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The shooting on the night of March 4, 1993 resulted in the death
of one Somali civilian, Mr. Ahmed Afraraho Aruush, and the wounding
of another, Mr. Abdi Hunde Bei Sabrie. For several reasons, this
significant incident was a turning point in the deployment of
Canadian Forces to Somalia. It was, among other things, the culmination
of a dubious interpretation of the Rules of Engagement given by
the Commanding Officer on January 28, 1993, an interpretation
authorizing Canadian soldiers to shoot at fleeing thieves or infiltrators
under certain circumstances.
The planning and execution of the mission that night by the Reconnaissance
Platoon caused serious concerns among some of the other members
of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group. Many suspected
that the two Somalis had been deceived, trapped and shot, in violation
of the Rules of Engagement. Immediately after the shooting, Maj
Armstrong, the medical officer who examined the body of Mr. Aruush,
concluded that he had been "dispatched" and alerted
the Commanding Officer. In the days following, Maj Jewer, Officer
Commanding the medical platoon, and Capt Potvin, the padre, met
with the Commanding Officer to express similar concerns.
Authorities at the Department of National Defence in Ottawa immediately
expressed concern that the Somalis had been shot in the back while
running away and that excessive force might have been used.
Notwithstanding all these concerns, the entire incident was the
subject of a cursory summary investigation by the Commanding Officer,
who designated a captain in his chain of command to report on
the incident. In other words, the Commanding Officer investigated
the operation of his own unit acting pursuant to his instructions
and following his interpretation of the Rules of Engagement. In
short, the Commanding Officer investigated his own operational
actions and decisions.
The Commanding Officer's report concluded that the shooting was
within the Rules of Engagement, absolved the Reconnaissance Platoon
of any criminal responsibility, and praised its work. This may
have led other CARBG members to believe that all such incidents
would be investigated in the same spirit and resolved at the level
of the unit. In January and February there had been several similar
shootings at night, at fleeing Somalis. There had also been instances
of improper handling of prisoners, with trophylike pictures
being taken. All these incidents, up to and including the shootings
on March 4th, had gone unpunished, and in this regard they may
have paved the way for the brutal torture and killing of a Somali
teenager being detained in the Canadian compound on March 16th.
In assessing this incident, we first provide background to the
incident and relate the facts and circumstances surrounding the
shootings on the night of March 4, 1993. Then we review the disputed
facts and rule on these facts. Finally, we state our findings
and conclusions on the incident and the allegations of subsequent
coverup.
By March 1993, thievery had become a constant, growing annoyance
for the Canadian troops at Belet Huen. The night of March 3rd
had been particularly active around the Engineers compound, where
items of interest to the local population were stored. A 200pound
pump used to refuel the helicopters had disappeared and was presumed
stolen. The Officer Commanding the Engineers Squadron, Capt Mansfield,
went to see the Commanding Officer the next morning and, citing
a manpower shortage, asked for assistance in providing security
for the Engineers compound.
At the morning orders group of March 4th, the CO, LCol Mathieu,
assigned Capt Rainville and the Reconnaissance Platoon (known
as Recce Platoon) to provide additional security for the Engineers
compound. No specific instructions, guidance or parameters for
the mission were given to Capt Rainville, although the CO knew
that Capt Rainville had shown a serious lack of judgment in conducting
unsupervised operations in Canada the previous year.1
Three incidents in particular were of concern.
On February 7, 1992, Capt Rainville simulated a nighttime
terrorist attack on La Citadelle in Quebec to test its security.
He and his patrol, disguised as terrorists, wearing masks and
armed with civilian weapons, stormed La Citadelle and captured
the two sentries in charge of the weapons and ammunition depot.
Capt Rainville severely mishandled and roughed them up in an attempt
to compel them to open the weapons store. One of the sentries
eventually escaped and alerted the Quebec Police Force. The police
antiterrorist team arrived on the scene just a few minutes
after Capt Rainville and his team had left.2 Only through
luck was bloodshed avoided. After the incident BGen Dallaire,
the commanding general of the Royal 22e Régiment,
sent a letter to BGen Beno concerning the serious lack of judgement
shown in this instance, directing that it be put in Capt Rainville's
file.3
On May 15, 1992, during a training exercise at CFB Gagetown involving
the taking of 'prisoners', Capt Rainville struck several 'captured'
officers and soldiers, including most notably Capt Sandra Perron,
ostensibly to simulate the treatment of POWs.4 Capt
Rainville also manhandled one of his own men to 'make him talk'.
Capt Rainville was given only a verbal warning, which was to remain
on his file for six months.5
Shortly before the Somalia deployment, a photograph of Capt Rainville
appeared in a Montreal newspaper, showing him with knives strapped
around his belt Rambostyle and claiming that he was trained
in kidnapping and assassination and could kill a man in three
seconds.6 Capt Rainville maintains to this day that
he was not responsible for the publication of the photograph.7
Although Capt Rainville received no specific instructions before
the March 4th mission, LCol Mathieu had instructed his troops
at a January orders group that they could shoot at thieves under
certain circumstances. This had caused tremendous confusion. Some
understood the CO's instructions as an authorization to shoot
at Somalis with intent to kill if they touched the wire surrounding
the Canadian installations. Others understood that the Somalis
had to enter the perimeter of the compound before deadly force
could be used. Still others thought the instructions were to shoot
at thieves only if they stole 'Canadian kit', but there was no
consensus about what this meant. For some, it meant any piece
of Canadian equipment, including jerrycans of water or fuel. For
others, it had to be a piece of military equipment, but this would
also have included jerrycans of fuel. There was also confusion
about whether intruders had to be armed before deadly force could
be used. Further, there was confusion about shooting at anyone
fleeing the compound. While some decided they would not shoot
at a thief who was fleeing, they all understood they could use
deadly force against someone, armed or not, who fled after stealing
Canadian equipment.
Many of the officers commanding (Caps Mansfield, Officer Commanding
the Field Squadron of Engineers,8 Maj Pommet, Officer
Commanding 1 Commando,9 Maj Seward, Officer Commanding
2 Commando, Maj Magee, Officer Commanding 3 Commando, and Maj
Kampman, Officer Commanding the Royal Canadian Dragoons Squadron,
for example)10 thought that the order or instructions
given by the CO to use deadly force against thieves was illegal
and refused to pass it on to their respective platoon commanders
and troops. Eventually, the CO's instructions were amended and
the troops were told to shoot "between the skirt and the
flipflops"-that is, at the legs. This was generally
accepted as being less extreme than the previous order. These
directives had at least the tacit approval of Col Labbé,
who was aware of them, and they were not rescinded until March
8th, four days after the incident under discussion here.
As for the environment in which the incident occurred, frustration
among the men was at its peak for various reasons. A U.S. soldier
who had been a close friend of some of the Canadians, Sgt Deeks,
had died on March 3rd near Matabaan, some 120 kilometres away,
when his jeep exploded a land mine.11 Repeated thievery
had upset the soldiers, who felt their privacy was invaded by
the same persons they were trying to help.12 The soldiers
apparently expected gratitude from the local population, but instead
received what they regarded as hostility.13 The lack
of adequate cultural awareness and training of the Canadian troops
made it difficult for them to understand and appreciate the behaviour
of the Somalis. In addition, they were living on hard rations
in difficult conditions and felt that their original mission to
pacify the Belet Huen Humanitarian Relief Sector had been accomplished;
they thought they should be going home, but no redeployment date
had been set. Morale was low; and boredom was exacting a toll
and fuelling frustration. All of this was reflected in the overaggressiveness
of some units, such as 2 Commando, despite the fact that its Officer
Commanding, Maj Seward, had received a reproof in January 1993
for allowing his commando to act aggressively toward the Somali
population.14 Training in the Rules of Engagement and
in cultural awareness might have eased the tension and frustration,
reminding the soldiers of the need for restraint in dealing with
local populations, but such training was not made available. Instead,
the rules were relaxed.
It was in this context of confusion about the Rules of Engagement,
low morale, unresolved aggressiveness and untamed frustration
that the Recce Platoon was loosely tasked with providing security
for the Engineers compound. This was a poor leadership decision
that would have fatal consequences.
The uncontested facts are as follows. On the night of March 4,
1993, the Reconnaissance Platoon, under the command of Capt Rainville,
was assigned the task of providing additional security for the
Engineers compound. Capt Rainville divided the patrol into three
detachments. Detachment 69, consisting of himself and his sniper,
Cpl Klick, took up a position in the back of a truck inside the
compound. Detachment 63, consisting of Sgt Plante, Cpl Favasoli,
and Cpl King, was located on the west side of the Engineers compound.
Detachment 64A consisted of MCpl Countway, Cpl Roch Leclerc and
Cpl Smetaniuk and was located off the southeast corner of
the Engineers compound. The detachments had overlapping arcs of
observation and fire, which were delineated by infrared
chemical lights (glow sticks visible through night vision equipment
but not to the naked eye) to avoid any risk of shooting at each
other.
About 10 minutes before 8:00 p.m., two Somali men were observed
walking along the east side of the perimeter of the Engineers
compound. The observer was Cpl Lalancette, who was stationed as
a sentry in 1 Commando's watch tower. The two men approached the
southeast corner of the perimeter, where the observation
was picked up by Detachment 64A, who watched as the men made their
way along the southern edge of the wire before pausing at the
southwest corner Detachment 69 picked up the surveillance
at the midpoint of the wire, and Detachment 63 began their
observation when the Somalis paused at the southwest corner.
As the Somalis began to move from this point, there is very little
agreement about the sequence and timing of events, apart from
the fact that they were challenged or scared off and fled from
the Recce patrol. As they fled, the Somalis were shot at from
behind by Detachment 63, with one being wounded and the other
continuing to flee. Once the wounded man had been subdued and
restrained, the pursuit of the second man continued until he passed
into the area of responsibility of Detachment 64A. The fleeing
man was challenged and then subsequently fatally shot by Detachment
64A at about 14 minutes past 8 p.m.
Much of the testimony before us concerning the incident was contested
and contradictory. Even participants in the event rarely agreed
on all the crucial elements. The testimony concerning these contested
facts is therefore of pivotal importance in assessing the incident
as a whole. We must determine, then, which view of events will
guide our findings concerning the March 4th incident. We do this
by examining each part of the incident in turn and identifying
the areas of crucial importance for assessing the functioning
of the chain of command and the issue of leadership in relation
to the incident.
There were significant discrepancies between the assistance requested
by Capt Mansfield of the Engineers and the mission carried out
by Capt Rainville and the Recce Platoon. Capt Mansfield asked
for assistance to increase security at the Engineers compound.
The Recce Platoon could have accomplished this goal in many ways,
none of which involve capturing intruders, yet this is the task
Capt Rainville assigned his men that night. What needs to be determined,
then, is how Capt Rainville redefined the mission, what authorization
he had to do this, and who he informed of the change. We also
assess the effectiveness of the measures put in place by Capt
Rainville.
We proceed in the following manner:
According to the Engineers, and as the testimony of Capt Mansfield
makes clear, the Recce Platoon was to provide additional security
for the Engineers compound, not to capture "saboteurs"
or infiltrators as some of the members of Recce Platoon maintain.
Capt Mansfield, Officer Commanding the Field Squadron of Engineers,
testified that Recce Platoon's presence in the Engineers compound
was requested to deal with the problem of theft, which was beyond
the capacity of the Engineers to control.15 Capt Kyle,
the Operations Officer for the CARBG, stated that the problem
of securing the perimeter of the Engineers compound against thieves
was a topic of discussion at the daily Headquarters compound orders
group.16 Capt Rainville volunteered his Recce Platoon
to provide additional security, as the platoon's duties at the
time consisted only of maintaining the Pegasus Observation Post
near the camp. Thus it was available for security duty, although
the Recce Platoon soldiers had no special expertise in this area.17
The task officially assigned by LCol Mathieu to Capt Rainville
was to provide additional security for the Engineers compound,
which Capt Rainville understood included the adjacent Helicopter
compound.18 Whether the Helicopter compound was included
in the task is somewhat unclear. Capt Mansfield testified that
he was never assigned responsibility for providing security for
the Helicopter compound by LCol Mathieu or Capt Kyle, and this
did not change after the loss of the fuel pump.19 Capt
Kyle assumed that the Helicopter compound was included in the
Engineers compound and so did not think it was necessary to mention
it.20 Sgt Groves, who was in charge of security for
the Engineers compound, stated that his men did not have official
responsibility for security in this area.21 WO Marsh
had the same view of this issue as Sgt Groves and Capt Mansfield-the
Engineers had informal responsibility for security of the Helicopter
compound, but this was technically not part of their compound
and was not the area of primary concern for them, and they did
not have someone specifically assigned to patrol in that area.22
When Capt Mansfield requested assistance with the security of
his compound, then, he was not thinking primarily in terms of
the Helicopter compound; he was concerned with the Engineers compound
where the nightly infiltrations were taking place. However, the
mission statement Capt Rainville passed along to his men was that
they were to apprehend anyone trying to infiltrate the Engineers
or the Helicopter compound. Capt Rainville stated in testimony
that he was simply refining the order he was given.23
There was no oversight of Capt Rainville with regard to his mission.
He was left to determine on his own how he would accomplish his
task. Capt Mansfield stated that once Capt Rainville had been
given the task, he was not going to micromanage him. Capt
Mansfield saw Capt Rainville as the expert in these matters and
was not about to tell him how to do his job, any more than he
would expect Capt Rainville to tell him how to build a bridge.24
This handsoff approach seems to have prevailed on the part
of LCol Mathieu and Capt Kyle as well.
Capt Rainville indicated that he reported to Capt Kyle before
proceeding with his task.25 Capt Kyle's view was that
it was up to Capt Rainville to decide how best to employ his soldiers
and that reporting back to Capt Kyle that the necessary coordination
had been done with other units and that Recce Platoon was ready
to perform its assigned task was routine; it did not have to involve
exhaustive detail.26 LCol Mathieu had essentially the
same view of this process; once he had given the task to Capt
Rainville, he trusted him to carry it out and did not feel the
need to keep close watch over his activities.27 However,
LCol Mathieu did say that he thought Capt Rainville should have
reported back to Capt Kyle with the details of his plan; if Capt
Kyle had any concerns he could then have reported them to LCol
Mathieu.28
It is clear that a full report of the mission plan and the method
of carrying it out was not given by Capt Rainville to either Capt
Kyle or LCol Mathieu, and in our view these details should have
been provided. Had this been done, the mission, in all likelihood,
would not have been carried out in the manner that Capt Rainville
directed, as according to LCol Mathieu, the role of the CARBG
was not to take prisoners.29
The mission, then, was technically a standing patrol to augment
the security of the Engineers compound, but Capt Rainville determined
this would be accomplished by apprehending infiltrators.30
The distinction between types of infiltrators would be drawn by
Capt Rainville.31 There was considerable testimony
to the effect that Capt Rainville's typical orders groups were
extremely detailed, to the point of being tedious for his men.32
This makes the complete absence of any instruction about how infiltrators
were to be captured quite puzzling. The members of the patrol
could provide no evidence that they were instructed in how to
effect capture of a thief or a saboteur;33 nor was
there any discussion of how the Rules of Engagement applied to
saboteurs.34 This is simply not consistent with Capt
Rainville's normal modus operandi.
