boyle to Dr. Calder in which he acknowledges that they had discussed the informal release of the documents and seeks Dr. Calder's approval.
The testimony of Mr. Gonzalez on the issue of the informai release of RTQs to Mr. McAuliffe is consistent with the process in place at the time to deal with the Somalia crisis. Indeed, at the time, no Somalia-related document could be released to the media without prior approval of Gen Boyle who was heading the Somalia Working Group under the direct supervision of the CDS and the DM. By Gen Boyle's own admission, he conducted a careful and conscientious review of all documents that were brought to him for sign-off and did not take any release lightiy.21
Furthermore, Mr. Gonzalez had just been recruited to fill the Director General position by Dr. Calder, and would not have taken it upon himself to publicly release such sensitive documents. We could find no logical reason why he would not have mentioned to Dr. Calder and Gen Boyle the consensus that he had ascertained among his senior staff to release informally only portions of the RTQs.22
Gen Boyle was described to us as a meticulous man, a micro manager, and a stickler for details.23 We find it hard to believe that a new Director General would have dared submit documents to Gen Boyle for his approval without telling him that the documents in question had been altered, especially since these documents were to be publicly released to the media.
Finally, it was common knowledge in the media liaison office at the time that Mr. McAuliffe was to receive altered documents.24
On January 20, 1994, Mr. McAuliffe made an official request under the Access to Information Act (ATI Act) for "all documents known as Response to Queries prepared by or for the Media Liaison Officer or DGPA branch at NDHQ between the dates of May 15, 1993, and January 16, 1994".25 This official request under the ATI Act encompassed the RTQs already released to the reporter but in altered form.
Fearing that the reporter would realize that the documents that had been unofficially released had been altered, the senior authorities at the DGPA decided to carry forward the pattern previously adopted and proceeded to alter the RTQs officially requested under the ATI Act.26 As Cdr Caie put it, "it was my understanding that they were operating under the same authority, if you wish, for lack of a better word, as we were with the original request on the RTQs."27 These RTQs were sent to Mr. McAuliffe on May 16, 1994, almost three months after they were due under the Act.28
Although there is no direct evidence of Gen Boyle's knowledge of the alterations of the documents formally requested under the ATI Act, we are satisfied that he knew of such alterations.
Indeed, Gen Boyle was quite familiar with the format of the RTQs as he had signed off on a number of them. Actually, he was required to perform a double sign-off of the Somalia-related documents, that is, as the group principal's representative and the person responsible for Somalia issues.29 The deletions were very obvious to anyone who was familiar with RTQs: the altered RTQs had no front page indicating the originator of the RTQs and the persons who had been consulted, no back page indicating those who had approved their contents and their release, and the documents were stripped of the sensitive background and comment sections. Although an average or standard RTQ had a minimum of three pages,30 many RTQs were reduced to a single page.
Gen Boyle simply could not have overlooked these obvious alterations as he reviewed the file. As Mr. Gonzalez put it, "I would find it incredible that somebody that had signed RTQs would not know that these were not RTQs."31 In addition, Gen Boyle dealt with the McAuliffe file four times during its preparation. The departmental ATI office even returned the file to him because the appropriate sign-off authorities had not been obtained. He was responsible and accountable for the accuracy of the RTQs sent to the requester via the ATI office.32
Gen Boyle's immediate co-workers who prepared the material for his approval also believed that he was aware of the fact that the RTQs in the package prepared under the Access to Information Act had been altered.33 Indeed, it would make little sense for these officers and Mr. Gonzalez to jeopardize their careers by deceiving Gen Boyle (as he has suggested) and inducing him to release publicly altered documents without telling him. They had no identifiable motivation for doing this type of action.
Gen Boyle had been a party to the earlier informal release of altered RTQs to Mr. McAuliffe, and he was therefore obviously quite aware of the impact that the subsequent release of the actual unaltered RTQs to Mr. McAuliffe would have had.