Capt Rainville stated that he made the distinction between thieves
and saboteurs during the orders group.35 The details
do not seem to have been clearly understood by the soldiers, however,
other than the fact that they had to fire a warning shot before
firing an aimed shot.36
Cpl Klick and Cpl King both maintained that the purpose of the
mission as explained to them at the orders group was to capture
saboteurs,37 but neither could explain why this was
not reflected in their earliest statements concerning the mission.
Cpl Favasoli has no memory of the use of the terms sabotage or
saboteur at any time during the orders group,38 and
Sgt Plante recalls no distinction being made between saboteurs
and thieves.39 Cpl Favasoli remembers that he did not
hear sabotage or saboteur in connection with the mission for a
particular reason: several weeks after the incident he received
a newspaper clipping from home in which Col Labbé was quoted
as mentioning sabotage, and Cpl Favasoli had not heard this before.40
Cpl Favasoli does recall, though, that Capt Rainville seemed clear
about the fact that they were to capture any infiltrators;41
this was echoed by Sgt Plante42 and the other members
of the patrol.
Patrol members all maintain that they were operating under the understanding that they were there to capture someone. However, they simply were not clear how this was to be accomplished, and in fact, nothing in the Rules of Engagement indicates how to effect such a capture.43 Cpl King maintains that his orders were to capture a Somali in condition to be interrogated, but he has no explanation for why the person they did capture was not interrogated;44 nor does Sgt Plante, who stated that they intended to interrogate prisoners to gain intelligence concerning sabotage.45 As for the mechanics of carrying out the assignment as it was understood, it was generally accepted among the soldiers that it was impossible to run down a fleeing Somali,46 yet there was no discussion or plan for effecting a capture.47 It seems clear that the only possible way to apprehend a Somali was by use of nonlethal force,48 but there is no provision in the Rules of Engagement for shooting to wound.49 In addition, Canadian soldiers are trained to shoot for the centre of visible mass, which further complicates the issue of how the members of the patrol were to accomplish their task of capturing Somali infiltrators.
Capt Rainville testified that LCol Mathieu gave the order that
before proceeding to deadly force as part of the graduated response,
the men were to shoot to wound if possible, and this is the instruction
he passed along to his men.50 This is likely the only
way a mission to capture a Somali saboteur or looter could have
been successful.51 There is no widespread agreement
on whether the individuals to be captured would have to be saboteurs,
or simply infiltrators; nor is there consensus on whether it was
permissible to shoot to wound. Capt Rainville testified that the
men had clear and unequivocal authorization from him at the orders
group to shoot to wound in order to effect a capture, but only
Sgt Plante understood that this was the case.52 This
may be why Sgt Plante is the only member of the patrol who equipped
himself with a 12gauge shotgun for the night's mission,
as this weapon is more suitable for nonlethal firing than
the C7 rifle. Capt Rainville maintained that he attempted to acquire
more shotguns for his troops but was unable to do so, despite
making the request up the chain of command.53 However,
this is difficult for us to accept at face value, as Sgt Groves
of the Field Squadron of Engineers held range practice with 12gauge
shotguns for the men in his Quick Reaction Force the afternoon
of March 4th to make them more familiar with the weapons.54
This would appear to have been an oversight in Capt Rainville's
planning, one that would have fatal consequences in the shooting
by Detachment 64A, discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.
There was obviously miscommunication about whether the focus of the mission was to be the Engineers compound, the Helicopter compound at the north end, or both. Cpl Favasoli thought that the focus of the mission was the Engineers compound, although they would have been concerned about the Helicopter compound as well.55 The deployment of the detachments clearly indicates that the focus of the mission was to the south, however, as the interlocking arcs of observation and fire all converged on the southern portion of the Engineers compound. This is also reflected in the orientation of the detachment positions. Capt Rainville and his sniper were facing to the south from their position inside the compound;56 all members of Detachment 63 were facing south, with their focus clearly on the Engineers compound;57 and the members of Detachment 64A were in a line facing northwest toward the southern part of the Engineers compound.58 (See Annexes D, E and F to this chapter.)
It does not seem to have occurred to anyone that infiltrators
might come from the north, and the Helicopter compound was not
discussed as a likely target for infiltrators.59 Cpl
King also conceded that the operation really covered only southwest,
south and southeast of the Engineers compound, because otherwise
there would have been a risk of shooting each other.60
Cpl Klick stated that the most likely avenue of approach to the
compound was from the south,61 but he admitted that
if the "saboteurs" had approached from any direction
other than the south, the positioning of at least the command
post/fire base in the truck inside the compound would have been
ineffective for all intents and purposes.62
Capt Rainville's view was that the north end of the Engineers
compound and the Helicopter compound were too wellguarded
by wire, by the Service Commando surveillance tower, and by the
Quick Reaction Force of the Engineers for infiltrators to get
in that way, so he oriented his men toward the most likely avenue
of approach, which was from the south,63 However, this
does not account for the fact that the main highway, just to the
north, remained essentially unguarded as an approach to the Helicopter
compound.
If Capt Rainville had wanted to make effective use of Cpl Klick's
talents as a sniper to counter possible sabotage by an organized
military opponent, he would have concealed him somewhere outside
the compound to cover the possible avenues of approach independently.64
As it was, Cpl Klick's only possible course of action in the event
of threatened sabotage would have been to shoot to kill, not to
apprehend as Capt Rainville intended. The normal escalation of
response under the Rules of Engagement would not have been possible.
Because of his positioning and employment in the mission, if Cpl
Klick had seen a hostile act, he would have had almost no other
option but to use deadly force.65 In fact, the chances
of the Recce patrol apprehending infiltrators inside the compound
without using their weapons was minimal, as no patrol members
were placed inside the compound where they would have had a chance
of apprehending someone.66
The way Capt Rainville deployed the three detachments effectively covered the specific purpose of engaging an infiltrator attempting to penetrate the south end of the Engineers compound.67 However, if we accept the stated goal of the mission as being to guard the Helicopter compound against sabotage and to capture infiltrators, the deployment of the Recce patrol is highly suspect.
This point was highlighted by the testimony of Maj Buonamici,
the Military Police investigator who subsequently investigated
the incident, who stated that the purpose of the mission is revealed
by the deployment of the soldiers. In his view there was clearly
no indication in the deployment of the Recce Platoon that night
that they were concerned at all about sabotage in the Helicopter
compound.68
There are further deficiencies in the deployment of the Recce
patrol if we accept that the purpose of the mission was to prevent
sabotage or to apprehend infiltrators. The division of responsibilities
between the Recce patrol and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of
the Engineers was totally illogical if we accept the version of
events given by patrol members. According to them, the Recce patrol
(located in the south part of the compound) would handle sabotage
(expected to happen in the north part of the compound) while the
QRF (located to the north of the compound) would be called in
to deal with thievery (anticipated to occur to the south where
supplies of food and water had been set out as bait),69
Would it not have been more logical for the Recce patrol either
to locate further north or to switch duties with the QRF? Locating
to the north part of the compound would also have offered the
opportunity to trap saboteurs effectively against the perimeter
wire.70
Sgt Groves of the QRF testified that his instructions were not
to enter the south part of the compound at all, but to patrol
to the north, including keeping the Helicopter compound under
observation and looking for thieves.71 Sgt Groves also
testified that he was unaware of any distinction between thieves
and saboteurs; he was simply told not to enter the south part
of the compound beyond the tent lines because, he understood,
the Recce patrol was there to guard against thieves and infiltrators.72
Capt Mansfield's testimony accorded with that of Sgt Groves in
this regard, in that he never heard about sabotage in connection
with March 4th until two weeks after the shootings.73
He testified that the response of the Recce Platoon to the security
problem was inappropriate to his needs.74 There had
never been any attempt at sabotage in his compound, and Capt Mansfield's
concern was theft.75
Nowhere in the testimony of members of the CARBG who were not
part of the Recce Platoon is there evidence of concern about sabotage.
There was a significant concern about theft, which Sgt Groves
said was almost epidemic.76 This view was echoed by
many of the nonRecce Platoon witnesses.77 Theft
was almost invariably petty theft of personal belongings, food
and water; there were no instances of weapons, ammunition or communications
equipment being stolen from the camp at Belet Huen.78
Thieves were caught on a regular basis; as many as 15 had been
caught around the end of February and the beginning of March 1993
at the Service Commando compound, before lights were installed.79
Sgt Groves indicated that he felt the Canadians were being laughed
at for not being able to put a halt to the nightly incursions,
but the Engineers had never shot at anyone.80 There
seemed to be no need to shoot at members of the local population
who might be involved in thievery, because they were not dangerous:
no Canadian troops had ever been injured by an intruder at the
Belet Huen camp. WO Ashman of the Unit Medical Services testified
that to his knowledge no Canadian troops at Belet Huen were treated
for wounds inflicted by a Somali during the whole deployment.81
Sgt Groves also testified that he was anxious about the mission
being conducted by the Recce Platoon because he felt that someone
would be shot that night.82 Further, in his testimony
Capt Mansfield was visibly distressed when he spoke about the
response of the Recce Platoon to the security problem, stating
that it was inappropriate and well beyond what the situation called
for.83
There were many possible methods of increasing security at the
Engineers compound. Capt Rainville chose to go about the task
by attempting to capture infiltrators rather than trying to deter
incursions.84 However, other security measures could
have been adopted that were much less aggressive, but offered
a fair chance of reducing or eliminating the problem of theft.
Capt Mansfield testified that the best way to stop incursions
would have been deterrence by way of increased defences.85
Capt Kyle agreed that more could have been done in the way of
deterrence through the use of paraflares, increased wire,
and lights.86 Capt Mansfield had the capability of
installing lights around the compound and erecting a lighting
tower to illuminate the southern end of his compound, as well
as fashioning a makeshift surveillance platform.87
WO Marsh indicated he had offered Capt Rainville four large spotlights
that would have lit the entire southern end of the compound, but
that Capt Rainville turned them down.88 Apparently
Capt Rainville wanted to avoid changing the appearance of the
compound and inhibiting the use of nightvision goggles,
to give him a greater chance of catching intruders.89
But if the Recce patrol had really been concerned about preventing
sabotage, why decline to erect a light tower or a watch tower
in the south end of the Engineers compound?90
Other possible security measures considered by Capt Mansfield
included bulldozing an area directly outside the wire,91
increasing the amount of patrolling inside and outside the wire
(which was already being done), and firing off paraflares
to scare off potential intruders.92
Providing greater illumination in the compound might have interfered with the use of night vision goggles by the Recce Platoon,93 but it is unlikely that potential thieves would have been inclined to approach a brightly lit compound in any event.94 This would seem to be borne out by the fact that a day or two after March 4th, the Engineers did erect a light tower and a surveillance tower under Capt Mansfield's orders, and thievery declined almost completely after that.95 Although in the minds of some, the shootings on March 4th may have contributed to deterring further looting, we are nonetheless satisfied that installing a light tower and a surveillance tower, along with increased foot patrols and firing off paraflares, would have provided more acceptable and lasting deterrence to infiltrators in the long run.
In our view trying to capture infiltrators was an unnecessarily and excessively aggressive measure. There is no evidence that infiltrators at the Engineers compound posed any great danger. (This point is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.) There is no indication of weapons ever being stolen from the Engineers,96 nor were there ever armed incursions into their compound. No Canadian Forces personnel were ever attacked or injured by intruders at the Engineers compound,97 In our view, nothing can justify the approach taken by the Recce Platoon on the night of March 4th. Potential intruders could simply have been deterred from attempting to enter the Engineers compound; it was completely unnecessary to capture them.
In our view, the mission conducted by the Reconnaissance Platoon
on the night of March 4th was a misguided attempt to send a clear,
strong message not to attempt to breach the Canadian wire. This
was also the goal Capt Hope described in his summary investigation
report, and he stated that it had been accomplished by the Recce
Platoon,98 This conclusion was shared by other soldiers.99
Some members of the Recce Platoon contended that the two men were
shot on the night of March 4, 1993 because the mission was to
apprehend infiltrators in an effort to prevent sabotage against
Canadian installations at Belet Huen. This explanation, in our
view, was concocted after the fact to disguise what would otherwise
have to have been considered an incident in which Canadian soldiers
acted in contravention of the Rules of Engagement by shooting
Somalis who were fleeing.
There is simply no objective evidence whatsoever to support the
sabotage theory, As we have seen, the assigned task was to provide
additional security for the Engineers compound. We have also seen
that Capt Rainville reinterpreted the mission as being to capture
infiltrators or "saboteurs". However, there are several
problems with the sabotage theory, and we discuss them under four
headings: the planning of the mission; the conduct of the mission;
the treatment of the captured Somali; and the earliest reports
dealing with the mission. From an examination of the relevant
testimony, it is clear that no saboteurs were apprehended on March
4, 1993; rather, the Recce patrol acted in an overly aggressive
manner, exceeding the boundaries of the Rules of Engagement and
shooting two Somalis who had already quite clearly ceased any
activity that could have been interpreted as hostile and were
fleeing the scene.
If the mission was designed to apprehend saboteurs, presumably
that would be reflected in the orders given to the Recce patrol.
Yet the members of the patrol were unable to produce any evidence
that they were instructed in how to effect capture of a saboteur,100
nor was there any discussion of how the Rules of Engagement applied
to saboteurs.101 Indeed, there was no plan for capturing
saboteurs;102 it was assumed that the soldiers would
simply react to the situation on the ground and somehow effect
capture.
The pretext provided for the fear of sabotage is not credible.
The theft of the fuel pump was the only evidence of sabotage produced,
and it is highly questionable. The 200pound fuel pump had
been completely unprotected by fencing or guards, and it was replaced
the next day.103 Further, there is no evidence that
the alleged theft was ever reported or was ever the subject of
an investigation. Had the fear of sabotage been genuine in relation
to the loss of the fuel pump, the Commanding Officer would have
been obliged under CFAO 223, Article 7a, to ask the Special
Investigations Unit to investigate the matter.104
A possible explanation for the disappearance of the fuel pump
is suggested by Capt Mansfield's action with regard to the light
tower which he had brought to the compound from the airfield without
authorization from CARBG HQ. According to Maj Buonamici, a former
infantry officer and former Formation Provost Marshall, theft
from one unit by another unit during multiunit or multinational
exercises occurs frequently. A possible explanation for what happened
to the fuel pump is that it was 'scrounged' or 'liberated' from
the CARBG by another unit with refuelling requirements.105
If sabotage had truly been the intent, the fuel pump could have
been destroyed, along with the 80,000 litres of fuel stored without
protection adjacent to the pump.106 In addition, there
is no evidence of sabotage of Canadian equipment at any time during
the deployment, let alone evidence of such acts by terrorists
or other militarily organized hostile forces. In particular, Capt
Mansfield had no reports of infiltrators attempting to sabotage
any of his equipment.107
The most likely target of any sabotage that might occur was the
Helicopter compound at the north end of the Engineers compound,108
or (less likely) the ammunition dump at its south end, which contained
confiscated unexploded ordinance slated for destruction.109
Thus, it is logical to suppose that the Recce patrol would be
set up in such a way as to offer maximum protection to the north
part of the Engineers compound; this would also offer the greatest
chance of catching a saboteur. However, the Recce patrol set up
to cover the south part of the compound, where boxes of food and
jerrycans of water had been placed, supposedly as a means of distinguishing
between thieves and saboteurs. But the bait was placed inside
a trailer within just 20 to 30 metres of the ammunition dump,110
making it next to impossible to determine which target a supposed
saboteur or thief had been attracted to (see Annexes B and C).
Accounts of how the mission was conducted are murky. Some elements
of what took place could conceivably apply to the scenario offered
by the sabotage theory, but other events do not support this.
Capt Rainville retained for himself the authority to distinguish
between potential thieves and saboteurs.111 However,
when Capt Rainville left the truck to approach the intruders he
gave Cpl Klick no instructions about whether they were thieves
or saboteurs.112 In fact, Cpl Klick admitted that he
was never told directly that the two Somalis were saboteurs; he
claims to have assumed that based on the fact that Capt Rainville
got out of the truck to go after them.113 Gpt Rainville
stated that he called Detachment 63 and instructed them to move
north to intercept the two Somalis while he approached them from
the other side. That way, they would be able to sandwich the Somalis
between them.114 However, none of the members of Detachment
63 can recall receiving this order from Capt Rainville.
There are also numerous contradictions and inconsistencies in
the testimony concerning the following series of events. When
Capt Rainville left the truck, he claims to have left his sniper
in place to cover his approach. However, Cpl Klick states clearly
that Capt Rainville did not ask Cpl Klick to cover him.115
Capt Rainville also maintains that the two Somalis conducted a
reconnaissance of the helipad compound for about 10 minutes. "116
Sgt Plante, who observed them continuously while they were supposedly
heading toward the Helicopter compound, did not see this 10minute
reconnaissance;117 nor did Cpl Klick or Cpl Favasoli.118
Cpl Klick's testimony agrees with the account in the log book
for that evening-that from the moment the two Somalis started
up the southwest side of the compound until the final shots
were fired, the total elapsed time was about five minutes.119
This would not have been nearly enough time to carry out a reconnaissance
of the Helicopter compound.
The viability of using a sandwich (or pincer) tactic to effect
capture of a saboteur or thief was also explored. Presumably,
this technique would have offered the greatest likelihood of capturing
an intruder.120 However, when questioned in detail
about this, Cpl King admitted that Detachment 63 was not well
positioned to sandwich intruders.121 Cpl Favasoli also
indicated that Detachments 63 and 64A were well positioned to
deal with intruders from the south,122 but it might
have been difficult to effect a sandwich manoeuvre. Sgt Plante,
who led Detachment 63, stated that it would not have been possible
to sandwich intruders at the Helicopter compound, as no one was
on the inside; instead they would have tried to funnel intruders
along the wire toward the other detachment.123 If the
intruders had fled toward the west, the patrol could have done
nothing about it.124 It was hoped that the patrol would
surprise them in the wire; the intruders would realize they were
caught and would give up.125 Cpl Roch Leclerc did not
envisage a sandwich tactic at all in his description of how an
intruder would be captured; the detachments all had separate areas
of responsibility that overlapped slightly, but Cpl Leclerc did
not speak of a sandwich or pincer manoeuvre.126 In
our view, the mission plan never included the capture of a Somali
unless the Somali gave up or was wounded and did not die.
The treatment of the captured Somali is incomprehensible if in
fact he was considered a saboteur. Cpl King was told to accompany
the wounded man, Mr. Abdi, to the medical compound for treatment
and to provide security while there.127 Yet, Cpl King
states that he was given no special instructions about how to
handle the suspected saboteur;128 did not turn him
over to anyone in particular;129 never informed anyone
at the hospital that Mr. Abdi was a suspected saboteur;130
that an American who spoke Somali came in without identifying
himself and interviewed the first suspected Somali saboteur ever
captured without any protest or argument from Cpl King;131
that Cpl King left the suspected saboteur wide awake and unguarded
in the medical compound;132 and that he was given no
instructions to interrogate the prisoner or indications that the
prisoner would be interrogated.133 Sgt Plante's recollection
of these points dovetails with Cpl King's, as they both accompanied
Mr. Abdi to the hospital, and neither took any special precautions
with the man they said was a suspected saboteur.134
Neither Sgt Plante nor Cpl King had any idea about what happened
to the prisoner,135 who was released from hospital
and never interrogated by Canadian intelligence.136
It strains belief to accept that Mr. Abdi would have been treated
this way if he had been a suspected saboteur. The behaviour of
Sgt Plante and Cpl King rings true only if Mr. Abdi was simply
a wounded man-perhaps a suspected thief-brought in for treatment.
Further, the fact that no weapons (other than a knife), explosives
or breaching devices were found on Mr. Abdi, and that he was wearing
a brightly coloured shirt, tends to refute the theory that he
was a saboteur.137
There is no mention of saboteurs in any of the written statements
produced for Capt Hope, who conducted the initial investigation
of the incident, and only Cpl Roch Leclerc mentions saboteurs
in his May 1993 interview with MWO Bernier of the Military Police.
All the others speak of "looters" or "thieves".138
The only soldiers who mention sabotage in their statements are
MCpl Countway and Cpl Leclerc,139 but they do not state
that the two men were saboteurs. Also, Cpl King's statement at
the general court martial of Capt Rainville mentioned setting
up an observation post in the Engineers compound and apprehending
thieves; no mention was made of saboteurs.140
This was consistent with the report made by Col Labbé to
NDHQ on March 23rd, which read in part as follows: The members
of reconnaissance platoon involved in the March 4th incident were
deployed as part of the normal nightly Canadian Airborne Regiment
Battle Group security plan to guard against looters. They were
properly briefed and prepared and had reviewed the approved Rules
of Engagement.141 At no time was the word saboteur
mentioned, and at no time did Capt Hope' s report on the incident
mention saboteurs, let alone that one had been captured.142
As Intelligence Officer of the CARBG, Capt Hope would have had
a great deal of interest in interrogating a captured saboteur
and would definitely have interviewed one.143 The fact
that he did not is highly significant, indicating that the men
were not seen as saboteurs at the time.
It is similarly difficult to believe that Capt Kyle would not
remember Capt Rainville reporting to Col Labbé and LCol
Mathieu in his afteraction debriefing that the two Somalis
shot were saboteurs, yet Capt Kyle testified that he remembers
Capt Rainville saying they were looters.144 He also
did not indicate in his Significant Incident Report that the Somalis
ever breached the wire, but rather that they were trying to break
into the Canadian compound.145 The first instance of
the word sabotage appearing in print with reference to the night
of March 4th was on March 5th, in LCol Mathieu's response to a
series of questions from NDHQ requesting information about the
shootings. LCol Mathieu stated that the Somalis were shot because
they attempted to gain access to the Helicopter compound, possibly
to commit an act of sabotage against the Black Hawk helicopters.146
Yet LCol Mathieu did not mention sabotage at his morning orders
group on March 5th as he might have been expected to do if sabotage
had been at issue.147
Several other points about the sabotage theory are also problematic.
The lack of curiosity and apparent nonchalance on the part of
the soldiers involved in the incident regarding what their comrades
had done is remarkable, given that this was supposedly the first
and only mission undertaken while in Somalia to capture saboteurs,
and they had actually captured one. Cpl Klick assumed that since
shots were fired, the members who fired must have followed the
Rules of Engagement, but he claims not to have inquired about
any details about the shots.148 Yet Cpl Klick presumed
to speak on behalf of patrol members on occasion, indicating that
he was quite interested in knowing their views on the events of
March 4th.149 Cpl King also stated that he asked questions
only to satisfy his curiosity about the events of the patrol.150He
did acquire a fairly detailed picture of events, however, as evidenced
by his first written statement to Capt Hope, and he never made
any mention of saboteurs.151 These and other inconsistencies
in the testimony and the lack of any objective evidence make it
impossible to put any credence in the sabotage theory.
If we accept the version of the events presented to Capt Hope
- that is, that the mission was to augment security by capturing
thievess--sthen the patrol members' evidence is consistent, and
the same understanding of the mission is reflected by Capt Mansfield,
Sgt Groves, and Col Labbé. If we accept the version of
events presented to us by the members of the patrol, the real
purpose of the mission as defined by Capt Rainville was not disclosed
up and down the chain of command; the setting out of supplies
as bait was not disclosed; the role of the Quick Reaction Force
of the Engineers in capturing thieves was not disclosed; the fact
that a saboteur was captured was not disclosed, nor was any information
gained from an interrogation of him disclosed.152 If
the mission was to capture saboteurs, then the testimonies are
inconsistent with each other and with the sabotage theory. In
our view, the evidence does not objectively support the sabotage
theory, and it is therefore not believable.
There was some discussion before us about the purpose of placing
food and water in a trailer at the south end of the Engineers
compound. There was also disagreement about who knew about this
tactic and who did not. Here we examine the legitimacy of the
tactic before determining who knew about it.
Most of the soldiers who were aware of the supplies being put
out testified that the supplies were there as a means of distinguishing
between simple thieves, who would be interested in the supplies,
and saboteurs, who would bypass them in favour of more significant
military targets such as the helicopters. This was Capt Rainville's
stated purpose for the ploy, which he referred to as a deception
plan; it was his own addition to the mission.153 The
only alternative view came from Sgt Plante, who said the supplies
would serve the purpose of attracting a thief already inside the
compound to a convenient location to be captured; they were not
intended, he said, to entice anyone outside the compound to enter.154
However, WO Marsh of the Engineers stated that this is exactly
the effect they would have had on any Somalis near the compound.155
Capt Rainville claimed that the supplies in the trailer constituted
a "deception plan", common under CF patrol doctrine156
and allowable under the Rules of Engagement.157 This
plan, he told us, would allow the Recce patrol to distinguish
between thieves and saboteurs and would provide a distinction
that would guide patrol members' response to the situation.158
There are several problems with this premise. First, this was
an environment in which food had been the cause of riots. Using
food to entice hungry people into a potentially dangerous situation159
would have been questionable in most circumstances and was simply
unacceptable here.
Further, the way the supplies were set out did not conform to
section 27(C) of the Rules of Engagement concerning the use of
military deception. The supplies were not placed so as to protect
against attack, nor were they placed in a way that would enhance
securitys--sin fact, they had the opposite effect, tempting intruders
to enter the compound. Nor did the supplies serve to deny hostile
forces the ability to track, locate or target Canadian or Coalition
forces.160At best, this tactic showed highly questionable
judgement. At worst, it was in direct contravention of the Rules
of Engagement.
Capt Mansfield was not aware of the "deception plan"
at the time,161 but he later saw this as a poor idea
that offered little or no deterrent value.162Capt Mansfield
stated that the effect of putting out the supplies was neutral
on potential intruders, because on the many other nights when
supplies were not put out, there were still incursions into the
Engineers compound.163 WO Marsh supervised the placing
of the ration boxes and water cans under Capt Rainville's direction,164
and although he did not necessarily agree with the tactic, he
was not about to tell Capt Rainville how to go about his business.165
Capt Rainville is not entirely sure whether he informed CARBG
HQ about the specifics of this tactic before the mission. He stated
that when he reported to the Operations Officer, Capt Kyle, he
sketched out the overall layout of the mission plan, including
the use of infrared chemical lights to mark positions and
the use of two layback detachments outside the wire, but
he was not sure whether he mentioned the "deception plan".166
Capt Kyle has no memory of hearing about it beforehand,167
and LCol Mathieu also states he was not informed of this element
of Capt Rainville's plan.168 This is highly significant,
not only for operational purposes, but also because it indicates
that this tactic was not cleared with the senior command of the
CARBG, breaking the loop of reporting and accountability that
should have been intact in the chain of command.
It was only after the shootings, when Capt Rainville debriefed
Col Labbé, LCol Mathieu, and Capt Kyle, that Capt Rainville
is sure he mentioned the deception plan.169 He states
further that he showed LCol Mathieu the location of the bait the
following day when they walked the ground where the shootings
had taken place.170 This is disputed by Col Labbé
and LCol Mathieu, who both state they were unaware of the existence
of the bait until well after redeployment to Canada.171
Clearly, the unease of the senior command with this tactic is
further evidence of its questionable legitimacy. In our view,
its only purpose was to entice Somalis into or near the Engineers
compound so that the Recce Platoon could engage them. As such,
the use of this tactic was deplorable; it cannot be justified
militarily, and it undermines the professional values and attitudes
of the Canadian military, The fact that Capt Rainville was allowed
to proceed in this manner is further evidence of the lack of adequate
command oversight with regard to this incident.
Along with the sabotage theory, the main justification for the
way the Recce Platoon reacted was what has been described as the
"military approach" of the two Somalis to the Engineers
compound and subsequently the Helicopter compound. Based on their
interpretation of the actions of the Somalis, the members of the
Recce Platoon judged that they were militarytrained, if
not soldiers or saboteurs; they therefore assumed a high state
of alertness. As we demonstrate, however, there was nothing in
the behaviour of the Somalis to suggest that they were anything
more than thieves exercising caution to avoid detection.172
Three characteristics of the incident led the Recce patrol members
to perceive what they called a military approach by the two men:
a "cloverleaf recce" of the south wire of the
Engineers compound; a "bounding overwatch" as they moved
outside the wire; and a "leopard crawl" approach to
the Helicopter compound. We examine the actions of Mr. Abdi and
Mr. Araush to determine whether they behaved, as contended, in
a military fashion.
From the point at which the two Somalis were first spotted by
Cpl Lalancette from the 1 Commando tower, he characterized their
progress as a normal walk toward the river along the path that
paralleled the east side of the Engineers perimeter.l73
Cpl Lalancette, who was not involved in the Recce Platoon operation
or in the shootings, had the two men under constant observation
through powerful night vision equipment, a night observation device
long range (NODLR). According to Cpl Lalancette's testimony, at
the halfway point of the east side of the Engineers perimeter,
the Somalis stopped and sat for up to a minute. They approached
the wire and touched it, then sat again for a couple of minutes.
Then they continued south. At the southeast corner of the
wire, they turned west.174 Cpl Lalancette asserted
firmly that he could see quite well and that there was nothing
to obstruct his view.