Finally, in the context of a military chain of command, it defies
common sense to believe that subordinate officers, for no personal
gain or benefit, would independently undertake the surreptitious
alteration of documents against the will of their superior whose
approval they would ordinarily have to secure prior to public
release.
The Change from RTQs to MRLs
In June 1994, Mr. McAuliffe made a second request for RTQs and was denied access to them.34 He was informed by the DND Co-ordinator for Access to Information and Privacy, acting on advice received from Gen Boyle on May 11, 1994 and June 17, 1994, that RTQs had not been produced since January 1994. Production had stopped ostensibly as a result of a change in policy and the introduction of a 1-800 media information line.35
As of January 1, 1994, under a new policy, Media Response Lines (MRLs) were created as a replacement for RTQs. These new documents were designed to have a lifespan of 72 hours. Gen Boyle was involved in the development and elaboration of that policy by Mr. Gonzalez.36
However, the evidence before us revealed clearly that Gen Boyle's memo was seriously misleading. RTQs were still produced in January, February, and March 1994,37 although, according to the policy, RTQs were supposed to have been replaced by MRLs. Indeed, some 35 RTQs were generated in this period. Gen Boyle himself signed, reviewed, or initialled some of these on January 14, 21, 25 and 26 and on February 9, 1994.38
The change of name from RTQs to MRLs was, in our view, nothing less than a vulgar scheme to frustrate Access to Information requests and was, in fact, regarded in this way by the personnel within the public affairs branch.39 Gen Boyle admitted that both documents served exactly the same function in the operations of the media liaison office.40 The destruction of MRLs after 72 hours was designed to defeat Access to Information requests directed to the Media Liaison Office within DGPA.41
Indeed, the memo by Col Haswell to Gen Boyle is indicative of the attempt to frustrate the Act.42 In that memo, he wrote that Mr. McAuliffe's request had been anticipated and "fortunately" the authorities were in a position to tell the reporter that RTQs were no longer produced for the period requested. This was done without telling the reporter that RTQs had simply been replaced by MRLs.
This deceptive mind set, prevalent within DGPA, is also apparent in a draft memo prepared for the signature of Gen Boyle.43 In this memo addressed to his superior, Dr. Calder, Gen Boyle suggested that in these times of increased Access to Information requests, it might be prudent to remove from all pertinent documents any references to the name of a journalist who had been critical of the Department. We were unable to ascertain if the original was eventually signed by Gen Boyle, but the memo reveals a willingness to alter existing documents prior to their public release under the Access to Information Act. Gen Boyle obviously was aware of the prevailing mind set with respect to ATI matters under his control.44 Indeed, Ms. Ruth Cardinal, who replaced Mr. Gonzalez as Director General of Public Affairs, added to the negative and restrictive interpretation of a citizen's right to access by adopting a practice of editing draft correspondence by using removable yellow stickers on documents which were not retained on the file thereby precluding any subsequent examination of the material.45 In any event, Gen Boyle's misleading memo signaled approval to his subordinates of what they were doing.
Furthermore, the installation of the media line had little to do with the production of RTQs or MRLs, as many witnesses, including Gen Boyle himself, acknowledged.46 Gen Boyle's memo also failed to inform Mr. McAuliffe that, in fact, MRLs had replaced RTQs and that the MRLs were, for all intents and purposes, RTQs disguised under a different name.
As early as August 20, 1993, before Mr. McAuliffe's informal request for RTQs, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), LGen O'Donnell, wrote to a number of senior officials, including the ADM (Pol & Comm) and Gen Boyle, expressing concern over the fact that some replies provided by various offices and group principals in response to ATI requests for Somalia records were incomplete and, in some instances, erroneous. He stressed the importance of the matter and the serious consequences that such failings could have for the integrity of the Department. In his communication, he spoke of the necessity for DND to act not only in accordance with the letter, but also with the spirit of the ATI legisiation.47 In a memo sent three days later by Gen Boyle to his superior, Dr. Calder, Gen Boyle addressed the concerns of the VCDS by asserting that he controlled every information request that went through the office and that he would sign off (that is, assume responsibility) on Dr. Calder's behalf. He went on to add that the same process would be followed for all ATI requests.48 Therefore, Gen Boyle was aware of the continuing problems before Mr. McAuliffe's request and pledged himself to exert strict control and ensure compliance with the Act.