At the halfway point of the southern edge of the perimeter,
according to Cpl Lalancette, the two Somalis sat again for one
or two minutes. They touched the wire a second time, then moved
on, and he lost sight of them briefly. From his position, he thought
they had entered the compound when he spotted them again,175
but the evidence revealed that they had actually moved around
the southwest corner of the perimeter and begun to move
north. Throughout Cpl Lalancette's constant observation of the
two Somalis, their behaviour consisted of a normal walk, and their
approach had nothing military about it.
This description by an independent observer contrasts sharply
with that of the members of the Recce Platoon, particularly Cpl
Roch Leclerc, who was later involved in the shooting death of
one of the men. According to Cpl Leclerc, when the two Somalis
reached the southeast corner of the perimeter they began
to walk more cautiously, stopping at various points along the
south perimeter to talk to each other and point in various directions
inside the compound.176 It is this manner of approaching
the wire, then moving away to discuss what they saw, that patrol
members characterized in their testimony as a "cloverleaf
recce".177 In fact, it could very well have been
a simple case of thieves not being sure of how to proceed or where
the best place was to enter the compound. Indeed, none of the
patrol members used the term cloverleaf in their first statements
concerning the incident. Only MCpl Countway and Cpl Smetaniuk
referred to a recce in their original statements, and neither
used the term cloverleaf.178
Only when pressed were patrol members willing to admit that the
likely cause of the pointing and discussion between the two men
was the rations and water visible at the south end of the Engineers
compound.179 The reasoning of patrol members becomes
circular and selfserving on this issue as well: it was the
fact that the two men approached the compound at night that led
patrol members to believe that the Somalis were armed and dangerous;
they could not see why the Somalis would approach a military installation
if they were not armed.180
All the members of the patrol now refer to the approach using
the cloverleaf term, including Capt Rainville, who testified that
he used the term when he reported to LCol Mathieu and Col Labbé
the night of the incident. He could not explain, however, why
he had not used the term in his statement.181 Capt
Rainville wrote in his statement that they "walked along
the wire".182
MCpl Countway also referred to the supposed 'cloverleaf'
in his testimony, although he had said in his May 1993 interview
with MWO Bernier of the Military Police that the men were just
walking by.183 When pressed, MCpl Countway could not
state clearly what a thief would do that was different from what
he saw as a "cloverleaf recce".184
This is significant because, when interviewed by the Military
Police, MCpl Countway characterized the mission as having to do
with stopping "burglars"; it was only after the general
court martial of Capt Rainville that MCpl Countway began to use
the terms cloverleaf and saboteurs.185
We do not believe that the two Somalis conducted a cloverleaf recce in the military sense that some members of the patrol now claim. The behaviour of Mr. Abdi and Mr. Aruush was, in our view, consistent with, at worst, the behaviour of thieves and did not indicate a serious threat, especially because, as we will see, they were not carrying firearms.
The second indication of militarytype behaviour that the
Somalis were said to have exhibited was proceeding in a "bounding
overwatch". This is the term Cpl Klick applied to the way
the two Somalis moved around the south wire of the perimeter.186
Significantly, he is the only one to use this term; in his statement
he referred instead to "monkeywalking" from bush
to bush.187 This is in sharp contrast with Cpl Lalancette's
description. When questioned about this in testimony, Cpl Klick
defined it as one man moving while the other one watched, or progressing
in a "leapfrog" manner. Even if it were true,
it would be simply another instance of applying a military term
to behaviour any thief would exhibit. Moving in this way would
have required no great degree of sophistication or military training
and was indistinguishable from what a thief would do. Yet this
was also taken to indicate military training and resulted in the
presumption that the Somalis were armed.188
The third element of the socalled military behaviour of
the Somalis was what Capt Rainville described as a "leopard
crawl" which they used in the final 100 metres of their approach
to the Helicopter compound.189 A "leopard crawl"
involves lying prone on the ground and moving on one's elbows
and knees, a technique Capt Rainville demonstrated during his
testimony. Like some of the other terms just discussed, this term
was used in Capt Rainville's testimony but did not appear in his
written statements directly after the incident. His statement
for Capt Hope indicates that they crawled190 but does
not mention a leopard crawl.
We see this as an obvious attempt to overemphasize the danger
posed by the Somalis, an attempt that is not supported by the
testimony of the soldiers under Capt Rainville's command. Cpl
Klick says the men did not crawl toward the Helicopter compound,
but rather moved rapidly once they left the southwest corner
of the Engineers perimeter.191 Cpl Klick's view of
their movements is supported by Sgt Plante, the only other member
of the patrol who says he saw the Somalis in this area. Sgt Plante
says they did not crawl the final 100 metres to the Helicopter
compound, but rather ran quite quickly.192 The testimony
of one other member of the patrol is significant and relevant
to this issue: Cpl Favasoli stated that he never saw the Somalis
pass the position of Detachment 63, crawling or otherwise; they
never went to the Helicopter compound.193 (This point
is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.)
Clearly, then, the attempts of Recce patrol members to characterize
the actions of the Somalis as a "military approach"
to the Engineers compound or the Helicopter compound simply do
not stand up to detailed scrutiny. There was nothing in the behaviour
of the two intruders to indicate that they might be other than
thieves. There is no credible evidence that they performed a "cloverleaf
recce", that they proceeded in a "bounding overwatch",
or that they moved in a "leopard crawl".
The Recce patrol members used military terms to describe the actions
of the two Somalis as a way of justifying their perception of
a threat, thus justifying the assumption that they were armed
and dangerous. There is nothing to indicate objectively that either
of the Somalis demonstrated any military training in their approach;
they merely exercised the caution one would expect of thieves
operating at night.
Image: The Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group camp at Belet Huen depicting the various compounds
Image: Computer generated scale diagram of the Field Squadron of Engineers compound and the Helicopter compound depicting the dimensions of the two compounds.
It is clear from the actions of the Recce patrol that evening
that the Somalis posed no threat to patrol members or to Canadian
installations. There is no other logical explanation for the manifest
lack of fear or caution displayed by Recce patrol members during
the mission. It is also clear from the instructions given by Capt
Rainville before the mission that no great danger was anticipated,
as there was no requirement for the soldiers to wear helmets or
protective vests.
Despite the fact that, to a man, patrol members maintained in
their answers to the supplementary questions194 that
they had reason to believe the Somalis might be armed, the incontrovertible
fact is that the Somalis had no weapons other than a ritual knife,
which was not removed from its sheath during the entire incident.
This fact was evident to the Recce Platoon, as the Somalis were
under constant observation from the moment they approached the
wire on the east side of the Engineers compound, and none of the
soldiers saw any weapons on either man.
The log entries show that Cpl Lalancette, the sentry in the 1
Commando tower, observed two Somalis walking along a path that
ran between the 1 Commando compound and the Engineers compound
at about 7:50 p.m. through his NODLR. Cpl Lalancette saw that
they were unarmed and reported their presence near the wire to
the Engineers,195 who passed the information along
to Capt Rainville.196 At this point, the observation
was picked up by the Recce patrol (see Annex G).
From the point at which the two Somalis passed the southeast
corner of the Engineers compound, Detachment 64A watched them
move slowly along the wire for approximately 10 to 15 minutes.
At no time did anyone in Detachment 64A see a weapon on either
man. Cpl Smetanink was the first member of Detachment 64A to spot
the Somalis as they approached the southeast corner of the
perimeter, and he stated that he saw no weapons.'97 Cpl Leclerc
stated that he could see the Somalis with the naked eye from 40
metres away and he saw no weapons.198 The same applies
to MCpl Countway, the commander of Detachment 64A, who also watched
the Somalis for 10 to 15 minutes and saw no weapons.199
Detachment 69 also had the Somalis under observation as they moved
along the southern edge of the perimeter. Once they reached the
southwest corner they were picked up visually by Detachment
63. The members of Detachment 63 also saw no weapons.200
This likely accounts for the almost complete lack of caution on
the part of the soldiers when they confronted the Somalis. Had
they thought they were facing armed saboteurs, they would undoubtedly
have conducted themselves much differently. For example, Cpl King
stated that he got up and left cover based solely on Sgt Plante's
words, "Get them". He had no other information; he apparently
saw nothing and simply assumed that the shot he heard must have
been a warning shot from Sgt Plante and that he was therefore
authorized to proceed quickly through the escalation of response
set out in the Rules of Engagement.201
Further evidence of the lack of threat lies in the actions of
Cpl King, who ran blindly after the Somalis in the dark after
shots were fired. He stated that this was somewhat foolish, because
they might have been armed, but that he had reacted on instinct.
It is more likely, however, that his reaction was based on the
fact that the Somalis were unarmed and posed no threat.202
Cpl King claimed that, as a general rule, he always assumed that
Somalis were armed. This was in keeping with the surprising standing
order to treat all Somali males over 14 years of age encountered
at night as armed.203 However, his behaviour on the
night of March 4th clearly contradicts his claim. It is difficult
to give any weight to Cpl King's assertion that he felt threatened,204
as he saw no weapons, and the man he shot at was running away
from him.
There are no instances in the statement of Cpl King that indicate
any confusion or fear during the events of March 4th, but he claims
to have experienced personal fear as a result of Sgt Plante firing
his shotgun.205 Yet he came charging out blindly from
his position and fired to wound, leaving the suspected saboteur
potentially able to return deadly fire.206 It is clear,
then, that Cpl King did not at any time feel threatened enough
to shoot to kill.207 The same can be said for Cpl Klick,
who stated that he had Mr. Aruush locked in his sights when he
paused at the southwest corner of the perimeter, but decided
not to shoot because he could see no weapons and could detect
no intent to throw a grenade or a molotov cocktail.208
This also accounts for the fact that Capt Rainville felt safe
enough to leave cover and run after the Somalis209
and to direct Sgt Plante, Cpl King and Cpl Favasoli to chase Mr.
Aruush while he remained alone with Mr. Abdi.210 Cpl
Favasoli admitted that he never really felt threatened, particularly
not after Mr. Abdi was wounded,211 and Sgt Plante also
admitted that he never felt threatened during the entire incident.212
He fired his weapon not out of fear but rather to complete his
mission of capturing an infiltrator.213
Detachment 63's use of bright white flashlights (instead of the
redfiltered flashlights common on military missions) indicates
that they were more interested in catching the Somalis than in
concealing their position.214 Cpl Favasoli also did
not feel much concern about the safety of Detachment 64A, as he
had seen no weapons on Mr. Arunsh or Mr. Abdi. As Mr. Arnush ran
toward Detachment 64A, Cpl Favasoli assumed they would have the
advantage over him.215
Capt Rainville seemed quite confident that Mr. Aruush posed no
danger to Detachment 64A, because he called out to them, "He's
yours", without mentioning that the man was armed or giving
any other such warning.216 It also did not occur to
Cpl Favasoli to warn Detachment 64A; he would have been surprised,
he said, if they did not know what was happening or could not
see Mr. Arunsh running toward them.217 Nor did the
members of Detachment 64A behave as if they perceived a threat
from the Somalis, as is clear from the actions of Cpl Smetaniuk,
who ran after Mr. Aruush without his weapon, even after Detachment
63 had already shot Mr. Abdi.218 The notion that a
trained soldier would leave cover and run blindly, without his
weapon, after an armed enemy is simply preposterous. The only
conclusion we can reach is that Mr. Aruush and Mr. Abdi posed
no threat whatsoever to Canadian troops or Canadian installations
at any time during the March 4th incident.
The question of whether Mr. Aruush and Mr. Abdi breached the wire
at the Helicopter compound is crucial to reaching an accurate
conclusion about Recce Platoon's justification for the shootings.
Capt Rainville and Sgt Plante maintain that Mr. Abdi and Mr. aruush
got into the wire at the Helicopter compound; this was the action
that was said to constitute a hostile act and therefore justified
an attempt to capture the men. We therefore need to determine
whether the evidence supports the contention of Capt Rainville
and Sgt Plante that the wire at the Helicopter compound was breached.
As the incident began, Detachment 63 was concealed behind a cistern
or well to the west of the Engineers compound (see Annex E). The
cistern was a rectangular concrete container, about four feet
wide by seven or eight feet long; it was located about 75 metres
due west of a temporary gate in the west perimeter of the Engineers
compound and more or less equidistant (110 to 140 metres) from
the southwest corner of the Engineers compound and the south
perimeter of the Helicopter compound.219
The three members of Detachment 63 were crouched behind the north
wall of the well, facing south, with Sgt Plante in the middle,
Cpl Favasoli to the east and Cpl King to the west.220
When Cpl Favasoli first spotted Mr. Abdi and Mr. Aruush, they
were about 100 to 200 metres to the southeast of the detachment
and were walking in a westerly or northwesterly direction, directly
toward their location.221
Cpl Favasoli observed the men through his nightvision goggles.222
Within two or three minutes, according to Cpl Favasoli, the men
had made their way in a casual, normal walk to within 20 to 25
metres of Detachment 63's position behind the well; they stopped
at a rockpile that lay between the well and the southwest
comer of the Engineers compound, at a distance Cpl Favasoli estimated
at 20 to 25 metres from the west perimeter of the compound.223
The two men sat down at the rockpile; they talked to each
other and gestured in the general direction of the compound.224
This testimony agrees with that of Cpl Klick, who also saw the
men squat down and observe the Engineers compound.225
(See Annex A.)
Cpl Klick, stationed inside the Engineers compound along with
Capt Rainville, saw the two Somalis to the south of the compound,
apparently arguing about and gesturing toward various parts of
the compound: one was apparently pointing to the food and water
containers that had been set out as bait; the others--swho appeared
to Cpl Klick to be in charges--sapparently rejected this idea and
pointed to the northwest, toward 2 Commando and the Helicopter
compound.226 Cpl Klick estimated that the two Somalis
remained at this location for between three and ten minutes.227
According to Cpl Klick, the man who seemed to be in charge prevailed;
Mr. Abdi and Mr. Aruush got up and moved away in a southwesterly
direction where they disappeared behind some shrubbery before
beginning to proceed northward.228 He then lost sight
of them for between 5 and 15 minutes, after which he saw them
near a mound of brush and rocks. He estimated that the mound was
30 to 50 metres southwest of the southwest corner
of the Engineers compound, although he conceded it could have
been 50 metres further north, in roughly the same location as
Cpl Favasoli put the rockpile.229 According to
Cpl Favasoli, at no time while he was observing them did the Somalis
appear to be trying to hide or conceal themselves.230
At this point, Sgt Plante called over the radio for radio silence.231
According to Cpl Favasoli, the two Somalis sat and talked on the
rockpile for about three minutes (this agrees with Cpl Klick's
recollection232), at which point Cpl Favasoli ducked
his head behind the well wall, having remembered that his lightcoloured
hat might be visible if the Somalis looked in that direction.233
Cpl Klick says he then saw the man who appeared to be in charge
take off his white shirt and wrap it around his waist.234
Cpl Favasoli stopped looking at the Somalis and focused instead
on Sgt Plante, who continued to observe them, and awaited a signal
from the sergeant.235 Cpl Favasoli estimates that he
remained in that position, with his head behind the wall of the
well looking at Sgt Plante, for about three minutes.236
During that time, according to Cpl Favasoli, Sgt Plante continued
to look to the south and did not turn to look west or north.237
Cpl Favasoli testified that he then heard Capt Rainville's voice
over the radio. He was concerned that the Somalis might hear the
radio communication, since as far as he knew they were only about
25 metres away, still at the rockpile. So he picked up the
radio and quietly gave a "63s--sWaits--sOut" signal, meaning
not to call that detachment.238 At that point, Sgt
Plante stood up, pointed his shotgun south, turned on the flashlight,
shouted "halt" a couple of times, then fired his shotgun.
After this initial shotgun blast and then, a few seconds later,
a second one, Cpl King also fired two shots from his C7. Sgt Plante
and Cpl King then went off in pursuit of the Somalis.239
The version of events just recounted differs sharply from the
version presented before us by Capt Rainville and Sgt Plante and,
in some ways, that of Cpl King. We therefore need to assess these
alternative versions and weigh them against that presented by
Cpl Favasoli. Sgt Plante agreed that the touching of the perimeter
wire by the Somalis would trigger the patrol to move in and apprehend
them.240 Sgt Plante recalls that when he first saw
the two men, they were about 75 metres away, near the southwest
corner of the Engineers compound.241 Like Cpl Favasoli,
Sgt Plante recalls that the men sat down at a point south of Detachment
63's location and about 50 metres from the west perimeter of the
Engineers compounds--salthough Sgt Plante does not recall the rockpile.242
Sgt Plante testified that the men got up and began to move north,
up the west side of the Engineers compound.243 As they
did so, according to Sgt Plante, they kept a constant distance
between them, walked in a bentover posture, hid behind bushes,
and stopped periodically to look carefully in all directions.244
This does not quite fit with Capt Rainville's testimony. Capt
Rainville recalled hearing Sgt Plante's call for radio silence
soon after the two Somalis rounded the southwest corner
of the Engineers compound. He saw them proceed north from the
southwest corner, stop and sit down on the rockpile.
They sat there for about ten minutes and were looking north, in
the direction of the Helicopter compound.
According to Capt Rainville, they then got up and moved north,
on all fours in a "leopard crawl", toward the Helicopter
compound, quickly covering the distance between the rockpile
and the Helicopter compound.245 As we have seen, however,
Mr. Abdi and Mr. Aruush did not in fact move in a "leopard
crawl". According to Cpl Klick, as the two men moved north,
he lost sight of them when they were about parallel with the temporary
gate in the west perimeter and slightly north of the well, about
20 to 25 metres from the wire.246 When they began to
move north, Cpl Klick says he heard Sgt Plante's call for radio
silence.247 Cpl Klick estimated that it took the two
Somalis about five minutes to make their way from the mound off
the southwest corner of the perimeter to the point where
he lost sight of them near the temporary gate.248
As the Somalis moved north and approached the location of Detachment
63, Sgt Plante claimed that he moved his body so that he could
watch the east and the north; he told Cpl Favasoli and Cpl King
to keep quiet and shut off the radio, which he had already set
down.249 Then he maintains that he told Cpl Favasoli
and Cpl King to hide, leaving him as the only one following the
movements of the Somalis. Sgt Plante did not think it was important
to tell his two subordinates that the Somalis were moving past
their location and to the norths--sthat is, behind their position.250
When confronted with Cpl Favasoli's testimony that he was watching
Sgt Plante and never saw him look in any direction other than
south, Sgt Plante answered, unconvincingly, that he could have
followed the Somalis with his eyes, without moving his body.251
Given the distance between the well and the Helicopter compound,
where Sgt Plante maintains the Somalis went, this is simply not
credible.
According to Sgt Plante, it took five minutes at most for the
two men to reach the Helicopter compound.252 He testified
that they moved quickly, but in his initial statement to Capt
Hope, he described their approach to the helicopters as very slow.253
He could not explain the contradiction. He did not recall seeing
them crawling during their approach to the Helicopter compound.254
Sgt Plante said that, on reaching the southern fence of the Helicopter
compound, one of the Somalis lay down while the other used a piece
of clothing or a towel to lift the wire.255 At this
point, Sgt Plante says, he told Cpl Favasoli and Cpl King to get
ready to move,256 but neither recalls hearing any instructions
from Sgt Plante. Sgt Plante does not recall whether he told his
men that the Somalis were in the wire.257 This is difficult
to believe, given that this was the event that was supposed to
trigger an attempt to apprehend an intruder.
Sgt Plante testified that he remained at the well during all of
this and did not have the detachment follow the Somalis because
he did not want to reveal his position to the Somalis.258
However, this explanation ignores the fact that Sgt Plante and
his detachment would have revealed their position simply by remaining
on the north side of the well. Sgt Plante himself says the Somalis
were looking around in all directions as they moved north. Again,
this explanation simply is not credible.
There are other fundamental problems with Sgt Plante's testimony
concerning what happened when the Somalis were, in his account,
at the wire. According to Sgt Plante, when the Somalis started
to penetrate the perimeter wire, he turned away briefly to get
ready to move in on them: he put down the radio handset and told
his men to get ready. He estimates that this took perhaps as long
as 15 seconds. In the meantime, he heard a sheetmetal sound
that caused him to look up; when he did so, he saw that the Somalis
were running back toward the south and had already covered half
the distance between the Helicopter compound and the well where
Detachment 63 was located.259
This sequence of events presumes several things that are impossible
to accept: that at the critical moment of the hostile act that
would have allowed the Recce Platoon to begin the escalation of
response, Sgt Plante took up to 15 seconds to remove the radio
handset (this would have taken no more than 1 or 2 seconds according
to Cpl Favasoli260); that Sgt Plante gave instructions
to his men, which they do not recall receiving; and that the 15
seconds or less when Sgt Plante says he looked away was sufficient
time for the Somalis to get out from under the wire and run at
least 100 metres. This is simply impossible.
Sgt Plante testified that he then moved out from behind the well,
to the east, to intercept the men. At the same time, he heard
Capt Rainville shout an order, but he did not understand it at
the time.261 Sgt Plante says that he then moved out
immediately and faced north to intercept the Somalis, but he had
taken only a few steps in an attempt to cut them off before realizing
that he would not be able to do so.262 He stopped,
gave a verbal warning, then fired warning shots toward the southeast.263
By that time, the Somalis were south of him. This means that they
had extracted themselves from the wire and run a distance of 175
metres from it, all within about 18 seconds. This would have been
physically impossible. It is quite likely that Sgt Plante could
not have caught the Somalis, but highly unlikely that he ever
faced north.
Cpl King, the third member of Detachment 63, was positioned near
the northwest corner of the well. He testified that he lay
prone behind the well, watching his arcs of fire to the southwest
and west of Detachment 63's position. Apart from Sgt Plante's
call for radio silence, he saw and heard nothing concerning the
two Somalis until Sgt Plante shouted "Get them" and
Detachment 63 engaged the Somalis as they fled south.264
Cpl King also asserted that if the Somalis had been running within
50 metres to the north of Detachment 63's position as claimed
he would have seen them.265
Capt Rainville's testimony differs on these events. According
to him, as the Somalis moved north to the Helicopter compound,
he radioed Detachment 63 and told them to follow the two men as
they moved north; he would do the same from inside the compound.
Capt Rainville acknowledged that no one at Detachment 63 recalled
receiving this communication. He testified that his plan was to
force the Somalis back from the Helicopter perimeter and toward
Detachment 63, which would apprehend them.266 However,
Detachment 63 was not where Capt Rainville thought it would be267
and was too close to his own location to make a sandwich manoeuvre
possible.
When the Somalis had almost reached the Helicopter compound perimeter,
Capt Rainville says he left the truck, telling Cpl Klick to cover
him.268 According to Capt Rainville, within two or
three minutes he had reached the southeast corner of the
Helicopter compound where it joined the west perimeter of the
Engineers compound. By then, he said, the Somalis were already
at the Helicopter compound perimeter wire and were attempting
to breach it; one was holding the wire with a piece of clothing
or cloth while the other tried to get through.269 However,
Capt Rainville is contradicted by Cpl Klick concerning this sequence
of events.
Shortly after he lost sight of the Somalis, Cpl Klick recalls
clearly that Capt Rainville left the truck and moved west toward
the western fence.270 Cpl Klick does not recall Capt
Rainville asking for cover when he left the truck, and Cpl Klick
did not cover him, maintaining his focus on his arcs of fire to
the south.271 According to Cpl Klick, there were no
radio communications between the time Sgt Plante called for radio
silence and when Capt Rainville left the truck, and both of Detachment
69's radios were left with Cpl Klick in the truck.272
Less than two minutes later, according to Cpl Klick, he heard
the rattle of concertina wire as Capt Rainville tried to open
the gate, almost due west of the truck. About 30 seconds later
Cpl Klick heard Capt Rainville shout "Get them". Cpl
Klick looked over at the gate again and saw that Capt Rainville
was gone.273 Ten to 15 seconds after hearing Capt Rainville
shout "Get them", Cpl Klick heard members of Detachment
63 shout "halt" in English, French and Somali. This
was followed immediately by gunfire.274
Capt Rainville said he did not hear the sheet metal sound that
Sgt Plante heard, nor did he hear any other loud noise that would
have alerted the Somalis to his approach; instead he said the
two men began to flee when they noticed him standing about 25
metres from them on the other side of the wire. Both parties ran
south, with Capt Rainville still inside the Engineers compound.
Capt Rainville says he shouted "Get them" a couple of
times during the pursuit and that he managed to get out of the
compound by jumping over the fence at the gate, where the wire
was only about one metre high. He heard the first gunfire from
Detachment 63 at about the moment he crossed over the fence.275
However, Cpl Klick estimated that the distance from the truck
to the west gate was 45 metres; a round trip north to the junction
of the Helicopter and Engineers compounds and back to the west
gate would have been more than 200 metres.276 Cpl Klick
estimated that about two minutes elapsed between the time Capt
Rainville left the truck and when he heard Capt Rainville shout
"Get them"; by his estimate, just five minutes elapsed
between the time the Somalis rounded the southwest corner
and began to move up the west side of the Engineers compound and
when the final shots from Detachment 64A were fired.277
This was clearly not enough time for Capt Rainville to move quietly
up to the Helicopter compound, then run back to the west gate,
shouting for Detachment 63 to "Get them".
The testimony of Cpl Lalancette, the sentry in the 1 Commando
tower, is relevant here. He was not involved in the shootings
and therefore has no interest in advancing a particular version
of events. Using the longrange night vision equipment, Cpl
Lalancette saw the Somalis move north from the southwest
corner of the Engineers compound. From his location he mistakenly
thought that the Somalis had breached the south perimeter of the
Engineers compound, so he conveyed this information by phone to
the 1 Commando command post. While he was still on the phone with
Cpl Noonan, the signaller on duty, he heard gunshots.278
Cpl Lalancette estimates that three to four minutes elapsed between
when he thought he saw the Somalis enter the compound and when
he saw a wounded man on the ground.279 This time frame
supports Cpl Favasoli's recollection but does not support Capt
Rainville's contention that the Somalis carried out a reconnaissance
of the Helicopter compound for 10 minutes before approaching it.
The 1 Commando logs bear out Cpl Lalancette's testimony concerning
the timing of events. Cpl Noonan logged in Cpl Lalancette's first
call advising of the presence of the Somalis, on the east side
of the Engineers compound heading south, at 20:00 hours (8:00
p.m.). He passed that information on to the Engineers squadron
command post at 20:02 hours. Cpl Lalancette's call advising that
the Somalis had penetrated the south end of the Engineers compound
came at 20:10 hours according to the log. Cpl Noonan passed this
on to the Engineers at 20:11 hours. Cpl Noonan noted in the 1
Commando log that he heard gunshots at 20:14 hours.280
One other element tends to refute the contention of Capt Rainville
and Sgt Plante that the Somalis got into the wire at the Helicopter
compound: the absence of any cuts or marks from razor wire on
either Mr. Abdi or Mr. aruush . When he saw the wounded man, Mr.
Abdi, after the shooting, Cpl Favasoli did not notice razor or
barbed wire cuts on his body.281 Likewise Sgt Groves,
commander of the Quick Reaction Force that night, did not see
cuts from razor wire or tears in the clothing of Mr. Aruush, the
man who died in the incident,282 nor did Cpl Mountain,
the medic who came to the scene with the ambulance.283
WO Ashman, a medical assistant at Unit Medical Services, where
the shooting victims were taken, saw no signs of fresh cuts from
razor or barbed wire on either man.284 The attending
surgeon, Maj Armstrong, also saw no evidence of fresh cuts on
either man.285 Moreover, the evidence of a variety
of witnesses indicates that both men were still wearing a shirt
of some sort at the time.286 According to WO Marsh,
no shirt or jacket was found near the Helicopter compound.287
If the Somalis were under the wire and had to exit hastily, as
claimed by Capt Rainville and Sgt Plante, the likelihood of fresh
razor wire cuts would be great. Yet no evidence was found of such
cuts.
Until he heard Capt Rainville's version of the incident at the
initial debriefing early the next morning, Cpl Favasoli had no
inkling that Mr. Abdi and Mr. Arunsh had done anything other than
sit on the rockpile.288 But even then, when Capt
Rainville said that the Somalis had approached the wire and were
trying to infiltrate the compound when they were challenged by
Sgt Plante, Cpl Favasoli assumed that he was referring to something
they had done at the south perimeter of the Engineers compound,
before he saw them walking toward the rockpile.289
Cpl Favasoli did not realize that anyone was suggesting that the
men had gone to the Helicopter compound until he saw a Canadian
newspaper clipping, received from home about a month later. At
that time, he simply dismissed the information as a mistake by
the media.290 It was not until he was interviewed by
counsel for this Inquiry, in February 1996, that Cpl Favasoli
realized that this was, in fact, Capt Rainville's version of events.291
Soon after the shootings, Cpl Favasoli had doubts about the patrol's
justification for using deadly force that night. He also felt
that he was expected to answer questions about the incident in
such a way as to allow for or support a justification of the shootings.292
In crossexamination, Cpl Favasoli acknowledged that it was
not easy for him to give his testimony, since it contradicted
that of Capt Rainville and Sgt Plante and tended to discredit
a key element in the attempt to justify the shootings.293
Cpl Favasoli also found it strange that neither Sgt Plante nor
Cpl King said or did anything at the time to indicate that the
Somalis had moved north behind them or were attempting to breach
the wire. After all, the plan was to catch infiltrators in the
wire.294 Moreover, one would have expected a warning
from Sgt Plante to stay still, or even perhaps to move to the
other side of the well, so as not to be detected by the Somalis
moving north, right past the location of Detachment 63, on their
way to the Helicopter compound.