However, in his testimony before us, Gen Boyle defined his role narrowly as one of ensuring compliance with the letter of the Act.49 Also, he acknowledged his failure to ensure compliance with the spirit of the law.50
The end result of this was to discredit a new system purportedly designed to bring greater transparency to DND's relations with the media and the public.51 To the contrary, the actual effect was a gradual erosion of transparency and accountability.
The letter of the VCDS certainly amounted to a serious warning and reprimand to the entire DND. Strikingly, according to the evidence before us, the remarks of the VCDS were subsequently ignored by those who received them.52 The mentality whereby one need only to obey the letter of the law continued to flourish during Gen Boyle's tenure. As one witness put it, a requester will only get what is specifically asked for and this may mean that he or she will receive nothing if the wrong terminology is employed.53
We are satisfied on the basis of the cogent evidence adduced before us that Gen Boyle participated in the devising of a process which provided the public with misleading or incomplete information and condoned such a process.
Deletions were made to documents, and the requirements of the ATI Act were not followed in this process of deletion. Mr. McAuliffe was never informed of the deletions and, consequently, no justifications were advanced to explain why the deletions had been made. A clear and successful attempt to deceive the reporter was in fact orchestrated.
In addition, an inordinate number of hours and prohibitive costs for the search and analysis of requested documents were initially charged against Mr. McAuliffe's first formal request (413 hours totalling $4,080), while such documents were in fact readily available.54 According to a letter signed by Maj Verville and addressed to Lt (N) Brayman, LCdr Considine, and Cdr Caie, the estimate made little sense as Lt (N) Brayman had confirmed that he knew how many RTQs had been written and where they were.55 Ms. Fournier also regarded the estimate as outrageous since she had collected all the RTQs in two days and the books were sitting on the office shelves.56 Gen Boyle and Col Haswell also agreed with Maj Verville that this reaction to the request made little sense.57
All these events took place under the management of Gen Boyle
who had special authority and responsibility with respect to ATI
requests and the public release of Somalia-related documents.
After the normal process occurred and group principals had signed
off, the material was sent to information officers who then forwarded
it to Gen Boyle for a final sign-off.58
In the fall of 1993, the Director General of the DGPA, Mr. Gonzalez, reported to the ADM (Pol & Comm), Dr. Calder, through Gen Boyle, who was then the associate for Dr. Calder.59 As his experience in DGPA broadened, Gen Boyle became more and more involved in public affairs management.60 Indeed, Gen Boyle's involvement became such that it was no longer limited to Somalia-related issues, but extended to all public affairs matters.61 In practice, Mr. Gonzalez, to his chagrin, came to report solely to Gen Boyle and no longer to the ADM (Pol & Comm).62 At one point, Mr. Gonzalez became so upset with Gen Boyle's involvement in the management of DGPA that he complained to Gen Boyle that if he (Gen Boyle) wanted to take over his job, he would gladly move. Mr. Gonzalez described this situation as an organizational nightmare.63 The reality was that Gen Boyle had become, de facto, the public affairs manager, at least regarding Somalia-related issues, and the supervisor of Mr. Gonzalez with respect to the management of all other aspects of public affairs.