Given the available evidences--sand, in particular, the various
contradictions in the evidences--swe do not find credible accounts
claiming that the two men who were shot on the night of March
4, 1993 attempted to breach the wire at the Helicopter compound.
As is apparent from the preceding review of the evidence, only
Capt Rainville and Sgt Plante claim to have seen Mr. Abdi and
Mr. Aruush approach the Helicopter compound. At the same time,
as the key instigators in the patrol's use of deadly force that
night, Capt Rainville and Sgt Plantes--sof all the members of the
Recce patrols--shad, and continue to have, the greatest personal
interest in trying to offer and strengthen a justification for
the shootings.
The physical evidence does not support their story, however. There
were no indications of razor cuts on either Mr. Abdi or Mr. Aruush.
Both men still had their shirts on, and no clothing or like material
was found near the Helicopter compound. If they removed clothing
for use in pushing aside the wire, what happened to this clothing?
If they did not, why did they have no cuts? The time frame suggested
by Capt Rainville and Sgt Plante is internally inconsistent, and
inconsistent with the testimony of Cpl Klick, Cpl Favasoli, Cpl
King, Cpl Lalancette, and Cpl Noonan and with the logs for that
night.
But it is the evidence of Cpl Favasoli, who was a member of Detachment
63 along with Sgt Plante and Cpl King, that casts some of the
greatest doubt on the statements that the Helicopter compound
wire was breached. Cpl Favasoli says that he never saw the two
Somalis move north of the rockpile, which lay to the southeast
of Detachment 63's location. Cpl Favasoli was supposed to monitor
the area east and south of the well, and he was observing the
Somalis closely until he ducked behind the well to avoid detection.
Sgt Plante remained peering over the top of the well.
From that point on, Cpl Favasoli kept his eyes on Sgt Plante,
waiting for a sign that the Somalis had moved to the wire and
were attempting to breach it, since that, by all accounts, would
be their cue to act. But the signal to move never came. Watching
Sgt Plante, it was Cpl Favasoli's impression that the Somalis
never moved from the rockpile before Sgt Plante, Cpl King
and/or Capt Rainville made their presence known.
Likewise, the evidence of Cpl Favasoli indicates that Sgt Plante
conveyed no indication, by words or actions, that the Somalis
were moving north toward the detachment's position. Cpl Kings--s
who was lying prone, watching the area west and southwest
of the wells--salso recalls no indication that the Somalis were
moving toward or past the detachment.
This is very puzzling, since the purpose of the mission was to
capture infiltrators, and the agreed strategy was to catch them
in the wire. One would have expected Detachment 63 to follow the
men if they intended to carry out the strategy. Capt Rainville
testified that he radioed Detachment 63 to follow the Somalis,
but no one at Detachment 63 heard such a message. Further, Cpl
Klick said there was no radio communication after Sgt Plante asked
for radio silence and before Capt Rainville left the truck, and
Capt Rainville left both radios in the truck with Cpl Klick.
Moreover, even if one accepted Sgt Plante's explanation that he
did not follow thé Somalis because he did not want to be
detected, how can one explain his complete failure to take even
the most basic and instinctive steps to stay hidden as the two
men moved north? If the Somalis moved north from the rockpile,
they would have been heading even closer to Detachment 63's location.
Once the Somalis were north of the well, there would have been
nothing to conceal Detachment 63.
Sgt Plante testified that he told Cpl Favasoli and Cpl King to
keep quiet and to hide. The evidence of Cpl Favasoli and Cpl King
contradicts this completely. Nor did Sgt Plante make any further
effort to conceal himself. If they preferred to stay concealed
instead of following the Somalis, another logical response might
have been to move around to the south side of the well. This was
not done either.
Failure to follow the Somalis if they were approaching the Helicopter
compound risked two unfavourable results: compromising the objective
of apprehending the infiltrators by being too far away when they
breached the wire; or, if the Somalis had in fact been saboteurs,
leaving the Helicopter compound vulnerable to attack. From where
they were, more than 100 metres away, Detachment 63 could not
have prevented at least one of the two Somalis from getting through
the wire or either of them from lobbing something like a grenade
over the wire. Yet some witnesses, including Sgt Plante, Capt
Rainville and Cpl Klick, claimed to believe that the way the Somalis
approached the Helicopter compound suggested military knowledge
or training.
Capt Rainville says he moved north, inside the Engineers compound,
to confront the Somalis; he radioed the information to Detachment
63 and told them to do the same. But no one at Detachment 63 recalls
hearing such a transmission. If Detachment 63 was supposed to
respond to an opportunity to catch infiltrators in the act, one
would have expected Capt Rainville to rebuke Sgt Plante. There
was no evidence to suggest that they were supposed to wait for
Capt Rainville's word before apprehending anyones--sonly before
shooting. But there was no rebuke; in fact Capt Rainville nominated
Sgt Plante for a citation following the mission of March 4th.295
No one saw Capt Rainville go north toward the Helicopter compound;
on the contrary, Cpl Klick's evidence is that Capt Rainville moved
directly west after leaving the truck and that less than two minutes
later, he heard the rattling of concertina wire as Capt Rainville
tried to leave the Engineers compound by the temporary gate in
the west fence. Coupled with Cpl Klick's testimony about the lack
of radio communication before Capt Rainville left the truck and
the fact that he left both radios in the truck, this tends to
suggest another more likely occurrence: Capt Rainville went straight
across the Engineers compound to the west gate area; he did not
take a rapid and unnoticed round trip of more than 200 metres
northwest from the gate to the junction of the Engineers
compound and the Helicopter compound and back.
The other question raised by Sgt Plante's evidence is how the
Somalis could possibly have passed by Detachment 63 if they were
running from the Helicopter compound perimeter. Sgt Plante claims
that he took his eyes off them for about 15 seconds as he prepared
to move. But Cpl Favasoli's evidence is that it only took a couple
of seconds to remove the radio handset and set it down.
It is difficult to believe that the Somalis could have extracted
themselves from the wire and run back, covering most of the distance
between the Helicopter compound and Detachment 63, before Sgt
Plante resumed his observation. It is also very hard to believe
that Sgt Plante would have taken his eyes off the Somalis for
as long as 15 seconds at that crucial moment. In addition, Cpl
Favasoli testified that Sgt Plante's body and his weapon were
pointed only south and southeast. This suggests that when
Sgt Plante first challenged the fleeing men, they were already
south of Detachment 63.
Three witnesses claim to have seen the Somalis move north from
the rockpile, but there are discrepancies in their descriptions
of how the Somalis moved. Sgt Plante said they were walking but
bent over, whereas Cpl Klick and Capt Rainville said they crawled
toward the Helicopter compound. In his statement to Capt Hope
the day after the shooting, Sgt Plante described the Somalis'
approach to the Helicopter compound as very slow. But in his testimony
before us, he indicated that the two men moved quickly. It bears
repeating that this claim of a military approach is contradicted
unequivocally by Cpl Favasoli and Cpl Lalancette.
Finally, from the fact that only a ritual knife was found on one
of the men, it seems clear that they were not saboteurs or military
personnel. The evidence shows clearly that the Somalis did not
attempt to breach the wire at the Helicopter compound and, indeed,
that they did not try to breach the wire at any other point before
being confronted by Capt Rainville and Detachment 63. The assertion
that they breached the wire of the Helicopter compound, thereby
committing a hostile act, is manifestly not borne out by the evidence.
The circumstances under which Detachment 63 made the decision
to shoot Mr. Abdi as he fled are key to understanding the March
4th incident, as this shooting set in motion the series of events
that led to the fatal shooting of Mr. Araush by Detachment 64A
a short time later. There is very little convergence in the testimony
of those involved in this shooting, and thus little consistency
in accounts of the events. What we must determine is which version
of events is most credible and what the significance of this shooting
was for the incident as a whole.
What we need to do, then, is to examine what led the members of
Detachment 63 to decide to apply maximum force and to determine
whether they were justified in doing so. We accomplish this by
examining the events as recounted by patrol members and determining
-as near as possibles--swhat exactly occurred. We then can determine
what conclusions Detachment 64A would have been able to draw from
the actions of Detachment 63.
We have seen that Captain Rainville instructed his men that the
object of the mission was to capture anyone who attempted to breach
the perimeter and to use whatever force was necessary to accomplish
the objective, including shooting at anyone fleeing. This directive
led to a heightened anticipation of conflict, as an attempt to
capture carried the likelihood of pursuit and physical contact.
The heightened state of readiness also led to a greater likelihood
of firearms being used; this was attested to by soldiers not involved
in the shooting, including Sgt Groves, Cpl Dostie and Cpl Chabot,
who all anticipated shooting when they learned that the Recce
patrol was going out that night.296
In the original plan for the mission, Detachment 63 was to have
been located 100 to 150 metres off the southwest corner
of the Engineers perimeter.297 However, Sgt Plante
determined that the best position for the detachment in terms
of available cover was behind the well, much further north of
the position planned by Capt Rainville.
Capt Rainville thought Detachment 63 was positioned in accordance
with his original plan, but he subsequently admitted in testimony
that they could well have taken another position without his knowing
about it,298 and this is indeed what happened. The
detachment took up a position at the well, which was generally
agreed ( in the testimony of detachment members as well as Capt
Mansfield and Capt Kyle) to be some 75 metres west of the Engineers
perimeter and 110 metres south of the Helicopter perimeter (see
Annex E).299 This put them slightly south and almost
directly west of the gate in the centre of the west side of the
Engineers perimeter, much closer to the location of Detachment
69, inside the perimeter, than Capt Rainville thought they would
be. This is significant, because when Capt Rainville claims that
he called for Detachment 63 to move north to sandwich the Somalis,
he believed they would come from the south as he approached from
the north. What actually happened, however, is that the Somalis
were just even with or slightly north of the location of Detachment
63, making a sandwich manoeuvre impossible.
When Mr. Abdi and Mr. Aruush rounded the southwest corner
of the Engineers perimeter, they were picked up by Detachments
63 and 69, who observed them as they stopped at a rockpile.
As with much of the testimony concerning the incident, the existence
and location of the rockpile are not agreed on. A rockpile
was created when the Canadians bulldozed the land to clear the
remains of an orphanage,300 and according to Sgt Groves
of the Field Squadron of Engineers, it was located 35 to 40 metres
from the gate and 75 to 80 metres from the southwest corner
of the compound.301 It was at the rockpile that
Sgt Groves conducted range practice with 12gauge shotguns
on the afternoon of March 4th.
Sgt Plante does not recall a rockpile.302 Cpl
King also does not remember seeing a rockpile,303
but this is because his area of responsibility was to the west
and southwest once Detachment 63 was set up behind the well.304
Cpl Favasoli recalls the rockpile quite clearly, as it was
one of two reference points he used to orient himself regarding
the location of Detachment 63.305 According to Cpl
Favasoli, the rockpile was within 20 to 25 metres of the
southwest corner of the Engineers perimeter and 20 to 25
metres south of the well.306 Cpl Klick agrees with
the general location as described by Cpl Favasoli, but puts it
perhaps 30 to 50 metres from the corner of the perimeter (see
Annex A).
We have concluded that the Somalis did not breach the wire at
the Helicopter compound, that they did not come anywhere close
to it, and that if they approached the wire anywhere, it was probably
very close to the gate.307 When the Somalis left the
rockpile and began to move north once again, they were quite
close to Detachment 63. Thus, when Capt Rainville radioed Detachment
63 to move north to intercept the intruders,308 Cpl
Favasoli quickly responded, "63s--sWaits--sOut", hoping
to avoid compromising their position.309 Cpl Favasoli's
quick response also explains why Sgt Plante has no memory of Capt
Rainville's instruction to move north; Sgt Plante was focused
on watching the Somalis, who were approaching his position.310
The testimony dealing with what caused the Somalis to flee is
complex and full of contradictions. This is the crux of the incident,
so we must determine what the Somalis were doing when they were
challenged by the Recce patrol, and we must determine what the
Recce patrol did when they challenged the Somalis. There are essentially
four relevant versions of this series of events, and we must sort
them out to come to a conclusion about which of them is valid.
According to Capt Rainville, he dismounted from the truck and
approached the Somalis as they headed toward the Helicopter compound;
it was his approach while they were attempting to penetrate the
wire that startled the Somalis and caused them to flee. He states
that as they began to flee, he gave a verbal warning and shouted
"Get them" to Detachment 63, then began his pursuit.311
Cpl Klick's version differs from Capt Rainville's, in that Cpl
Klick says the Somalis passed just north of the gate, then Capt
Rainville left the truck and went toward the gate, not the Helicopter
compound.312 Two minutes later, Cpl Klick heard a rattle
like the sound of concertina wire being dragged. He assumed Capt
Rainville had opened the gate to go after the Somalis. Then Cpl
Klick heard Capt Rainville shout "Get them", followed
closely by warnings in English, French and Somali from Detachment
63, followed by shots.313 What made the Somalis flee
in Cpl Klick's version was the dragging of the concertina wire
as Capt Rainville opened the gate.
This differs considerably from the version of Sgt Plante, who
says he heard a sheetmetal noise, as if someone had stepped
on the hood of a truck314 (he would not have mistaken
this for the dragging of concertina wire315), and this
sound set in motion the series of events ending with the shooting.