On April 21, 1995, we issued an order requesting the transfer to the Inquiry within 30 days of receipt of the order, of all Somalia-related documents in order to secure and safeguard these documents.64
Once our Order for Production of Documents was issued to DND,65 Gen Boyle's role within DND placed him in a unique position to ensure that the DGPA complied. As chairman of the Somalia Working Group from September 27, 1993, until June or July 1994,66 he had a chance to familiarize himself with the Somalia-related documents created by the DGPA. He reportedly exercised strict control over any public release of Somalia-related press releases, backgrounders, Response to Queries and Media Response Lines.67 After April 21, 1995, two chains of command were available to him to exhort the DGPA to conform to our order. Until approximately the end of June 1995, he remained Associate ADM (Pol & Comm) and de facto overseer of the DGPA.68 Ms. Cardinal, who replaced Mr. Gonzalez as Director General of Public Affairs in late March 1994, reported regularly to Gen Boyle.69 Their meetings gave him a forum for instructing her on how to ensure that the DGPA complied with our order. The Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team (SILT) furnished a second chain of command through which he could attempt to ensure that the DGPA obeyed our order. According to the directive of April 6, 1995 that established SILT formally, SILT was to report directly to Gen Boyle.70 After he became ADM (Per), the reporting channel for SILT moved along with him.71 During the spring and the summer of 1995, he could therefore have ordered SILT to take concrete measures to obtain copies of the DGPA's Somalia-related documents. How adequately did Gen Boyle exploit either chain of command to arrange for the DGPA's Somalia-related documents to reach the Inquiry?
We conclude without hesitation that Gen Boyle did not give Ms. Cardinal clear, timely guidance that could have helped her in complying with our order. She testified that she never received a copy of the order, although she was informed verbally of its existence.72 Neither Gen Boyle nor Dr. Calder nor their staff gave her instructions for identifying the documents liable to be forwarded or an overall methodology for complying.73 She acknowledged that SILT provided instructions that the DGPA was to transmit material; however, SILT did not indicate how the DGPA should collect, collate, and transmit the documents in response to the order.74 Gen Boyle did not give SILT precise instructions for the DGPA to follow in gathering and dispatching Somalia-related documents. While this lack of action fixes Gen Boyle with a leadership failure, it does very little to absolve either SILT or DGPA of their responsibilities in this regard.
The consequences of Gen Boyle's misconduct were serious. Testimony before the Inquiry confirms that Ms. Cardinal issued no written or verbal instructions to her personnel to ensure compliance with the order.75 Gen Boyle had not clarified adequately her obligations under the order. Only in September 1995, that is, some four and a half months subsequent to the order and three and a half months after its original expiry date, did the DGPA personnel most familiar with Somalia-related documents -- Lt(N) J.D. Brayman, Ms. Nancy Fournier, and Ms. Ciaudette Lemay -- learn of it and realize that they had to respond.76
In September 1995, the DGPA's reluctance to comply with our order became especially blatant. We received evidence to the following effect: on September 5, 1995, Lt (N) A. Wong discovered Ms. Fournier placing documents from one set of Somalia binders into a burn bag; he ordered her to desist; she began to replace the documents; and Col Haswell instructed her not to proceed further with the destruction.77 We are satisfied that some senior elements within the DGPA attempted willfully to avoid complying with our order: their motive was to conceal the demonstrable fact that on two occasions Mr. McAuliffe had received RTQs in altered form.
By September 5, 1995, Gen Boyle was no longer Associate ADM (Pol & Comm), and he had therefore ceased to exercise oversight over the DGPA. Yet he remained overseer of SILT and as such had a duty of care toward the documents Ms. Fournier was placing into a burn bag. Specifically, he was obliged to ensure that we were informed immediately that these documents existed and that an attempt to destroy them had taken place; furthermore, he should have arranged for these documents or copies to be relayed to us. The extent to which he discharged this duty of care from September 5, 1995 onward shows that he failed to take concrete and appropriate measures in relation to the DGPA documents to ensure proper compliance with our order.
Gen Boyle himself suggested that he first knew on September 21, 1995, that an attempt to destroy Somalia-related documents occurred at the DGPA.78 We quite simply do not believe his evidence on this point. If indeed he did not know earlier, three different chains of command would all have had to fail: the DGPA, the SILT and the Judge Advocate General (JAG) chains of command.