However, Cpl Favasoli's recollection is that the radio call, which
came when the Somalis were within 20 to 25 metres of Detachment
63, may have startled the Somalis, because very soon after this
Sgt Plante stood up, shone a flashlight in their faces, and said
halt, twice, before firing a warning shot with his shotgun.316
When reminded of his interview with the Military Police on June
17, 1993, in which he said that a sound from the radio made the
Somalis run, and that this was also Cpl Favasoli's testimony,
Sgt Plante conceded that this was possible.317
Capt Rainville's order to "Get them" came, according
to Cpl Favasoli, after Sgt Plante and Cpl King fired warning shots
while the Somalis fled.318 Sgt Plante stated, though,
that he did not turn on his flashlight and give the verbal warning
until he heard Capt Rainville say "Get them"; otherwise
he would have let the Somalis go.319
There are problems with Sgt Plante's testimony, as we saw earlier
in our discussion of the alleged breach of the wire. It is difficult
to reconstruct the sequence of events from Sgt Plante's testimony,
because the Somalis clearly could not have passed him going north,
then started running to the south before he stepped up and shone
his flashlight. Sgt Plante's contentions--sthat while the Somalis
were running south from the Helicopter compound he set aside the
radio handset and told Cpl King and Cpl Favasoli to get ready320
- is not supported by the testimony of the two corporals.321
As for where Sgt Plante was aiming when he prepared to challenge
the Somalis, Cpl King testified that he was not watching, while
Cpl Favasoli testified that Sgt Plante never turned to the north
and that he heard Capt Rainville shout "Get them" only
after Sgt Plante and Cpl King had already fired warning shots
and were pursuing the Somalis, who continued to flee.322
Sgt Plante did not mention hearing "Get them" in his
statement to the Military Police, nor did he mention the sheet
metal noise or the bait.323
It seems clear to us that Sgt Plante acted on orders received
at the orders group and fired to prevent the escape of the Somalis,
not for any other reason. Cpl King simply followed his lead, while
Cpl Favasoli did not fire his weapon. Thus it was not because
of a sense of threat or a hostile act that Sgt Plante fired, but
rather to accomplish the mission of capturing the Somalis, as
he admitted in his testimony.324 Had he not fired,
they would most likely have escaped, resulting in the failure
of the mission.325
There is little dispute about what happened when Sgt Plante and
Cpl King fired their weapons, Cpl King missed, but Sgt Plante
hit Mr. Abdi in the buttocks and subsequently restrained him with
plastic cuffs. Capt Rainville joined Detachment 63 at the location
of Mr. Abdi. Cpl Favasoli then spotted Mr. Arnush with his nightvision
goggles and pointed him out to Sgt Plante and Cpl King, so that
they could attempt to apprehend him. There is disagreement on
whether Mr. Abdi was searched right away, as Capt Rainville insists
he was.326 All members of Detachment 63 state that
he was not searched until they returned to assist Capt Rainville
in subduing Mr. Abdi, who had begun to wriggle out of the plastic
cuffs.327 Cpl Favasoli, who confiscated a knife from
Mr. Abdi and kept it for two months (until asked for it by the
Military Police), stated that he removed the knife after Detachment
63 broke off the chase and returned to where Capt Rainville was
watching Mr. Abdi.328
Sgt Plante and Cpl King maintained the chase under Cpl Favasoli's
direction until Mr. Aruush ran into the area of responsibility
of Detachment 64A. The salient point here is that Detachment 63
gave up the chase not in resignation that Mr. Aruush would get
away, but because it was beyond doubt that Detachment 64A would
apprehend him with little or no trouble, as they could see Mr.
aruush running straight toward them. This is what Sgt Plante assumed,
based on the fact that his flashlight was on the whole time; he
therefore saw no need to warn Detachment 64A of Mr. aruush 's
approach.329 The same applies to Cpl Favasoli, who
said he had no difficulty seeing with the naked eye and would
have been astonished if Detachment 64A did not see Mr. aruush
running toward them.330
Two critical elements of the shooting by Detachment 63 established
the circumstances under which Mr. Aruush lost his life. First,
no hostile act precipitated the Canadian troops opening fire.
LCol Mathieu himself agreed that the Somalis should have been
allowed to continue to flee; if they had been allowed to flee,
the shootings would not have happened.331 Second, in
our view, it was the instruction, given during the Recce Platoon
orders group, that the purpose of the mission was to capture Somalis
who attempted to breach the perimeter, using whatever force was
necessary, that resulted in the shootings.
Significantly, we are satisfied that Mr. Abdi and Mr. Aruush did
not penetrate the wire at any of the Canadian compounds, nor,
we think, did they even get the opportunity to do so; they were
scared off before they had the chance. But having approached as
close as they did, the Canadian troops were not about to let them
get away, so Sgt Plante opened fire with the intent to wound and
subsequently capture. This decision heightened the state of readiness
of the men of Detachment 64A. The fact that they were not armed
with 12gauge shotguns made the death of Mr. Aruush more
likely.
The basic sequence of events leading to the death of Mr. Aruush
is not in dispute. After Mr. Abdi was wounded, Cpl Favasoli spotted
Mr. Aruush some distance southeast of their position and
directed Sgt Plante and Cpl King in pursuit of him. Mr. Aruush
fled in an easterly direction, toward Detachment 64A. At the midpoint
of the south wire of the Engineers compound, Detachment 63 discontinued
the chase when they saw that Mr. Aruush had entered Detachment
64A's area of responsibility. Capt Rainville warned Detachment
64A that Mr. Aruush was coming their way and that they should
"Get him". When Mr. Aruush was challenged orally by
Detachment 64A, he shifted direction, trying to veer away from
their position. Leaving his weapon behind, Cpl Smetaniuk ran out
after Mr. Arunsh. Cpl Roch Leclerc fired a single warning shot.
Then MCpl Countway and Cpl Leclerc dropped to their knees, and
each fired an aimed shot at Mr Aruush. The man went down with
the first volley but tried to get back up. Then MCpl Countway
and Cpl Leclerc fired a second volley, which killed Mr. Aruush.
Despite agreement on this basic sequence of events, other aspects
of the incident were the subject of conflicting evidence. There
are significant discrepancies and conflicts in the evidence concerning
the path of Mr. aruush 's flight from Detachment 63 and his attempted
flight from Detachment 64A. All members of Detachment 64A say
that Mr. aruush fled in a generally southeasterly direction,
starting out reasonably close to the southwest corner of
the Engineers compound and moving further from the wire as he
headed east. Sgt Plante and especially Cpl Klick recall Mr. Aruush
running closer to the south perimeter of the Engineers compound.
Cpl Klick testified that Mr. Aruush stopped about one or two metres
from the southwest comer of the wire to look back to where
Detachment 63 had gathered around Mr. Abdi. Cpl Klick thought
the man was running more or less parallel to the south wire and
about 20 metres away from it.332 Cpl Favasoli, however,
recalled sighting Mr. Aruush with his nightvision goggles
about 150 metres south of the Engineers compound, then later seeing
him further east and about 50 metres north, suggesting a northeasterly
path.333 (See Annex I.)
After Detachment 63 discontinued their pursuit of Mr. Aruush,
they turned back west to rejoin Capt Rainville, who had remained
with Mr. Abdi, so the members of Detachment 63 did not see what
Mr. Aruush did in response to Detachment 64A's challenge. All
three members of Detachment 64A, as well as Cpl Klick, testified
that they saw Mr. Aruush veer south in response to Detachment
64A's challenge. The only variation was in MCpl Countway's testimony.
He said that Mr. Aruush ran in a zigzag fashion, constantly
changing direction.334 All members of Detachment 64A
recall that Cpl Smetaniuk ran toward the south in his attempt
to intercept Mr. Aruush (see Annex K).
There is conflicting evidence about where Mr. Arunsh lay after
being shot. All members of the Recce patrol who saw the location
of the body recalled it being south or southeast of Detachment
64A's position. But other compelling evidence from nonRecce
patrol witnesses who were more familiar with that part of the
Canadian encampment indicated that Mr. Arunsh's body was located
north of Detachment 64A's reported location, much closer to the
southeast corner of the Engineers compound, and not more
than 30 metres southeast of the southeast corner of
the Engineers compound. (This point is discussed in greater detail
later in the chapter.)
Those involved in the shooting have offered various justifications
and excuses, as have their superiors in the chain of command on
their behalf. However, we believe that, like the shooting by Detachment
63, the evidence leads to the conclusion that the shooting of
Mr. Aruush was motivated purely by the goal of completing the
mission by preventing his escape, not by the need to respond to
a threat.
Further, LCol Mathieu admitted in his testimony that if the Recce
patrol had been adhering strictly to the Rules of Engagement,
the fact that the Somalis had not shot at patrol members should
have led Capt Rainville to tell Detachment 64A, "Let him
go", not "Get him".335
Capt Rainville admitted that, during his orders group, he had
told patrol members that they could use deadly force if necessary
to prevent an intruder from escaping. To Capt Rainville, shooting
to prevent flight amounted to the same thing as physically apprehending
someone.336 This guidance on the application of the
Rules of Engagement was understood clearly by patrol members.
This is demonstrated most clearly by the fact that they saw the
use of deadly force as necessary to prevent the Somalis escaping,
not because they felt threatened.337
The members of Detachment 64A heard yelling and then shooting
from Detachment 63.338 Cpl Leclerc claims to have heard
a radio message from Capt Rainville to Detachment 63 indicating
that the Somalis were trying to go under the wire,339
but Capt Rainville made no such transmission. When Capt Rainville
left the truck, he left the radio behind.340 MCpl Countway
testified that he believed that the Somalis had committed a hostile
act.341 But he has no credible explanation for this
belief other than the radio transmission referred to by Cpl Leclerc.
MCpl Countway also said he did not know who was shootings--sthe
Somalis, the Canadians, or boths--sand that this contributed to
a fear for Cpl Smetaniuk's safety as he ran out to intercept Mr.
Aruush.342 But this rationalization makes no sense
for a number of reasons.
Concern about Cpl Smetaniuk's safety was not mentioned by anyone
in their initial statements to Capt Hope.343 Further,
if the Somalis had been shooting, Cpl Klick would have engaged
Mr. Aruush as he fled through the sniper's arcs of fire. But Cpl
Klick did not engage Mr. Aruush, even though he knew he was heading
toward Detachment 64A's location, because he saw no evidence that
Mr. Aruush was preparing to use a weapon.344 Moreover,
all members of Detachment 64A agreed that they would have expected
Capt Rainville or Detachment 63 to radio them if the Somalis had
displayed or used weapons;345 indeed, any other expectation
is simply not believable.
Detachment 64A heard Capt Rainville shouting that the second Somali
was heading their way and that they should get him.346
Obviously, if Mr. Aruush had been armed, Capt Rainville would
have said so at this point. Moreover, Cpl Leclerc testified that
he took Capt Rainville's message to mean that they should intercept
the Somali, not kill him.347 This interpretation tends
to suggest a realization that the Somalis had not shot at anyone.
Had there been any significant doubt or concern at Detachment
64A about the threat posed by Mr. Aruush, they could have used
the radio to get more information, but they did not.348
Furthermore, by all accounts, Mr. Aruush immediately changed direction
and veered away from Detachment 64A in response to their challenge,349
which he would not have done if he intended to harm them.
The most telling indication that Detachment 64A did not fear return
fire from Mr. Aruush is that Cpl Smetaniuk took it upon himself,
or was ordered by MCpl Countway, to run after and intercept Mr.
Aruush.350 Cpl Smetaniuk left his weapon behind when
he did this, and no one told him to come back and get it or to
discontinue his efforts. No reprimand was ever given for Cpl Smetaniuk's
unarmed pursuit of Mr. Aruush.351
Even when MCpl Countway and Cpl Leclerc decided to shoot, neither
of them told Cpl Smetaniuk to cease his pursuit; Cpl Leclerc simply
told him that they were going to shoot.352 If there
had been any real concern that Mr. Aruush was armed, surely Cpl
Leclerc and/or MCpl Countway would have told Cpl Smetaniuk to
get down or come back, anticipating that Mr. Aruush might return
fire if they missed or merely wounded him. Clearly, the only concem
was Cpl Smetaniuk's safety in relation to shots from MCpl Countway
and Cpl Leclerc,353 and that was certainly Cpl Smetaniuk's
only fear at the time. Cpl Smetaniuk testified that he heard his
colleagues say something, then he heard a shot. He says he assumed
they were commencing the escalation pursuant to the Rules of Engagement,
so he dropped to the ground to get out of the way.354
Afterward, Cpl Smetaniuk was quite shaken by the events.355
Finally, there is the admitted fact, confirmed by the medical
evidence, that MCpl Countway and Cpl Leclerc shot Mr. Aruush in
the back as he was running away from their position. No logical
reason was given for the second, fatal volley of shots. MCpl Countway
and Cpl Leclerc admit that they did not feel threatened, that
Mr. aruush was just getting up and had not resumed his flight
or done anything else. No further warning was given before they
fired again. Cpl Leclerc testified that he fired the second time
out of reflex and that there was no threat.356 We believe
that it is clear, based on the sum of the evidence, that the members
of Detachment 64A who shot Mr. Aruush did so as a means of capturing
him rather than as a result of a perceived threat.
MCpl Countway and Cpl Leclerc say that Mr. Aruush began to get
up and had pulled himself into a runner's crouch when they dropped
to their knees and fired again. They say that they were about
50 metres from Mr. Aruush when they fired.357 The crucial
difference between the fate of Mr. Aruush and that of Mr. Abdi
was that Detachment 64A was armed only with C7 rifles, while Sgt
Plante had a 12gauge shotgun. When Sgt Plante opened fire,
the spray pattern of the shot resulted in the wounding of Mr.
Abdi, whereas the men in Detachment 64A had little option but
to fire at the centre of visible mass, as they had been trained
to do. Thus the chance that their shots would be fatal was much
greater than when Sgt Plante fired.
We heard evidence of statements by witnesses suggesting that when
Mr. Aruush was shot the second time, he was shot at close range.
Cpl Dostie and Cpl Martin Leclerc were in the Service Commando
observation tower at the time of the shooting. Cpl Martin Leclerc
was looking through nightvision goggles. According to Cpl Dostie,
after they heard the second volley of shots from Detachment 64A,
Cpl Martin Leclerc said to him that the soldiers had shot the
intruder at "point blank" range; to Cpl Dostie, this
meant five to ten feet.358
Cpl Martin Leclerc denied saying this to Cpl Dostie.359
However, Cpl Martin Leclerc apparently had difficulty remembering
a number of things about the incident, so we find it difficult
to believe that he could be so categorical about not telling Cpl
Dostie that the patrol members had shot Mr. aruush at "point
blank" range. Cpl Dostie, on the other hand, has nothing
to gain by lying about what Cpl Martin Leclerc said to him that
night, and Cpl Dostie did not volunteer to testify,360
which would suggest that he has no particular axe to grind.
Cpl Dostie's recollection is supported by Cpl Chabot. According
to Cpl Chabot, Cpl Roch Leclerc indicated to him that Mr. Aruush
was "close" when he was fatally shot; Cpl Chabot interpreted
this as anywhere between 10 and 25 metres.361 Cpl Roch
Leclerc admits that he told Cpl Chabot after the shooting that
he was "close" when he fired, but says that he considers
50 metres close range.362
The medical evidence is somewhat conflicting, particularly as
it relates to interpreting the more immediately fatal wounds to
the neck and head. Maj Armstrong was the surgeon on duty at the
Unit Medical Services, where both shooting victims were taken.
In the case of Mr. Aruush, Maj Armstrong noted a 2 by 3 centimetre
wound in the upper belly area with a significant amount of protruding
omentum (abdominal tissue). He also noted a large wound on the
left side of the neck and on the right side of the neck extending
into the right facial area. Smaller wounds were found in the back:
one (approximately 7 to 10 millimetres in diameter) was in the
central back area just to the right of the spine; another was
in the posterior shoulder area near the juncture of the left shoulder
blade and the collar bone. There was another small wound in the
middle of the anterior base of the neck363 (see Medical
Annex A).
As part of the Military Police investigation in April 1993, Dr.