The DGPA chain of command was led by Ms. Cardinal who met with him routinely for more than one year after she became Director General of Public Affairs. LGen Fox, as Special Adviser to SILT conferred reguiarly with Gen Boyle about the gathering of Somalia-related documents for the Inquiry. (We have concluded on the evidence before us that LGen Fox clearly learned of the attempted destruction and, in all likelihood, conveyed this information to Gen Boyle before September 21, 1995.) Additionally Lt (N) Wong, a member of SILT from the spring of 1995, enjoyed direct access to Gen Boyle for over one year before the incident of September 5, 1995. From August to October 1995, he met with Gen Boyle at least 10 times to obtain his signoff on approximately 30 Access to Information Act requests for Somalia-related information.80 BGen Boutet, the JAG, consulted with Gen Boyle frequently.81 BGen Boutet's subordinate, LCol Carter, was also a SILT lawyer; she therefore had two chains of command through which she could relay to Gen Boyle the knowledge she had of the attempted destruction of documents.82 In brief, we believe that some or all of the above mentioned individuals revealed the events of September 5, 1995, to Gen Boyle before September 21, 1995. As for the contention that the information was withheld from Gen Boyle by all of these officers for over two weeks, if indeed true, and if all of them did not advise their superior, such inaction provides a stunning indictment of the functioning of the chains of command within DND.
Even if we were to accept Gen Boyle's assertion that the events
of September 5, 1995, became known to him only on September 21,
1995 -- which we do not -- this does not assist him greatly. Certainly
he could have ordered his subordinates to inform us expeditiously
of the serious problems at the DGPA and the DGPA's failure to
comply with our order, but he did not do so. We were in daily
contact with SILT especially with LGen Fox, Col J. Leclerc, and
LCol Carter; yet we received no pertinent information. Only when
we confronted SILT on October 3, 1995 with our knowledge of the
ongoing problems was there any admission of the facts. On October
27, 1995, LCol Carter forwarded to us by fourth-class mail some
samples of altered and unaltered RTQs; the package reached us
on November 8, 1995. Mr. McAuliffe broke a news story on November
8, 1995, that blamed Gen Boyle for providing misleading information;
in the afternoon of the same day we obtained three boxes of DGPA
documents. The foregoing chronology lends additional support to
the view that Gen Boyle misconducted himself by failing to take
concrete, timely measures to ensure that the DGPA documents falling
under our order reached the Inquiry.
While we have remarked that SILT reported directly to Gen Boyle from April 1995 onwards, we stress that SILT's Special Adviser, LGen Fox, continued reporting to Gen Boyle even after Gen Boyle became CDS in January 1996. From April 1995 well into 1996, except perhaps from the autumn of 1995 when questions about his own role in handling Somalia-related documents compromised his role, Gen Boyle was favourably situated to follow the response to our orders and requests for documents and to influence it. Did he assist us properly as overseer of SILT to obtain all relevant information from DND?
Unfortunately, SILT, acting under Gen Boyle's authority, failed to implement a system to achieve compliance with our Order of April 21, 1995, and a follow-up procedure to ensure that all elements within DND and the CF fully and satisfactorily conformed with our order and the forces-wide message of June 16, 1995. Gen Boyle's own testimony leaves little doubt that SILT did not institute an organized, structured methodology for identifying, locating, and collating documents and forwarding them to the Inquiry.83 LGen Fox's evidence suggests that SILT remained content to respond to the Inquiry's requests for documents as they arrived.84 Gen Boyle's testimony confirms that even in a reactive stance, SILT's responses to document requests were frequently not timely or forthcoming.85 SILT's practices in transferring documents to the Inquiry also betrayed a relatively casual approach. In a memorandum of April 27, 1995 to Gen Boyle for action, Col Leclerc affirmed that all documents forwarded to the Inquiry would be registered and copies kept at SILT,86 but Gen Boyle testified that this plan was not realized in practice.87 In brief, we conclude that Gen Boyle, as overseer of SILT, did not assist us properly in obtaining in a timely and responsible manner all relevant information from DND and, accordingly, misconducted himself.
Under Gen Boyle, SILT sought only belatedly and grudgingly to track down some of the most revealing documents about CF operations in Somalia, and the in-theatre logs are an especiaily egregious example. We made repeated requests for in-theatre logs during the autumn of 1995 and issued a specific order in January 1996 for all missing logs; yet the intelligence logs of CJFS Headquarters, brought back from Somalia to Canada under heavy military security, were destroyed in February 1996. Officially the reason advanced for destroying them was that the authorities needed storage space, but Gen Boyle himself conceded that these logs had been stored since their return in the intelligence lock-up inside the 1 Cdn Div Headquarters intelligence cell in Kingston.88
The operation logs of the CARBG form another important example demonstrating SILT as dilatory in its pursuit of documents. These operation logs were delivered with pages missing to the Inquiry on February 1, 1996,89 that is, over nine months after our Order of April 21, 1995. Gen Boyle acknowledged that attempts to locate the missing pages apparently began only on March 11, 1996.90 By Gen Boyle's recognition, other categories of logs reached the Inquiry only tardily, if at all.91 Only after we informed the military authorities that we would summon Gen Boyle as a witness to account for the inadequate compliance with our orders did the search for logs become vigorous. More generally, the whole process of providing documents to us began seriously to unfold only when we indicated to Gen Boyle that he would have to provide sworn testimony about the extent of his conformity to our orders and document requests; we then received highly relevant documents we had awaited for months. In our view, Gen Boyle, as overseer of SILT adopted an approach toward the Inquiry's orders and document requests that mirrored the approach he espoused throughout in managing the Somalia crisis: a policy of containment and damage control.
Gen Boyle sought to mitigate his responsibility and, hence, accountability, for SILT's omissions from June through August 1995 by claiming that LGen Fox failed to inform him and the DM of the difficulties the Inquiry encountered in obtaining documents.92 We believe it to be likely that LGen Fox did advise Gen Boyle of these difficulties but, in any event, in professing ignorance Gen Boyle has availed himself of a weak defence; as overseer of SILT, he ought to have supervised the work of SILT and known of these difficulties. Nevertheless, as we have made clear, our disclosure problems with SILT persisted well beyond August 1995, since Gen Boyle remained SILT's overseer. In short, Gen Boyle's affirmations that he was unaware of the Inquiry's difficulties in obtaining documents do not allow us to vary our finding that he did not assist us properly to obtain, in a timely and responsible manner, all relevant information from DND, and that he failed in his capacity as the officer responsible for supervising SILT's operations to assist our Inquiry in the timely gathering of relevant information.
In finding that the three allegations against Gen Boyle were supported
and that he therefore misconducted himself, we are obliged to
assert more broadly that he displayed poor and inadequate leadership.
His was the foremost demonstration that errors of leadership permeated
DND's response to the problems that had manifested themselves
in Somalia. When Gen Boyle misconducted himself, he committed
the same fundamental mistakes that had surfaced earlier in the
Somalia mission itself. The system of arrangements SILT instituted
under his oversight to provide the Inquiry with Somalia-related
documents was inadequate and flawed. He failed to oversee and
supervise adequately crucial areas for which he was responsible
-- witness his failure to ensure that the Inquiry received the
DGPA's Somalia-related documents in a timely and responsible way.
Furthermore, he held his subordinates to a standard of accountability
that he was not prepared to abide by himself. By his own admission,
he failed to respect the spirit of the Access to Information
Act, but when asked how he would react if subordinates obeyed
the letter but not the spirit of the law, he replied that he would
react "in a very negative fashion", and added that he
would take remedial measures.93 Although his failures
of leadership would be grievous enough in any senior commander,
they acquire uniquely troubling dimensions when they appear in
a CDS, who must lead and inspire the entire Canadian Forces.
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