James Ferris, then head of forensic pathology at Vancouver General
Hospital and a professor of forensic pathology at the University
of British Columbia, conducted an autopsy on Mr. Aruush. Although
there had been considerable decomposition of the remains by this
time, Dr. Ferris described the presence of wounds similar to those
described by Maj Armstrong.364 (See Medical Annex B.)
Both agree that the wound in the central back is an entrance wound
that connects with the abdominal wound and that Mr. Aruush was
therefore shot in the back at least once.365 However,
Dr. Ferris and Maj Armstrong otherwise tended to differ in their
interpretations of the wounds, especially in the hypotheses about
the shooting that each derived from interpreting the wounds.
Maj Armstrong's hypothesis was that the victim had been shot from
the back through the abdomen and was then finished off a few minutes
later by shots to the head and neck.366 Dr. Ferris
concluded that Mr. Aruush was hit with only two bullets, both
fired from the rear: one bullet that passed through the back and
abdomen in a slightly right to left trajectory; and a second,
which caused all remaining wounds, that passed from left to right,
through the left shoulder from the left rear and then through
the neck, exiting through the right side of the neck and face.367
This interpretation is basically consistent with the evidence
of MCpl Countway and Cpl Roch Leclerc. However, as Capt (N) Blair
of the Judge Advocate General's office wrote in a situation report
to senior management at NDHQ on May 6, 1993, the forensics and
ballistics team could not comment on the events of the night,
but could only issue very narrowly focused comments on the condition
of the body as they found it six weeks after the shooting.368
In effect, the fact that the remains were almost completely skeletonized
limits the usefulness of Dr. Ferris's conclusions, which means
that Maj Armstrong's hypothesis cannot be ruled out.
Maj Armstrong based his hypothesis on the following factors. He
thought that the amount of omentum protruding from the abdominal
wound suggested that the victim had been alive and breathing for
some minutes after the shooting. Maj Armstrong also believed that
the wound in the lower front of the neck (which is evident in
photographs taken the night of March 4th) was an entrance wound
associated with the exit wounds on the neck and head. He thought
that the angle thereby indicated for the fatal wounds suggested
that the victim had been lying on his back when he was shot, by
someone from the front, standing above the victim.369
Maj Armstrong found further support for his theory in the fact
that he saw no dirt on Mr. Aruush's face or on the protruding
omentum when he examined the body shortly after the shooting.370
Dr. Ferris, on the other hand, stated that, in his opinion, abdominal
contents can be extruded from a gunshot wound as a victim is dying
or even after death, so evidence of this would not necessarily
indicate that the victim had remained alive for two or three minutes
after sustaining the first wound. With respect to the wound near
the base of the front of the neck, Dr. Ferris believes that this
was caused by an exiting bullet or bone fragment.371
On May 7, 1993, a forensic team conference was held in Ottawa;
it concluded that the findings in Dr. Ferris's report were tenuous
except for those relating to the number and sequence of bullet
wounds.372 For this reason, we are not able either
to endorse or to rule out Maj Armstrong's hypothesis.
While Maj Armstrong had the advantage of examining the body right
after the shooting, Dr. Ferris is a more qualified expert and
was examining the remains for the express purpose of determining
the nature and the pattern of the wounds. The available medical
evidence is thus inconclusive on the question of the range at
which the immediately fatal wounds were inflicted. Nevertheless,
the statements of Cpl Martin Leclerc and Cpl Roch Leclerc, as
related by Cpl Dostie and Cpl Chabot, indicate that the shooters
were close enough to their target for this to be an aspect of
the incident they considered worth mentioning to others.
In our view, the evidence with regard to the circumstances of
the shooting by Detachment 64A leads to the conclusion that Mr.
aruush posed no threat and that detachment members fired only
to complete their mission. There was no danger to Cpl Smetaniuk,
other than the possibility of being shot accidentally by MCpl
Countway or Cpl Roch Leclerc. If there had been, he would never
have chased Mr. Arnush without a weapon. If the situation had
been genuinely dangerous, MCpl Countway would have ordered Cpl
Smetaniuk not to leave cover, or called him back shortly after
he ran out.
It is also clear that the men of Detachment 64A shot Mr. aruush
the second time from close range, likely from a maximum distance
of 50 metres. We cannot rule conclusively on the exact distance
because there was no physical evidence available for ballistics
experts to examine, and the body of Mr. Aruush, when examined
by Dr. Ferris, was decomposed beyond the point where determinations
of this nature could be made, What is clear, however, is that
the justifications provided for shooting Mr. Aruush do not stand
up to scrutiny.
There were significant discrepancies in the testimony regarding
the spot where Mr. Aruush fell after being fatally wounded.
Cpl Lalancette, who was following events from his position in
the 1 Commando Tower through a night observation device that picks
up heat emissions, estimated that Mr. Aruush was lying 10 to 15
metres from the southeast corner of the Engineers compound
perimeter.373
Sgt Groves, commanding the Quick Reaction Force, arrived on the
scene soon after the shooting in response to a request for assistance
from Capt Rainville.374 He placed the location of the
body at 15 to 20 metres south of the Engineers compound perimeter
wire.375
Cpl Mountain, the medic accompanying the ambulance, estimated
that Mr. Arunsh lay about 10 metres from the southeast corner
of the Engineers compound.376
The Recce patrol members who were on the scene all claim that
the body of Mr. Aruush was significantly further south than the
other witnesses estimated. Cpl Favasoli of Detachment 63, who
went to the scene of the second shooting after it was over, said
that the body was lying about 50 to 100 metres south of the Engineers
compound.377 Cpl Klick, the patrol's sniper, did not
actually see the body, but he recalls seeing the ambulance 50
to 100 metres south of the Engineers compound when it picked up
the body.378 The members of Detachment 64A and Capt
Rainville all claim that the body was further south still, between
100 and 175 metres southeast of the southeast corner of
the Engineers compound.379 Their average estimate was
about 145 metres (see Annex J).
There are also discrepancies in testimony about whether the body
was east or west of the southeast corner of the Engineers
compound. Sgt Groves, Cpl Klick and Cpl Favasoli indicated a location
west of the southeast corner, whereas the other witnesses
placed the spot east of that corner.380
WO Marsh inspected the area the morning after the shooting. During
this daylight inspection he found a bloodstained area of
sand about 25 to 35 metres southeast of the southeast
corner of the compound.381
Significantly, all Recce patrol members who testified about the
location of the body placed it in such a way as to indicate that
Mr. Aruush was south of Detachment 64A, so that MCpl Countway
and Cpl Roch Leclerc would have been firing away from the Canadian
compounds. The evidence of non-Recce patrol witnesses, however,
indicates a location that would have had them firing in a more
northerly direction, and thus more in the direction of the Canadian
compounds, based on their own evidence about Detachment 64A's
location.
The medical evidence is of some assistance in this matter and
contradicts the contentions of Detachment 64A members with respect
to the victim's location. It seems beyond dispute that, when he
was first shot, Mr. Aruush was, or had been, moving in an easterly
direction, away from the location where Mr. Abdi had been shot.
It is also beyond dispute that the first shot to hit Mr. Aruush
struck him in the area of the right rear flank and exited from
his left abdominal area. This basic trajectory is consistent in
the observations of Maj Armstrong, WO Ashman and Dr. Ferris. This
righttoleft/back-tofront trajectory tends to
indicates--sassuming that Mr. Aruush was facing east, as everyone
admitss--sthat Mr. Aruush was north and east of Detachment 64A
when first shot. This is the more likely location. Mr. Aruush
could also have been northwest of the shooters, provided
he was facing in a northerly direction. But he could not have
been south of them, running in a southeasterly direction,
as they claim.
The Recce patrol members, particularly those in Detachment 64A,
would have had an interest in concealing negligence (shooting
in the direction of the compounds) or concealing the fact that
Mr. Arnush had passed them and was moving away from their position
when they shot him. Any such motive would give them an interest
in establishing a location for Mr. Aruush's body well south of
the location suggested by the evidence of other witnesses.
By the same token, witnesses who were not part of the Recce patrol
had no conceivable stake in the location of the body. The evidence
of WO Marsh is particularly compelling. Following the shots fired
by Detachment 63, WO Marsh came out to the truck, where Cpl Klick
was still stationed, and saw flashlights converge near the southeast
corner of the Engineers compound. He later returned and inspected
the area in daylight and found the spot by locating blood stains
in the sand.382 He had no stake in how the shooting
occurred and was undoubtedly looking around to understand what
had happened the previous night and where. His estimated location
of the blood stains is very close to the location for the body
given by the other disinterested parties: the medic, Cpl Mountain,
and Cpl Lalancette. It is also in the vicinity of Sgt Groves'
estimate.
The conclusion we can draw, therefore, is that Mr. Arunsh's body
was located 20 to 35 metres from and south of the southeast
corner of the Engineers compound and that the shots from Detachment
64A were fired in the direction of the Canadian compounds.
As we have seen, several elements of the March 4th incident lead
to the conclusion that there was no real danger that night, and
no threat of sabotage; in fact security was a secondary concern
of the Recce patrol. This view is borne out by examining what
took place after the shootings. The evidence reveals a communications
gap among the patrol members that resulted in a breakdown in the
mission chain of command and in the Engineers and Helicopter compounds
being left unguarded for long periods during the night of March
4th.
From the events of that night, it appears that command in the
field changed hands, or should have changed hands, at least three
times. After the wounded man, Mr. Abdi, was taken to the hospital
in an ambulance by Sgt Plante and Cpl King between 20:20 hours
(8:20 p.m.) and 20:41 hours, Capt Rainville went with Cpl Favasoli
to the location of Mr. Arunsh's body. Capt Rainville then accompanied
the body to the hospital at 20:51 hours.383 At 21:13
hours he called for CWO Jackson and the U.S. interpreter to interview
Mr. Abdi.384
Sgt Plante and Detachment 63 reformed in the Service Commando
compound and resumed to their position at the well, some two hours
after leaving the field with Mr. Abdi.385 Capt Rainville
went to the Headquarters compound to provide a debriefing to Col
Labbé, LCol Mathieu, and Capt Kyle. Following this debriefing,
Capt Rainville called the members of Detachment 64A into the Engineers
compound to provide more information to CWO Jackson for his report
at 23:00 hours.386 This debriefing lasted approximately
30 minutes, after which Detachment 64A resumed to their position
in the field.387
There are several important points here. There was no communication
with regard to a change in command while Capt Rainville was out
of the field, or while Sgt Plante was at the hospital with Mr.
Abdi. Officially, command should have passed from Capt Rainville
to Sgt Plante to MCpl Countway, back to Sgt Plante, then back
to Capt Rainville. This did not occurs--sa fairly serious breakdown
in the chain of command. The result is that Capt Rainville retained
effective command of the mission while out of the field for at
least three hours and did not pass command to either of his subordinate
detachment commanders.
Further, the entire time that Detachment 63 was out of the field,
some two hours in total, the west side of the Engineers compound
and the south side of the Helicopter compound remained completely
undefended.388 The same can be said for the period
when Detachment 64A went to the Engineers compound to debrief
CWO Jackson: the entire east and south sides of the Engineers
compound remained undefended for the 60 to 90 minutes it took
Detachment 64A to go inside, make their report, and return to
their position.389
It is difficult to believe that if there had been any real danger
to the Engineers compound or the Helicopter compound, Capt Rainville
would have proceeded in this manner. The only conclusion we can
draw is that there was no real danger of any attack or sabotage
at the Engineers and Helicopter compounds that night, and that
the real priority was capturing intruders and reporting that fact
up the chain of command. Otherwise, precautions undoubtedly would
have been taken to establish effective command in the field and
to send replacement troops into the field while the detachments
were called away to accompany the prisoner or to report.
During our hearings we explored the rumour that Capt Rainville
had allegedly promised to buy a case of beer if the men shot a
Somali on the night of March 4th, to determine whether there was
any basis for it. Sgt Plante, Cpl Favasoli, Cpl Roch Leclerc,
and Cpl Smetaniuk of Recce Platoon recall hearing Capt Rainville
make a promise that the men would have beer after the mission;
this may have left the men with an inappropriate impression of
why they were on patrol that night.
There are discrepancies in the testimony about how the subject
was raised. Sgt Plante, Cpl Favasoli and Cpl Smetaniuk recall
Capt Rainville making the offer, but cannot say with certainty
exactly how the issue came up. Cpl Roch Leclerc and Capt Rainville
suggest that the comment he made was in response to a remark made
at the orders group preceding the mission. During the orders group,
Cpl Roch Leclerc heard Cpl Smetaniuk make a comment to the effect
that since they would be out all night, they would not be able
to have their allotment of beer for the day.390 Capt
Rainville testified that his response to this comment was what
prompted the rumour that he wanted a Somali shot that night. According
to Cpl Smetaniuk, Gpt Rainville said something to the effect that
if they had to shoot that night, he would buy a "6pack
for a wound, and a 24 for a kill".391 He accompanied
this comment, Cpl Favasoli said, with the observation that in
the event of danger that night, it would be "better to be
judged by 12 than carried by 6". The soldiers found this
remark offensive at first, but afterward Cpl Favasoli took it
to be an expression of gallows humour to the effect that if they
were able to cheat the grim reaper, that it would be cause for
celebration.392 Capt Rainville also indicated in his
testimony that he was much more comfortable appearing before us
to explain that sort of comment than he would have been writing
a letter home to the parents if any of his men had been killed.393
There is far from widespread agreement concerning exactly what
words Capt Rainville used that night, but there is general agreement
that the subject of having beer after the mission did come up,394
and Capt Rainville himself admits this. Capt Rainville stated
in his testimony that he made a flip remark in answer to another
soldier's remark that they would have a beer after the mission
(this would not have been abnormal), but he denies promising to
buy a case if they shot any Somalis.395
The significance of this issue is that the subject of having a
beer did come up between Capt Rainville and his men, and that
it was discussed inappropriately in the context of an orders group
before they went out on patrol. What was actually said is likely
never to be resolved. The case of beer comment may not have amounted
to an offer of a reward for the killing of a Somali. It may have
had no impact whatsoever on the subsequent events. However it
was meant, the comment was clearly inconsistent with respect for
the lawful conduct of operations, and it had the serious potential
to mislead impressionable soldiers.
killing of Mr. Aruush. Actions and inaction on the part of the
chain of command were designed to ensure that it maintained control
of information about the incident, to obscure the nature of the
incident, and to downplay its seriousness.
The belated and selfserving response of the chain of command
to the administrative, operational, and disciplinary problems
manifested in the March 4th incident was weak, inadequate and
ultimately unjustifiable. It also fell far short of the professionalism
and leadership that Canadian soldiers deserve and the Canadian
public expects. Integrity and courage were superseded by personal
and institutional selfinterest. It is our firm belief, based
on the evidence adduced before us, that the failure of the chain
of command immediately to address and remedy the problems revealed
by the March 4th incident possibly set the stage for the death
of Shidane Arone 12 days later.
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